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ABSTRACT
This thesis considers the pivotal role of the State in the process of agrarian 
change, through the analysis of a rural development project in North-East 
Brazil. The analytical model adopted here is the new institutionalism approach 
in development theory. New institutionalism emphasises the institutional 
context within which individuals preferences are determined. In development 
studies it argues that the capacity of the State to promote equitable 
development depends, not simply upon the utility maximising behaviour of 
actors, but also upon the nature of the States own institutions.
To illustrate this argument, this thesis takes as a case study the Integrated 
Rural Development Project in the Northern Agreste of Pernambuco state. This 
was one of 43 area-based projects of the larger Programme for the 
Development of the Integrated Areas of North-East Brazil (POLONORDESTE).
It was the major programme implemented by the Brazilian State, designed 
specifically to raise productivity and income of small farms in the region. This 
study provides historical information on the way the national and local political 
environment shapes the State's intervention and its role in agrarian 
development. In doing this, this study argues that to understand patterns of 
rural development, scholars should attach greater significance to the capacity 
for autonomous choice on the part of local level actors, both public and private, 
in shaping rural development policy.
The information on the policy process and the achievements of the project was 
provided by unstructured and semi structured interviews, participant observation 
and informal contacts at project management level and local level, the archival 
sources of the project and oral histories of participants. The material on 
household farms was provided by a panel study of 340 sampled farms located in 
six selected municipalities of the Northern Agreste, undertaken at the beginning 
and at the end of the project. This analysis examined some of the 
transformations taking place in the Northern Agreste farming activities under the
impact of State intervention and how the benefits of development policy were 
distributed among different classes of producers. It also examined economic and 
political interactions resulting from State action at local level. The limits and 
possibilities of peasants raising their standard of living are investigated, 
according to an analysis of their livelihood strategies and the support given by 
the project.
The main conclusion of this thesis is that integrated rural development projects 
could result in strong support for the small farm sector, especially for those 
groups of small farmers with a sufficient resource endowment, particularly land, 
enabling them to respond to incentives to increase their market surplus. The 
non-interference of the project in the structure of land-distribution, has left a 
large segment of the landless rural population and some smallholder farmers 
without sufficient or secure land, since these groups were excluded from the 
project’s agricultural components. For these peasants, the project led only to an 
increase in non-farm employment opportunities and access to collective goods 
provided to some villages. The State’s physical presence in rural areas, 
however, has pluralized power at local level, breaking the former fusion of 
wealth and power of the local landed elite. Thus, patronage was “democratised” 
at local level as public goods were diverted to favour some rural poor.
However, we cannot say that the project brought long term improvement to the 
small sector. When the money finished, the benefits ended. Furthermore, 
through the conferring of divisible and private benefits, the project served mainly 
to reinforce individual interests and allowed peasants to seek public policies as 
a matter of personal self-interest. Therefore, a malfunctioning system of State 
control, based in distant authority which does not take into consideration local 
conditions, may be worse in terms of resource management and project 
sustainability than a strategy which aims to improve local system of rules and 
collective organisation.
3
In memory of 
my Mother, Marina Ednea Barreto Monteiro (d. 1989), 
with all my love and devotion
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A thesis is a cumulative process and to accomplish this work would not have 
been possible without the support of many individuals and Institutions at different 
stages.
Acknowledgement is due to the Universidade Federal de Pernambuco (UFPE), 
for providing the opportunity which enabled me to do this course, and to CAPES 
(Coordenagao de Aperfeigoamento de Nivel Superior), which awarded me a 
scholarship allowing me to pursue my Ph.D. programme in England.
I am indebted to Dr. Ian Roxborough, who supervised the first half of my 
academic life at LSE, for his patient guidance and friendship during the making 
of my original proposal and the early stages of this thesis.
I am grateful to Dr. John Harriss, who supervised my work during my last two 
years at LSE, whose accurate critiques and updated knowledge helped me to 
define the main guidelines of the making of this work. I also thank him for his 
comments on an earlier version of the main chapters of this thesis.
I can not express my indebtedness in words to Dr. Anthony Hall who was my co­
supervisor during my years at LSE and who assumed the supervision of this 
work when I needed to came back to Brazil. He read and criticised accurately an 
early draft of this thesis and his valuable advice allowed me to prepare this final 
version of the thesis. More than that I thank him for his friendship and kind 
support throughout. Without his persistence and help it is unlikely that I would 
have been able to complete this thesis.
My thanks to all members of staff and colleagues of The London School of 
Economics and Political Science for providing an academic environment for 
discussion in a comradely atmosphere. I especially thank to Richard O'Reilly (in 
memory), from Computer Advisory at the LSE, who introduced me to SPSS in the
VAX and gave me important insights during the processing of my complex data 
set.
I thank Dr. Jose Graziano da Silva for his seminar in Agricultural Development in 
Brazil at the Institute of Latin American Studies which was of immeasurable 
relevance for making the bridge between theory and reality. I also thank him for 
comments on an early research project and for the stimulating atmosphere which 
existed among the student members of his seminar.
My special debt to Augusto Cesar Oliveira, Alfredo Soares and Herminio de 
Souza Ramos, from the Department of Economics of UFPE, my old colleagues 
and former coordinators of the POLONORDESTE/PIMES Evaluation Unit, who 
gave me access to the data collected in the evaluation surveys. They were also 
some of the my most important informants.
My thanks to many people who helped during my the complementary fieldwork in 
Recife and Northern Agreste. I thank in particular those in the PRORURAL, who 
facilitated my return to the municipios researched, who provided me with 
important information and gave me access to their archives and to the frames 
included in this thesis. Thanks to local rural extensionists from EMATER-PE, 
who helped me to localise the people interviewed in the panel study, and who 
gave me precious information which was fundamental to recovering the social 
history of the project and to my interpretations of the data. Last, but not least I 
thank my local informants, especially those household farmers who helped me to 
understand the difficulties and vicissitudes of peasant life.
More recently I owe much to my colleagues from the Department of Social 
Sciences at UFPE, whose friendship and encouragement was of great help to 
keep me on course. My special debt to my old friend Tercina Vergolino, who was 
with me in the POLONORDESTE/PIMES Evaluation Unit research team, and
6
nowadays is my colleague as a member of the Sociology academic staff at 
UFPE, who took her own time to discuss parts of this work.
My special thanks to Paulo da Fonte Filho, my oldest son, and Claudia da Fonte, 
my sister-in-law, who helped me in the organisation and tabulation of the data.
As one can see, the work force that I needed in this research, like in peasant 
households, was provided by members of my own family.
My thanks to all my friends who became part of my extended family in London, 
who at different stages shared with me the joys and the anguish of the making of 
this thesis. It was their friendship which enabled to overcome the "saudade" of 
my genuine family. I thank in particular Joseneide (Jo) and Derek Attreefor thei 
hospitality during my last stay in London.
I am specially moved by the kind assistance of all of my family. Through trials 
and tribulations they gave me the emotional support required to persevere. First 
an foremost I am very grateful to Antonio, my father, Paulo Filho, Ana Carolina 
and Pedro Henrique, my beloved children, whose encouragement and love have 
meant much to me. I also owe a debt to Paulo da Fonte for his help during my 
stays in London. Paulo, through his own work as an agronomist and a member 
of the Agricultural Planning staff at the Secretariat of Agriculture of the State of 
Pernambuco, has also contributed as an informal adviser of this thesis.
Finally, I thank Terry Mulhall, who was my colleague as a Ph.D. student at LSE, 
and who nowadays is Visitor Professor at the Programa de Pos-Graduagao em 
Sociologia (PPGS) at UFPE, who made editorial corrections and valuable 
comments on an early version of the first chapters and on the final version of this 
thesis.
7
CONTENTS
ABSTRACT......................................................................................................................2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................. 5
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION....................................................................................15
1. The Issues Under Study.............................................................................. 15
2. Structure of Chapters................................................................................... 24
CHAPTER II: THE STATE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT:
EXPLAINING PUBLIC POLICY CHOICES AND OUTCOMES.................. 27
1. Introduction....................................................................................................27
2. Theories of the State................................................................................... 29
2.1. Pluralism....................................................................................................29
2.2.Corporatis m.................................................................................................30
2.3.The Technocratic Approach...................................................................... 32
2.4 Class-Perspective Theories of the State................................................ 34
2.5 The Rational Choice Paradigm......................................  36
3. New Institutionalism: An Alternative Approach to the State and
the Third World Development........................................................................ 41
3.1. New Institutionalism and Rational Peasants: The State as
the Object of Peasants Politics ........................................................... 49
4. Conclusion..................................................................................................... 57
CHAPTER III: THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT.................................60
1. Introduction....................................................................................................60
2. The National Context: Transition to Democracy and Decline 
Bureaucracy Control Hegemony....................................................................61
3. The Regional Scene and Local Politics................................................... 77
4. Conclusion..................................................................................................... 89
CHAPTER IV: THE NORTHERN AGRESTE PROJECT: THE POLITICS OF
POLICYMAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION................................................. 92
1. Introduction..................................................................................................92
2. The POLONORDESTE: Conception, Objectives and Strategy.............94
3. The Northern Agreste Integrated Rural Development
Project: Planning in Practice..........................................................................104
8
3.1. Targets and Achievements by Component......................................... 115
4. Conclusion................................................................................................. 130
CHAPTER V: OUTCOMES: PROJECT IMPACT AT THE FARM LEVEL 137
1. Introduction.................................................................................................137
2. Changes in Sample of Farm Households: 1980-1985..........................139
2.1. The Distribution of Agricultural Capital................................................ 141
2.2. The Different Levels of Technology.....................................................150
2.3. Land Use and Agricultural Production................................................ 156
2.4. Market Orientation.................................................................................. 165
2.5. Households Class Status....................................................................... 174
4. Conclusion................................................................................................. 182
CHAPTER VI: PUBLIC POLICIES AND PRIVATE CHOICES: POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC INTERACTIONS AT LOCAL LEVEL........................... 186
1. Introduction..................................................................................................186
2. Public Policy: State Patronage and the Pluralization of Power............187
2.1. Employment............................................................................................ 188
2.2. State Visibility.......................................................................................... 190
2.3. Collective Action and The Trend Towards Privatism.........................192
3. Public Policy: The Economic Impact of State Patronage......................198
3.1. Technical Advice: Transformation of Technician into Broker.......... 199
3.2. Formal Credit and Risk Reduction....................................................... 203
3.3. Markets and Middlement........................................................................ 211
4. Private Choice: Household Survival Strategies....................................214
4.1. Strategies for Gaining and Maintaining Access to Land................... 214
4.1.1. Balancing of Inheritance and Purchase........................................... 215
4.1.2. Land Titling..........................................................................................218
4.1.3. Sharecropping and Tenancy.............................................................. 220
4.2. The Wage Labour Market:: An Income Defensive Strategy..............224
4.3. Migration: Defusing Demographic Pressure....................................... 230
4.4. Education, Social Mobility and Urbanisation......................................238
5. Conclusion...................................................................................................243
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS FROM THE NORTHERN
AGRESTE PROJECT.................................................................................... 251
1. Introduction..................................................................................................251
2. Policymaking and Implementation: The Institutional Environment
9
and the "Rules of the Game"....................................................................... 253
3. The Outcome: Private Solutions to Collective Problems.................... 258
3.1. Economic Outcomes: Some Consequences of Risk Aversion 258
3.2. Political Outcomes: Impact on Clientelism and Collective
Action................................................................................................................ 264
4. Lessons from the Northern Agreste Project: Political and Policy 
Implications...................................................................................................... 267
4.1. The Residual Problems: Efficiency and Sustainability...................... 267
4.2. A Missing Element: Beneficiary Participation...................................269
APPENDIX ONE: METHODOLOGY AND SOURCE OF DATA........................... 274
1. Introduction.................................................................................................274
2. The Panel Sample Data.............................................................................276
2.1. The Selection of Municipios...................................................................277
2.2. The Selection of Farms...........................................................................281
2.3. The Household Interviews..................................................................... 284
3.The Oral Histories........................................................................................286
ANNEX: List of Names and Some Characteristics of
People Interviewed...........................................................................  288
APPENDIX TWO: Questionnaires............................................................................293
BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................................................................325
10
LIST OF TABLES
Table IV. 1 - POLONORDESTE: Aims, Strategies, Areas and
Executors......................................................................................................... 94
Table IV.2 - IRDP-AS-PE: Projects Targets and
Accomplishments............................................................................................ 134
Table IV.3 - IRDP-AS-PE: Total Project Cost by
Component (US$ ’000).................................................................................136
Table V.1 - Northern Agreste: Distribution of Production 
Units by Size Category of Farms, (Turnover),
Panel Sample, 1980/85.................................................................................. 142
Table V.2 - Northern Agreste: Distribution of Production 
Units by Size Category of Farms and by Land
Operated among Households, Panel Sample, 1980/85..............................143
Table V.3 - Northern Agreste: Distribution of Properties
by Size Category of Farms and Landless Producers,
(Turnover), Panel Sample, 1980/85............................................................. 144
Table V.4 - Northern Agreste: Percentage of Production
Units that have Structures Incorporated into the Land
by Size Category of Farms, Panel Sample, 1980/85................................ 149
Table V.5 - Northern Agreste: Percentage of Production 
Units that have Access to Water, Electricity and 
Irrigation Systems by Size Category of Farms, Panel
Sample, 1980/85............................................................................................. 150
Table V.6 - Northern Agreste: Percentage of Production
Units Employing Tractors and Other Equipment by Size
Category of Farms, Panel Sample, 1980/85...............................................151
Table V.7 - Northern Agreste: Draft Animals and Cattle:
Inventory of Herds and Average Size of Herds by Size
Category of Farms, Panel Sample, 1980/85...............................................154
Table V.8 - Northern Agreste: Percentage of Production 
Units Employing Modern Inputs by Size Category of
Farms, Panel Sample, 1980/85....................................................................156
Table V.9 - Northern Agreste: Evolution in Land Use by
Size Category of Farms (row percent), Panel Sample,
11
1980/85.............................................................................................................158
Table V.10 - Change in Producer Prices for Farm Products
of the Agreste (1948/1950=100)...................................................................160
Table V.11 - Northern Agreste: Share of Each Category 
of Farm in the Production of Main Crops and Dairy
Products, Panel Data, 1980/85.....................................................................163
Table V.12 - Northern Agreste: Percentage of Production Sold 
of Food Crops by Size Category of Farms, Panel
Sample, 1980/85............................................................................................. 166
Table V.13 - Northern Agreste: Cropping: Value of Marketed 
Output by by Size Category of Farms (in US$),
Panel Sample, 1980........................................................................................169
Table V.14 - Northern Agreste: Cropping: Value of Marketed 
Output by Size Category of Farms (in US$),
Panel Sample, 1985........................................................................................170
Table V.15 - Northern Agreste: Livestock: Value of Marketed 
Output by Size Category of Farms (in US$),
Panel Sample, 1980/85.................................................................................. 173
Table V.16 -  Northern Agreste: Distribution of Farms by Size and 
Household class-status categories (row percent),
Panel Data, 1980/85........................................................................................179
Table VI. 1 - Northern Agreste: Access to POLONORDESTE's 
Services by Size Category of Farms (row percent),
Panel Sample, 1980/85.................................................................................. 191
Table VI.2 - Northern Agreste: Percentage of Farmers
as Members of Cooperatives, Panel Sample, 1980/85............................194
Table VI.3 - Northern Agreste: Percentage of Farmers 
as Members of Labour Unions, Panel Sample,
1980/85.............................................................................................................195
Table VI.4 - Northern Agreste:: Access to Technical Advice 
by Size Category of Farms (row percent), Panel
Sample, 1980/85............................................................................................200
Table VI.5 - Northern Agreste: Access to Credit and Source 
of Financial Capital by Size Category of Farms (row
percent), Panel Sample, 1980/85................................................................ 205
Table VI.6 -  Northern Agreste: Share of the Value of Loans
12
by Source and by Size Category of Farms (row
percent), Panel Sample, 1980/85................................................................206
Table VI.7 - Northern Agreste: Access to Land by Size 
Category of Farms (row percent), Panel Sample,
1980/85 216
Table VI.8 -  Northern agreste: Owners Who Had Title
of Land by Size Categories of Farms (row percent),
Panel Sample, 1980/85...................................................................................218
Table VI.9 - Northern Agreste: Composition of Production 
Units: Owned Land and Rented Land by Size
Category of Farms, Panel Sample, 1980/85.............................................. 222
Table VI. 10 - Northern Agreste: Amount of Land Leased Out 
and Number of Tenants, Sharecroppers, and Moradores
by Size Category of Farms, Panel Sample, 1980/85................................ 223
Table VI. 11 - Northern Agreste: Main Obligations of
Sharecroppers Towards the Landlord, Panel Sample,
1980/85............................................................................................................ 224
Table VI.12 - Northern Agreste: Composition of Agricultural 
Labour Force, by Type of Employement and Size
Category of Farms, Panel Sample, 1980/85.............................................. 227
Table VI. 13 - Northern Agreste: Resident Population 
According to Their Relationship to Head of 
Household and Age Group (column percent), Panel
Sample, 1985.................................................................................................231
Table VI. 14 - Northern Agreste: Migrants According to
Their Relationship to Head of Househould and Age
Group (column percent), Panel Data, 1985............................................ 232
Table VI. 15 - Northern Agreste: Reason for Migration by 
Size Category of Farms (column percent), Panel
Sample, 1985.................................................................................................235
Table VI. 16 - Northern Agreste: Direction of Migration 
by Reason for Migration (column percent), Panel
Sample, 1985......................................  235
Table VI. 17 - Northern Agreste: Migrants by Period of
Emigration an Size Category of Farms (row percent),
Panel Sample, 1985..................................................................................... 238
Table VI. 18 - Northern Agreste: Parents and Children’s
Educational Level (column percent), Panel Sample, 1985...................... 239
13
Table VI.19 - Northern Agreste: School Situation of
Children Between 7 and 14 Years Old (column percent),
Panel Sample, 1980/85.................................................................................242
Table 1.1 - Municipios selected by Production System and
Sub-regions.....................................................................................................281
Table 1.2 - Number of Householders sampled by
Municipios........................................................................................................ 283
Table 1.3 - Number of Householders sampled by Size
Categories of Farms...................................................................................... 284
.Table 1.4 - Number of Unstructured-Semistructured 
Interviews by Categories of People Interviewed
and Place (1991-92)...................................................................................... 287
LIST OF F IG U R E S
Map 1 - Programme for the Development of Integrated
Areas of the Northeast - Physical Location................................................... 17
Map 2 - Northern Agreste Rural Development Project
Area - Location................................................................................................. 22
Map 3 - Northeast Region - Special Programmes:
Locations of Project Areas...............................................................................97
Map 4 - Northern Agreste: Production Systems and
Municipios Selected....................................................................................... 280
Plate 1. A POLONORDESTE Health Post in a Northern Agreste
Village...............................................................................................................248
Plate 2. Supply of Water in a Northern Agreste
Village with POLONORDESTE Resources................................................248
Plate 3. A Small Dam Constructed with POLONORDESTE
Resources in the Northern Agreste............................................................. 249
Plate 4. A Feed Road Constructed with POLONORDESTE 
Resources Linking a Northern Agreste Village to the
Town Center....................................................................................................249
Plate 5. An Artisan Cooperative Assisted by POLONORDESTE
Resources in the Northern Agreste............................................................. 250
14
CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
1. The Issues Under Study
Despite conceptual and ideological controversies which surround the meanings 
of "development", the term "rural development" has emerged as "a distinct 
approach to interventions by the State in the economies of underdeveloped 
countries" (Harriss, 1982: 15; See also Lea and Chaudhri, 1986). It is defined by 
the World Bank as "a strategy designed to improve the economic and social life 
of a specific group of people - the rural poor". However, in a broad sense, it is 
clear that the World Bank and other international agencies are concerned "with 
the modernisation and monetisation of rural society, and with its transition from 
traditional isolation to integration with the national economy"; and that strategy to 
reduce rural poverty (avoiding the need for more fundamental restructuring of 
rural property relations) is "to increase production and raise productivity" (World 
Bank, 1975a:3).
The widespread efforts to "modernise" peasant agriculture - where the goals of 
production and income were considered to be synonymous - have been the 
subject of considerable debate. Some evaluations of "rural development" 
strategies have tended to emphasise the successes of modernisation efforts in 
terms of increased market production by peasant producers1 (World Bank, 
1975b) or the income gains that can be achieved from the modernisation of
1 The term "peasant" has been used classically "to refer to the many groups of people who their 
own land and tools and use their own and family labour, and who are members of 'part societies' 
defined by their subordinate relations to external markets, the state and the dominant culture" 
(see Harriss, 1982:21). Although departing somewhat from classic definitions, here I am using a 
definition of peasant as posed by Ellis (1989:12), in which peasants are understood as "farm 
households, with access to their means of livelihood in land, utilising mainly family labour in farm 
production, always located in a larger economic system, but fundamentally characterised by 
partial engagement in markets which tend to function with a high degree of imperfection." 
According to this definition, peasants cease to be peasants and became instead family farm 
enterprises when they became wholly committed to production in fully formed markets. The 
empirical evidence shows that “small farmers” (up to 50 ha) in the region are essentially family 
farms, in the sense of the definition above. For this reason I use here peasant and this term 
interchangeable.
peasant production (Reinhardt, 1987). Others have emphasised the negative 
consequences of these efforts in terms of increasing rural inequalities, reaching 
the few and producing new forms of exploitation (Feder, 1976; Payer, 1980; 
Stryker, 1979; De Janvry, 1981: 234-246; Grindle, 1986: 160-174). In these 
analyses of the mixed results of rural development programmes and the critiques 
of those programmes along equity lines, however, limited attention has been 
paid to the political aspects of the articulation of the State with the peasantry. 
There has been too little study of the way the national and local political 
environment shapes the State's intervention and its role in agrarian development 
and to the political consequences of these actions2.
In considering state patronage as central to understanding agrarian processes, 
the research tries to identify the State's role and limits in the management of 
reforms and how its policies are likely to influence changes in rural societies in a 
concrete situation analysis at a micro-regional level. It does this through a case 
study of the implementation and outcomes of the Integrated Rural Development 
Project in the Northern Agreste of Pernambuco state (IDRP-AS-PE). This was 
one of a larger Northeast Programme of 43 area-based projects implemented by 
the Programme for the Development of the Integrated Areas of (Brazilian) North- 
East (POLONORDESTE). It was one of ten first generation World Bank funded 
rural development projects in eight states of the North-East.
The POLONORDESTE was the major programme designed specifically to raise 
productivity and rural incomes, particularly for small producers in this region.
The area of the programme extended over 809 thousand squares Km, or the 
equivalent of 54 per cent of the Brazilian North-East (see map 1). Although 
POLONORDESTE is generally considered to have been more successful than 
previous efforts to help the small producer (World Bank, 1983; Ferreira, 1984; 
Tendler, 1988), precise quantitative information on POLONORDESTE's impact 
is not available due to the non-existence of a common evaluation system for the
2 In relation to the last point, Grindle is an exception.
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programme. Moreover, its multi-component and multi-sectorial approach, 
associated with the particular economic and political structures at state and 
municipal levels, made it difficult to ensure uniformity in its implementation and 
results, and each project had intermediaries and specific points which can only 
be understood by means of a case study.
The period under consideration is 1979-1985; the period of the implementation 
of the IDRP-AS-PE, our case study. The two decades, between the years' 64-84, 
represent a period of rapid development of the productive forces and changing 
production relations in agriculture. According to Ferreira (1984), this process in 
the North-East region has brought with it the modernisation of a predominantly 
peasant economy and their effective incorporation into a market or capitalist 
economy. He suggests that the development of the family labour farms and their 
strength as an economic "middle class", which has been facilitated by their 
increasing integration in commodity production, has been found in the majority of 
the areas of the North-East where State intervention was taking place.
In the early 1970s, government planners in Brazil began to call for a new 
approach to the problem of rural areas, orienting separate policies toward what 
they had defined as the modern and traditional sectors. With the re-emergence 
of urban food supply problems, family-labour farms, traditionally a significant 
source of marketed food surpluses, has became a more explicit target of 
modernisation policy. As pointed out by Goodman and Redclift (1981:148),
"Although couched In redlstributionlst rhetoric, efficiency criteria, particularly short-term 
output expansion, takes precedence at the level of policy implementation. This output 
response is achieved by measures which intensify the commoditization of small-scale 
production. They included subsidised institutional credit programmes which capitalise the 
means of production and so enhance the necessity of marketed surpluses. Indirect 
measures comprise rural infrastructural investment, especially roads, to bring the "target 
groups" into closer contact with modem marketing and distribution systems and long­
term credit programmes to attract processing firms to areas of small-scale agriculture."
This orientation, which has gained momentum since 1974, with special credit 
lines for small producers and, more ambitiously, "integrated rural development" 
programmes, is exemplified by the Programme for the Development of Integrated
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Areas of Northeast (POLONORDESTE). This concentrates federal resources in 
areas of small-scale agriculture selected for their "economic potential".
In fact, the rationale for the creation of the POLONORDESTE comes from the 
experience of integrated rural development in other Third World countries, rather 
than the experience of regional planning in Brazil. By the mid 1970s, in several 
Latin American countries, further efforts to redistribute land had become unlikely 
given the greater capacity of the State to respond to rural conflict and the growth in 
the economic and political importance of capitalist sector that had taken place. At 
the same time, a new consensus emerged among State elites that agriculture had 
become an impediment to national economic development and rapid 
industrialisation. Increasing concern was voiced over the national and international 
ramifications of lagging domestic food output, high rates of unemployment and 
underemployment, massive rural-to-urban migration, and a constricted internal 
market for domestic manufactures. Increased production of food thus became a 
major development priority during the 1970s and, as a consequence, rural 
development figured prominently in national plans (See Grindle, 1986, especially 
Chapters 4 and 5).
With the World Bank in the lead, this perspective was strongly supported by 
international lending agencies3, especially after 1973, when Robert MacNamara, 
president of the World Bank, indicated the priority that would be assigned to rural 
development by the Bank. In fact, by 1980, rural development had became the 
largest loan category of the Bank. Much of this money was directed toward 
integrated rural development programs.
Within the sphere of development policy making, many critiques of the agricultural 
sector argued that increases in the production of domestic food stuffs would follow 
upon the infusion of credit, infrastructure, technology, health care, education, and
3 The donor community rather than developing country governments played a decisive role in 
promoting integrated rural development (IRD) as an approach to rural development. Lending 
agencies like USAID, ODA (England) and GTZ (Germany) became advocates of IRD and were soon 
followed by other agencies.
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other amenities in poor rural areas. Poverty was blamed on subsistence peasants’ 
lack of access to productive resources and on unemployment or low-productive 
employment. As in Schultz's (1976) traditional agriculture, poverty was understood 
as a separate phenomenon from the functioning of the economic system and the 
poor are those who lag behind, who were by-passed by progress, and who 
remained at the margin of society. As a consequence, policy recommendations 
regarding poverty were directed by idealistic and humanitarian concerns and the 
policy implication was that the productivity of the poor should be increased (De 
Janvry, 1983:150).
The integrated approach to rural development is characterised by extensive 
infusions of development aid in rural areas in order to raise productivity among 
peasant farmers to address some of the more visible aspects of poverty and 
underdevelopment. The programme’s logic assumed that peasants would not be 
able to escape from centuries of poverty and exploitation unless they were supplied 
with access to credit, extension services, green revolution technology, water, roads, 
markets, health facilities, education for their children, and non-farm sources of rural 
employment.
Integrated rural development programmes were based on a dualistic perception of 
the agricultural economy, called by Grindle (1986:162) a "new dualism", which 
asserted that peasants and large farmers faced distinctive environments that 
presented them with distinctive incentives to produce particular kinds of crops and 
to adopt particular kinds of innovations. Accordingly, the rationale for productive 
activities differed between the two types of agriculture. Capitalist farmers produced 
for a market and were interested in maximising their long-range and absolute level 
of profits. Peasant producers sought to maximise short-range security needs and to 
provide for family subsistence. Both large-scale farmers and peasants were judged 
to act rationally, given the constraints they faced in achieving their basic priorities. 
The two sectors were seen as operating in relative isolation from each other, 
therefore distinct public policies had to be directed towards each sector of the 
agricultural economy. Thus, new programmes targeted at the rural poor had to be
added, while the State could continue to provide aid and subsidies to large-scale 
farmers.
This study, however, is not an attempt to evaluate the economic success or 
failure of "integrated rural development" strategies, nor their suitability or 
applicability for specific regions or other countries. Instead, our concern is to 
understand, through a case study of the policy process and outcomes of one of 
these projects for "rural development” and the "modernisation of small farms", 
how it was shaped by the pre-existing local and national political and institutional 
context and to examine some of its intended and unintended consequences. In 
explore these dimensions it is important to identify interfaces linking local-level 
institutional arrangements with the larger political-economic system. Thus, the 
analysis of the exercise of power at different levels of society emerged as a 
central element of our efforts to understand these connections and to account for 
the particular form of structural change which is taking place in the micro-region .
The Northern Agreste Integrated Rural Development Project (IRDP-AS-PE) 
included 36 municipios4 of two micro-regions of the "Agreste Pernambucano5":
19 municipalities of the Agreste Setentrional and 17 municipalities of the Vale do 
Ipojuca (see map 2). This area can be taken as a representative zone of food- 
producing small-scale agriculturalists of the Agreste. It illustrates regional 
diversity within the enormous variety of agrarian transition in Brazil under the 
impact of the more centralised economic policies in the post-64 strategies of 
modernisation implemented by the State.
This research is, thus, a theoretical and methodological attempt at bringing the 
State into the analysis of agrarian processes by looking at rural differentiation
4 Municipalities are units of local government with specific power and form. They are composed 
by the municipal sede (referred as "cidades") and their districts (subunits of counties called 
"vilas"). Only Brazil’s areas outside "cidades" and "vilas" are considered rural.
5 The Agreste is a transitional zone located between the Zona da Mata and the semi-arid Sertao 
and is characterised by diversity of landscape over short distances. It is almost the North-East in 
miniature, with very dry and very humid areas.
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within its specific historical context, and by highlighting "the profound political 
nature of the agrarian question" (White, 1989). Thus, in the sense in which it is 
understood here, bringing the State into the analysis of agrarian change is not 
considered to be simply a matter of how the State promotes efficiency or 
inefficiency in rural development. Rather, as Hart suggests (1989:48)
"it entails understanding how power struggles at different levels of society are connected
with one another and related to access to and control over resources and people".
The perspective of this study conceives the present situation of the Northern 
Agreste as an interplay between capital's imperatives and the livelihood 
imperatives of the small producers and landless workers running through 
Brazilian history. "This is not just to emphasise the resilience of peasant 
production", instead, "the emphasis is on seeing the outcome of these struggles 
between capital-and-livelihood-seeking as shaped by social and political forces, 
rather than economically determined", as Henfrey claims (1989:7) in his 
approach. This means that the nature of agrarian transitions, not only in Brazil, 
is open and dependent not just on peasant resilience, but on political responses 
to it.
The analytical approach adopted here is based on the new institutionalism 
approach in development theory whereby the State and its institutions are seen 
to play a pivotal role in determining the performance of the economy. New 
institutionalism is an appropriate complement to the neo-classic framework when 
evaluating the role of the State in developing countries because the institutional 
analysis seek to incorporate the historical context in which the State and its 
policies are situated. Rather than insisting on one identical projection for the 
economic role of the State in all developing countries, institutional analysis is 
sufficient flexible to admit of country specific institutional structures that can 
serve to make better the efficiency of the growth path. Its significance for the 
study of development is related with the fact that it claims to offer a theory of 
development in terms of appropriate institutional change.
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The new institutionalism is important in the context of economic policy in the 
1990s because it challenged the dynamic role ascribed to the market by the 
economic ortodoxies of the last ten years or so, introducing new justification for 
interventionist beliefs6. The reintroduction of structures and institutions to the 
debate helps to explain why an automatic presumption in favour of free market 
solutions may not be warranted. Markets themselves are institutions. The State 
is the primary agent of institutional intervention and it has the capacity to 
stabilise or transform institutions including markets. The State is also the body 
responsible for the enforcement and protection of all formal property rights. By 
virtue of the State’s role in specifying and enforcing formal rules, as North 
(1995) points out, "the nature of the State is bound to play a central role in 
determining the path of development”.
2. Structure of Chapters
Chapter II (The State and Rural Development: Explaining Public Policy Choices 
and Outcomes) will consider a number of approaches to explain policy choices 
and outcomes on State intervention, giving special attention to theoretical 
interpretations to the nature of the State. The focus on the character of the State 
aims to highlight an issue often neglected in the analysis of results of rural 
development policy, that is the State as a social phenomenon, and its role and 
limits in the management of reforms. This chapter will provide a broad theoretical 
framework for the empirical analysis, formulating the conceptual approach for 
the consideration of the articulation of the State and rural society and the 
multiple ways in which State action and societal demands and resistance shape 
and reshape one another.
The purpose in Chapter III (The National and Regional Context) is to describe 
the political and institutional context, at national and regional level, in which the
6 See Harriss, Hunter and Lewis (1995).
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POLONORDESTE and its integrated rural development projects took place. This 
chapter will present, firstly, a brief general account of economic and political 
changes in Brazil between 1964 and 1985; secondly, it introduces a brief 
historical analysis of State policies in the Brazilian North-East. The aim is to give 
an appreciation of the political and institutional constraints on political action and 
the importance of pre-existing institutional patterns in shaping the political 
behaviour of policy-makers and the policy process.
Chapter IV (The Northern Agreste Project: The Politics of Policy Making and 
Implementation) introduces a discussion on POLONORDESTE's conception, 
objectives, strategy, targets and achievements. It will also discuss the IRDP-AS- 
PE in the process of planning and implementation at state government and the 
political environment within which the local bureaucracy operates. The main 
focus here is: (i) to examine public policy-making - how decisions are made, the 
issues involved, and who influences them; (ii) to look at the policy- 
implementation process by examining the main instruments of implementation: 
the bureaucracy - its structure and performance; the allocation of resources; and 
what was in fact the policy implemented by the project.
Chapter V (Outcomes: Project Impact at the Farm Level) will introduce the area 
where the surveys were carried out and will investigate the nature and extent of 
short-term transformations taking place in the Northern Agreste farming activities 
under the impact of State policies. These changes will be examined mainly 
through information based on analysis of a "panel sample" of 340 household 
farms in the Northern Agreste of Pernambuco. It will try to outline systematically 
the principal trends observed in the different types of production organisation 
and household strata and to correlate the observed changes with the State 
action.
CHAPTER VI (Public Policies and Private Choices: Political and Economic 
Interactions at Local Level) will discuss, firstly, the extent to which the 
institutional framework provided by the State contributed for the relative
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performance among the categories of farms and in particular the improved 
situation of small farms. It discuss also the political consequences of the State 
action at local level. Secondly, through the analysis of household living 
strategies, it will explore how small farmers responded to the alternatives 
created by State intervention and sought to fulfil their desires for greater material 
well-being. Overall, there will be an attempt to identify the limits of the State in 
the implementation of reforms, and the capacity for autonomous choice on the 
part of local actors, both public and private. This study argues that to understand 
patterns of rural development, scholars should give greater weight to the 
importance of these choices in shaping the impact of State intervention upon the 
structure of local societies.
Chapter VII (Conclusions: Lessons from the Northern Agreste Project) will 
summarise findings and returns to the broader theoretical question raised here 
concerning the character of the State and its role and limits in the management 
of reforms. In this way, close attention must be given to how the pre-existing 
political and institutional environments shape the strategic political motivations 
of policy-makers and the policy process and to the importance of choices of local 
level actors in shaping rural development policy. I will discuss also the economic 
and political interactions in the main results of State interventions at local level 
and the long term limitations of the project approach for solving problems of 
peasant agriculture and rural poverty in the region. I will conclude this chapter by 
evaluating the relevance of the “new institutionalism” approach to studies of rural 
development and, finally, I draw out some of the policy implications of the 
perspective which I have employed.
Amongst the appendices there is an explanation of the methodological basis of 
this research. The appendix "Methodology and Source of Data" describes the 
methodological procedure followed in the collection of the field research date 
and the strategy used in the data analysis.
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CHAPTER II - THE STATE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT: 
EXPLAINING PUBLIC POLICY CHOICES AND OUTCOMES
1. Introduction
State policies are political projects; plans emerge from a highly complex 
bureaucratic and institutional context and their implementation is again a political 
process of some complexity. State policies aim to distribute the benefits in the 
form of resources, goods and services, or alternatively they selectively penalise, 
regulate, give permission or withdraw resources. Thus they have distributive or 
redistributive effects. But in order to understand this allocative process it is 
necessary to go be beyond the interests of those involved in influencing and 
formulating policy. It is important to distinguish between the top political 
leadership (State elite) which takes general political decisions, and the hierarchy 
of agents, the bureaucracy which is supposed to implement those decisions.
The act of implementation itself frequently transforms policy. For that reason it 
seems important to focus upon intervention ‘practices’ as they involve and are 
shaped by the struggles between the various participants, rather than simply on 
intervention ‘models’, by which we mean the ideal-typical constructions that 
planners, implementors or clients may have about the process. Therefore one 
must look closely at how policy is implemented and at how the relevant actors 
(both implementors and target and non-target groups) react to it. This study 
argues that to understand outcomes of development policies scholars should pay 
more attention to the capacity for autonomous choice on the part of local actors, 
both public and private and give greater weight to the importance of these 
choices in shaping the impact of external agents upon the structure of local 
societies.
A critical issue underpinning the policy-making process is the conception of the 
State. Theories of the State are enormously varied. For some the State, as an 
executive apparatus for decision making and control, has identifiable and 
concrete concerns about the definition and pursuit of national development
(Grindle, 1986), and "relative autonomy" to pursue policies that could engender 
economic growth, social stability (Skocpol, 1979; Nordlinger, 1981). For others 
(which includes Marxists and some Neoclassical Economists), the State is 
largely controlled by ruling classes or passively responds to rent-seeking 
behaviour of various interests groups and lobbies. For them, the main function of 
the State “is to extract income from the rest of the constituents in the interests of 
that group or class.” (North, 1981:22).
The issue of who controls1 the State has therefore emerged as a significant 
focus of discussion among those who recognise that the State “has a particular 
importance in setting and policing the rules of the game”, or “the institutional 
framework” in North’s (1995, 1981) sense. According to North’s (1981: 21) 
definition, “a State is an organisation with comparative advantage in violence”. 
Since “the essence of properties rights is the right to exclude”, an organisation 
with this characteristic “is in the position to specify and enforce property rights”. 
Given its role in specifying and enforcing formal rules and property rights, “the 
nature of the State is bound to play a central role in determining the path of 
development” (North, 1995)2.
This chapter will furnish a critical assessment of contrasting analytical 
approaches to understanding policy choices and outcomes on State intervention, 
giving special attention to theoretical interpretations of the nature of the State. 
After we have looked at different approaches to the State we will be in a better 
position to assess which State theory offers the best explanation for elucidating 
certain key theoretical problems on the determinants of State policies and the 
role of intervening agents in shaping the outcomes of State intervention. This 
discussion will provide a broad theoretical framework for the empirical analysis, 
formulating a conceptual approach for the consideration of the role and limits of
1 Our use of the concept of autonomy of the State relates to the degree to which the State is able 
to articulate policies that do not correspond to the interests of powerful economic and social 
groups in civil society.
2 The importance of coercion for the State was stressed by Max Weber who defined the State as 
an enduring set of executive and administrative organisation whose role is to control a given 
territory and to make authoritative decisions for society. Although the State, in a Weberian
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the State in the management of reforms and how its policies are likely influence 
changes in rural society. .
2. Theories of the State
2.1. Pluralism
Pluralist (or liberal) political theory is, in some sense, "the official ideology of 
capitalist democracies" (Carnoy 1984:10). Implicit in the analysis of the State is 
the pluralist view that the government intends to serve mass interests even if, in 
practice, it does not always do so. Government is the servant of the people 
placed there by the people to perform that function. For pluralists, the State is 
neutral, an "empty slate", and still a servant of the citizenry - of the electorate - 
but the common good is defined as a set of empirical decisions that do not 
necessarily reflect the will of the majority.
Pluralism views the modern State and bureaucracy as disjointed in structure and 
blundering in performance. The older version of pluralism holds that after 
modernisation in the West, and particularly in the twentieth century, political 
power has come to be increasingly fragmented and diffused. Absolutism marked 
the growth of centralised State power; however, the subsequent advent of 
democracies marked the reversal of this process. Accordingly, the contemporary 
Western and notably the American political system3 is seen as an intricate 
balance of power amongst overlapping economic, professional, religious, ethnic 
and other groups or associations. Each group is held to exercise a certain 
influence on the policy-making process, but none of them is seen as possessing 
a monopoly or decisive share of power, since the different groups all check and 
counterbalance each other. Thus, no distinct power elite is discernible and the
definition, is the institution with monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory (Weber, 1964:156), this difinition focuses on the means of the State, not its ends.
3 According to Dahl (1967, ch. 1), one of the most striking characteristics of the American 
political system is the extent to which authority is divided among a variety of independent actors. 
Many policy issues are placed in the hands of private or semi-public organisations.
29
i
government is increasingly subject to pressures from the various interests 
groups. ~
In the pluralist tradition, the fragmentation of society into competing groups is a 
political analogy to the competitive market-place in classical economics. Like the 
economic efficiency derived through an open and competitive market, the public 
interest is thought to be best served when policies emerge out of competition 
among large numbers of political interests (Dahl, 1967). Thus, the pressures of 
interest groups in the political process are evaluated positively: the political 
competition of interest groups served not only to protect, but actually to 
construct, the public interest.
The relative autonomy of the State is not an issue for pluralists. Not only is the 
initiative for policy linked to mobilisation of interests in society, but the source of 
policy change must be sought in changes of coalition of interests groups or in 
their relative power in bargaining, negotiating, marshalling votes, and otherwise 
influencing the policy makers. Many elements of pluralism have evidently been 
geared primarily to the analysis of the American political system, and if its 
analysis partially fits some Western European cases, this is more by chance 
than by design (See Etzioni-Halevy, 1985, ch. 9). This perspective may be 
particularly difficult to apply in the case of many peripheral countries, where 
votes and lobbying activities may not be useful for interpreting societal 
preferences, and interest groups may not be sufficiently well organised to put 
effective pressure on policy elites or may not have guaranteed access to them. 
This is especially the case of authoritarian States where the decision making 
process is not open to wide participation.
2.2. Corporatism
The development of corporatism in the twentieth century was related to its 
bifurcation into two types, according to the role and relative power of the State in 
relation to other organisations. According to Schmitter (1979) one type is that of 
State corporatism in which the State dominates the corporate groups by 
repressive imposition of authoritarian political forces (this exists mainly in fascist
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or other non-democratic regimes). The other type is that of societal corporatism, 
in which the dominant relationship is reversed and the corporate groups 
dominate the State (this exists in Western, capitalist, democratic countries).
The corporatists have something in common with the pluralists in their emphasis 
on the crucial importance of interest groups, and in their recognition that the 
modern State has had to adjust to substantive power centres outside itself. But 
the pluralist approach implies that multiple, voluntary, competitive, and self- 
propelled groups have a major impact on State policy, while the corporatist 
approach posits that only a limited number of non-competitive, hierarchically 
ordered and State-licensed groups have such impact (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983:64).
The concept of corporatism has been applied to a variety of Latin American 
regimes. Malloy interprets "authoritarian corporatists regimes ... as a response to 
a general crisis of public authority brought about by the multiple effects of 
delayed dependent development" in Latin America (Malloy, 1977:5). The 
resurgence of military rule in South America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Uruguay) in the 1960s, occurred in the context of the erosion of earlier 
expectations of the first two decades of the post-World War era that greater 
economic and social equality and a more democratic form of politics would 
emerge in Latin America4. They were ruled by the military as an institution, rather 
than exclusively by individual military rulers, which appeared to adopt a 
technocratic, bureaucratic approach to policy-making (as opposed to a more 
"political" approach through which policies are shaped by economic and political 
demands from different sectors of society, expressed through such channels as 
elections, legislatures, political parties, and labour unions). In the course of this 
reassessment, a new term came into use. This approach to policy-making has 
led scholars to call these regimes "bureaucratic-authoritarian"5. As a first 
approximation, this may be thought as a type of authoritarianism characterised 
by a self-avowedly technocratic, bureaucratic, non-personalistic approach to
4 For an analysis of these expectations see Packenham, 1973.
5 Examples of the initial use of this term are found in Stepan, 1973.
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policy-making and problem solving. Beyond this there is some variation among 
scholars6.
There are, at least, two central issues in the analysis of authoritarian regimes: 
firstly, their ability to instigate and direct social and economic changes that tend 
toward "modernisation" or development; secondly, their power and autonomy vis- 
a-vis different sectors of society and their potential for stabilising, 
institutionalising, and legitimating control. Theories of the corporatist State and, 
especially, of the bureaucratic-authoritarian State have dealt with both of these 
issues primarily in terms of the political and social processes accompanying 
accelerated industrialisation. The evidence of distortions and failures in the 
execution of development programmes can substantiate the argument that 
various theories of the authoritarian State may exaggerate both its development 
potential and its degree of autonomy from the dominant civil sectors. Moreover, 
the realisation that the "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regimes of the 1960s and 
1970s varied widely in their resorting to corporatist-type structures has led to 
some doubts about the usefulness of the concept in the contemporary context.
2.3. The Technocratic Approach
In the technocratic approach, decision makers are the focus of analysis for 
explaining policy outcomes. Executive and bureaucratic "players" compete over 
preferred solutions to particular policy problems and use the resources available 
to them through their positions (hierarchy, control over information, access to key 
decision makers, etc.) to achieve their goals. State policy is, thus, the result of 
competing activities among bureaucratic entities and actors constrained by their 
organisational roles and capacities. Their views on what policy should prevail 
are shaped by their position within government; that is, the issue position of each 
player is defined by the bureaucratic position he or she occupies, such that 
"where you stand depends on where you sit" (Allison, 19717:176)). In this model, 
the autonomy of decision makers in shaping and pursuing policy is potentially
6 See for example O'Donnell, Ch. 1 and 7;, Cardoso, Ch. 2;, and Collier, Ch. 9, in Collier (1979).
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very great. It is constrained only by the power and bargaining skills of other 
bureaucratic actors and by their own hierarchical position of power, their political 
skill, and the bureaucratic and personal resources available to them. From this 
perspective, policy clearly originates in the bureaucratic and policy-making 
apparatus, not in societal relationships of power and domination.
In this approach States are analytically separable from society and considered to 
have interests that they pursue8. At any particular moment, these State interests 
may or may not correspond to the interests of particular classes or groups in 
society. Although State action may lead to policies that favour particular societal 
groups, this does not necessarily imply that these groups imposed their 
preferences on the policy elites. Sometimes, in pursuit of its own interests, the 
State may adopt policies that may be detrimental to the interest of powerful 
societal groups. The capacity to do so successfully depends on the strength and 
autonomy of the State, factors that are recognised to vary across time and 
regimes (Migdal 1988, Skocpol 1985). The State is considered to be, thus, more 
than an arena for social conflict or an instrument of domination employed by the 
dominant class or class alliance. It is potentially a powerful actor in its own right. 
According to Skocpol (1979:27), the State is an institution with “a logic and 
interests of its own not necessarily equivalent to, or fused with the interests of 
the dominant class”.
In some ways, this approach is akin to the elitist model9 which holds that 
societies are divided into the few who rule and the many who are ruled. The first 
groups (the elites) effectively monopolise power and are able to enjoy its
7 As quoted in Grindle and Thomas (1991:29).
8 Interests of the State include, for instance, the maintenance of social peace, the pursuit of 
national development as defined by policy elites representing particular regimes, and the 
achievement and maintenance of its own hegemony vis-d-vis societal actors (Grindle, 1986, 
Stepan, 1978, Skocpol 1985).
9 This model of society was originally developed by Wilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca and Robert 
Michels. After the Second World War it was further elaborated by Wright Mills. Mills saw modem 
society dominated by power elites which manipulate the masses into accepting its rule. This elite 
consists of upper political, military and corporate economic personnel whose power is derived 
from their key position in their respective institutional structures (see Etzioni-Halevy, 1985 Ch.
4).
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advantages while the second group (the mass) is invariably in a dependent 
position, and has.no choice but to acquiesce in this arrangement. Most members 
of the elitist school are concerned with ruling elites or power elites in which 
bureaucratic-technocratic elites form only one of several powerful components. 
The technocratic view, however, is concerned specifically with the power of 
bureaucratic elites, and argues that they increasingly replace other elites in 
determining State policy.
When applied to the study of State intervention in rural development this 
approach seems to attribute considerable co-ordinating power to State 
bureaucracy. There is no appreciation of inter-agency conflict or of the struggles 
that take place between farmers’, organisations and government or private 
institutions. A related problem is the failure to locate the discussion within an 
analysis of existing power structures at either regional or national level.
The State centred approach, which conceptualises the State as an autonomous 
agent of social transformation, may be seen as a mirror image of the pluralist 
and Marxists view because each emphasises the elements of bureaucracy 
neglected by the other. While the pluralist and Marxists view has emphasised the 
fragmentation, vulnerability and responsiveness of the State bureaucracy, the 
technocratic approach has emphasised its concerted power and distance from 
public demands. State centred theorists talk about State objectives without 
relating them to the interests of particular social groups. In their attempt to rid 
State theory from economic reductionism or interests groups, theorist have gone 
to the other extreme detaching the State from any form of social determination.
2.4. Class-Perspective Theories of the State
Theories of the State rooted in a Marxist, class-perspective analysis differ 
fundamentally from liberal theories in that they posit a State that is an 
expression, or condensation, of social-class relations, and these relations imply 
domination of one group by another. Therefore the State is both a product of 
relations of domination and their shaper.
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Marxist theorists have long been divided between "instrumentalist" and 
"structuralist" interpretations of the State in capitalist society10. Instrumentalist 
theories tend to treat the State as an instrument of domination, either under the 
direct control of capitalist classes or subject to deliberate capitalist influences.
On the other hand, structuralist perspectives maintain that the influences of 
dominant classes over the State are at the best indirect. Thus, the State 
functions independently of narrowly defined class interests in order to perpetuate 
the capitalist social order as whole. By so doing, the State may necessarily act 
against the interests of certain dominant classes or class factions.
An example of this view is the logic of capital theory; which argues that the 
contradictions of capitalist development, following universal historical tendencies 
(derived from Marx's "Capital"), shape the capitalist State and its contradictions. 
According to this theory the principal characteristic of capitalist development is 
the tendency for the rate of profit to fall. The class struggle is expressed through 
surplus extraction and is reflected in declining profits. The State emerges as a 
necessary response to this tendency and is historically shaped by it. As a class 
State, its principle role is to provide countertendencies to the falling rate of profit 
- to maintain and stimulate capital accumulation in the face of its "logical" and 
unavoidable tendency toward decline. The form of the capitalist State and its 
functions are derived totally from the general crisis of capitalism, and the general 
crisis is a function of the overproduction of capital.
One of the best known examples of this approach for understanding agricultural 
development and State policy is that by De Janvry (1981:1), "a case study of the 
uneven nature of capitalist development and of the role and limits of the State 
both in implementing a set of reforms directed at the contradictions of uneven 
development and in re-creating another set of contradiction in so doing". He 
argues that the problems of agricultural production and poverty cannot be 
explained in terms of the characteristics of the agrarian sector or by reference to
10 The instrumentalist-structuralist dichotomy is often considered the heart of the debate between 
Ralph Miliband (1969,1970 and 1973) and Nicos Poulantzas (1968 and 1978) over the nature of 
the capitalist State.
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farm behaviour or processes at the village or farm level. These issues, according 
to him (1981:8) must instead be related to (a) the nature of class structure of 
peripheral economies and (b) the process of capital accumulation which "guides 
the historical development of capitalism". From this perspective, agricultural 
policy has as it ultimate objective “fomenting the development of capitalism in 
agriculture”. In so far as it has any political purpose it is to “stabilise the social 
relations of capitalism by changing the class structure in agriculture” (De Janvry, 
1981:202-3).
The major difficulty with De Janvry’s formulation is that it interprets the pattern of 
agrarian development in Third World economies as resulting from the logic of 
capital accumulation and little attention is given to others factors such as styles 
of political intervention and ideologies of development represented by State 
programmes, or the influence of forms of peasant organisation or resistance. The 
image he gives is that of passive peasantry faced by overwhelming external 
forces. De Janvry’s interpretation of ‘reformist’ policies demonstrates the 
similarities in their structural role, but he fails to elucidate the important 
differences in their means of implementation and context specific outcomes, with 
no concern to the differential local responses to development programmes.
2.5. The Rational Choice Paradigm
The rational choice paradigm, variously labelled "collective-choice" or "public 
choice", "the new political economy", "neo-classical political economy" and "the 
economics of politics", has expanded and altered the theoretical implications of 
pluralist approaches. As Moore (1990:225) argues ,
"...the analytical core of the rational choice paradigm ... is familiar and simple: the 
investigation of how far patterns of political action can be explained by making the 
working assumption that individual actors (persons, political parties, government 
agencies, governments, etc.) behave as rational choosers between the alternative 
courses of action open to them in the pursuit of the maximisation of their respective 
utilities. It is the paradigm of the 'economic man' applied to politics".
According to Moore (1990:226), what is called the rational choice paradigm has 
not only a range of general labels but a set of sub-fields which are imperfectly 
differentiated from one another both nominally and substantively, e.g. "the new
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institutionalism" concerned with explaining the origin of economic and social 
institutions; "collective choice" bearing on the conditions under which aggregates 
of individual agents will undertake joint action to generate public goods and 
services; and "rent-seeking" analysis which deals specifically with the way in 
which people combine and compete to determine the way in which governments 
mobilise and redistribute material resources.
When applied to the study of economics, its parentage lies in micro-economics. 
However, according to Bates (1983:136) it is important to note the degree to 
which it represents a critique, both empirical and normative, of this tradition. With 
the conviction that the conventional paradigm is too narrow, the rational choice 
approach studies social choices more generally. It recognises that problems of 
choice and allocation occur in settings other than markets. Political society, like 
the marketplace, is composed of self-interested individuals who form coalitions 
and compete to acquire benefits from government. However, that which 
represents an equilibrium in a market cannot be expected to represent an 
equilibrium in a non-market setting. If, in the market, competition and self- 
interested behaviour generate efficiency in the allocation of resources, in the 
political arena, self-interested behaviour generates negative outcomes for 
society - a State that is captured by narrow interests, policies that are distorted in 
economically irrational ways by self-seeking groups, and public officials whose 
actions are always suspect (Bates, 1981). The approach thus makes it possible 
to respond to questions such as that posed by Robert Bates (1981:3; 1983:2): 
Why should reasonable men adopt public policies that have harmful 
consequences for the society they govern? What influences the selection of 
these policies?
In this view the State is controlled by ruling groups and its main function is to 
extract income from the rest of the constituents in the interests of that group.
Like the pluralist perspective, the rational choice paradigm assumes that political 
society is composed of self-interested individuals who coalesce into organised 
interests. Interest groups, which tend to form around relatively narrow issues of 
special importance to their members, are created by individuals seeking specific
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self-interested goals (see Olson, 1982). Complementing the interests of groups 
in capturing favoured status in the distribution of resources in society are elected 
public officials who follow a "strategic calculus" as they seek to use public 
resources to stay in power, the resources of the State become a "weapon for 
survival" (Ames, 1987). Politics, then, is the sum total of individuals seeking 
special advantage through public policy and officials seeking to benefit from 
public office through reelection and rents.
In this approach, the politically rational goals of private interests and public 
officials generally lead to ends that are economically irrational. Thus, its 
assessment of politics stands in considerable opposition to the pluralist 
assumption that wise policy results from fragmented interest articulation in the 
political arena. According to Bates (1988: 352), “a major reason is that public 
officials are frequently less concerned with using public resources in a way that 
is economically efficient than they are with using them in a way that is politically 
expedient”.
According to Moore (1990:234), "rent-seeking" analysis (a sub-field of the 
rational-choice paradigm) illuminates the way in which, within Third World 
States, public resources devoted to agricultural development are allocated 
among different farm services. As Moore argues (1990:241), the explanatory 
power of the rational choice paradigm appears to derive from the fact that it very 
positively draws attention to the variation in the political effectiveness of political 
actors which derives not simply from their socio-economic status but also from 
their capacity to organise politically and from the amount of reward they might 
expect to gather. As Moore points out (1990:226),
"The core imagery here is of people using politics to obtain from the State - via licences, 
quotas, permissions, and other interventions - the material rewards which they cannot 
obtain through their own 'legitimate' efforts in economic enterprise. The meta-hypothesis 
is that the rationale behind State intervention in the economy is the exploitation by public 
servants, and private beneficiaries of opportunities to make 'illegitimate' profits (rents)."
The class logic version of the Marxian political economy of development is 
morphologically almost identical with the version of rational choice theory which 
concentrates on the problematic role of interest groups. Both have political
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processes which guarantee economically irrational outcomes. The only 
important difference is that the former attributes the pressures for economic 
irrationality to an exploitative class, while the latter attributes it to the activities of 
self-interested groups. The introduction of rational self-interest as the sole 
motive of politicians and bureaucrats did not change the neo-Marxist view of the 
State as an entity merely pretending a real concern for the public interest and 
national welfare. As Bates (1983: 146-7) points out:
"...politicians select economic policies not out of a regard for their economic merits but 
out of a regard for their political utility; economic inefficiency can be politically useful. [...] 
States have their own objectives. They want taxes and revenues and intervene actively 
in their economic environments to secure them. Politicians want power. And they use the 
instruments of the state to secure and retain it by manipulating the economy to political 
advantage. [...] The African case thus compels recognition of the possibility that political 
forces may be fully autonomous and, as in consequence, may act at the cost of 
economic rationality and solely in service of themselves."
Rational choice theory offers explanatory insights into the functioning of the 
predatory State11, which features predominantly in the literature on development 
countries. In his model of the State North (1981, chap. 3) stresses the 
widespread tendency of the State to produce inefficient property rights and 
hence fail to achieve sustained growth. These are produced by two constraints 
on the ruler. Under the competitive constraint, the ruler will avoid offending 
powerful constituents. If the wealth or income of groups with close access to 
alternatives rulers is adversely affected by property rights, the ruler will be 
threatened. Accordingly, he will agree to a property rights structure favourable to 
those groups, regardless of its effects upon efficiency.
According to North (1981: 28), efficient property rights may lead to higher 
income in the State, but lower tax revenues for the ruler because of transaction 
costs (monitoring, metering, and collecting such tax) as compared to those of
11 The predatory or exploitation theory of the State is held by remarkably varied collection of 
social scientists, including Marxists analysts of the capitalist State and some neoclassical 
economists. These views the State as controlled by ruling groups or classes. The main function 
of the predatory State is to extract income from the rest of the constituints in the interests of that 
group or class. The predactory State would specify a set of property rights that maximised the 
revenue of the group in power, regardless of its impact on the wealth of the society as a whole. 
Such theories have been propounded by those seeking to explain the failure of particular 
countries to achieve self-sustaining economic growth.
39
more inefficient set of property rights. A ruler therefore frequently found it in his 
interests to grant a monopoly rather than property rights which would lead to 
more competitive conditions. Thus, the property rights structure that will 
maximise rents to the ruler (or ruling class) is in conflict with that that would 
produce economic growth. Given the structures of this model, it is clear that 
only under unusual circumstance does it happen that the ownership structure 
specified by the ruler is consistent with the kind of efficiency standards implied 
by the neo-classical model. North refers to the frequent fact that the State, for 
reasons of maintaining its support structures, may prolong socially inefficient * 
property rights. He shares with other liberal economists a basic distrust of the 
State, whose unrestrained power and rapacity result in institutional atrophy and 
economic stagnation.
Under this approach the State is also analysed as an arena in which outcomes 
result from the pursuit of rational interest by individual politicians, bureaucrats 
and others actors. Where the interests of rulers and ruled conflict, personally self 
interested politicians will not make arrangements which secure the legitimate 
interests of citizens. In the absence of a natural harmony of interest, rulers serve 
themselves better by using their power to exploit others, and political 
arrangements which limit rulers’ pursuit of self interest are the only constraint on 
this exploitation. If such arrangements do not exist or have been subverted 
(which is the scenario in Third World countries), then the adoption of ‘good’ 
policies is impossible to achieve.
This cynical view of the State leads to a bleak and deeply contradictory 
pessimism about the possibilities of progress. In fact, the success of neo- 
Marxism in discrediting the assumption of the benevolent State paved the way 
down which the New (neo-classical) Political Economy moved triumphantly in the 
1980s12.
12 Among academics some have simply abandoned the conceptual vocabulary of neo-Marxism in 
favour of that rational choice theory, which is considered to furnish a more consistent and 
powerful explanation about the political economy. Others have tried to combined neo-Marxism 
with rational choice theory. See Przeworski (1985) and Roemer (1986), as an example of what is 
called of a school of "rational choice Marxism".
3. New Institutionalism: An Alternative Approach to the State and Third World 
Development
Observers of the Third World have long been concerned with its typical pattern 
of government economic regulation, which has appeared inefficient and often 
corrupt. Scarce economic resources often seem to have been diverted away 
from the poor, and grand-sounding economic strategies have sometimes 
appeared as little more than screens for measures which have enriched well- 
organised groups in both public and private sectors. Although attempts to apply 
the rational choice paradigm to the Third World have been rare and recent, 
these sound like the conditions in which this approach, which is essentially a 
formalised critique of government inefficiency and corruption, might be expected 
to thrive13.
This approach to Development is an economic theory of politics, and uses the 
assumptions of neo-classical micro-economics -  methodological individualism, 
rational utility maximisation, and the comparative static method of equilibrium 
analysis -  to explain the failure of the State in developing countries to adopt neo­
liberal economic policies for growth and development. Consequently, according 
to Toye (1993: 321), neo-liberalism presents not merely “a body of settled 
conclusions immediately applicable to policy, but also “an account of why its 
prescriptions over forty years of practice of development have until recently 
found so little political favour”.
However, we can say that nothing in those assumptions determines the features 
of the State that have been identified above. Bates (1983:134-5) emphasised 
three fundamental characteristics of this approach which require clarification: the 
premise of rational choice; the method of equilibrium analysis; and the role of 
institutions.
13 One can reject the deep ideological bias out of which rational choice paradigm was born. 
However, as Moore points out (1990:230-231), this does not invalidate the core ideas behind it: 
the suspicion that the pattern of State involvement in economic affairs is the product of political 
pressures from organised groups pursuing their material interests. Its emergence was partly an 
attempt to find a new line of formal, theoretical defence for a simplistic pro-market, anti-state 
doctrine when a set of research findings suggested that the welfare losses associated with
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Accordingly, the assumption of rationally maximising individual agents 
represents one cornerstone of this approach. Rationality demands that individual 
decision makers choose their most preferred alternatives, which will be ranked in 
terms of their value in enabling the individual to secure his or her preferences. 
Note that rationality says nothing about the content of preference. Nor does 
rationality require perfect information. It requires only that choice makers order 
alternative courses of action in terms of their estimates of the consequences for 
the values they seek to attain and they choose the alternative which they expect 
to yield the most favourable outcome14.
Rational choice is characterised by its commitment to the individual as a unit of 
analysis and the assumption of rational behaviour, but this rationality merely 
demands that individual decision makers choose their "top" or most preferred 
alternatives, which will be ranked in terms of their value in enabling the individual 
choose his or her preferences without imposing conditions on the "content" of 
preferences. According to Heath (1976:76), "the rational choice theories are 
about the way in which people choose given their beliefs and they do not 
themselves venture to say anything about the nature of those beliefs". If, as is 
required by the theory, the individual knows (or believes that) what the outcomes 
of every course of action will be, all he has to do is rank the outcomes and select 
the best. Thus, it is a fallacy to say that "it is rational only to pursue one's own 
self-interest" and the many people who act out of a "sense of duty or friendship 
cannot be accounted as rational and cannot be brought within the scope of 
rational choice theory", and that the theory can apply only to the selfish and 
egotistical.
government regulation of the economy were far lower than many economic liberals had asserted.
14 Broadly speaking, the rational choice approach as used in exchange theory, game theory and 
in economics begins with the assumption that people have given wants, goals, values or "utility 
functions". It then assumes that these goals cannot be equally realised. Men live in a world of 
scarcity and therefore must select between alternative courses of action. They will, it is assumed, 
do this rationally, selecting the course of action which is the most effective means to their goal or 
selecting the course which leads to their most preferred goal (Heath, 1976:3).
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As pointed out by Heath (1976:79), "rationality has nothing to do with the goals 
which men pursue but .only with the means they use to achieve them". When we 
ask whether someone is "behaving rationally" we are asking, for example, 
whether he is "choosing the most efficient means to his goal". We are not asking 
whether he is choosing the "right" goal. Thus, I would argue against the 
assumption that individualistic and rational behaviour is "an assumption that 
leads to pessimistic conclusions about the potential for change and the ability of 
policy elites and citizens to conceptualise and act upon some broader vision of 
the public interest", as Grindle and Thomas (1991:4-5) pointed out.
The method of equilibrium analysis provides another cornerstone. It is through 
equilibrium analysis that insight is achieved as to how the choices of individuals 
result in social outcomes. However, the use of equilibrium analysis does not 
imply a conviction that the world is "determinate". Nor does the use of equilibrium 
analysis assume that the world is orderly. By an equilibrium is simply meant a 
situation in which no party has an incentive unilaterally to alter its behaviour. In 
situations of chaos, or in the making of revolutions, there may be strong 
incentives to behave violently, which can represent an equilibrium strategy15. To 
apply equilibrium analysis is thus not to imply that there is social order, much 
less lack of change. However, to move from individual maximising agents to the 
analysis of social equilibrium requires assumptions about the social and political 
context of choice making.
The institutional environment provides a third basic element of the theoretical 
apparatus of the rational choice approach. For, without knowledge of their social 
and political context, one simply cannot infer social outcomes from a knowledge 
of preferences and the use of equilibrium analysis. Clearly, institutions help to 
determine the nature of social outcomes. In moving away from an exclusive 
preoccupation with markets, the rational choice approach recognises the
15 Tong (1988) constructed and tested a rational choice model of collective violence, using 
rebellions and banditry in the Ming Dynasty of Chin (1368-1644) as the empirical reference. This 
model views rebellions and banditry as a rational response in a subsistence crisis, in the same 
family of other survival strategies.
importance of a far broader range of human motivations. As Bates (1983:140) 
states: _ . . .
"... because it grappled with the complexity of analysing institutions other than markets, 
the collective-choice approach has learned that the precise specifics of institutional 
environments count, in the sense that they play a key role in determining the way in 
which individuals preferences aggregate into social outcomes. Institutional environments 
offer choosers values in addition to economic values: membership, office, prestige, etc. 
They provide access to resources other than income or productive technologies: To 
power, networks, or systems of rights and obligations, And they provide frameworks 
within which bargaining takes place and strategies are developed. They define, in short, 
'the rules of the game1 which determine the values of outcomes which can be sought by 
alternatives courses of action."
Thus, from inside the methodological individualism tradition, Bates emphasises 
the importance of institutions. His argument is that while rational individuals 
should constitute the unit of analysis, “they compete within a set of political 
institutions; and the structure of these institutions shapes their interactions so as 
to determine the outcome that will hold in equilibrium” (Bates, 1989:10-13).16 
Because this approach is sensitive to the determining power of cultural and 
institutional settings, it is highly resistant to any effort artificially to ‘homogenise’ 
human behaviour and requires the use of a precise and detailed knowledge of 
cultures, structures and institutional environments.
With a renewed emphasis on social structure by the new institutionalism, the 
institutions of political life take on an expanded significance. They are no longer 
seen merely as a set of constraints (unchanging and unexplained) within which 
individual politicians and bureaucrats rationally maximise their utility. Their role 
in conferring legitimacy, authority, and power on those who participate in them 
can be understood, as can the associated concept of institution-building and 
institutional decay. If the problem is that self-interested behaviour by rulers of 
developing countries has increased, one must enquire how structures have 
changed to weaken the institutional constraints on opportunistic self- 
aggrandisement in the realm of politics.
16 Cited by Toye (1993: 337).
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The new institutionalism is important in the context of economic policy in the 
1990s because it challenged the dynamic role ascribed to the market by the 
orthodoxies of the last ten years or so, introducing new justification for 
interventionist beliefs17. The reintroduction of structures and institutions to the 
debate helps to explain why an automatic presumption in favour of free market 
solutions may not be warranted. Markets themselves are institutions. Thus, the 
new institutionalism reintroduces the State and it shows that "neither State nor 
market is the best way in which to organise the provision of goods and services" 
(Toye, 1995). Its significance for the study of development is related with the fact 
that it claims to offer a theory of development in terms of appropriate institutional 
change.
The new institutionalism rejects a certain very restrictive conception of the 
market “as an abstract realm of impersonal economic exchange of homogeneous 
goods by means of voluntary transactions on an equal basis between large 
numbers of autonomous fully-informed entities with profit-maximising behavioural 
motivation and able to enter and leave freely” (Harriss-White, 1995), which is 
central to neo-classical economics. The new institutionalism starts from the 
reality that information is rarely complete, and that individuals have different 
ideas (or mental models18) of the way in which the world about them works.
The recognition that the economies of the developing world are characterised by 
pervasive market failure enables those armed with the insights of the new 
institutionalism to attempt to account for a wide variety of social forms that might 
otherwise appear mysterious and to appreciate the economic significance of 
apparently non-economic institutions. Focusing on the law, property rights, 
bureaucracies, and other non-market structures, the new institutionalism seeks 
to demonstrate how rational individuals might employ non-market institutions to 
secure (in equilibrium) collective levels of welfare that they otherwise might not 
be able to attain, given their responses to market incentives" (Bates, 1995: 27).
17 See Harriss, Hunter and Lewis (1995).
18 North (1990:37) argues that individuals makes choices on the basis of their mental models, 
which are in part culturally derived, differ widely, are not easily changed and give rise not to the 
one determinate position of general equilibria theory but potentially to multiply equilibria.
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Thus, it offers ways of understanding the economic significance of features of 
Third World societies and cultures that market-based reasoning might 
misunderstand or ignore.
According to Popkin (1988: 246), market economics gave economists a set of 
tools with which to discuss economic policy, but economists had no corres­
ponding awareness of the economic role of nonmarket institutions. Although 
some field workers wrote on one or another “traditional institution” and its role in 
the rural economy, economists were resistant to being interested in rural 
institutions other than markets. Schultz’s Transforming Traditional Agriculture is 
an example of the assumptions and focus that free-market economists used in 
examining peasant agriculture. In his discussion of the evidence for economic 
response to new opportunities and their allocation of resources at the farm level, 
Schultz emphasised the responsiveness of peasants to market forces. In the 
worlds of Theodore Schultz, given the right incentives, farmers in the developing 
world would “turn sand into gold”. “Distortions” introduced into the agricultural 
markets by governments, he contends, furnish the most important reasons for 
their failure to do so (Schultz, 1978). However, Schultz’s work is severely limited 
because of its focus on market forces and a fixed institutional framework. By 
ignoring the interplay between market forces and national and local institutions, 
he makes prescriptions that are far too narrow and predictions that are far too 
optimistic about the beneficial aspects of increased market activity19.
As Lipton has shown (1968), the conclusion that peasants are production- 
maximising does not pay sufficient attention to problems of risk and uncertainty
19 Stiglitz (1993:27) argues that models focusing on fully informed rational peasants working 
within ‘rational’ and efficient institutions are likely to be not only inadequate, but seriously 
misleading, just as models that simply hypothesise that peasants are rule (tradition)-bound, 
irrational, and non-economic are almost misleading. Peasants are rational, but they are not fully 
informed. And imperfect information (as well as a variety of other transaction costs), besides 
limiting the effective degree of competition, creates institutional rigidities, allowing the 
persistence of seemingly inefficient institutions. It may not be possible to affect change in a 
decentralised manner -  central co-ordination, that is government intervention, may be required. 
Market forces by themselves may not be enough to ensure the success of the development 
process.
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facing the household. The jump from peasant efficiency to village efficiency (or 
production maximisation for a given level of technology), moreover, assumes 
perfect markets in land, labour and capital. It fails to take sufficiently into account 
the problem of nonmarket goods and insurance. Peasants’ worries about risk 
and insurance and the economic benefits of institutional remedies to these 
problems were ignored by most economists, not just by Schultz.
There are potential contributions of new institutionalis to the analysis of 
nonmarket supralocal organisations for insuring peasants against risk and 
uncertainty. One example is provided by institutions that offer "generalised 
reciprocity”20: institutions in which people invest resources, not in expectation of 
specific recompense, but rather in an effort to create a general fund of goodwill 
that can subsequently be tapped should a specific need arise. Families 
constitute the most striking example of such institutions. In the absence of 
secure property rights, they mobilise family ties, religious groups or ethnic 
associations in support of commerce and trade; the richness of information in 
such environments facilitates calculations of the appropriate level of trust and the 
density of social ties increases the costs of the loss of reputation, rendering 
probity of greater value than opportunism in economic transactions. In the 
absence of effective States, capable of providing public goods, people are likely 
to join religious associations, fundamentalist groups or revolutionary parties in an 
effort to secure them21.
What makes the new institutionalism approach especially relevant for students of 
long-run Third World Development it is the focus upon the interaction between
20 " See Bates (1995: 36).
21 Popkin's (1979) classic study of Vietnam provided an example, as he examines the role of 
churches and the Communist Party in providing property rights, public works and changes in 
political institutions. Through study of four pre-revolutionary and revolutionary Vietnamese 
organisations, Popkin shows how these organisations were able to gain control of large sections 
of the country and to channel significant peasant resources into creating new rural societies. By 
undermining the power of village notables, the organisations provided peasants with mutually 
profitable sources of insurance and welfare, and helped them to overcome the institutional 
manipulations of market and bureaucratic connections to give the peasants access to the 
institutions that had previously kept them at a disadvantage. By doing so, they helped the 
peasant to tame markets and enter them on their own. But, more importantly, the changes in 
authority relations engendered new conceptions of identity and self-worth among the peasantry.
institutions and organisations22. Khan (1995) shows how distinct institutional 
arrangements can shape organisational behaviour and how alternative sets of 
organisational responses may impact on institutions. Consequently, while it may 
be argued that to a large extent growth is institutionally path-determined, agents 
being conditioned by prevailing cultural norms23 and possibly deflected from 
behaviour that is optimal or maximising, this does not preclude individual 
organisations acting as agents for institutional change. Similarly, novel 
productivity-enhancing institutions, can emerge almost spontaneously, triggered 
by minimal individual initiatives, and are not invariably rooted in collective 
behavioural change. This implies a greater recognition of cultural-institutional- 
diversity and the prospect of positive institutional change resulting from a range 
of individual actions, presuming that action to be largely driven by optimising 
rationality.
Both formal and informal institutions and voluntary organisations affect economic 
outcomes because they condition the opportunities and incentives of agents. 
State regulation in general creates or attenuates property rights and is therefore 
part of the formal institutional structure. The State is also the body responsible 
for the enforcement and protection of all formal property rights. The State is 
closely associated with the protection and maintenance of formal institutions and 
the processes through which they are changed. However, as Khan (1995: 72) 
stresses, “It does not necessarily imply that the State decides which institutions 
to protect and how. The State or parts of it can under some circumstances act
22 According to North (1995:23) “institutions are the rules of the game of a society, or more 
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction”. They are 
composed of formal rules (statute law, common low, regulations), informal constraints 
(conventions, norms of behaviours and self-imposed codes of conduct) and the enforcement 
characteristics of both. “Organisations are the players: groups of individuals bound be a common 
purpose to achieve objectives". They include political bodies (firms, trade unions, family farms, 
co-operatives); social bodies (churches, clubs, athletic associations); and educational bodies 
(schools, vocational training centres.)
23 According to Brett (1995: 205), “Culture is not simply a given derived from individual chosen 
preferences, but an outcome of the interaction between values and institutional and 
organisational rules and structures. ... For a as long as oppressive conditions prevail, individual 
behaviour will be dominated by opportunism".
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autonomously, in others it simply responds to pressures from competing classes 
and groups”.
Bates (1995) points out that the theory does not discriminate among an infinite 
number of possible outcomes and shows that the same economic institution can 
have different consequences in distinct contexts. Thus, what the State can do to 
promote rural markets, to help small-scale industry, to respond to the pressures 
of labour unions and women’s organisations, and to address a great number of 
other tasks depends upon how well the government’s own institutions are 
working. The reasons for the different outcomes have to do with the political 
context, or what Khan (1995) refers to as "the political settlement", meaning the 
balance of power between the classes and groups affected by an institution. This 
balance crucially influences the net effects of an institution. The new 
institutionalism emphasises choices, whereas the reality is often that outcomes 
are determined by constraints which have to do with the political settlement.
The theoretical significance of Bates’s (1980) analysis of the divergent 
agricultural conditions in Ghana and Kenya is its political interpretation. What he 
seeks to make known is an appreciation of the fundamental importance of 
politics to the process of agrarian development. Whether an agricultural 
economy flourishes or stagnates is seen as being primarily derivative of the 
operation of political forces or of the political attributes and conduct of the rural 
population. The interplay of organised interest is thus central to the study of rural 
development. Therefore development specialists finds in the new institutionalism 
a justification for basing development efforts on community action and civil 
engagement.
3.1. New Intitutionalism and the Rational Peasant: The State as the Object of 
Peasant Politics
The phenomenon of unequal political mobilisation and the problem of collective 
action have emerged as a major concern of the literature on institutional 
analysis. Almost all debates on rural politics take as axiomatic the great 
difficulties faced by poor, physically dispersed farmers in effectively engaging in
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supra-local political activity of any kind. With a few exceptions, peasants seem to 
attract attention only when engaged in national or social revolution. In fact, this 
focus on revolution is not only the legacy of myths propagated, social scientists 
have been amazed by very real, and quite dramatic, twentieth-century social 
revolutions in which peasants have played an important role. Out of this has 
emerged an image of the peasant in which they are seen as passive or at most 
simmering with discontent until they join together or are organised by 
revolutionary party and overturn the existing social order24. Current research on 
peasant politics have shown that these images of the peasant obscure much of 
the political activity occurring in the countryside, and has concentrated in less 
dramatic but ongoing struggle within peasant societies and in studying every 
forms of peasant resistance.
Our interest is not in the politics of revolutions but in the political participation of 
peasants. In this case, it would be possible to employ a restrictive view of 
political activity, defined as "activity by private citizens designed to influence 
governmental decision making" (Huntington and Nelson, 197625), because it has 
contemporary relevance for the study of rural development. Nevertheless, it 
seems wiser to adopt a broad definition of political activities26, because, 
especially in the countryside, political and economic power are generally 
intertwined.
24 Despite the fact that peasants have always had difficulty making their voices heard, there has 
been no shortage of people inclined to speak for them. According to Brown (1990:1-2), such 
volunteers have created two myths about the peasant: The first evokes a peasantry that is 
"repository of authenticity and national virtues, quick to defend their own rights and the rights of 
their people”. The second myth is that of a peasant imbued not with revolutionary vigilance but 
with "submissiveness and political stupor", a peasant characterised by "backwardness, ignorance, 
and passivity".
25 As cited in Brown (1990:4).
26 Brown (1990:6-7), identifies four basic forms of political activity: (i) Atomistic action - which 
comprises the political activity of individuals and small groups. Specifically, this form of activity 
may include banditry, uprooting of crops, arson, cattle poisoning, and attacks by individuals or 
small groups on officials and landlords or their agents - all of which are considered to be political 
crimes; (ii) Communal action - Also a form of direct action, in which peasants, acting in large 
groups or communities, take matters into their own hands to enforce their will. Examples of this 
are land invasion, strikes, and attacks by large groups on landlords and officials; (iii) Legal and 
institutional action - which comprises actions viewed as legitimate by central authority and 
institution - that is demands articulated through regular channels, such as voting or jointing
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Previous studies, although often focused on revolution, provide some answers to 
the question of what makes peasants act politically. A large body of literature on 
structures that inhibit or facilitate peasant action presupposes that peasants 
require more than a common viewpoint to resist, especially when co-operation 
and co-ordination are required. For some, the system of agricultural production 
affects peasant politics in two ways: it determines the material conditions of the 
peasantry and affects whether peasants face problems in groups or as 
individuals27. For others the crucial factor for political activity is the open 
("outward oriented") or closed ("inward oriented") nature of the village28. The 
State also appears as a sort of social structure which affects not only 
rebelliousness but also tendencies towards other forms of political activity. Here 
we will review previous interpretations of the effects on peasant society of the 
growth of central States.
The structuralist approach emphasised the repressive and inhibiting character of 
the State. In this view (see for instance Paige, 1975), the State often stands as 
little more than the accomplice of those elites who derive their livelihood from the 
control of land. Yet others attribute such importance to the State that the State, 
not the peasantry, becomes the determining factor in rebellion. For Skocpol 
(1979, 1982), peasants rebel only when allowed to do so by a State already 
weakened by internal divisions or foreign wars. In this State-centred approach, 
the question should not be when peasants decide to rebel but when the State 
allows them to. In normal times States are strong enough to prevent rebellions 
and to prevent open forms of political activity which they consider illegitimate. A
political parties; (iv) Revolt and revolution are the final form.
27 The impact of agricultural production on peasant social organisation is not a recent recognition. 
It forms the basis for Marx's analysis of the French peasantry. Yet the effort to describe the 
relation between production system and political activity remains controversial. Wolf (1969) and 
Scott (1979) argue that the peasants most prone to revolution are village-dwellers who possess 
landed property. In contrast, Paige (1975) argues that smallholding peasants are normally 
conservative and quiescent, whereas propertyless labourers - cultivates who earn income from 
wages not land - are more likely to become revolutionary.
28 Migdal's (1974:87) basic argument is that peasants in the Twentieth-century Third World have 
been undergoing a disruptive economic transition from predominant "inward orientation" - 
marked by subsistence and agriculture and strong communal and patronage controls - to greatly 
increased "outward orientation" - marked by substantial involvement of individual peasants and 
households with extra-local "multiplier mechanisms: markets, cash, and wage labour".
strong State, thus, should be a politically atomising force, because it arrests and 
punishes those who organise or actively protest against its purposes. Only in 
favourable political circumstances is the insurrectionary potential of peasants - 
whether traditionalist or commercialising, landed or landless - able to propel 
revolutionary transformation, and presumably to take political action.
As an answer to the question of what makes peasants act politically, a large and 
consensual body of literature has also emerged focusing on the political outlook 
of peasants. The "moral economy perspective"29, articulated by James Scott 
(1977, 1979), has a structural and microeconomic dimensions as well as a 
cultural or moral one. The microeconomic dimension is based on Scott's view of 
the centrality of the existential struggle for subsistence to the peasant's life and 
behaviour. Continually battling just to maintain themselves, peasants are forced 
to work to meet their minimal needs before attending to other concerns. This is 
the "safety first" principle - peasants will avoid risks that could threaten their 
subsistence, however great the potential payoff. In microeconomic terms they 
are risk-averse. This engenders what Scott calls the "subsistence ethic", 
according to which peasants judge claims on their crops not by how much is 
appropriated but by what remains for them to eat (Scott, 1979:5, ch. 1 and 2). 
Claims on the peasantry that endanger its subsistence are viewed as more than 
economic threats, they are moral violations of peasants rights.
Scott portrays the village in pre-capitalist peasant society as a key institution, 
characterised by a variety of social arrangements designed to insure village 
members against a subsistence crisis. Implicit in the moral economy analysis is 
the proposition that the longevity and success of a lord and his role rests on the 
quality of the subsistence guarantee he provides his clients. For elites, the 
peasantry's subsistence ethic means that they must not invade the subsistence 
reserves of the poor and that, furthermore, they have a positive moral obligation
29 According to Popkin (1979:2) "the moral economy is an economic approach not because it 
uses the methods of modem economists, but because it addresses important issues about 
markets and other economic institutions". It is moral not because it assumes peasants and elites 
were more moral and less calculating in pre-capitalists settings, but because it assumes that, 
under earlier institutions, the calculus governing behaviour leads to moral outcomes with respect
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to provide for maintenance needs in time of scarcity (Scott, 1979:33). To the 
extent that the village elite respects this principle by protecting poor members of 
the community against ruin in bad years, their position is considered legitimate; 
they are leaders of a moral community. Thus, it is the subsistence ethic which 
provides the perspective from which peasants view claims on their resources, 
and the moral economy unifies peasants in the face of threats. According to a 
Popkin's (1979:15) account of the moral economy perspective, in this approach
"The growth of the central State, the commercialisation of agriculture, and the growth of 
population all serve ... to shift the terms of exchange against clients. (...) When the 
multistranded ties to patrons who provided all the essential services, insurance, and 
credits necessary for agriculture erode and the bonds dissolve, peasants will attempt to 
form new patron-client relationships with moneylenders, shopkeepers, and so forth. But 
whether there are multistranded ties to one patron or singlestranded ties to numerous 
patrons, a peasantry that can meet short-run subsistence through such ties will be 
effectively demobilised by virtue of its dependence links. Without a short-run subsistence 
crisis, then, peasants will not engage in political protest (Popkin, 1979:15).
The major alternative to the perspective of moral economy is the view, articulated 
by Popkin (1979, 1988b) who stresses that organising to supply themselves with 
public goods is precisely what peasant villagers find very difficult to do. Arraying 
himself against Scott, Popkin point out the difficulties of collective action at 
village level and the limited abilities of peasants to generate village insurance or 
welfare arrangements. Following Olson (1982), this new school recasts this 
individualistic peasant behaviour as rational rather than backward or 
dysfunctional. This is the rational-peasant approach30, the core of which Popkin 
(1979:31) describes as follows:
"By rationality I mean that individuals evaluate the possible outcomes associated with 
their choices in accordance with their preferences and values. In doing this, they discount 
the evaluation of each outcome in accordance with their subjective estimate of the 
likelihood of the outcome. Finally, they make the choice which they believe will maximise 
their expected utility. (...) It is clear the case that, at different times, peasants care about 
themselves, their families, their friends, and their villages. However, I do assume that a 
peasant is primarily concerned with the welfare and security of self and family. Whatever 
his broad values and objectives, when the peasant primarily takes into account the
to peasant welfare than under the social arrangements and institutions of modem capitalism.
30 Following Brown (1990), I have used the title of Popkin's book to characterise this approach 
rather than the term political economy, which Popkin and others seem to prefer, because the 
term rational peasant is equally descriptive and probably more precise.
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likelihood of receiving the preferred outcomes on the basis of individual action, he usually 
will act in a self-interested manner".
The rational-peasant school stresses the entrepreneurial individualism of 
peasant life. According to Popkin (1988a: 11-13), peasants are self-interested 
and that means that they are concerned with individual benefits, not group 
benefits, when contemplating cooperation. In particular, whether a self-interested 
person will contribute to a collective action depends on individual - not group - 
benefits. Thus, collective benefits from action do not necessarily provide 
individual reasons to participate. Rational egoists are interested in the benefits 
that their participation in the collective brings to them individually. If an 
individual's benefit does not exceed the cost to the individual of participating, 
then the individual will want to be a "free rider" - to benefit from the collective 
action of others while making no contribution. The common usefulness of 
organised activity was not sufficient to induce participation. As long as the only 
results of contributing to common goals were common advantages, peasant left 
the contributions to others and expended their scarce resources in pursuit of 
private interests. They opted for individual interests over common interests. They 
would take part in organisations only when there were benefits contingent upon 
participation31. According to Popkin (1988a: 12), any attempt to organise for 
group action must recognise the distinction between individual and group 
benefits and must provide sufficient incentives to engage in collective action.
As Olson stated (1982:2) "unless there is coercion or some other special device 
to make individuals act in their common interests, rational, self-interested 
individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests". The 
unorganised group - the group that has no lobby and takes no action - fits the 
main argument of Olson's and illustrates his central point: "that large or latent 
groups have no tendency voluntarily to act to further their common interests".
The rational individual in the large group in a socio-political context will not be
31 According to Giap and Truong Chinh (1974: 2331) peasants "have the mentality of private 
ownership". Traditional peasant organisations "are all characterised by individual profit for each 
member of the group. None have a social nature, i.e., a common advantage for the entire group 
or for society ... W e have yet to see peasants spontaneously organise societies which have a 
common usefulness".
willing to make any sacrifices to achieve the objectives he shares with others. 
There is accordingly no presumption that large groups will organise to act in their 
common interests. Only when groups are small, or when they are fortunate 
enough to have an independent source of selective incentives, will they organise 
or act to achieve their objectives (Olson, 1982:166-7).
Olson’s “logic of collective action” can be understood as variants of the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma (although Olson himself does not use it in his exposition). 
The well-known parable of the Prisoners’ Dilemma has a great appeal for social 
theorists because it appears to provide a solid basis for a profoundly disturbing 
conclusion -  that rational individuals cannot achieve rational collective 
outcomes. It seems to be applicable to all situations in which it is possible for 
some to co-operate while others are willing to co-operate. Where Olson and 
other collective action pessimists are surely right is the need for some coercion 
to back agreements. According to Wade (1988: 209), their emphasis on 
difficulties of strictly voluntary collective action -  that proceeds from moral 
commitment, or habit, or a calculation of the benefits to each if each complies -  
is a useful counter to the optimism of those who believe that collective action and 
co-operation are a matter of teaching people what are their real common 
interests or a question of changing values in the direction of less individualism. 
On the contrary, as Wade’s study on collective action in South India provides 
evidence, “the ability to make people do what they may not immediately want to 
do, by means of sanctioned rules, is a necessary ingredient for any arrangement 
for common pool resources”.
Institutions which give people the assurance that if they do comply with the rules 
they will not be victimised -  that those others who do not comply will be 
punished -  greatly increase the chances of voluntary compliance. This is 
important because the law as mechanical barrier -  whether local law or national 
law -  can be effective when only a tiny minority of the population is likely to 
break it. Most of the observance of rules has to be more voluntary, because the 
cost of enforcement when large numbers of people comply involuntarily (through 
a calculus of evasion and punishment) is likely to be prohibitively high (Wade,
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1988: 203). Olson leaves open the question of whether the source of selective 
punishment or inducement is inside the group or outside. One can interpret his 
argument in the way that he is simply saying that negative selective sanctions 
are an essential part of the design needed to sustain collective action. But he 
can also be suggesting that the sanctions must be organised from outside the 
group itself, specifically by the State.
According to Brown (1990:20-1), the moral-economy perspective suggests a 
strong hostility between peasants and the State for two reasons. First, the State 
represents an alien political force interested not in serving peasants but in 
remoulding, transforming or developing them. Peasants should not be expected 
to sympathise with (or even understand) the political agenda of their rulers. 
Peasants clash with the State especially when it is more intrusive. For example, 
the implementation of development policy provokes a high degree of resentment 
and alienation. A second reason for peasant resentment of, and alienation from, 
the State is material. States tax peasants and sometimes demand their labour as 
well. Whether for the purposes of development (as defined by ruling elites) or of 
support for a political structure that serves a landed class, elites rarely return to 
peasants much of obvious or immediate value. Less ambitious States may desire 
taxes and labour from peasants, more ambitious States may wish that the 
peasantry adopt different techniques, live in different places, and redirect its 
political loyalties to the State. Such official ambitions can be expected to provoke 
a resentful and alienated political outlook. Thus, peasant political activity is also 
often motivated by hostility towards the State.
However, the rational-peasant perspective questions the reasons for hostility 
between peasants and the State. With regard to cultural alienation, this 
perspective would cast doubt on the existence of such alienation and, more 
importantly, on the relevance of such alienation to political action. Peasants 
should be more interested in securing individual livelihood than acting against 
enemies of community values. With regard to the structural opposition between 
peasants and the State, Popkin (1979:34) focuses on the possibility that States 
will ally with peasants against landed elites. Enterprising peasants will therefore
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regard the State not only as a structure for taxation but also as a potential ally in 
local struggles. Accordingly, central States can sometimes increase their own 
revenue by overthrowing patrons and raising total production enough to benefit 
both themselves and the peasantry. New institutionalist theorists does not 
discriminate among an infinite number of possible outcomes. What the State can 
do to promote rural markets and to help small-scale farmers will depend on how 
the government’s own institutions are working. The new institutionalism 
emphasises choices, whereas the reality is frequently that outcomes are 
determined by constraints which have to do with the political settlement.
3. Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to furnish a critical assessment of contrasting 
analytical approaches to understanding policy choices and outcomes on State 
intervention, paying special attention to theoretical interpretations of the nature 
of the State. The focus on the character of the State aims to highlight an issue 
often neglected in the analysis of results of rural development policies, that is, 
the State as a social phenomenon, and its role and limits in the management of 
reforms.
The approach adopted here differs from those theorists who see the State as 
separable from society and considered to have separate interests that it pursues, 
as defined by policy elites, detached from any form of social determination 
(Grindle, 1986). The approach adopted here should be distinguished also from 
what may be called the logic of capital theory, which suggests that the main role 
of the State is to maintain and stimulate capital accumulation in face of its 
“logical” and unavoidable tendency toward decline (De Janvry, 1981). The 
approach adopted here accepts the pluralist view of the State in that the 
formulation of State policy can be understood in terms of competition among 
organised interests groups in society to influence the decision-making process. 
However, we could doubt both the benign pluralist view, in which the public 
interest is thought to be best served when policies emerge out of competition
among large numbers of political interests (Dahl, 1967), and the rational choice 
pessimist view in which self-interested behaviour generates negative outcomes 
for society -  a State that is captured by narrow interests, policies that are 
distorted in economically irrational ways by self-seeking groups, and public 
officials whose actions are always suspect (Bates, 1981).
The analytical approach adopted here is based on the new institutionalism 
development theory whereby the State and its institutions play a pivotal role in 
determining the performance of the economy. The State is considered to be “the 
primary agent of institutional intervention” as it has the capacity to stabilise or 
transform institutions, including markets (Stein, 1995: 129). The new 
institutionalism is an appropriate complement to the neo-classic framework when 
evaluating the role of the State in developing countries because the institutional 
analysis seeks to incorporate the historical context in which the State and its 
policies take place. Rather than insisting on one identical projection for the 
economic role of the State in all developing countries, institutional analysis is 
sufficiently flexible to allow for country-specific institutional structures that can 
serve to improve the efficiency of the growth path.
Furthermore, the State is seen invariably as a reflection of the hold over power 
within a society, representative of the dominant interest group. The institutions of 
a society - formal and informal - are created to serve those in possession of 
bargaining power, and the effort to uphold these institutions, even in the face of 
changes in transaction costs, information flows and their increasing disutility, 
leads to the formation of dominant interest groups (Harriss, Hunter and Lewis, 
1995:10). However, in this view the “State can also play a crucial role in the 
assignment or reassignment of property rights according to society’s preferences 
for equity and justice” (Handoussa, 1995:136). Analyses of institution-building 
essentially have to deal with the exercise of political power and manipulation of 
economic advantage.
The problem of collective action has emerged as a major theme in the body of 
literature on institutional analysis. State intervention often has to be prompted by
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campaigning interest groups, which are hard to organise for reasons explained 
by Olson (1982). Popkin’s (1979) analysis of peasant politics (recasting 
individualistic peasant behaviour as rational rather than backward or 
dysfunctional) fits the main argument of Olson (1982), that a lack of organisation 
does not imply an absence of common interests, and people with common 
interest - especially if there are large numbers of them - do not automatically 
organise to further these. Incentives and sanctions are necessary to gather the 
resources to maintain an organisation, to prevent people from free-riding on 
collective benefits. Assuming that peasants are self-interested, Popkin (1979) 
analyses co-operation in peasant society based on task-specific incentives and 
calculations. He shows how enlargements of Olson's approach to “free riders” 
and collective goods help to explain the considerations whereby peasants will be 
able to organise successfully. But there is evidence of others factors are also at 
work when collective action is successfully organised32.
The selection of views about the question of what makes peasants act politically 
demonstrates the dangers of mounting generalisations about “peasantry” as a 
social type. Rural societies in developing world are marked by greatly varying 
features and tendencies both in their internal ecology and cultures, and in their 
connection with markets, State institutions and other external influences. If we 
must seek generalisation it should be less about the essential nature of peasant 
society than about these internal and external factors which influence peasant 
behaviour. In so doing we must expand the proportion of social structure which 
can be explained in terms of universal human nature acting in different contexts 
and facing different kinds of situation. Social, political and, indeed economic 
structures have to be reintroduced into the analysis. However, it is very important 
-  and this is one other important contribution of the new institutionalism -  not to 
do so to the exclusion of individual agency and the single person’s power of self- 
determination. As Toye points out (1993: 332), “a structuralism which treats 
people only as determined by structures is no less objectionably reductionist 
than an individualism which treats society, polity, and economy only as the 
aggregates of self-determined individual action”.
32 See for instance Wade (1988).
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CHAPTER III - THE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT
1. Introduction
The purpose of this Chapter is to describe the national and regional context in which 
the POLONORDESTE and its integrated rural development projects took place. The 
central issue of this chapter to give an appreciation of the political and institutional 
constraints on political action and the importance of existing institutional pattern in 
shaping the political behaviour of policy-makers and the policy process. The first 
important question is why the policy reform was undertaken or what political 
conditions lead to a decision to implement policy reform. This political and 
institutional context helps also to explain why the policy met the fate that it did.
On March 31, 1964, a military coup overthrew President Goulart and inaugurated 
the longest period of ostensible authoritarian rule in Brazil. The chapter will present, 
firstly, a brief general account of economic and political changes in Brazil between 
1964 and 1985. Although our focus in this chapter is mainly political and 
institutional, we must note as well the economic legitimation strategies of the post- 
1964 regime. After 1974, with the gradual political opening of the regime1, the 
influence of the technocrats declined and the military began to cultivate its regional 
and social bases more systematically. When the deteriorating economic situation 
undermined the resources and therefore the power of the State itself, the Brazilian 
regime also began seriously addressing the underlying economic difficulties. In 
these circumstances, it may be political considerations, and in particular the desire 
to restore State control and authority which induce a programme of policy reform. 
According to Ames (1987:148-149), the survival strategies available to the regime
1 Here, I am using Collier's definition of "regime", which "comprises the formal and informal "rules 
of the game" for political succession (coups, coups within coups, election, military selection, etc.); 
political decision making (open-competitive, closed-bureaucratic); basis of support (inclusive or 
exclusive); and dominant modes of social control (repression, co-optation, formal-legal). The 
"regime" is typically distinguished from the particular incumbents who occupy government roles, 
the political coalitions that supports these incumbents, and the public policies they adopt. A 
change of regimes is thus identified by a major disjuncture in the nature of the rules of the game 
for political succession, decision making, representation, and control (Grindle, 1987:60; see also 
Collier, 1979:402-3).
implied a strategic coalition, and each coalition required a distinctive pattern of 
policy outputs. The goal of all these survival strategies was "popularity" for the 
military; the strategies themselves answer the question: "Popularity with whom?"
The second part of this chapter introduces a brief historical analysis of federal 
government policies in the Brazilian North-East The strategic political motivation of 
the military regime.to deal with two of the biggest problems of the rural North-East 
through POLONORDESTE -  poverty and lack of agricultural modernization -  was 
its search for legitimacy and political support. The electoral support from North-East 
elites was critical to the electoral cycles of 1978 and 1982. We should note that this 
period coincide with the elaboration and implementation of the programme and this 
fact is important to explain its outcome.
2. The National Context: Transition to Democracy and Decline of Bureaucracy 
Control Hegemony
Brazil has the physical size (8.5 million square kilometres), the population (150 
million) and the natural resources to become a major power2. Even though it is still 
viewed as an underdeveloped country, its economy was the eighth largest in the 
western world at the end of the 1980s. Brazil's potential for eminence has been 
evident for a long time, but the fulfilment of that potential has constantly been 
frustrated. According to Bruneau (1982:56) this unfulfilled potential provided 
justification for the military take-over in 1964, as the military was persuaded that the 
government of Joao Goulart was leading the country to ruin.
The aim of the coup according to the swiftly issued First Institutional Act, was "the 
restoration of internal order and the international prestige of the country". That 
constitutional rupture represented an ending of the era of democratic politics that
2 This potential was recognised, for example, in a 25 page article on Brazil (The Economist, April 25, 
1987), where Brazil was considered to be "the unstoppable colossus of the South; a major power 
already; the first big Third World Country knocking on the door of the club of developed democracies; 
and a potential United States in the next century".
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had begun in 1945. The coup and its proposal for an authoritarian regime found its 
ideological postulates in the Doctrine of National Security3 and Development. As 
Bruneau (1982:59) puts it:
"The doctrine assumes the presence of internal enemies working in conjunction with 
international communism to subvert the state; considers economic development vital in order 
to create national power; emphasises the nation and therefore is intolerant of 'unreliable' 
elements within it; sees power an indivisible; and firmly believes in Brazil as a future world 
power".
The economic goal was to establish an irreversible process of capitalist 
development in the country, based upon the political alliance of three internal 
groups which supported the military: large sections of the national, industrial and 
agrarian bourgeoisie, the traditional rural oligarchies and the middle class. A 
dynamic of total control, in which the internal security apparatus assumed a 
commanding role, led to an abuse of power, arbitrary imprisonment, widespread 
torture, and the suppression of freedom of expression. The military arrested activists 
on the left, such as student leaders, labour union leaders, organisers of Catholic 
groups, and rural union and peasant league organisers. The repression was most 
severe in the North-East, where the peasant leagues and the recently legitimised 
rural labour unions were cracked down upon. Some peasant organisers suffered 
torture, while others simply disappeared, victims of summary execution.
The democratic experience of 1945-1964 was, from the time of Brazil's 
independence in 1822, somewhat unusual4. No long tradition of democratic 
participation had to be rolled back, since the country had been accustomed to 
authoritarian regimes of one sort or another. Further, there is no tradition in Brazil of 
autonomous groups and movements challenging the power structure; civil society
3 The conspirators shared a strongly anti-Communist view developed in the military's Escola Superior 
de Guerra (Higher W ar College), modelled on the U.S. National W ar College. The Cuban Revolution 
stimulated the Brazilian military to apply the theory of "internal war", where the primary threat was 
defined as coming not from external invasion, but from leftist labour unions, intellectuals, peasant 
unions, clerics, and university students ((Skidmore, 1988:4).
4 The anti-Communist view was not new in Brazil. In 1954 President Getulio Vargas had been driven 
to suicide by a military conspiracy similar to that against Goulart. Vargas, who had earlier been 
Brazil's president from 1930 to 1945 (the last eight years in authoritarian regime) had returned to the 
presidency by popular vote in 1951 with nationalist and populist policies.
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was weak and largely unstructured, so few strong groups or associations had to be 
disbanded in 1964.
Historically, one of the reasons for Brazil's lack of social mobilisation is the fact that, 
before 1964, its political parties only slowly broadened their base of support. 
According to Martinez-Alier and Boito Junior (1977:155), this lack of interests in 
party politics, which is clearly related to the history of local politics in Brazil, seems 
to have been reinforced by the growing limitations imposed on the political process 
by the post-1964 governments and their repercussions at the local level. The 
growing restrictions on local autonomy and budgets had a consequence that many 
mayors belonging to the opposition party, once elected and dependent thus of the 
generosity of the appointed state governors, switched to the government party.
However, from the late 1950s until 1964 there was a growing awareness among 
some politicians, including President Goulart and many in the opposition, that 
institutional impediments to mobilisation and democratisation had to be eliminated. 
As Bruneau (1982:57) stated, they strove to encourage political participation by 
mobilising the working class in the rural and urban areas to change the institutional 
structures. They hoped that this mobilisation would result in a broader power base 
for Goulart and strengthen the power of the president. The church also participated 
in this mobilisation by means of the CNBB (National Conference of Brazilian 
Bishops), the universities, rural unions, and the Basic Education Movement (MEB). 
However, mobilisation and agitation undermined the established institutional order 
without having the capacity to change it.
The military, with a great deal of civilian support, moved in to rule provisionally until 
it could be sure that populism, “demagoguery”, and general agitation had been laid 
to rest and that Brazil was safely on the road to economic stability and a 
continuation of the existing socio-economic structure. In effect, the military came to 
occupy the State apparatus and consolidated its powers throughout that apparatus 
and the whole of society.
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After the 1964 military coup, the problem for economic planners in Brazil was to 
bring about the rapid recovery of an economy which had been operating far below 
its potential. The absence of any tradition of macroeconomic planning in the 
bureaucracy, combined with this growth imperative necessity, did not permit the 
adoption of decentralisation which might have led to a slow process of relaxing 
institutional rigidity. The scarcity of people with experience of such policies 
demanded that the available personnel be concentrated in a few of the most crucial 
organisations in the official set-up, and these became the decision-making centres. 
The conflicts between the objectives and goals of the various proposed policies 
could not be resolved between social groups and regions without threat to the 
political regime. It was therefore necessary to train technical staff to make decisions 
on what the stability of the economic system would be in the long run (Hadded, 
1978).
In the period 1964-1974, we are dealing with what O'Donnell (1979) calls a 
"bureaucratic-authoritarian" regime. The bureaucracy is, thus, the most dynamic 
element of the centralised State. In conditions where most mobilisation is 
discouraged, the new role of the bureaucracy is to promote a surrogate mobilisation 
around the bureaucratic goals of the ideology of national economic growth and 
national security. According to Foweraker (1981:230), "planning, regional and 
sectoral agencies practise the ideology of development, while the military apparatus 
and specialist police and investigatory organs practise the ideology of national 
security"; and, the two practices were "conscientiously linked". In practice the 
civilian and military bureaucracies in Brazil after 1964 "cannot be distinguished".
In economic terms the military has succeeded spectacularly in attaining for the 
country the status of a major power. With the exception of the first three years 
(1964-1966), the post-1964 governments gave enormous impetus to modernisation. 
The Costa e Silva (which replaced Castelo Branco in 1967) and Medici (1969-1974) 
administrations implemented a brutal repression, but they also presided over the 
beginnings of Brazil's economic “miracle”. According to Ames (1987:143), during 
this period, growth rates were enough to grant the regime an important claim to
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legitimacy. With the gross national product increasing by more than 10 percent 
annually, the government appeared to enjoy considerable popularity, particularly 
among the rapidly growing middle and upper middle classes constituting its primary 
clientele. Regime propagandists had no difficulty linking rapid economic growth with 
social peace.
The government pursued an essentially capitalist approach in which it fortified 
markets, improved the functioning of the price system, and increased the State's 
role in the economy. The State played an enormous role in the economy as a 
manager by means of fiscal measures or outright regulations, as an economic agent 
through the ownership of banks and other financial institutions, and as a producer in 
the steel and petroleum industries. If there is some debate about whether the post- 
1968 growth was really attributable to government policies or was merely a 
continuation of the boom-and-bust5 syndrome of Brazilian economic history, there is 
no debate at all, concerning the huge role of the State in the economy.
This regime change also had important implications for the rural sector. It inhibited, 
because it was no longer politically necessary, any structural transformation in the 
pattern of land use. Within the new regime a carefully planned, but ineffective, land 
reform programme appeared: the Land Statute of November 30, 1964, was the 
agrarian reform legislation. It provided means by which the State could expropriate 
unused, privately held land in return for indemnification. The programme of land 
redistribution, although adequately legislated, staffed and funded, did not enjoy 
sustained support and was opposed by the landed elites of the coast and sertSo.
Although adequately legislated and staffed since the "Land Statute" of November 
1964, reform had not enjoyed sustained support and was rejected by the landed
5 The old view of Brazil was as a boom-or-bust commodity producer. That view originated in the 
sixteenth century, when sugar boomed, opening up the country's North-East: sugar dwindled as an 
export earner over the next couple of centuries when faced with fierce competition from the West 
Indies. Gold came next, being discovered in the southern state of Minas Gerais in the eighteenth 
century. As the gold ran out, coffee took over, accounting, by middle of the nineteenth century, for 
half of Brazil's export earnings. By the end of the century Amazon rubber was all the fashion, 
symbolised by the rubber baron's extravagances. The boom fizzled out when an English botanist 
smuggled a seedling from an Amazon rubber tree to Malaya, where it thrived much more cheaply 
than in Brazil (The Economist, 1987:4).
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elites. However, if the legislation and institutional framework were rarely used to 
change the structure of landholding in the North-East hinterland or other rural areas, 
it provided the means by which the State could respond to specific instances of rural 
protest with gradual land expropriation and entitlements of land, especially in State- 
sponsored colonisation projects on the Northern frontier in the Amazonia.
According to Martins (1990:249), the coup of 1964 and the land tenure policy of the 
military regime struck down the peasant movement, the revolt in the countryside. 
The message sent to Congress by General Castelo Branco proposing constitutional 
reform to allow approval of the Land Statute clearly established what the aim of the 
land reform would be under the military: to decapitate the peasant movement. That 
is, to separate rural workers from left-wing political groups such as the Communist 
Party (PCB) and the Peasant Leagues, which were deeply and actively involved in 
the conflicts, providing them with political leadership and a sense of historical 
perspective. The dictatorship gave a new military and geopolitical direction to the 
struggle, in an attempt to by-pass the rural workers, while at the same time via fiscal 
incentives, transforming those who control large-scale capital into landowners.
For the rural proletariat, minimum wages, social security and other labour legislation 
provide the legal apparatus and institutional rationale for solving problems of 
working conditions and wage disputes. Similarly, access to credit, infrastructure 
projects, extension services, and rural amenities such as education and health 
services for rural small holders, all placed resources in the hands of the State to 
manage rural protest and co-opt rural dissidents. Thus, there was an increasing 
belief that the State was becoming the "new patron" (Grindle, 1986; Soifer and 
Howe, 1982; Dias, 1978).
Two principal objectives of modernisation strategies were to transform rural 
technology and production relations in such a way as to reduce conflict in the 
countryside and, at the same time, to remove agricultural bottlenecks to rapid 
industrialisation (Bicalho and Hoefle, 1990). The benefits of subsidised
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technological innovation and capital investment were heavily concentrated in large- 
scale enterprises, reinforcing the inequitable distribution of rural income and wealth.
The strong bias of modernisation policies towards export crops and large enterprise 
was modified slightly in the 1970s with the re-emergence of severe urban food 
supply problems. Special credit and investment programmes were introduced to 
capitalise production and intensify commodity relations in small-scale family 
agriculture, traditionally a major source of domestic food staples. In the 70s, the 
discussion on the land tenure system and the need or appropriateness of political 
structural reforms was put back: the agrarian problem was no longer the existence 
of the "latifundio" but the inefficiency of the "minifundio".
The "conservative modernisation"6 strategy embodies the view that the productivity 
of traditional producers can be increased by developing and inducing the adoption 
of new industrialised agricultural technology, regardless of their size or conditions of 
access to resources, because of the assumption that technology is "neutral" to 
scale. Based on this assumption, both "latifundio" and "minifundio" can potentially 
benefit equally from technological innovation, transforming themselves into modern 
capitalist enterprises. The implication of this strategy is that agrarian reform is 
unnecessary on economic grounds, thus preserving the conservative alliances 
between the authoritarian military state and "latifundio" landlords. Indeed, the so- 
called "conservative modernisation" government policy, has been understood to 
have concentrated holdings and forced people off the land7.
6 This approach, in which subsidised institutional credit was the main agricultural policy, 
predominated from 1965 to 1979 (See Kageyama and Graziano da Silva, 1987 and Martine,
1989).
7 In 1984, according to the Movement of Landless People, 4 percent of the people owned 67 per cent 
of the cultivable land, while the poorest 71 percent of people were squeezed on to 10.9 percent of the 
land. These small farmers feed Brazil. Of the food staples, they provided almost 28 percent of the 
rice, over 55 per cent of the maize, over 66 per cent of the beans, and almost 78 percent of manioc. 
But over two-thirds of them live below the poverty line, receiving only half of the statutory minimum 
wage or less. Although Brazil is the world's second largest agricultural exporter, malnutrition causes 
almost seven out of every ten deaths among children under five years of age (MacDonald, 
1991:3).See also Graziano da Silva (1982 and 1987).
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In 1973 and 1974, Brazil's military regime experienced two shocks. The first blow 
was the dramatic increase in oil prices following the Arab-lsraeli conflict. The oil 
crisis exposed the vulnerability of the "economic miracle" that had legitimated the 
military and made Brazil the toast of the developed world. The second blow was 
the regime's electoral defeat at the end of 19748. The stunning electoral defeat 
suffered by the military government signified a growing rejection by Brazilians of 
the military regime itself. The 1974 electoral campaign was the first time the 
opposition was able to make its case about the gap between rich and poor, the 
deterioration of urban health conditions, the rights of workers, and other issues.
Civil society also began to stir. The dualistic expression "State versus civil 
society" became quite common in Brazil, by virtue of the struggle against 
authoritarian rule during the 1970s.
The years 1974 to 1985, are what Stepan (1988) calls the "democratising period" in 
which new movements within civil society presented challenges to the authoritarian 
State. For Stepan (1988:4-5), "civil society" means "that arena where manifold 
movements (such as the church, women's groups, neighbourhood associations and 
intellectual currents) and civic organizations from all classes (such as trade unions, 
entrepreneurs, the press, the Association of Brazilian Lawyers) attempt to constitute 
themselves in an ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves 
and advance their interests".
However, Stepan explicitly treats "civil society" and "political society" as distinct 
categories. For him, "political society" in a democratising set means "that arena in 
which the polity specifically arranges itself for political contestation to gain control
8 As part of the measures geared to controlling the free play of the country's politic all forces, the 
military government by the Institutional Act No. 2 of 1965 abolished all previous political parties 
and increased considerable the power of the executive. Although the later constitutions contained 
the principle of a multiple-party system, the new electoral laws established norms for the creation 
of new parties which in practice only permitted a two-party systems. Thus, in the 1974 election 
the electorate had the choice between two institutional parties: The Alianga Renovadora Nacional 
(ARENA), the government party, and the Movimento Democr£tico Brasileiro (MDB). Despite the 
formal restrictions and the pressures exercised and privileges enjoyed by the government party 
throughout the electoral campaign, the MDB obtained an impressive victory in the most 
important states. Not only did the MDB obtain the legislative majority in these states but it 
succeeded in winning federal deputies and senators in areas in which the ARENA had never 
thought it would lose (Martinez-Alier and Boito Junior: 1977:148).
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over public power and the State apparatus". Thus, a full democratic transition must 
involve political society, and the composition and consolidation of a democratic 
polity must entail serious thought and action about those core institutions of 
democratic political society - political parties, elections, electoral rules, political 
leadership, intraparty alliances, and legislatures - through which "civil society" can 
constitute itself politically to select and monitor democratic government. As Stepan 
(1988:6) points out:
"In this [democratising] period civil society almost never came to the defence of political 
society. The regime's strategists were understandably happy with this pattern of behaviour of 
the opposition that supported liberation more than democratisation”.
In this process of controlled liberation directed towards a conservative democratic 
system, there have been tremendous vacillations and ambiguities as the military 
sought to remove itself from direct power (and thus from blame), while maintaining 
its prestige. According to Bruneau (1982:64-65), the causes of the opening are 
varied and interact with one another in very complex ways indeed. For him, 
legitimacy, and its loss, is at the forefront, since it is a problem for any military 
regime which cannot base its right to rule on the interests of the people as reflected 
in elections. Besides questions dealing directly with legitimacy, there are those 
related to the increasingly difficult problem within the military, as an institution, of 
maintaining unity after sixteen years in power. These are related in turn to the 
tremendous changes which took place in Brazilian society during the period of 
military rule. By the early 1980s there was a large middle class, a highly qualified 
industrial working class, even a large entrepreneurial group worried about the huge 
State role in the economy and society. The modernisation of society has resulted in 
illegal strikes by workers, protests in the media and by entrepreneurs through 
whatever political channels they can find, and the formation of groups, where the 
church has been active.
During the most severe repression, the Catholic Church defined a new role for itself 
as spokesman of the ignored and repressed majority of the population and was 
involved in the protection of political prisoners and the denunciation of State
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violence. According to Bruneau (1982:67), because few other groups or 
organizations have been allowed to exist, the church, with its elaborate structure, 
was sought out and by and obliged to become involved with elements such as 
protest groups, students, and political parties, which sought protection and 
legitimacy. In the Geisel years, it began to achieve both tighter co-ordination at the 
top, in the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB)9 and at the grass roots 
level through its Base Christian Communities (CEBs - Comunidades Eclesiais de 
Base)10.
Land tenure was a vital area of concern and of the church's involvement. Since 
other institutions of civil society were either absent or unable to function effectively, 
the church offered the only resource for many of the landless and their would-be 
organisers. The church first became involved in the Amazon region, where land was 
rapidly becoming concentrated, and the people being evicted had no means of 
defence and no one to raise a protest except the church. In 1971, Dorn Pedro 
Casadaliga, Bishop of Sao Felix do Araguaia in Mato Grosso, described and 
analysed the situation in his diocese in a 125 page document ("A Church in the 
Amazon in Conflict with the Latifundia and Social Marginalization"). Once attention 
was drawn to the land tenure issue, it became clear that the same problem was 
endemic throughout Brazil. In 1975 a Comissao de Terras (Land Commission) was 
founded linked to the CNBB for the purposes of assessing reform programmes and 
publicising and denouncing cases of injustice, and to encourage diocesan groups to 
organise legal assistance and undertake information campaigns aimed at peasants 
and pastoral agents. In 1977 the commission, now called the Comissao Pastoral de 
Terras (Pastoral Land Commission), convoked the First National Assembly on the 
Land Pastoral in order to develop further strategy.
9 The National conference of Brazilian Bishops, founded in 1952, is a church organization that 
acts socially and politically to implement the conclusions reached in the periodic synods of 
bishops.
10 The Base Christian Communities are small groups of local people who organise around an 
urban or rural parish. Stepan (1973:144) describes the CEBs as "Church grass roots communities 
which have been not only an alternative form of cultic organisation but also 'schools' for 
educating the exploited in their inalienable human rights"
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The bishops, assembled for the eighteenth General Assembly of the CNBB in 
February 1980, overwhelmingly approved a scathing critique of Brazil's land tenure 
structure and government policies which, in their view, aggravated this situation.
The bishops’ position, as reported in this document and as supported by their 
institutes and publications, brought them into direct conflict with the regime. By the 
early 1980's, the political opening on the national level emboldened some landless 
peasants and their leaders to organise and demand land redistribution. These 
groups were often linked to the radical Catholic clergy, who in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, were especially active in the Amazon basin, the Centre-West, and the 
North-East (Bruneau, 1982:85. See also Martins, 1990).
After 1974, the influence of the technocrats declined. With its shocking defeat in the 
1974 election, with civilian pressure for liberation mounting, and with the increase in 
oil prices threatening the "economic miracle", the regime embarked on a gradual 
political "opening" (abertura). The newly installed administration of General Geisel 
(1974-1978) had already committed itself to a gradual democratisation, but after 
these twin shocks it was plain the military would need a new claim to legitimacy if it 
wanted a significant role in a pluralistic political future. Since formal withdrawal from 
power was never intended to end military influence in policy making, the military 
began to cultivate its regional and social bases much more systematically. 
Clientelistic practices increased sharply (Ames, 1987; Cammack,1982).
By 1975, Geisel began talking about social policy. According to Ames 
(1987:147), the president went on to link socio-economic liberation to the post-oil 
crises economic difficulties, and boasted of his success in avoiding recession 
and unemployment and even continuing to innovate in social policy. In a 
televised speech in August 1, 1975, the president left little doubt of his intention:
"Relaxation should not be only political, nor even predominantly political. What we seek 
for the nation is an integrated and humanistic development, capable of joining all sectors 
of the national community - political, social and economic (Cited by Ames, 1987:147).
Policy was inseparable from partisan activity. In a speech to the leadership of the 
government party in October 1975, the president emphasised his desire for an
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electoral victory by the party. Three elements, according to Geisel, were crucial 
for an ARENA triumph11: the programme of the party, its leadership, and the 
deeds of the government. The president's commitment to social "abertura" was 
widely accepted by Geisel's successor, Joao Figueiredo (1979-1984). Even 
more than Geisel, Figueiredo's speeches stressed wage increases, expansion of 
education, programmes to reach the poor (especially in rural areas), and the 
central role of agriculture (Ames, 1987:148).
Starting with Geisel’s administration and continuing through Figueiredo's 
government, the Brazilian "opening" had a strong element of deliberate 
decompression (later rebaptized normalisation and eventually redemocratization). 
According to Lamounier (1990:90), it amounted to a recognition among the regime's 
power holders that an indefinite monopoly of power by means of hegemonic party 
would not be viable. The opposition seems on the whole to have evaluated the 
situation correctly and to have sought to explore the political spaces that appeared 
at each moment. The formidable impact of the 1974 elections helped it to organise 
under the label of the Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro (PMDB) for 
electoral purposes, while at the same time establishing bridges among a variety of 
social movements and associations then increasingly (re)politicising. As pointed out 
Lamounier (1990:90), the government also benefited in many ways:
"Decompression helped [...the government] to contain the growing autonomy of the 
repressive apparatus, which had seriously compromised ... the country's image abroad. [...] 
the government could capitalise on the political benefits of an atmosphere of progressive 
'normalcy', as if exchanging losses of legitimacy arising from discontent with its past for gains 
based on the increasing credibility of its intentions as to the future. Paradoxically, the erosion 
of authoritarian legitimacy since 1974 amounted to a revitalisation of government authority - 
since such authority was thus invested in the role of conductor of the decompression."
11 President Geisel, defining in 1975 the role of ARENA, was able to say: "it gives political 
support to the government; it approves measures in the legislature, and it popularises 
government activity". With the representative function of Congress severely compromised by the 
exclusion of spokesmen for majority interests, and the legislative function in all major areas 
taken over by the executive branch, the continued commitment of successive electoral victory as 
a source of legitimisation has led, after an initial period of hostility to the "professional 
politicians", to a resurgence of clientelism and manipulation of government patronage for 
electoral ends (Cammack, 1982:61).
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According to Lamounier (1990:89), the gradual and peaceful Brazilian "opening" 
seems unique by virtue of the fact that it was essentially an opening through 
elections. It was not a result of sharp mass mobilisation and was not precipitated by 
dramatic or external events. A gradual accumulation of pressures was channelled 
through the electoral process. Election results functioned as indicators of the degree 
to which the authoritarian regime was losing legitimacy and, in turn, helped to 
aggregate further pressures against it. In 1984 the authoritarian regime was greatly 
weakened but not to the extent of decomposition. The erosion of authoritarian 
legitimacy from 1974 amounted to a revitalisation of government authority because it 
was invested in the role of conductor of political liberation. However, "abertura" had 
to mean more than just political liberation. If the military wanted to prevent social 
unrest and avoid military intervention in future government, political relaxation 
without a social component could not be secure. As Ames points out,
"...the military was never ideologically monolithic, and the inevitable fragmentation 
accompanying the long years of military rule further reduced the unity of military thinking. 
Still, most officers were strongly anti-Communist, pro-Western, pro-capitalist and anti­
populist. Military officers were intent that a new civilian regime should not reverse the gains 
of the post-1964 period. They did not want to see the politicians they had overthrown return 
to power. They definitely did not want too much probing into the Brazilian version of the "dirty 
war" against subversion. [...] To the degree they could induce the population to support 
conservative politicians, and to the degree the military commanded respect, civilian rule held 
less danger." (Ames, 1987:149)
The party reform of 1979 ended the compulsory two-party structure established by 
the first military government in 1965. The Figueiredo Government, knowing that the 
continuity of electoral disputes within the two-party framework would inevitably lead 
to a major defeat, resorted to its majority in the Congress and in the Senate and 
changed the legislation, precipitating the return to a multiparty system. According to 
Lamounier (1990:91), the ambiguity of the opening was brought to the surface. On 
one hand, the procedure was formally impeccable, since the government did have 
the majority, and the reform was demanded even by some sectors of the opposition; 
on the other, the evident intention was to fragment the opposition party, the PMDB, 
in order to keep the agenda under control for longer and to set the conditions under 
which the new party structure would be formed.
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In 1982 there were direct elections at municipal and gubernatorial level. In the 1982 
elections, in a last desperate attempt to maintain eroding national support, the 
government rammed through the federal Congress before the election an electoral 
change which took advantage of the traditional political system prevalent throughout 
the less developed North-East. The new law effectively prohibited any kind of 
alliance among the opposition parties and required that votes be cast on a strictly 
party basis at all levels (councillors, mayors, state and federal deputies, governors 
and senators). Care was thus taken to avoid a serious defeat for the government, 
since the election would affect the composition of the Electoral College that would 
choose the next president. As Hoefle observed (1985:28), many national leaders 
were from the North and the North-East and they were perfectly well aware that local 
loyalties override any higher-level ones. The ruling national politicians gambled 
correctly that North-Eastern voters would cast their ballots for higher level 
candidates of the government if they wanted to vote for the choice for mayor and 
councillor12.
The North-East proved to be the salvation of the PDS (Partido Democrata Social, 
the new government party which replaced ARENA in 1979) in the election. The 
small-town politics of the country were of great significance for maintaining the 
conservative regime in power, as was clearly evident in the 1978 and 1982 
elections. In these elections, the interior votes outweighed the votes of the capitals, 
and the North-East with its numerous small states helped maintain the appearance 
of a government majority at the state and federal level (Hoefle, 1985:27-8).
After the 1982 election, popular support for the military government rapidly eroded 
to the point that the opposition came to power. A new civilian president, Tancredo 
Neves, was selected in January 1985, by the Electoral College. Though Neves
12 In an analysis of the Brazilian voter in democratic transition, Mettenheim (1990:39-40) shows 
that the different levels of campaign participation across Brazil indicate the uneven development 
of mass politics and mass belief system in the country. The higher levels of participation in rural 
areas may give impression of a participatory rural political culture. However, the prevalence of 
face-to-face types of participation among rural respondents (except media exposure) suggest, 
along with other data and the secondary literature, that clientelism and patronage were the 
principal realities of rural politics, not democratic forms of participation.
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represented the opposition, his PMDB (Partido Movimento Democratico Brasileiro) 
party had grown out of the “tamed” opposition MDB (Movimento Democratico 
Brasileiro), permitted in the earlier years of the military regime. During the 
campaign it became increasingly apparent that the opposition would win the 
presidency and many prominent North-Eastern politicians gradually cut their ties 
with the PDS. These "dissidents" established a new party, the Partido da Frente 
Liberal (PFL), and they formed a tactical alliance with the opposition parties which 
gave them a majority in the Electoral College. Jose Sarney, the former civilian head 
of the governing party (he had defected to the opposition in 1984) and an important 
North-Eastern politician, member of the original PDS dissident group, was his vice- 
president.
During the presidential contest, in their haste to assure victory in the Electoral 
College, the national opposition leaders allied themselves with the whole 
conservative leadership of the North-East. The opposition alliance represented a 
"well constructed articulation of interests" among the elites in Brazil. At the same 
time it satisfied the opposition as it was thought that it could unite them and bring 
them to the power. However, Neves died (in April, 1985) before taking office and 
was replaced by his vice-president. The Sarney government inherited a public 
sector in deficit, the largest absolute international debt of any Third World Country 
(US$ 112 billion), a high rate of unemployment and inflation at 250 percent per year. 
Even before the death of Tancredo Neves, a number of North-Eastern politicians 
were awarded ministries and other important government posts in return for support 
rendered during the presidential campaign. The Brazilian authoritarian regime was 
ending by peaceful means.
A new constitution was drafted during 1987 and 1988. The lack of interest in 
promoting agrarian reform was evident in the new federal constitution. During the 
Constituent Assembly of 1987/88, the Uniao Democratica Rural (UDR), representing 
the powerful large landowners lobby of the South and South-East, was able to 
empty the agrarian reform of any practical meaning. "Productive land" was defined 
so broadly that it would have been difficult to expropriate unused forested lands let
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alone ranch land. Representatives of the conservative political parties of the North 
and North-East helped this lobby's cause by voting in block to protect their own 
interests. The empty pastures of the North-East are, thus, treated as "productive 
land" and cannot be expropriated. Without an agrarian reform through legal 
channels the only alternative left open is land invasions which, like the early 1960s, 
would usher in a return to political instability, repression of worker and peasant 
movements and more conservative modernisation which would complete the 
process of peasant expropriation.
The first fully democratic presidential election for 26 years was held in 1989. In an 
atmosphere of growing political confidence, the traditional parties were pushed to 
the side in these elections. Against all expectations, the contest became one 
between the right-wing candidate Fernando Collor (a former governor of Alagoas 
state, located in Northeast region) and the left-wing candidate Luis Inacio da Silva 
("Lula"). Lula is the most famous union leader in the post-1964 period. He emerged 
as a nation-wide workers' leader from the metalworkers' strikes of 1978, 1979 and 
1980. He was one of the founders of the new "Workers' Party" (PT) and its president 
for some years. He was elected as a Congressman in the 1986 elections. In the 
1989 presidential elections he was the Workers' Party candidate. In a run-off 
election, Collor defeated Lula by a margin of just over 5 percent, and took office in 
March 1990.
The next section will discuss Federal policies for the North-East region, and the 
increasing role of federal government intervention in undermining the power of the 
North-Eastern traditional elites. However, as we shall see later, it does not mean 
State reconsideration of the situation of Brazil's disenfranchised peasantry. Rather, 
these interventions represent attempted solutions to the "agrarian question" under 
conditions of rapid economic growth, industrialisation and urbanisation and the need 
to create an environment conductive to the expansion of the capitalism in the 
countryside. The incorporation of the rural poor into its economic model would be 
especially effective in the military government’s search for legitimacy.
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3. The Regional Scene and Local Politics
The North-East is, by official designation, a nine state region of Brazil13, with an 
area of 1,542,271 square kilometres, about 19% of the total area of the country. 
Possessing a climate typical of equatorial and tropical regions, the North-East 
presents quite wide variations in rainfall, vegetation and fertility, and may 
conveniently, according to Andrade (1979:9) be broken down into four subregions: 
The Zona da Mata, with a hot, humid climate and two well defined seasons, one 
rainy the other dry; the Sertao, also hot, but dry, where droughts have periodically 
destroyed the vegetation, wreaked havoc on the animals, and forced the people to 
migrate (this climatic diversity has produced, since the colonial period, two diverse 
systems of agriculture - sugar-cane and cattle raising); the third, transition zone is 
called the Agreste, with its small land-holdings and mixed farming, with some 
stretches of land almost as humid as the Zona da Mata, and others as dry as the 
Sertao; the last zone Middle North, is a transitional zone from the North-East to the 
Amazon region and the Central Plateau, where population density has traditionally 
been low. However, in recent decades this zone have been experiencing the strain 
of rapid colonisation and violent conflict over land ownership.
The North-East is still an area with acute problems of extreme poverty and 
starvation. According to data from IBGE, through the Pesquisa Nacional por 
Amostra de DomicNio (Domestic Census) relating to 1990, the North-East, with 21.8 
million poor, had 55% of the poor of the country - 63% of the rural poor and 48% of 
the urban - as well as, the largest incidence of poverty - 51% of the population. In 
the rural area of the North-East this number increases to 69% (See Albuquerque, 
1993:56-58). Poverty in the agricultural sector is one of the most important factors
13 It includes Alagoas, Pernambuco, Paraiba, Rio Grande do Norte, Cear£, MaranhSo, Piaui, Bahia 
and Sergipe. The traditional North-East included only the first five of these states. In 1936, with the 
creation of the "Drought Polygon", this area was expanded. A small section of Minas Gerais also 
became part of the polygon for the purpose of Federal assistance. The "polygon" is the area in the 
North-East most susceptible to severe climatic variations and sporadic drought conditions and that is 
eligible for federal funds for drought relief.
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inducing rural-urban migration since 1950. This situation is aggravated in the Sertao 
and Agreste by the periodic droughts that devastate the land, kill the cattle, crops, 
and dislocate hundreds of thousands of impoverished peasants and landless 
agricultural labourers in mass migrations to coastal and more hospitable agricultural 
areas.
Until 1959, the underlying causes of the plight of the North-East had commonly been 
viewed as environmental rather than economic and social, most intervention having 
been in response to specific droughts. In this period, State intervention took place 
basically through the creation of regional agencies, and was characterised by a lack 
of co-ordination of State actions. Such was the case with the National Department of 
Works Against the Drought (DNOCS) founded in 194514. Such also was the case 
with the Bank of North-East (BNB), created in 1952 and the Alcohol and Sugar-cane 
National Institute (IAA), created in 1933.
Apart from the construction of hydroelectric facilities, reservoirs, dams and roads 
(the major form of Federal investment in the semi-arid interior) and the continuous 
support given to the big planters through the BNB and IAA, the commitment of the 
Federal Government to development in the North-East was practically nil. According 
to Galvao (1988), this was in sharp contrast to its direct involvement through 
massive investments in big industrial establishments, and subdization of private 
industrial initiatives in the most industrialised areas of the country.
During this time the political arena in the North-East had been characterised by 
opposition between the sugar-cane bourgeoisie and the cattle raising oligarchy. 
However, the latter traditionally dominated the local institutions of the State, and 
federal intervention through the DNOCS reinforced their oligarchic power. DNOCS 
had concentrated on the building of dams (acudes) and drilling of wells for irrigation,
14 The increasing dissatisfaction with the lack of action taken against the drought, considered 
officially as a national disaster since 1877, and with limited success of the measures which had been 
implemented led to the creation of the "SuperintendSncia dos Estudos e Obras Contra os efeitos das 
Secas" in 1906. It was renamed two years later as the "Inspectoria de Obras Contra as Secas" 
(IOCS), and again as the "Inspectoria de Obras Contra as Secas" in 1918, with its headquarters in 
Rio de Janeiro. After the 1945 drought IFOCS was given the present name, and its headquarters was 
transferred from Rio to Fortaleza (Hall, 1978)
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and on the building of non-paved roads. The creation of 'labour fronts' for the 
building of roads and dams in periods of severe drought15 was another aspect of 
DNOCS activities. Oliveira (1981:170) exemplifies how these occurred:
" Most of the dams and wells were located in the lands of cattle-raising farmers ... The roads 
... in practice benefited only the cotton economy: in fact, cotton was the only product of the 
Northeast hinterland to be sold outside the region in significant volum e.... wages in the 
labour fronts were often paid in kind, wage goods being bought by the DNOCS from the 
landowner at a high price. Applicants recommended by the coroneis were given priority in 
the fronts, which thus became the object of clientelistic practices. Payments to fictitious 
workers or even funds of non-existent works, made available by the DNOCS, were also 
appropriated by local oligarchy, which had in effect, complete control of the government 
agency in the region.”
Unlike the situation at the federal level, the oligarchic hold on the State in the North- 
East remained unchallenged. Political power presented a clear class content, and 
relations between the State and the subordinated classes were devoid of the 
ambiguities of the populist regime at the national level16. During this time, the State 
was nothing but an instrument of oppression used by the landowning class. Thus, 
when the League movement started, the only leaders who managed to succeed 
were those who spoke out openly against public power, a symbol of the complex of 
interests represented by the coroneis (Furtado, 1965; see also Page, 1972).
This process of increasing political awareness and activity had accelerated 
remarkably in the North-East during the ten years which preceded the military coup. 
For Furtado, this process - together with a strange paradox in agricultural 
development - were responsible for the revolutionary potential in the North-East in 
the early 1960s. This paradox consisted of the fact that, increased production 
aggravated the problem of economic inequality. As Furtado (1965:159) pointed out:
15 DNOCS became closely associated with what were know as the "drought industrialists", the 
industria da seca, a term used to describe anyone who exploited the drought situation for his own 
profit (Hall, 1978:8).
16 After 1937, there was rapid industrial growth in Brazil. During the Vargas government the urban 
proletariat became a principal political interest. Vargas through the use of government funds, public 
workers, and social welfare programmes, manipulated the working class in order to counterbalance 
traditional political powers, which were located primarily in the North-East. The working class, in 
accordance with the salaried middle class, professional people, middle-level military officers, public 
functionaries and bureaucrats, provided a firm basis for "populism", the political phenomenon that 
appeared during the Vargas years and provided the structure for Brazilian politics until the military 
coup of 1964 (Roett, 1972).
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"...in the Mata zone, expansion of the cane fields has brought even greater misery to the 
workers, depriving them of the possibility of producing their own food requirements. In the 
Agreste, valorisation of the stock-rearing industry has created pressure for a raise in the land 
rent paid by a worker whose productivity is stationary or declining. In the Sertao, improved 
conditions for expanding the cattle industry, created by efforts of the government, and 
increased cotton production with the aid of official financing, have allowed the population to 
increase, which requires a corresponding growth in food production on lands that are 
increasingly subject to climatic irregularities."
The growth between 1955 and 1964 of the Ligas Camponesas (Peasant Leagues) in 
the North-East (mainly in Pernambuco and Paraiba states), should be seen as a 
consequence of the overall situation of the peasantry. According to Galjart 
(1964:20), the leagues arose in a situation where the personal bond between 
peasant and landowner had become weaker or had disappeared, where the peasant 
found himself unprotected, and where his standard of living had fallen relatively and 
maybe even absolutely, he was willing to follow anybody who promised to improve 
his lot. It was a situation where there was room both for the power hungry and the 
morally indignant, and both had begun to organise the peasants.
Within the complex system of relations of production in the sugar-cane region the 
workers struggled against the landlords as proletarians (for wages) and as internal 
peasants (for land, and for elimination of the semi-compulsory forms of labour such 
as the cambao, an exchange of labour for usufruct rights). According to Oliveira 
(1981:171), pressures for the removal of the semi-peasants from the land and for 
the intensification of semi-compulsory labour increased social conflict to a point of 
high tension. The "pax agraria in the North-East" was disrupted, provoked by both 
the local politico-economic situation and by the economic expansion of the Centre- 
South into that area.
In the late 1950s, the explosive political and social situation of the North-East led to 
a major shift in the role of the central government in the region. In 1959, the North- 
East Development Superintendency (SUDENE) was created and the State adopted 
a new interventionist approach, characterised by a co-ordinated planning effort at all 
levels. The introduction of regional planning coupled with federal financing of 
industrial investment in the North-East, inaugurated a new and decisive stage in the 
process of economic integration of the region into the national capitalist system. The
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new stage was characterised not only by a new form of economic expansion of the 
Centre-South, based on direct industrial investment, but also by the transformation 
of the structure of the State in the region17.
After the creation of SUDENE, a regional policy of industrialisation was implemented 
based on the transfer of financial resources from developed regions to the North- 
East, via the mechanism of fiscal incentives. According to Ferreira (1984:77) 
industrial accumulation became the dynamic pole of the regional economy and the 
interests of the agrarian oligarchy had to be redefined. In this sense, agricultural 
development policy was re-oriented in order to stimulate the penetration of capital 
into rural areas, and was reduced almost entirely to supporting the frontier 
expansion and settlement programme in Maranhao and to financing large cattle and 
agro-industrial projects which would benefit the landowning class. This development 
strategy did not therefore seriously threaten the interests of the existing dominant 
agrarian class, especially when no substantial measures of agrarian reform were put 
in practice.
The defeat of populist and reformist forces in the 1964 coup, and the repression of 
rural labour movements, created the immediate preconditions for more ambitious 
modernisation policies and dictated their specific form. When order was restored to 
the North-East's interior through a process of massive labour repression in the rural 
areas, the regional problem lost much of its urgency. "The poorest area of the 
Western Hemisphere" become more a matter of rhetoric in the speeches of the 
Federal authorities than a pressing issue of public policy.
The need to integrate all regional plans into national planning activities was 
stressed in the Government Programme of Economic Action (PAEG), 1964-66, 
which was the economic programme of the first president of the post-1964 regime.
17 According to Oliveira (1981) SUDENE was created as an instrument of planned intervention, 
aimed at overcoming inter-regional class conflict and at the promotion of capitalist expansion of the 
Centre-South. For him, the objective of SUDENE "was to remove the cotton and cattle oligarchy from 
the state in the Northeast", which "interested, for completely different reasons, all social forces in the 
region; i.e., the popular classes, the local industrial bourgeoisie, the international associated 
bourgeoisie, and the popular classes of the Centre-South." See also Oliveira, 1977.
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The desire of the federal government to co-ordinate all planning activities resulted in 
an administrative reform law (February, 1967), which reorganised the federal 
bureaucracy, transferring responsibility for regional co-ordination and planning to a 
new Ministry of the Interior, which became the means of communication among all 
federal agencies operating in the North-East. While SUDENE retained its co­
ordinating role in terms of regional investment policy, it was administratively 
subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior.
The increasingly important role of the central government in planning and resource 
allocation signified SUDENE's subordination to national priorities and the virtual end 
of the regional autonomy which the agency enjoyed prior to the 1964 coup. 
According to Roett (1972:162),
"the growing political and administrative centralisation of the military regime precluded 
independence and real initiative by units on the periphery, particularly in the North-East, 
which had long been considered a potential danger from a national security perspective".
The two first military presidents, Castelo Branco (1964-67) and Costa e Silva (1967- 
69), had done little new for the North-East. Delfim Neto and his team saw their 
mission as reviving the national economy, which meant primarily the developed 
South-East. They saw no point in allocating large sums to an area where the return 
on investment was bound to be low.
When Garrastazu Medici assumed the presidency in 1969, the North-East 
presented an economic problem whose solution was far beyond the resources 
committed by any previous Brazilian government. No major region of Brazil could 
compare to the scale of misery in which most of 30 million North-Easters lived. In 
June, 1970, when a devastating drought struck the North-East, Medici flew to Recife 
and saw for himself the extent of the problem. His apparent shock at the situation of 
the drought-affected area was translated into an emotional speech in the SUDENE 
auditorium in Recife (in which he affirmed his commitment to the North-East), and in 
increased federal funds for emergency relief (Hall, 1978). Nine days after Medici's 
speech, the National Integration Programme (PIN) and the Programme for the
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Redistribution of Land and Stimulation of Agro-Industry (PROTERRA) were 
launched. These first two great regional development programmes were 
incorporated into the first National Development Plan (I PND) for 1972/74.
What this meant was that, in the 1970s, State intervention in the North-East was 
closely dictated by national economic policy. Regional development planning 
was subordinated to the national planning system, and regional development 
agencies, as well as state governments, lost most of their previous power in the 
conduct of regional development. The problem of balance of political power was 
no longer that of rural interest groups dominating the higher levels of 
government, as in former times, but rather the opposite, that of the urban- 
industrial sector dictating rural policy.
The PIN officially announced the government's intention to colonise the Amazon 
region with emigrants from the drought-affected North-East. It brought together two 
interests of the Brazilian Government: the integration of the Amazon and the 
resolution of social and economic problems in the North-East18. The Transamazon 
Highway project, key to the PIN, tapped Brazil's aspiration to reach out into the huge 
unoccupied distances within its borders, and fitted ideally into the government's 
high-powered public relations campaign that extolled Brazil's prestige and its 
inexorable climb to world-power status. The President and his advisers could easily 
ignore the agronomists and geographers who knew the fragility of the Amazon's 
ecosystem and its limited agricultural potential. They could also ignore the 
reluctance of North-Eastern governors to accept the administration's justification of 
the plan. The governors of the North-East feared that the "draining of resources 
from the North-East to develop the North would be permanent" (Roett, 1972:151). 
The traditional source of opposition, Congress, was still in forced recess (decreed 
by Medici at the end of 1969) when the Amazon programme was approved, and the
18 Medici called PIN "the solution to two problems: men without land in the North-East and land 
without men in the North". According to Skidmore (1988:146), M6dici and his policymakers found 
the Amazon an attractive solution for the North-East crisis because a direct attack on the regional 
problem would be prohibitively expensive both economically and politically.
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reluctance of the governors of the North-East did little to deter the Medici 
administration from proceeding with the implementation of the programme.
The PROTERRA's purpose was to put substantial funds into acquiring land for small 
and medium-sized farms (in the North and North-East), financing the expansion of 
farming and helping to organise and modernise rural properties. Money was also to 
be used in financing the establishment of agrarian industries (including seed and 
fertilisers) and in improving research programmes, storage and distribution facilities. 
As Ames points out (1987:160),
"...though elite fears of a radical agrarian reform contributed to the 1964 coup, the concept of 
land reform remained attractive to the military government, at least symbolically, as a tool for 
rural modernisation".
However, PROTERRA's land acquisition was barely an improvement over mere 
credit. Its financial agents were the Bank of Brazil, Bank of North-East of Brazil and 
National Bank for Economic Development. The lending of the Bank of Brazil 
illustrates the powerful concentration of PROTERRA capital behind agro-industry. 
Between 1971 and 1978 more than 97% of the Bank loans went for land acquisition, 
but more than 62% of the loaned funds went to agro-industry. Land recipients had to 
pay for the land at market prices, former landowners were well compensated, and 
the parcels of land were too large (in Pernambuco these parcels had to average 60 
hectares). Moreover, according to Ames, most important for the failure of 
PROTERRA was the absence of political will. As he states:
"President Medici may have believed in PROTERRA, but economic czars Delfin Neto, Reis 
Velloso and Simonsen did not. [...] Delfim Neto had told the World Bank, which supported 
agrarian reform in the Northeast, that he had nothing against land reform. Since the World 
Bank had the money, the Word Bank could pay for redistribution. But acquiescence was not 
support. PROTERRA needed active backing, because the landowners, for whom 
redistribution embodied the spectre of radical change, were the mainstay of the State 
oligarchies." (Ames, 1987:163-164)
PROTERRA's only serious support came from the World Bank, but even the bank 
realised that significant agrarian reform was a dream because no consensual 
agrarian reform was possible and a confrontation policy was simply inconceivable. 
As Ames (1987:165) points out, "a regime backed for ten years by the upper strata 
was hardly likely to change horses in mid-flood".
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By the middle 1970s the World Bank had begun pursuing Robert McNamara's 
"Basic Needs" strategy. With PROTERRA an acknowledged failure it was time for a 
new beginning. In late 1973, the federal government constituted a special inter- 
ministerial commission in Brasilia (with representatives of the Ministries of Planning, 
Interior, and Agriculture) to guide the planning and implementation of a major rural 
development programme for the North-East. From a series of events, which included 
exchanges between the government and various World Bank missions regarding 
their common interest in supporting small-farmer activities in the North-East, 
emerged the POLONORDESTE. At the SUDENE level, as the embryo of a technical 
secretariat for the future programme, only a small regional commission was formed.
The Ernesto Geisel Government (which replaced Medici in 1974) began with high 
hopes for the economy. Its Second National Development Plan: 1975-1979 (II PND), 
set a target growth rate of ten percent per year, to be achieved by shifting from 
consumer durables to intermediate industrial products and capital goods. The high 
growth was to improve income distribution and would require a continued high level 
of capital inflow, as well as an increase in domestic savings. The second National 
Development Plan (II PND) seemed to restore also the balance between the 
Amazon and North-East regions. Under this plan resources were divided between 
the POLONORDESTE and the Programme of Amazonian Agricultural, Ranching 
and Agro-mineral Growth Poles (Programa de Polos Agropecuarios e Agrominerais 
da Amazonia - POLOAMAZONIA).
The POLONORDESTE is seen by Ames (1987:140) as one of the social and 
economic programmes adopted by General Geisel as part of his efforts to ensure 
long-range influence for the military. If successful, the rural development 
programmes, by turning poor peasants into middle-level capitalists, could be 
used to argue that the bureaucratic-authoritarian imposed economic model was 
accessible to all classes and an apt vehicle for social as well economic 
development. The military regime could use such an incorporation of the rural 
poor into its economic model to demonstrate its capacity to solve one of Brazil's 
most dramatic and highly publicised social problems.
The exploitation of the rural poor by both the rural propertied class and the 
commercial sector, especially in the drought-prone North-East, has been a major 
target of criticism of Brazilian society. It has formed an important part of the 
national literary tradition, has received considerable attention in both national 
and international press, and has been the focus of studies and projects of 
various international agencies, as well as of aid missions from different 
countries. Successful rural development programmes would therefore be 
especially effective in the military government’s search for legitimacy, as they 
could be used both as a response to national and international criticism and as 
an affirmation of the regime's superiority over previous governments. The 
regime's need for legitimacy requires that these programmes succeed. Indeed, 
the publicity with which the federal government inaugurates such programmes 
makes their failure especially harmful to its attempt to legitimate itself.
Moreover, the POLONORDESTE, as a region-wide approach, spreading money 
widely in the North-East, could also be manipulated for organising a rural 
constituency. In the “democratising period”, because the regime needed to 
mobilise political support through elections, it sought to manage its legitimacy 
through the pursuit of redistributive and populist policies. However, the national 
significance of local politics of the North-East does not meant that rural interest 
groups exercise much dominance over state and federal politicians. To understand 
political importance of the POLONORDESTE it is important to know how local 
politics operate.
National politics means little at local level. When asked about elections, 
household farmers would almost invariably talk of municipal elections. At local 
level, party politics also appears as irrelevant and its counterpart is 
personalisation. The quality of municipal administration is always related to the 
personal characteristics of those in charge. The farmers' demands vis-a-vis the 
municipal government refer basically to matters that might contribute to 
improving their everyday lives. It is expected that the mayor should provide 
water, electricity, roads, schools, sanitation, health posts or clinics. Moreover,
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many expect to derive some advantage in the course of election campaigns for 
local office.
The head persons in the various organisations are replaced after elections, 
when the influential new 'prefeito' (mayor) appoints people to the supposedly 
vacant posts. Examples of such posts are all the Municipal Secretariats 
(Treasurer, Education, Planning, etc), Directors of schools or other municipal 
agencies. They can also dismiss people from or contract people for a countless 
number of jobs in schools, health posts, and bureaucracies. All the local notaries 
were either themselves influencial or had relatives who were influential in the 
community.
Local politics, especially of the small municipios, also means little at national 
level. An election, when each vote may be decisive, is one of the rare occasions 
when a politician needs something from the local leaders and general 
population. At such times, state deputies, senators and national representatives 
visit rural areas shaking hands with people and promising their support to the 
local bosses. These visits are occasionally followed by the distribution of money 
and such favours as medical help, medicines and spectacles, to those who 
promise to vote for them. Patron-client patterns of behaviour become significant 
in the periodic mobilisation of peasant voters. At the village level, there is 
competition among brokers for peasant votes which can be delivered to a 
particular political patron. According to Powell (1970:416), such competition, 
(which has been described as "factionalism"), is an essential ingredient in the 
process of aggregating clients into the widespread network, and linking them to 
vertical patronage structures in the political system.
Important elements in this process are the unofficial district representative or 
"cabos eleitorais", who still remain and are effective in the political life of the 
community. Some of them are small farmers, residing in rural districts or small 
villages. They have a delegated role in allocating goods and distributing favours 
among villagers to get support for the candidates. The local "cabos eleitorais”
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are those who directly distribute or supervise these goods. By doing so, they 
strengthen their position among the villagers" (Cavalcanti, 1982:143). A truly 
influential "cabo eleitoral" is one who can deliver his entire district's votes to the 
candidate of his choice. He may benefit personally from this position by obtaining 
favours for his own family such as a teacher's job for his daughter, improved 
roads for his trucks, or a drinking place for his cattle. The closest allies or nearby 
landholders will also be benefited and will tend to support him.
Municipios provide most government services at local level and the elected 
leaders can easily manipulate the disbursement of funds for roads, dams, and 
school construction to benefit his allies; often he can choose where 
improvements will be made. He and his friends find it easier to obtain credit in 
State banks, as well as services such as agricultural extension and health care. 
According to Gross (1979:129-130), patronage power is used to further the 
interests and fortunes of the dominant town faction. The power of patronage 
permits the leader to extend or withdraw practically any service to a citizen of the 
county. While villages are generally dominated by a single strong man, the 
towns (the municipal "sede") are invariably divided into factions19. "Election time 
is the prime season for factional conflicts; disputes may become acrimonious, 
with outbursts of insults, denunciations, vandalism, intimidation or even violence" 
(Gross, 1979:131).
Gross (1979:141-142) suggests that, since factions are not ideologically oriented 
and tend to crosscut socio-economic strata, they reduce the possibility of class- 
based struggle by dissipating energy in petty strife serving private interests. 
Factionalism is a political process allowing for a certain amount of interference 
by the central government in local affairs, while at the same time channelling 
resources into their communities. The municipio provides the major point of 
articulation between the national society and rural dwellers. Factions, with all
19 Gross, following Nicholas (1965), defines factions as "non-corporate political groups, based on 
conflict, recruited by leaders on diverse principles, but united by individual self-interest" (our 
emphasis).
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their violence and inefficiency, are an integral part of the system of social control 
in rural Brazil.
Participation in factional disputes is most intense at higher social levels, but the 
division touches nearly everyone regardless of his status or where he lives.
Lower peasants tend to be identified with their employers, creditors, or other 
patronal figures, but their factional participation is generally limited to attending 
rallies during campaigns and to voting. Peasants may perform their duty to their 
patrons but do not hesitate to fraternise with supporters of rival factions. While 
not forced to participate constantly in factional disputes, peasants are seriously 
affected by the struggle. A village dominated by a "cabo eleitoral" of the 
opposition faction will not have its road upgraded, its teachers may go for months 
without pay, and promised public works will not materialise. To organise co­
operatives or other forms of mutual assistance is difficult because factional 
interests always threaten to sabotage them (Gross, 1979:131). It is within this 
context of "patronage" and "factionalism" that the cautious participation of 
peasant in politics may be better understood.
4. Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to set the political and economic scene, at national and 
regional level, in which the POLONORDESTE and its integrated rural development 
projects took place. The aim was to give an appreciation of the institutional 
constraints on political action and the importance of existing institutional patterns in 
shaping political behaviour
Firstly, I have tried to show the changes occurred in the Brazilian political regime 
between 1964 and 1985. The military came to power in 1964 with the declared 
intention of the restoration of internal order and the international prestige of the 
country. In the period 1964-1974, what O'Donnell calls a "bureaucratic- 
authoritarian" regime was established, in which the military came to occupy the
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State apparatus and the bureaucracy was the most dynamic element of the 
centralised State. This fits in the pattern of civil-military relations identified by 
Grindle (1987:262) as "the military as ruler", where the military, as a unified 
corporate institution, takes over political power with the intention of establishing a 
military regime and governing society for a extended period of time. Civilian 
politicians and political parties of all shades are rejected as corrupt, inefficient, and 
antinationalist.
From 1974 to 1985, there was what Stepan (1988:4-5) calls the "democratising 
period", in which the regime embarked on a gradual political "opening" (abertura). 
During this period, new movements within civil society (such as the church, trade 
unions, entrepreneurs, the press, the Association of Brazilian Lawyers, women's 
groups, and neighbourhood associations) presented challenges to the authoritarian 
State. Three factors led to the survival crises of the Brazilian military regime: the oil 
price increase of 1973, the regime's electoral defeat in 1974, and the popular 
struggle for democracy.
Agricultural policy and federal policy for the North-East region after 1964 
responded to two factors. One was poverty and the cyclical problem of drought.
The other - more a national than a regional problem - was the need to create an 
environment conducive to the expansion of capitalism in the countryside. If the 
two first military presidents (from 1964 to 1969) had done little new for the North- 
East, in the post-1970 period State intervention was closely associated with the 
guidelines of national economic policy. The planning system which followed 
contemplated the enforcement of regional development programme which, in 
some cases, was to cover more than one geographic macro-region. This was the 
case of the first two great regional development programmes - PIN and 
PROTERRA - which included the North and North-East regions, and were 
incorporated into the first National Development Plan (I PND) for the period 
1972/74.
90
Amongst the many efforts made by the military to deal with the twin problems of rural 
poverty and lack of agricultural modernisation, there also emerged the 
POLONORDESTE, established in 1974, within the policy guidelines of the II PND. It 
emerged also as a result of exchanges between the government and World Bank 
missions regarding their common interest in supporting small-farmer activities in the 
North-East. Under this plan resources were divided between the POLONORDESTE 
and POLOAMAZONIA, and it seemed to restore the balance between Amazon and 
North-East regions and to calm down the North-Eastern governments' fears that 
draining of resources from the North-East to develop the North would be permanent.
The POLONORDESTE is seen as one of the social and economic programmes 
adopted by Geisel and his successor, Figueiredo, as part of their efforts to ensure 
long-range influence for the military. If successful, POLONORDESTE would be 
used by the military government as an affirmation of its capacity to solve one of 
Brazil's most dramatic and highly publicised social problems. Moreover, as a region- 
wide approach, putting money everywhere in the North-East, where survival of local 
politicians depends on securing government largesse for their regions, the 
programme could easily be manipulated for political objectives. This strict control of 
voters and local leaders has been made possible because civil service jobs and 
transfers of funds for provision of infrastructure and social services have assumed a 
major role in the economy of the North-East interior. Because the restrictions on 
municipal autonomy and budgets, the mayors depends on the generosity of the 
state governor and national politicians. The regime always drew its strongest 
support from the conservative, predominantly agricultural states of the North-East. In 
fact, as we have seen, the close relationship between the military regime and North- 
Eastern elites, proved to be of great significance for maintaining the appearance of 
a government majority at the state and federal level, as was evident in the 1978 and 
1982 elections.
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CHAPTER IV - THE NORTHERN AGRESTE PROJECT: THE 
POLITICS OF POLICYMAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION
1. Introduction
The policymaking process is one of the most important aspects of a political 
system: not only do the most powerful political actors preside over it, but the 
central structures of the State channel it, and the demands of political 
participants are targeted at it. To explain the outcome of the policy process is to 
explain the most important characteristics about the nature of the State. 
Hinnebuch (1989: VIII) points out that equally important in understanding a 
regime is the policy implementation process. As he says, ” precisely because 
Third World countries suffer from an inordinate gap between policy and 
outcomes, how a regime works cannot be understood without a study of policy- 
implementation-in-action". In this chapter I also shared the conviction held by 
Grindle and contributors to the book "Politics and Policy Implementation in the 
Third World" (1980), that the implementation process is especially central to 
politics and is thus worthy of investigation.
The frequent disparity between goals and outcomes in the implementation of 
public policy in the Third World leads to considerations which have tended to 
focus more on the insufficient planning or inadequacy of the programme itself1, 
on the administrative apparatus and procedures of implementing bureaucracies 
or on the characteristics of bureaucratic officials. Such factors can account for 
the "often imperfect correspondence between policies adopted and services 
actually delivered" (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975:446). However, less attention 
has been given to linking characteristics of policies and programmes to their 
subsequent implementation, to relating implementation problems to
1ln fact, technical issues in the design of programme package are important because they can 
led to the failure of particular reform inactive. Sometimes, because initial programme package is 
so limited in extent and so small in magnitude, in comparison with the scope of the problems that 
it is expected to be solve, that it can be judged as to have little prospects to be successful.
characteristics of the political and institutional context in which they are 
pursued2. However, once the political decision to implement policy is taken, 
issues surround implementation constitutes a major determinant of the fate of a 
particular policy initiative.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss policymaking and policy- 
implementation in action, focusing on the bureaucratic complexities and the 
contradictions of the Northern Agreste Integrated Rural Development Project 
(IRDP-AS-PE)’s implementation with its social and economic aims. Here I used 
Grindle's (1980:7) concept of implementation, which is considered to be
"a general process of administrative action that can be investigated at the specific 
programme level. Its success or failure can be evaluated in terms of the capacity actually 
to deliver programmes as designed. [...] The general process of implementation thus can 
begin only when general goals and objectives have been specified, when action 
programmes have been designed, and when funds have been allocated for the pursuit of 
the goals. These are basic conditions for the execution of any explicit public policy."
This chapter will present, firstly, a discussion of the technical issues in the 
design of POLONORDESTE's policy: its conception, objectives, strategy and 
targets. Secondly, it will attempt to look at the political and institutional aspects 
of the policy- implementation process of the Northern Agreste Integrated Rural 
Development Project (IRDP-AS-PE) at state government level; specifically, it will 
look at the everyday management, the interaction amongst players - policy 
agencies and politicians - and the politics of patronage which help shape high 
policy. This chapter will also look at the structure of public institutions and the 
way in which structure may affect politicians’ influence in the implementation 
process. It tries therefore to answer the question of how the political and 
institutional context of administrative action affected policy implementation. This 
leads to an analysis of the extent to which technocrats and public managers 
allocate resources and develop strategies for pursuing both public and personal 
goals in a way that expands their own power, highlighting the political 
motivations, in terms of rational choice, for patterns of public resource allocation.
2 Some exceptions can be found in Grindle and Thomas (1991), Grindle (1980 and 1977).
2. The POLONORDESTE: Conception. Objectives, and Strategy
The Programme for Development of Integrated Areas of the Northeast was 
established by Decree-Law 74,947 of October 1974 to promote, in association with 
other programmes and within the policy guidelines of the II PND, the development 
and modernisation of farming activities and the provision of assistance to small 
producers in selected priority areas of the Northeast (See Table IV.1).
TABLE IV.1 - POLONORDESTE: AIMS, STRATEGIES, AREAS AND EXECUTORS
AIMS STRATEGY AREAS EXECUTORS
To promote the Through creation of l-Humid valleys Co-ordination:
development of agricultural and SEPLAN
agriculture and livestock poles ll-Humid MINTER
livestock (Art. 1). highlands MINAGRI
activities For each of the
in select areas areas which Ill-Dry farming Execution:
of the North- constitute the SUDENE
East. programme, IV-Coastal BNB
integrated tablelands
development plans State
will be executed, V-Pre-amazon Government
which will specify region
the public Involved
investments and the Ministries
actions to be
followed (art. 5).
Source: POLONORDESTE - Secretaria de Planejamento (SEPLAN, 1976).
As stated in the original Decree, the POLONORDESTE philosophy emphasised the 
transformation of traditional agriculture into market-based agriculture3. By the end of
3 Prior to officially launching POLONORDESTE, the government engaged a French-Brazilian 
consulting firm to undertake studies to detail the programme and to prepare the projects. However, in 
1975, although the projects were still not ready for implementation, the federal co-ordination teams
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1976, the main objective of POLONORDESTE was to improve the living conditions 
of the rural population.~According.to a POLONORDESTE document (1976) three 
major guidelines were proposed: (1) promotion of efficient agriculture, (2) income 
increase, and (3) expansion of employment. During the implementation period, in a 
redefinition of the general objectives, the assistance to small producers (with or 
without land ownership) was adopted as the first' priority. In this way, the basic 
objective of the programme and its beneficiary or "target" population were seen as 
follows:
"The understanding of the social problems of the Northeast is basic to its conception, i.e., 
the conception of top priority to the promotion of small producers with or without land 
ownership. The basic objective of the programme was to propose solutions leading to the 
suppression or reduction of the limiting factors which hinder the activities of small peasant 
producers, and which are required if their income level is to increase and if they are to enter 
the market economy" (IPEA, 1978 cit. by Ferreira, 1984:186).
According to a World Bank document (1989:2) a key consideration in the design 
of projects to assist the poor, is the recognition that almost the only asset of the 
poor is their labour. Thus, strategies to raise their incomes need to rest largely 
on ways of increasing the productivity of their labour. Given this perspective, and 
the objective of helping the rural poor, the POLONORDESTE projects included a 
comprehensive set of components:
"i) Credit, to give recipients some assets beyond their labour;
ii) Research, to improve technological, and hence labour and land productivity;
iii) Extension, to improve technology and ensure that credit was spent productively;
iv) Land reform and titling to give beneficiaries the security to allow them to invest;
v) Roads to reduce marketing costs and improve the working of the labour market;
vi) Support to small non-farm enterprises, to improve the opportunities for off-farm 
employment;
vii) Health, both to improve labour productivity, and through the use of rural health posts 
to practice preventive medicine for a wide range of health problems which were costly to 
treat in their advanced form, and thus previously went untreated;
viii) Education to improve labour productivity; and
ix) Marketing support to increase competition in the market, and increase the price-elasticity 
of demand." (World Bank, 1989:2-3)
Funding was to flow from a number of sources including PIN, PROTERRA, budget 
allocations and foreign borrowing. These funds, in many instances, simply
began allocating funds for the partial implementation of four IRDPs and provided support for four 
colonisation and several irrigation projects. The result was the programme started out with a diversity 
of approaches with respect to target groups and the solution of technical problems.
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represented a reallocation of funds from other areas and, therefore, were not 
additional resources for all the sub-regions concerned. The breakdown of 
resources by type of project for 1975 to 1979 was as follows: 40.4 per cent for 
integrated projects; 11.3 per cent for settlement projects4; 39 per cent for irrigation 
project, and 9.3 per cent for other actions. The importance of irrigation projects 
(which were discontinued in 1979) in draining resources from POLONORDESTE 
shows the initial duplication of government actions (Ferreira, 1984:190). By 1981, 
the number of projects had increased to 43 IRDPs and 4 settlement projects5, 
which covered 777 municipios and about 12,936 thousand people. The IRDPs vary 
considerable in area, population, volume of funding and geographical situation. 
However, they were usually carried out in densely populated areas, where 
communities or villages already existed, which made it possible to reach a greater 
number of people.
Although various types of priority areas were considered for action, the 
programme was confined mostly to the humid valleys, which comprised about 50 
per cent of the projects implemented and covered half of the targeted population 
(see map 3). In most of these areas, official action was already taking place 
through DNOCS and CODEVASF irrigation schemes. In terms of economic 
potential, the valleys and humid uplands were, in fact, the areas most suited to 
fulfilling the original goals of modernisation and transformation of traditional 
agriculture into market agriculture. In these areas, according to Ferreira 
(1984:189), capitalist penetration had also taken place more intensively. The dry
4 The POLONORDESTE's strategy was based, in fact, on two dimensions: (1) Rural settlement 
projects and (2) projects of integrated rural development (IRDPs). The preference for the latter is 
explained by Chalout (1980) in terms of economic cost. The IRDP is relatively cheap and "like 
settlement projects, it also responds to some of the fundamental needs of the peasants, such as 
access to the land, credit, marketing and organisational capacity".
5 Their allocation by state was as the following: Cear£ had eight IRDPs, Piaui and Pernambuco six 
each, Paraiba and Bahia five each, Alagoas four, Rio Grande do Norte and Sergipe three each, and 
Minas Gerais one. Rio Grande do Norte had two Colonisation projects and Bahia and Maranhao each 
had one.
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farming areas, which hold over 30 per cent of the population received little 
attention6.
The Northern Agreste Integrated Rural Development Project (IRDP-AS-PE)7 
included 36 municipios8 of two micro-regions of the "Agreste Pernambucano": 19 
municipalities of the Agreste Setentrional and 17 municipalities of the Vale do 
Ipojuca. The project covered an area of 11,558 Km, 11.7% of the area of 
Pernambuco State. In 1985, half of the population of the Northern Agreste (16% of 
the population of the State -1,044,100 inhabitants) was rural (49,5%) and 
agriculture was the main economic activity of 60% of the economically active 
population9. The high population density (90 inhabitants / Km2) and the precarious 
living conditions there have transformed the region into one of large-scale rural 
exodus.
6 The strategy of "building on the best", which is typical of capitalist development, is one of the 
problems pointed out by many critics of integrated rural development projects. The areas 
selected for projects tend to be those which are best provided with land and water resources, and 
to the natural advantages are added the massive insertion of farm services and the distribution of 
public amenities. If the project is successful, the effect could be to sharpen local or regional 
inequalities. Another problem of integrated rural development projects is the predominant World 
Bank official view that rich and poor coexist peacefully within rural society and that both small 
and large farmers can profit from the adoption of modern techniques proportionally to their 
ownership of land. This assumption of “scale neutrality" allows the Bank to count as 
"beneficiaries" of its projects everyone who lives within the targeted area, regardless of the actual 
effects of the project (Payer, 1982:232-233).
7 The POLONORDESTE programme started in Pernambuco state in 1976, with the 
implementation of four (4) Integrated Rural Development Projects (IRDPs), among them the 
Northern Agreste Project, from 1977. Because the Northern Agreste region was considered to be 
a priority development area, and in need of more financial resources, the state government 
requested the aid of the World Bank in financing the Northern Agreste Project in November 
1977. The Bank expressed a decision to participate, provided that the original project could be 
reformulated for Bank financing, which was agreed.
8 From September 1989, the Resolution n° 51 of the Brazilian Federal Government changed the 
division of Brazil into "mesoregions" and "microregions". The "Agreste Setentrional" was 
dismembered in two new regions: Alto Capibaribe and Baixo Capibaribe. See the denomination 
of the municipalities, included in the Project area, in the Appendix on Methodology and Source of 
Data.
9 Data are from FIDEPE - Informagoes Demogr£ficas de Pernambuco, 1986.
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The first reality one is confronted with in studying agrarian problems of the Agreste 
is the importance of the small farmer10, unlike in the Zona da Mata and Sertao. The 
Northern Agreste project area was identified as having potential for some small- 
scale irrigated vegetable and fruit production. Location and rainfall gave it (like other 
integrated rural development projects) better prospects for expanded agricultural 
production than the large areas of drier land in the North-East. The topography 
ranges from the hilly more humid areas in the East, through the flat central plains, to 
the more mountainous West. Soils are of medium fertility. Groundwater resources 
are limited, costly to exploit and high in salt content. On the basis of these physical 
constraints, agricultural development is very localised and varies within short 
distances. Humid areas are characterised by the production of commercial crops, 
the use of more intensive technology and wage labour. In the semi-arid zones, there 
is a predominance of cattle raising.
The project area is not entirely subject to the droughts that periodically devastate 
the Sertao, except in the years of the great droughts, when even the Zona da Mata 
suffered the effects. In the Agreste, away from the wet areas, the rainfall averages 
are relatively low, almost always less than 1,000 millimetres per year and 
concentrated into a few months, March to June, causing serious problems to local 
production. Although lack of water does not reach the accentuated proportions of 
the Sertao, it is one of the most serious problems that the population of Agreste has 
confronted since the colonial period. A particularly prolonged and acute drought 
happened to coincide with a large part of the intended project periods (1979-83). In 
terms of production results, the crops hit hardest by droughts were cotton and 
subsistence food crops on which smallholders and sharecroppers in the project area 
were most dependent.
The Northern Agreste region, because of its importance in the production of food 
staples for the metropolitan area of Recife and the provision of seasonal workers for
10 Following Thiesenhusen and Melmed-Sanjak (1990), Lehmann (1982) and IRDP-AS-PE 
official conceptuation I shall call Brazilian farms up to 50 hectares "small farms". According data 
from Agricultural Census of 1985, in Northern Agreste this group accounts for 97% of the 
properties and 44.7% of the farmlands.
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the sugar-cane plantations in the Zona da Mata, was considered to be a priority 
development area by the state government. Even though the restrictions imposed 
mainly by natural resources, the agrarian structure and markets, the interventions to 
be achieved by the programme, aiming to increase production, productivity and the 
incomes and living standards of small farmers and of small non-farm enterprisers, 
could make possible, according to official expectations, the gradual occurrence of 
changes and beneficial impacts on the level of the economic activity of the region.
In the Northern Agreste Project, the intention was to diversify small farmer activities 
away from the traditional cultivation of subsistence crops to more remunerative 
vegetable and fruit crops; previous levels of subsistence food production were 
expected to be maintained, and the area under improved pastures and fruit and 
vegetable crops were to be expanded. In sum, according to Final Report 
(PROPRURAL, 1988:14-15) the main objectives of the IRDP-AS-PE were defined as 
follows:
To increase production and productivity of the agricultural activities of low income 
producer target population;
- to improve the level of per capita income and rural employment opportunities, 
contributing to the reduction of rural migration;
- to improve the standard of living of the rural population through the social and 
economic infrastructure;
- Improving the effectiveness of institutions participating in the project."
Though the North-East region had diverse farming environments and agricultural 
potential, the integrated rural development projects were very similar in their aim of 
increasing the incomes and living standards of small farmers and of small non-farm 
enterprises through the provision of infrastructure (roads, marketing and storage), 
services (education, health and support to co-operative enterprises) and a package 
of agricultural support including credit, extension, research, improved seed and 
more secure land tenure. The IRDP-AS-PE specific interventions included Water 
conservation and a Community Development Fund.
There were a large number of agencies involved in the programme. At the federal 
level, the Ministry of the Interior (MINTER) held formal responsibility for programme
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policy-making and for co-ordinating the activities of the various sectoral agencies 
involved in POLONOROESTE projects. MINTER performed routine administrative 
tasks: channelling the resources to the states, monitoring their use, and 
consolidating reports from SUDENE. The federal Secretariat of Planning (SEPLAN) 
focused mainly on general policy issues, funding decisions including determination 
of available programme resources, and overall evaluation of special programmes. 
The Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) also participated in decisions regarding 
POLONORDESTE.
At the regional level, the SUDENE had responsibility for co-ordinating 
POLONORDESTE. Regional co-ordinating functions included setting (together with 
Ministry technicians) overall and sectoral guidelines for the programme, assisting 
the states in project preparation and annual planning, monitoring project execution, 
and maintaining liaison with the federal entities involved. The projects were 
implemented by existing federal and state line agencies, commercial banks, 
agricultural co-operatives, and municipalities.
At state level, planning was the responsibility of two state government secretariats: 
Planning (Planejamento) and Agriculture (Agricultural The Secretariat of Planning 
was responsible, through the Technical Unit (TU) and CONDEPE, for the co­
ordination of the activities of formulation related to social and economic 
infrastructure, administrative organisation, investment plan and social and economic 
evaluation. The Secretariat of Agriculture was responsible, through the CEPA 
(Comissao Estadual de Planejamento Agrfcola), for co-ordinating the activities of 
surveying the project area, agricultural development, infra-structure of food 
provisioning, and credit and agricultural policies. During the planning phase, each 
agency to be involved in execution11 supplied technicians and other resources 
indispensable to the elaboration of sectoral projects. During design and analysis of 
projects, technicians and consultants from World Bank and SUDENE also 
participated.
11 There was 16 executing agencies and 24 collaborating agencies involved in execution of the 
IRDP-AS-PE.
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During the planning phase of sectoral projects not one conflict of opinion occurred 
among the technicians-and consultants. A technician participant (from the Technical 
Unit) describes this phase as follows:
"The agreement with the World Bank was for the alteration of a project that already existed. 
The alteration had a very strong technical orientation. This was because, the political 
decision for the implementation of the project having already been taken, there was likely to 
be little political interference. There was no struggle among the state agencies. The 
guidelines were defined in the II PND. [.] Each State Secretariat defined their needs. These 
was analysed by the Technical Unit, the Bank and SUDENE. [...] Each project bring their 
plurianual proposal and their aims (for the five years).
World Bank approval occurred in April 1979, and the loan was granted in June of 
the same year, to conclude in December 1984, later postponed to December 1986. 
The Board welcomed the Pernambuco project as well-designed and directed 
towards meeting basic needs in a poor area that needed assistance (World Bank, 
1989:34). In fact, the project itself was not questioned. At this stage of the policy­
making decision- makers at regional level considered the advice they received from 
national and international corps of technical advisers. However, it is clear that the 
principal concern influencing decisions, at state level, was access to aid from World 
Bank and to federal funds. It was only during the implementation of the project that 
State elites at federal level encountered serious impediments to the pursuit of their 
plans.
POLONORDESTE is generally considered to have been more concerned with the 
promotion of small producers than previous efforts (World Bank, 1983; Tendler, 
1988; Ferreira, 1984). However, no one believes that the programme could have 
been expected to solve the problems of rural poverty in the region. There were 
about three million poor families in the North-East, and the principal programme 
benefits have probably gone to a small number of these. Although Ferreira (1984) 
has indicated that 140,000 producers have benefited from the action of 
POLONORDESTE, the available data do not permit him to identify economic 
categories of beneficiary12. Precise quantitative information of POLONORDESTE's
12 There is no agreement on the number who benefited by the programme. According to Tendler 
(1988) project beneficiaries (farmers receiving direct benefits) were estimated to be 209,440 people.
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impact on farmers income is not available due to the non existence of a common 
evaluation system for the programme. Also, too much analysis relies on secondary 
information and development agency publications rather than on systematic 
research with farmers over the project area13.
Unlike the irrigation and settlement projects, the multi-component and multi-sectorial 
approach integrated rural development made it difficult to ensure uniformity in its 
implementation and results. Like other integrated rural development programmes, 
the POLONORDESTE had multiple, vague, often unrealistic and at times 
contradictory objectives. Its overload in terms of ambitions resulted in a failure to 
identify a clear aim for the programme, and it often demanded the impossible from 
the project management.
There was also the discrepancy between the formal objectives of the State and the 
real development that takes place. This gap between policy making and policy 
implementation can be revealed at project level, and this perspective may correct 
possible misconceptions of the "federal" view. What was said at the federal level 
was one thing, but what was done at local level was another. In explaining the gap 
between formal objectives and real development (in the case of federal policy for the 
frontier), Foweraker (1981) refers to the tendency within the authoritarian State to 
treat political problems as if they were simply administrative, and to the vulnerability 
of the State administration to the political pressures of economic groups, operating 
inside and outside the local State departments. But this is material for the next 
section.
According to Chalout (1980: 357), by 1977, the 35 POLONORDESTE projects (31 IRDPs and 4 
settlement projects) directly affected 810,000 in the North-East, and it was hoped that by the end of 
1979, to increase the number of those involved to 2.1 million. According to World Bank estimates 
(1983:61) this number did not exceed 100,000 by 1980.
13 See for example Bursztyn (1984). There are also technical analyses on programme 
implementation during its execution phase (Sampaio at al, 1987; Sampaio at al, 1978).
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3. The Northern Agreste Integrated Rural Development Project: Planning in Practice
In contrast to policy formulation, the policy implementation process tends to be more 
flexible, open, political and competitive. According to Hughes and Mijeski (1984), 
there are two general areas where policy implementation is most susceptible to 
political pressure and competition and which pose considerable problems for 
achieving policy goals:
'The first area concerns institutional constraints on policy implementation and the willingness 
or ability of various ministries, agencies or departments to carry out presidential initiatives. 
Centralised policymaking often results in public programmes that are established without a 
clear concern for their administrative feasibility. Programmes may envisage goals that 
bureaucratic organisations are incapable or unwilling to pursue, perhaps because of poorly 
trained administrators, lack of knowledge about how to achieve the goals, or refusal to alter 
familiar behaviour or comfortable organisational structures. In addition, when bureaucratic 
agencies have not been deeply involved in formulating policy, they may simply resist having 
changes imposed on them. In other cases, of course, individual agencies, ministries, or 
departments become enthusiastic policy supporters, especially if they can anticipate an 
expansion of their budgets, personnel, power, or programmes from jumping on the policy 
bandwagon." (Hughes and Mijeski, 1984:158)
Both institutional and political constraints on policy implementation were important in 
the case of the Northern Agreste project. The most persistent technical criticism of 
POLONORDESTE is, possibly, related to organisational matters as would be 
expected from these multisectoral and multiagency approaches. It was the first 
major North-Eastern programme to use this integrated approach and a large number 
of agencies at all levels of government were assigned responsibilities and were 
expected to co-ordinate their activities with a variety of related organisations. To 
establish integrated, target-oriented planning and action by participating 
government agencies was particularly complicated due to the number of 
components involved. Many of the executing agencies were working for the first time 
in co-ordinating their activities with other agencies
Co-ordination of each project and the establishment of policy guidelines was 
undertaken by a Management Council (Conselho Diretor) composed of the State 
Secretariats responsible for the implementing agencies. The State Secretary of 
Planning was appointed head of the Council for the Northern Agreste project. 
Technical Units were set up to carry out day to day co-ordinating of project activities,
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finalise annual operating plans with the operating agencies, provide technical 
support, and serve as the. link between the executing agencies, the Management 
Council and the financing agencies. In Pernambuco, the Government had 
established a Technical Unit (TU) within the Secretariat of Planning which oversaw 
the four POLONORDESTE projects in the state. With the increasing workload, 
separate Management Units (gerencias) were set up in 1978 for each project, 
including the Northern Agreste project. The TU was also responsible for monitoring 
the project.
The costs of equipping, staffing and providing the necessary materials for the 
Technical Units during the implementation periods were included in the project 
investment costs. The Technical Unit, like in other JRDPs, was located in the state 
capital (Recife) and the project set up a regional office in Caruaru to promote 
interaction among the executing agencies at local level and to improve contacts with 
local communities and project beneficiaries. The Technical Unit had a large number 
of staff and was thus costly to maintain. Project administration costs (including 
monitoring and studies) incurred by the Technical Unit amounted to 9.6% of the total 
costs of the project14. Not included in these figures are the costs of project 
administration incurred by each of the executing agencies.
The Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE), through an Evaluation Unit, 
comprising a research team from the PIMES (Programa Integrado de Mestrado em 
Economia e Sociologia), was given a contract covering evaluation. Data collection 
for a baseline and final survey was financed, as were several evaluation studies. 
Inexplicably, no contract was entered into to cover the processing and analysis of 
the final survey and the data collected has not been properly analysed and 
evaluated15. In fact, the Evaluation Unit did not have a relevant role in influencing 
the implementation of the project. According to a former co-ordinator of the 
Evaluation Unit, because PIMES was considered an outside body there was a
14 See Table IV.3 - "Total project costs by component".
15 Part of this data is analysed and discussed in chapters V and VI of this thesis.
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general resistance of the agencies (involved in the implementation) to the 
conclusions of PIMES. Another problem was the structural difficulty experienced by 
the Technical Unit in managing the resources to carry out implementation of 
measures suggested by PIMES. Since the project executing state and federal line 
agencies reported directly to state political leaders, the TU was obliged to co­
ordinate the activities of agencies over which it had little control. Also, it did not have 
direct control over project resources.
The structural difficulty experienced by the Technical Unit in co-ordinating the 
activities of independent executing agencies is related to the fact that it did not have 
direct control over project resources. Organisational tensions were unavoidable 
given the large number of agencies involved. The relationship among participating 
organisations was termed "coexistence" rather than co-ordination. During 
implementation each agency continued to define its own priorities and determine the 
activities of its field agents and reported directly to state political leaders. Moreover, 
many of the executing agencies were not traditionally oriented towards the needs of 
small farms and rural poor (PIMES, 1984c).
As we see in the discussion of the project’s services and inputs, a large number of 
agencies of government were assigned responsibilities and were expected to co­
ordinate their activities with a variety of related organisations. Many of the executing 
agencies were working for the first time in co-ordinating their activities with other 
agencies. Problems of bureaucratic competition, personal animosities and 
ambitions, differing philosophies and clientele groups, as well as issues of 
compliance, scheduling and funding were extensive. Most pervasive was the 
problem of trying to ensure control over personnel and resource allocation while 
allowing for flexibility to meet local conditions. Its complex administrative structure 
and complicated mechanisms for the allocation and transfer of funds appear 
unwieldy. Disbursement of funds from Brasilia and the World Bank was slow and 
erratic, causing uncertainty and frustration for project implementors.
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Problems at the project level were endemic. From the most general perspective, the 
plan developed by the-State elite in relative isolation from national bureaucratic 
headquarters became subjected to administrative shortcomings and political 
patronage. Moreover, programme resources were often allocated according to 
political criteria, with little concern for maintaining the integrity of integrated 
solutions to local economic constraints. The administrative complexity of the projects 
mushroomed as the implications of the term "integrated" became apparent. These 
issues loomed large as the programmes moved from the formulation of neat 
"packages" to the implementation of real projects.
In practice, however, the bureaucratic and political infighting that hampered 
implementation of POLONORDESTE was a sign of the absence of support in 
Brasilia. It was originally expected that SUDENE would be a monitoring and co­
ordinating agency between the states and the government in Brasilia. The latter, 
however, would not yield its financial control to SUDENE. Rather than transferring a 
block of money to SUDENE for the whole of POLONORDESTE the government in 
Brasilia parcelled out the money state by state. The World Bank followed suit, 
refusing to give SUDENE control of its block grant. As the states developed more 
expertise, they began to bypass SUDENE and deal directly with the central 
government. Unable to provide logistical support to the states and unwilling to 
relinquish control over their activities, SUDENE became a bottleneck in the 
programme. In the early 1980s, a debate took place over the relative emphasis on 
social versus infrastructural components in individual POLONORDESTE projects. 
According to World Bank informants, this debate was carried on mainly inside the 
bank and among the state agricultural experts rather than at the level of the central 
administration (Ames, 1987:165-166).
The Annual Operating Programme (POAs) was the instrument for preparing the 
budget of the project for each year. The project guided and controlled 
accomplishment of the objectives. However, it was possible to modify strategies, the 
quantity of physical-financial targets, locations, etc. Through the operational plans 
(POAs), POLONORDESTE replanned its activities annually. Because of this
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instrument, the IRDP-AS-PE introduced a series of changes in its original projects, 
increasing its area of action, creating new segments, substituting executing organs. 
However these changes did not bring about any substantial change in the structure 
of the methodology of planning and execution of the programme16. Consequently, 
the difficulties remained in order to reach the target group of the investment in 
question.
Despite some rigidity in the form of dispensing funds, executing agencies always 
managed to overcome that rigidity and to become vulnerable to the political 
pressures of groups operating inside and outside State departments. Thus, 
according to a former co-ordinator of the Evaluation Unit, there were resources 
whose allocation to a specific sector was influenced less by social and economic 
considerations and more by the fact that it was "a sector that could have more 
influence on the election results".
Clientelism and patronage continued to be the principal realities of politics in North- 
East rural areas. As we have seen in chapter III, the small-town politics of the 
country were of great significance for maintaining the conservative regime in power. 
Local offices and politicians became involved in selecting sites for facilities, routes 
for roads, locations of other infrastructure, and recipients of jobs. Mayors played a 
very strong role in the execution of the project because this guaranteed to a certain 
extent power over the farmers. The farmers’ demand vis-a-vis the municipal 
government refer basically to matters that might contribute to improve their everyday 
lives. They expected that the mayor should provide water, electricity, roads, schools, 
sanitation and health posts. Moreover, municipal leaders could manipulate the 
disbursement of funds to benefit their allies if they can choose were improvements 
will be made. A technician participant (from the Technical Unit) describes the role of 
the mayors during the implementation as follows:
16 According to an Evaluation Unit Report (PiMES, 1984b, PIMES, 1984c) in the methodology of 
planning and execution of the programme three major mistakes were made: (i) inadequacy in the 
manner of the participation of the target population, (ii) the overambitious aim of wanting to reach 
simultaneously all the programme area, and (iii) the individuality with which each segment 
constructs its POA.
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"In the execution of the project the mayors "quarrel" not only to define locations. But many 
more schools were built than forecast and their came in the demand of the prefectures. The 
mayors were harmful in the sense of wanting to allocate construction work for their political 
areas. In many cases they succeeded... There were cases of empty schools and even 
construction in private properties. The same case occurred in the health centres."
It might seem that the North-East is controlled by rural interest groups whose 
leaders, in turn, have a strong voice in national affairs. However, the national 
significance of local politics of the North-East does not mean that rural interest 
groups exercise much dominance over state and federal politicians. During the 
military regime the flow of political power was strictly from the top downwards. In 
this centralised national political system, voters and leaders of the interior have 
been brought under the firm control of regional political bosses who have, in turn, 
been manipulated by the South-Eastern political leaders in control of the national 
government. This strict control of voters and local leaders has been made possible 
because civil service jobs and transfers of funds for provision of infrastructure and 
social services have assumed a major role in the economy of the North-East interior. 
Because the restrictions on municipal autonomy and budgets, the mayors depends 
on the generosity of the state governor and national politicians.
When the mayor was linked to the state governor or federal politicians, he could 
nominate people even for the agencies of state or federal government. However, the 
power of appointment to desirable state and federal jobs was not completely within 
the local leader’s domain. He had go to the capital numerous times for personal 
meetings with high-level politicians in order to ensure that the proper connections 
were made with the right senior bureaucrat in the different government agencies. It 
is exactly through such contacts that, according to Hoefle (1985:23), “the state and 
federal politicians exert complete control over local leaders”.
The governors also find project resources useful to the extent that services might be 
provided among competitiong areas or applicants on a discriminatory basis so that 
they might be used to bargain for political support. For this reason the participation 
of local politicians in the distribution of project resources was important. Through the 
allocation of project resources to benefit the rural allies of government the state
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governors were building blocks which could be used to build up national power. This 
can be illustrated by the account of one technician from the Technical Unit:
"There was a real war between the political and technical question when the case was of 
carrying out activities in municipalities with opposing governments. [There was also...] 
facilities in cases where the mayors were of the same party of the governor... They had 
more strength. Sometimes the governor emitted messages with 'give priority1 to 
solicitations stemming from the mayors, and the technicians remained in an immobile 
situation, in some cases it was difficult to deny because you could not use as an argument 
the absence of demand."
As the number of POLONORDESTE projects grew, along with the size of the 
project areas, the governors saw the programme as a way for them to obtain 
secure commitments from the central government to support part of their state 
budgets. From a North-Eastern point of view, the federal government had 
routinely reneged on its budgetary commitments, or did not allocate enough funds 
to the region. This is part of a long-standing view in the North-East that the region 
provides more revenues to the rest of the country than it gets back in resources 
from the federal government. POLONORDESTE became attractive to the North- 
Eastern governors because it carried with it the central government's contractual 
commitment to the World Bank to provide counterpart funding for the projects - 
roughly sixty-five percent of total programme funding. To the state government, 
this represented an unusually "guaranteed" commitment of federal funding. In 
sum, the governors came to see the POLONORDESTE as a means of helping 
them to cover their operating costs for the agricultural agencies. Though the 
governors gave political support to Bank-funded programmes, this support came 
to be given less for what the programme could do and more for their ability to 
cover certain ongoing costs of the state budget (Tendler, 1988:31-32). As an 
Assistant Secretary from the State Secretariat of Agriculture said:
"In the case of the IRDP of the Agreste, the resources of the World Bank substituted those 
of the State. Thus, the State was freer to play with resources that it had to give for 
research and with the technical assistance, etc. It remained freer to play that and give 
privileges to other groups. [...] There may have been a deviation in the resources, but I 
think that money was feeding state bureaucracy, and everyone gained. [...] The 
institutions, the technicians, all won out. Votes, as when they indicated that a certain work 
had to be built in such place, or when they manipulated the teacher who received the 
salary, or the agronomist that changed, in essence they won over that resource."
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Another source of POLONORDESTE support to North-Eastern governors was the 
fact that government agricultural agencies in the North-East came to be among the 
largest public-sector employers during the programme period - second only to the 
state education and health departments. Within that set of services, extension had 
the largest share. Becoming such a large employer of professionals in the State 
public sector gave the extension service the power not only to "do whatever it 
wanted", as people complained, but to protect the jobs it had acquired. Many 
observers say that public-sector employment there weighs more significantly as a 
formal employment opportunity than in the more developed part of the country. 
Opportunities for formal employment outside the public sector are relatively less 
than elsewhere. The North-East accounts for 15% of total formal employment in 
Brazil, but 22% of public-sector employment in the country. In a certain sense, then, 
the politics of public-sector employment also pressured state governors to protect 
the extension service even if it was not delivering anything politically valuable to 
them. Similarly, whereas public-sector employment in the North-East accounted for 
32% of North-eastern formal employment in 1984, public sector employment in the 
rest of the country accounted for only 20% of employment17.
Most observers describe the political-bureaucratic history of POLONORDESTE as 
an attempt to build a programme around a set of specific geographical areas with 
"growth-pole" characteristics. The concentration of projects in certain geographical 
areas proved to be politically difficult, because mayors lobbied to include more 
areas in the programme. The more the projects lost their original growth-pole focus, 
the more popular they became with politicians. The programmes "over-expanded" 
and this decision crippled the programme from an economic point of view: having so 
many farms meant that too few resources were provided for each, with the result 
that most operated inefficiently.
A principal reason for this, apparently, was a desire to put them in areas where they 
would provide "public works" benefits to the supporters of the government in power.
17 Data are from Maia Gomes (1985), cited by Tendler (1988:32-3).
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Similarly to what Bates (1981) observed to project-based agricultural policies in the 
African case, "allocations were used in an attempt to solve essentially political 
problems, often at the cost of considerable economic efficiency". The gap between 
the economic aims of the project as it was defined and its implementation is 
explained by a former co-ordinator of the Evaluation Unit in the following terms:
"The aim [of the IRDP-PE] was more economic, at least that was what declared in the 
project. The implementation ended up by being more political, but not in the wider sense, 
more at the 'kitchen' level, of the interior, of locality, of region. It ended being more an object 
of local political implementation. [...] And that happened because [...] of paths outside the 
project, paths that were not expected. For example, that manipulation of the budgets with a 
small political objective of small politicians. It [...] means that a reasonable percentage of the 
funds did not arrive at the predicted destination. When the funds arrived they either took 
different paths [...] and were not spent on what was expected] or took more than the 
predicted time to reach the places they should have."
The problems of the states in getting the central government to release the 
committed counterpart funds helped to discredit the programme. In coping with 
delayed receipt of counterpart funds from the federal government, project managers 
reported that they did everything they could to "preserve staff' - namely, they gave 
priority to salaries and cut back on investment and other operating costs. This led to 
“the impression that POLONORDESTE contributed 'only' to building and maintaining 
the public-sector apparatus and did little for its intended beneficiaries" (Tendler, 
1988:33). However, this could never constitute a long term improvement, as stated 
by a technician from the State Secretariat of Agriculture:
'The State benefited in the same manner the small farmer benefited. The money finished, 
the benefits ended. During the period of the project they received more resources, hired 
more people, and at the time that the project ended, that benefit ended. The State, as the 
leading provider of services did not gain benefits in the long-run."
According to Grindle (1980:221-223), among a variety of factors that determine 
whether programmes formulated at the national level will reach their intended 
beneficiaries is the performance of the field administrator-implementor. Whether he 
responds to the expectation that he execute programmes depends upon him as well 
as his own perceptions of how best to achieve his personal goals, whatever they 
may be. One method of achieving the implementation of programmes over the long 
run would be to seek to improve the capacity of the intended recipients for effective 
demand-making. Thus, the objective would be to strengthen low-status clients in
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relation to the political and economic elites who generally have the capacity to 
subvert programme goals. For such a strategy, there obviously must exist a national 
administrative leadership, which is sincerely committed to achieving policy 
objectives. Perhaps most importantly, these administrators must be able to count 
upon the support of national political leaders when conflict arises at the local level. 
This is the ingredient most frequently missing, due to the overriding concern of 
coalitions of supporters to ensure the continuity of the political regime.
The planning and management of POLONORDESTE projects can be considered 
"top down", although some attempts to promote participation either through specific 
"community development" components or through components such as health and 
education have been tried. At the same time, most state technical units tried to 
consult local authorities and community representatives in preparing annual 
operating plans (POAS). While the general objective of engaging beneficiaries in 
planning, execution and supervision was "laudable", the World Bank document 
(1983:49) attests to the obvious, that the realisation of this goal would require a 
different strategy and methodology, as well as, "more flexibility in terms of approach 
than that already existing". Attempts to promote participation of the target population 
in preparing annual operating plans can be illustrated by the account of one 
technician from the Technical Unit:
"In 1981, we thought about planning ... (the annual operating plan) differently. We went to 
the rural communities, verified the demands and embarked on a plan that had the 
endorsement of the rural communities. However, the Technical Unit could only exercise this 
practice for one year... There were many complaints to the governor over the (new) manner 
of planning by the Technical Unit. I think that this (participation of the target population) was 
harmful politically because ... the mayors, deputies and councillors could not imply that the 
project was a result of their struggles and power. Then, the TU suffered pressure to return to 
the traditional planning system."
In fact, popular participation, in the post-64 period, was a stated objective of the 
First and Second National Development Plan (PND I and II) and in several regional 
plans. However, in the socio-economic context where popular participation was 
propagated, only the quantitative aspects of development was emphasised, with the 
aim of eliminating the cultural resistance to innovation. Peasants’ participation was 
not an issue for those who planned and implemented the programme and projects
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reached local level in the guise of State patronage or government largesse. National 
and regional planners-knew little about the local circumstances of targeted areas 
and this was further aggravated by the lack of feedback from local areas to the top 
of the decision-making hierarchy.
As it will be show in the next section, an assessment of the achievements by 
components showed an overemphasis on the accomplishment of the physical 
targets and the difficulty of the management agencies of the project in measuring 
the quality of the services delivered. Moreover, the monitoring data from the 
components of the project do not permit a definitive conclusion, as to whether the 
services provided by the project were important for increasing income, 
productivity or distributional equity. Because of this, there was a majority opinion 
inside and outside the agencies involved that POLONORDESTE contributed 
"only" to maintaining the State apparatus and to feeding the bureaucracy, and 
did little for its intended beneficiaries. As a former co-ordinator from the 
Evaluation Unit stated:
T h e  main beneficiary of the POLONORDESTE were the technicians, who earned money 
from the work they carried out, and the institutions that capitalised on it. The Directorate of 
State Land (COTEPE), for example, was founded with money from the POLONORDESTE. A 
'white elephant'... but which had a band of cars, air conditioning machinery, and physical 
installations. All the capital of the institution was bom under the POLONORDESTE and for a 
long time it lived on this capital. Then came the politicians, the suppliers. In the building of 
roads, for example, you have the purchase of tractors, heavy equipment; in the building of 
schools you have the cement, brick and tiles suppliers. Those... were the ones who in fact 
used the money of the World Bank for the POLONORDESTE".
If after the implementation of the Northern Agreste project there was doubt, in the 
opinion of the majority, about the project's capacity to accomplish its economic aims, 
there was no doubt about its political utility. If the project failed to generate an 
adequate return on the publics investment made, it was privately rewarding for those 
who build it, staff it, or hold rents in it. Thus, the kind of explanation which is 
required to explain the outcomes of POLONORDESTE policy is one based in other 
factors than the social and economic objectives of the State. The approach that is 
needed is one that looks at this agricultural programme as part of the whole 
mechanisms employed by the government in its efforts to secure political control
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over the rural population and thus to remain in power. The components included in 
the programme seem clearly to have helped the governors' efforts to organise 
political support in the countryside18.
3.1. Targets and Achievements by Component
Generally, POLONORDESTE projects were designed with three components: (1) 
direct inputs to improve production (usually the largest portion of programme funds); 
(2) infrastructure to encourage and support increased production; and (3) social 
infrastructure such as health and educational facilities and peasant organisations 
(usually given the smallest portion of programme funds). The approach largely 
avoided the issue of redistribution of land. The belief was that these goods and 
services could be supplied without altering the structure of landholding and would 
still have a significant impact on the standard of living in rural areas.
Under the original growth pole approach, basic sectoral instruments included public 
investments for feeder roads, rural electrification, storage facilities, agricultural 
research and experimentation, technical assistance and rural extension. A special 
credit line (for both production and investment costs) was established for use by 
producers involved in the programme, and complementary investments in social 
infrastructure for rural communities (health, education and water supply facilities) 
were included. In addition, support for co-operatives, small non-agricultural 
enterprises, land regularisation and redistribution, together with funds for advance 
crop purchase, were later introduced (World Bank, 1983:45).
The number of components and achievements varies across projects. For the 
programme in general, land activities, tenure regularisation, advance crop purchase 
funds, and support for small non-agricultural enterprises was included less
18 As Bates (1981:114) states, "Project-based policies, as opposed to pricing-based policies, are 
... relatively attractive from the point of view of organising rural constituency in support of the 
government in power. Governments can choose where to locate such schemes. They can also 
choose with whom to staff them. Both decisions offer opportunities for organising political 
support. [...] Through the promise of benefits they can secure co-operation; through their 
conferral, they can reward compliance; and through their withdrawal, they can punish those who 
protest."
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frequently than other components in IRDPs. According to the World Bank Interim 
Assessment (1983:55^ the effectiveness of each component depended on the 
institutional influence and capacity of the co-ordinating and executing agencies.
The traditionally stronger agencies (e.g. extension, road development authorities) 
tended to achieve their physical targets more quickly than agencies with weak 
administrative capacity or chronically inadequate recurrent cost funding (health 
services, village water supply). Land distribution and regularisation had suffered 
because "local institutional arrangements do not exist or are extremely 
cumbersome".
Between 1979 and 1987, the IRDP-AS-PE project's principal quantitative 
achievements included construction of 1,097 kilometres of rural roads; the 
construction of 115 rural schools; the construction of 13 health posts, and 86 
community water supply systems. In terms of direct agricultural support 23,000 
farmers were assisted with rural extension services and 13,788 producers were 
provided with credit (See Table IV.2).
Desegregation of distribution of resources by guideline is sufficiently clear to 
show the main emphasis of the policy. A substantial amount of resources 
(26.9%) was invested in actions, which directly benefited the rural producer 
(excluding rural credit). In this sector, the main achievements concern technical 
assistance and rural extension (16.1%), research (2.2%), co-operatives (2.3%), 
marketing (1.9%), and land regularisation (3.7%). The economic infrastructure 
segment, which includes feeder roads, reservoirs and dams, absorbed 19% of 
the investments. Social infrastructure (education and health) had 6.6% of total 
IRDP-AS-PE funding, while at the State level, general administration and co­
ordination, including monitoring and evaluation activities, had 9.6% of total funds 
(See table IV.3).
The structural difficulty experienced by the Technical Unit in co-ordinate the 
activities of independent executing agencies is related to the fact that it did not have 
direct control over project resources. Organisational tensions were unavoidable
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given the large number of agencies involved. The relationship among participating 
organisations was termed "coexistence" rather than co-ordination. During 
implementation each agency continued to define its own priorities and determine the 
activities of its field agents and reported directly to state political leaders. Moreover, 
many of the executing agencies were not traditionally oriented towards the needs of 
small farms and rural poor (PIMES, 1984c).
As we see in the discussion of the project’s services and inputs, a large number of 
agencies of government were assigned responsibilities and were expected to co­
ordinate their activities with a variety of related organisations. Many of the executing 
agencies were working for the first time in co-ordinating their activities with other 
agencies. Problems of bureaucratic competition, personal animosities and 
ambitions, differing philosophies and clientele groups, as well as issues of 
compliance, scheduling and funding were extensive. Most pervasive was the 
problem of trying to ensure control over personnel and resource allocation while 
allowing for flexibility to meet local conditions. Its complex administrative structure 
and complicated mechanisms for the allocation and transfer of funds appear 
unwieldy. Disbursement of funds from Brasilia and the World Bank was slow and 
erratic, causing uncertainty and frustration for project implementors.
i) Credit
Farm credit was a major component of the project (30.9% of the total funds). 
However actual disbursements for credit were low (32% of the loan amount 
allocated). Sub-loans for seasonal credit were relatively less important than for 
investments. Around 13,788 credit plans (double the target) were approved in the 
IRDP-AS-PE, where credit for on-farm investment was used largely for livestock.
This was a deviation from the original aim of also financing the establishment of 
permanent crops and other permanent on-farm improvements such as storage 
installations and reservoirs.
Alterations in the credit policy determined by the Conselho Monetario Nacional 
made it difficult to fulfil the aims of the project. Throughout the project these changes
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were reflected in sudden reductions in seasonal credit ("custeio") applications 
because it was decided that the loans contracted within the budget of the 
POLONORDESTE, should be destined only for investment. Such loans, which 
demand the property as collateral, impeded the awareness of a large proportion of 
the target landless population (it was estimated that about 32% of the small 
producers were landless) because of bank requirements for collateral and or letters 
of permission from the landlord required of tenant farmers. Working-capital credit 
(custeio) was less subject to these constraints. Working-capital credit was important 
not only because it reached a larger number of farmers than investment credit - and 
lower down in the income distribution - but because its availability seems to have 
had a large impact on farmers’ decision about production (Tendler, 1988:61).
Apart from this, there were also the administrative problems related to the state-level 
co-ordination of the programme. The Bank of Brazil, Bank of the North-East (BNB) 
and State Development Bank of Pernambuco (BANDEPE) disbursed rural credit, 
through the local agencies. Within the three banks involved only BANDEPE acted 
according to the methodology stipulated by technical assistance rules.
Nevertheless, the BANDEPE had played only a minor role in POLONORDESTE's 
small-farmer credit programme, partly because of the typical lack of interest of the 
banking system in such programmes, and partly because of the World Bank's 
concern that the state development banks were politicised and not as reliable as the 
long-established Bank of Brazil and Bank of the North-East.
The Bank of Brazil, the main conduit of POLONORDESTE small-farmer credit, had a 
better reputation than the state banks - with its well-known system of merit-based 
hiring, and its greater invulnerability to local politics due to its centralised mode of 
operations, with its headquarters in Brasilia. But, according to Tendler (1988:56), it 
was the Bank of Brazil's very "invulnerability" to politics and centralised operation 
that caused some governors and state agency managers to consider the bank 
"unresponsive" to the state's concern for lending rapidly to small farmers, and the 
landless in particular. When the "political meddlers" are competent technocrats and 
reformist governors, for Tendler, vulnerability to political pressure can turn into a
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desirable, rather than an undesirable quality. The strong preference of the state- 
level agency managers.for the state bank, over which they had power, is one more 
sign of the institutionally difficult nature of targeted rural development programmes, 
which are predicated on re-orienting formal credit toward small farmers.
According to a PRORURAL Report (1987:19), the release of funds by the Central 
Bank, apparently, did not take into consideration the seasonality of the regional 
agriculture, troubling in a significant manner the work of EMATER and the 
programme due to the scarcity of credit in periods indicated by the agricultural 
calendar. The TU, apart from participating in the elaboration of the POAs, did not 
exert any control whatsoever over the distribution of funds destined for this 
component. Because of the autonomy that the groups of banks enjoyed in the use of 
project funds and in selection of beneficiaries, there are doubts whether their criteria 
were in fact compatible with the objectives of the programme. This could explain why 
monitoring and evaluation reports complained that the percentage of small 
producers contemplated by the credit programme remained inferior to the number of 
large and medium sized owners included as the beneficiaries of the 
POLONORDESTE19. According to a technician involved, this was because of 
institutional structures:
"Because of the actual institutional arrangements a good slice of the budgets did not reach 
the small producers. Then you cannot say who is the guilty one... It was the manner the 
banking system operates. For example, a certain quantity of funds flowed into the bank, so 
that they would be destined for the small producer. Who finally determined who would 
receive those budgets was the manager of the local bank... As it was the manager who 
chose, and his job, his career, and several aspects related to his personal life, depended on 
who he was going to lend and the guarantee he has that the budgets were going to return... 
he preferred to decide on the destination of the budgets for those who would have the ability 
to repay. From then onwards the landless producers and the small producers were practically 
excluded. And then, and that is not the managers fault, neither the bank's fault. The problem 
is the system's and that was not forecast by the programme".
In fact, most technocrats in the North-East see investment credit as being 
inaccessible to the smallest landowners and to the large numbers of tenant 
farmers because of the high risk for tenants in investing in land that is not their
19 See, for instance, an Evaluation report called "Credito na Srea do IRDP-AS-PE: Distribuigao, 
uso e reflexos nas Unidades Produtivas" (PIMES, 1984a).
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own, small landowners' fears of losing mortgaged land, and the generally poor 
treatment of tenant and small landowner farmers by banks and the consequently 
high transaction costs to them of obtaining credit.
ii) Agricultural Research
If the Green Revolution successes made heroes of agricultural research and 
extension in Third World countries, this was not the case in rainfed areas, where 
much of the investment by governments and donors in agricultural development 
has not added up to impressive increases in output, yields or income. According 
to Tendler (1993:1567), "more often than not the finger of blame for these 
disappointing outcomes has been pointed at agricultural extension and research 
institutions." As she states,
"Monitoring and evaluation reports repeatedly point to research as 'too academic,' not 
concerned about small-farms crops and practices, not sufficiently engaged in field testing 
and adaptation of its findings, and not interested in collaborating with the extension service in 
the interests of dissemination".
Much of this, was the case of agricultural research undertaken by the State 
Agricultural Research Institute (IPA-PE) before and during the project years. 
However, because of heavy pressures from the governor and World bank to "do 
something for small farms", IPA developed several improvements which were readily 
taken up by the farmers: new varieties of beans, tomatoes, and carrots; cultivation of 
manioc with animal traction and improved spacing between plants; new crops 
associations; soil conservation; and the introduction of potato cultivation. Co­
operation between extension and research was improved with the secondment of an 
EMATER extensionist to the Research Station in Caruaru in 1980. However, 
agricultural research has been substantially refocused to give adequate, but not 
exclusive, attention to the problem of small farmers.
iii) Extension
Agricultural extension was another major component of the project. Costs were 
projected at 10% of total baseline costs in the IRDP-AS-PE and actual
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disbursements of the loans exceeded the loan amount, which had been originally 
allocated, The overrums explained by the expansion of the project areas and the 
extension of the project periods.
The extension services were delivered through the Company of Technical 
Assistance and Rural Extension of the Pernambuco State (EMATER-PE), with its 
headquarters in Recife, which had 36 local offices. The technical team at the state 
level included 9 regional technicians and a field team composed of 40 rural 
extensionists and 10 social ones. That team was steadily increased to 109 local 
extensionists (rural and social), 19 technicians at regional level and 4 at central 
level; apart from the administrative-support staff. As we can see, the project was 
successful in significantly expanding the extension of services available to small 
farmers. Staffing, mobility and office space were all increased. It should be 
recognised, however, that this expansion took place from a small base and that, 
even after expansion, most small farmers had no direct contact with extensionists.
The target number of farmers benefiting from agricultural extension was exceeded 
under the project (23,000 or 148%). However, the work of extensionists was affected 
by a periodic shortage of on-farm credit, the drought and frequent staff turnover. 
Also, during the drought, many of the staff were involved in emergency relief 
operations and therefore the service had no active role in developing cropping 
patterns adapted to the drought. The extensionists also played an active part in 
assisting farmers' applications for credit and they frequently spent too much time in 
their offices because they were processing the paperwork for credit applications for 
their clients.
The provision of technical advice was largely "captured" by the credit programme, 
so that extensionists became accustomed to providing technical advice supported 
by credit at negative rates of interest. To the point that extensionists were told on 
several occasions: "We need a subsidised credit programme so that farmers can 
afford to take our advice". Due to the dependence of the extension services on 
others such as rural credit, agricultural research, marketing, seed and seedlings,
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etc. The lack of integration among project components restricted the performance 
of agricultural extension . Also, the action of extensionists was limited by lack of 
funds, principally affecting local offices and co-ordinating offices. Extensionists 
frequently spent more time in their offices than the field because there was a 
chronical shortage of vehicles, as well as of funds for fuel and vehicle maintenance. 
The substitution of the budgets of EMBRATER (Brazilian Enterprise for Technical 
Assistance to Agriculture) and other sources by the IRDP, carried with it a 
dependency of EMATER on project budgets.
Despite this, the extension service obtained satisfactory performance figures in the 
attainment of basic targets, such as: number of producers assisted, area in 
hectares, herd assisted and number of demonstration units implemented. However, 
in "final reports" from the World Bank and Technical Units, EMATER was judged in 
terms of inputs rather than outputs: number of farms assisted, area assisted, number 
of demonstrations units, assistance to farmers' groups, etc, rather than rates of 
adoption of new varieties, observed yield increases, or transformation of the local 
economy. Although it was affirmed that "good transfers of technology were realised 
in some municipalities" and "installed demonstration plots which were technically 
well-managed; they showed various production systems (including both 
monocropping and multiple crops) and used traditional and improved technology" 
(World Bank, 1988:12), it is difficult to measure the quality of the services rendered.
Some observers of POLONORDESTE felt that the quality of the extension services 
had been compromised by their rapid growth and the way in which they grew. Before 
this expansion, trained agronomists working directly with farmers predominated in 
the extension services. Because of a new model of extension that required working 
with much larger number of farmers per extension agent, the service rapidly took on 
many middle-level "agricultural technicians", who were usually poorly trained. The 
trained agronomist, who used to interact with farmers, started to stay at his desk 
supervising his new inexperienced technicians, who were effectively the farmers' 
main contact (Tendler, 1988:34-35). Thus, besides the satisfactory figures in the 
attainment of basic targets, there was also a perception of the "lack of professional
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capacity in the fields of EMATER", aggravated by the "high turnover of staff at local 
level” and by the "political mismanagement" in the designation and choice of staff, 
as well as the "ineffective monitoring of work carried out in the field".
Connected to the activities of EMATER, there was a component called "Seeds and 
Seedlings". With project resources, the State Seeds and Seedling Company - 
Companhia de Sementes e Mudas de Pernambuco (SEMEMPE) linked to the 
Secretariat of Agriculture (SAg) was set up in 1979. It produced seeds for basic 
crops (beans and corn), seedlings for passion fruit, citrus, avocado, coconut and 
papaya, and banana suckers. The budget of the project allocated to the production 
of seeds, which was based on EMATER demand estimates, consisted of moving 
capital for the SEMEMPE. The budgets formed a revolving fund that was injected 
annually with resources. As there was no indexation of the budgets, with growing 
inflation, the power to purchase of seeds was greatly reduced as the years went by.
It is not clear what share of the project area's needs were met by the project, nor 
what share of seeds and seedling production went to the small-scale farmers. 
However, the seed-distribution programme was remarkably popular among 
technocrats, politicians and the poorest farmers. It gave rapid results (in some crops 
the harvest come only few months after seed distribution) and worked well in the 
diffusion of an approved variety (once farmers adopted, the harvest would give them 
their next year's round of improved seeds). Though the extension service did not 
play its usual organising and teaching role, it was crucial to the execution of seeds 
distribution.
iv) Land reform and titling
Land access, and poor availability of water were the major problems experienced by 
the programme. The World Bank document (1983:62) states that "it has been 
difficult to design and effectively implement land components in IRDPs in a 
generally weak institutional environment and a political context in which such efforts 
have traditionally been resisted". The Northern Agreste project included costs for
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studies on land acquisition and titling, and eventually for improving land titling 
services. The study was implemented and pointed out the need for a specific State
Land Authority (COTEPE), which was established in 1981 under the Secretariat of 
Agriculture. This new authority faced similar constraints on land redistribution as the 
agencies in other states. Nonetheless, 6,300 hectares of land in the municipio of 
Pesqueira were distributed to farmers under the IRDP-AS-PE. The Bank 
subsequently addressed the land tenure problem on a wider scale under the North- 
East Region Land Tenure Improvement Project, which became effective oniy in 
March 1986.
The delay in the institutionalisation of COTEPE contributed to an underemphasis on 
the target for land purchase, since COTEPE could only purchase property via third 
parties. Apart from that, the methodology used for the purchasing of lands slowed 
down the process. During 85/86, their method was changed quite significantly, and 
the property was bought via INCRA, through the instrument of expropriation as used 
in agrarian reform. Apart from the measures taken, administrative problems such as 
a lack of qualified technical staff, raising of conventional topography, together with 
the scarcity of available land and the high price per hectare of rural property, all 
contributed to the inefficiency in the execution of this component.
This was also the case in the "Water Conservation" component. The project was 
originally intended to provide for the construction of two 50,000 m3 communal dams, 
operated by groups of farmers. These were constructed as planned, but the drought 
required an expansion of targets and a reorientation of the programme. The State 
Agriculture and Livestock Services Company (CISAGRO) therefore constructed 
additional 146 small-scale irrigation schemes, dams and tubewells. Consequently 
disbursements for this component were more than twice those expected at 
appraisal. The importance of this component was the demonstration effect of the 
community projects and the scope for expansion of irrigated areas. However, the 
accomplishments of this component were far below the needs of the farmers located 
in a semi-arid region, where drought is one of the most serious problems.
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v) Roads
Road construction was a major component of the project. Roads accounted for 17% 
of projected baseline costs and disbursement and the target for road construction 
was exceeded (1,097 km, or 115%). Infrastructure activities, such as roads, is seen 
by some technicians as an improvement because with a large road network that was 
opened could have long term effects, and quite significant economic results. In fact, 
as Tendler (1988:8) pointed out,
"The Bank and Brazilians... see road-building agencies as among the most powerful of 
public-sector activities - because of the successful pressures by contractors to spend on 
roads, the political appeal of road-building to politicians, and the prestige of civil engineers."
Road-building also came under criticism because of poor maintenance (Tendler, 
1988:5). Since some construction had not been carried out to standard and 
maintenance was poor, the rains destroyed some structures. A great part of the 
roads was lost because there was no conservation and reconstruction proved costly. 
The state Highways Department (DER-PE) trained municipal workers in road 
maintenance. However, the municipalities lacked funds of their own to ensure the 
proper upkeep of roads and eventually it was necessary to support this under the 
project.
Conflicts occurred at local level about the location of roads - conflict among 
technicians, politicians, and landowners, and between contending politicians or 
landowners. Though the victory of local elites or powerful politicians in these 
decisions about placement of roads might have reduced the social benefit of these 
investments - locating a road according to political interests or where a powerful 
landowner has his farm, rather than according to some measure of small-farmer 
production density or traffic needs - the public nature of the facilities still spread 
their benefits to a large number of people. Roads, like other infrastructure 
investments and social services, are politically popular because there are no 
apparent losers, only winners. However, some suggested that the rich benefited 
disproportionately from road investments, which often heralded a wave of further
125
impoverishment of the poor - through a process of increased land values, land 
buying, and expulsion-of tenant-farmers.
vi) Support to small non-farm enterprises
The "Small-Scale Non-Farm Enterprises" component was designed to help small 
"informal" enterprises increase their efficiency and expand, thus improving off-farm 
employment opportunities. The project supported the development of these 
enterprises, which performed a variety of activities including food processing, 
carpentry, ceramics, sewing, leather work, small stores and services. This 
component was executed by the Northeast Union of Assistance to Small-Scale 
Organisations (UNO) and was considered "very successful" (World Bank, 1988:47). 
Some 7,340 enterprises were assisted with management training and about 2,670 
enterprises received credit.
Like the extension service, this component relied on access to credit at negative 
real interest rates, to fund investment by participating small businessmen. 
According to Tendler (1988:116). "This has attracted better-off firms that might 
normally have access to bank credit without the project - just as medium and 
larger farms with access to bank credit tended to edge out the poorest farmers in 
the highly subsidised credit programmes for small farmers." The subsidised 
credit was part of a "technical package" including better accounting sales 
promotion, business planning, etc. Some assisted small enterprises had several 
subsidised loans. Unlike small farmers, many of the small businessmen 
graduated the use of unsubsidised credit, as the availability of subsidised dried 
up. However, like small farmers, there seemed to be little interest in the advisory 
services in the absence of credit. Just as for extension this component also had 
difficulty with the non-availability of credit under the project.
vii) Health
The construction targets of the health and sanitation components were exceeded in 
the PDRI-AS-PE. However health administration continued to be mediocre. The
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State did not have the resources to maintain, supply and staff health posts properly. 
The posts suffered from inappropriate supplies of drugs, poorly trained staff, and 
infrequent supervision and inspection by the Secretariat of Health. These problems 
were subsequently addressed on a wider scale under the North-East Basic Health 
Service Project.
The health posts and associated scheme for training people from the community to 
provide simple health care represented a useful extension of the health care system 
to rural people. The key to the success of this component was the training of 
community members (usual two people for three months) to carry out simple medical 
tasks, such as inoculation, child delivery, bandaging and splints, diagnosis of 
common illness or dehydration, etc. The hiring of community members meant that 
wages could be kept to the low level customary in the community (thus keeping 
recurrent costs at an affordable level) but responsibility for primary heath also gave 
the health post attendant(s) recognition and status within the community. Extension 
of this low cost/ low technology health care meant that many health problems were 
treated, which had previously gone untreated. This system also allowed more 
serious conditions to be recognised and referred to the local town for professional 
care.
A large number of water supply schemes and pit latrines were constructed, and 
many water filters were distributed. However some water supplies fell into disuse 
because water quality was poor, the system had been poorly built, attendants were 
not adequately trained, and the villages were not sufficiently acquainted with 
construction and maintenance procedures.
viii) Education
Targets for school construction, repair, equipment and teacher training were 
exceeded. This was attributed to the performance of the State Secretariat of 
Education, in spite of the problems of late release of budgeted counterpart funds. As 
with health, the staffing of project schools depended on teachers trained in the 
community. Because the low salary level, only very poorly trained local people are
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likely to be available as teachers. Teachers have often only finished second grade 
themselves.
If physical targets were met through the construction of schools and though service 
delivered may have flourished for a few years, just as for health posts, Tendler 
(1988:22) states that, "the usual problems of flagging political interest and severely 
reduced operating funds for salaries and supplies ultimately undermined these 
activities". In fact, in education, low teacher salaries, the low educational levels of 
teachers, apart from the use of political criteria for hiring and firing teachers, created 
insuperable obstacles to improving schooling. Nevertheless, many people felt that 
the project had made a good start in improving educational opportunities open to 
rural people. However, the emphasis was in the formal education of children and not 
in professional or adult vocational education "to improve labour productivity".
To a certain extent, the perception of the positive contributions of project health and 
education components suggests, as Tendler points out (1988:23), "that something 
was better than nothing." Though the judgements in favour of health and education 
may not reflect upon the quality of implementation of these components, they 
nevertheless are consistent with the findings that education and health, when they 
are supplied, are "more beneficial and accessible to [rural] poor than credit and 
other agricultural services" as stated in a Bank assessment of the North-East 
projects (World Bank, 1983:58).
Amongst "social infrastructure" components, such as health and educational 
facilities, there was also a component aiming to help peasant organisations. This 
was the "Community Development" component, which was executed through the 
Programme for the Development of Rural Communities (PRODECOR), a national 
agency of the Ministry of Agriculture. This component was not present at the 
beginning of the Northern Agreste IRDP and the proposal to encourage participation 
and organisation of small producers in the execution of "community projects" started 
only in 1981. Under the experimental programme, some small-scale infrastructural
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improvements were carried out in three municipalities; construction materials were 
provided by the fund and unskilled labour was contributed by the population.
ix) Marketing support
The marketing component was executed by EMATER and selected co-operatives, 
and a large number of other agencies (CISAGRO, COBAL, FECOMIPE, OCEPE, 
ASSOCENE, and CEPA). Resources at the beginning of the project channelled 
towards strengthening the structures of the actual executing agency, such as the 
purchase of weighing machines or employment or training of staff. At the beginning, 
the action was summarised at the meetings, preliminary studies and in the selection 
of beneficiaries. Meanwhile, this component was progressively diversifying its 
activities, introducing the commercialisation of horticultural products, providing 
operating credit to farms before the planting season through the advanced purchase 
of production (CAP - Advance Purchase Programme) and buying the production 
surplus (CEP - Surplus Production Purchase) at guaranteed minimum price. Many 
people referred with enthusiasm to CAP and CEP, minor parts of the project, 
because both programmes gave priority attention to the basic crops produced by 
large number of poor farms - beans, corn, manioc, and cotton, a staple of the mixed 
farming system. However, their success was undermined by the long drought. Other 
actions included purchasing and resale of agricultural and livestock products, 
incentives to caprinoculture, implementation of microindustries and places for the 
refilling of supplies, improvement of open markets, public markets and 
slaughterhouse.
Important to the "marketing component" was the execution of "Co-operative 
Support", which was channelled towards 20 co-operatives and involved a large 
number of state agencies (EMATER, OCEPE, FECOMIPE, CEPA, CISAGRO, and 
COBAL). CISAGRO and COBAL participated via their commercial agencies, places 
of resale of agricultural and livestock products located in municipalities in the area 
of the project where co-operatives did not exist. Actions were directed almost 
exclusively to the strengthening of the co-operatives infrastructure. However,
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artificial criteria were adopted for the selection of the co-operatives to be benefited. 
As far as problems related to the financial-economical weakness and the low quality 
of the services offered, autocratic gestures were added to differential treatment to 
small and large associates. In relation to the large number of agencies involved, 
they acted individually and without integration.
The attainment of the targets of education and training of officials and associates in 
the "co-operative" component were exceeded. However, only four of the planned 16 
crop assembly warehouses were constructed, due to budget cuts and lack of 
interest of the co-operatives. Radio equipment was provided to improve 
communications between EMATER, the co-operatives and the Agricultural 
Information Service (SIMA), but information is not available on whether reliable 
market news was in fact broadcast to farmers as planned.
4. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss policymaking and policy-implementation 
in action, focusing on the bureaucratic complexities and the contradictions of the 
project’s implementation with its social and economic aims. In particular, it shown 
the way in which the interaction amongst local institutional and political interests 
helped shape high rural development policy. As we have seen, the integrated 
approach used in POLONORDESTE seems to offer planners coherent ideas about 
how public policy could be designed to respond to problems of rural poverty and 
underproductivity. However, through the analysis of the implementation process 
became clear how the policy instrument and strategies chosen to secure social and 
economic objectives were inconsistent with the full attainment of these objectives.
Pursuit of the administratively ambitious integrated rural development projects was 
bound to involve serious obstacles. Nevertheless, beyond the problems of 
management and administration, and regardless of the capacity of bureaucratic 
officials to successfully implement, public policy ideologically shaped by elite goals 
at national level were subverted by alliances of bureaucrats and local politicians
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competing for their slice of the new resources when the project comes out of the 
planning process. It was during the shaping of the day-to-day administration and 
implementation that capture of the project by interest group politics and patronage 
were most evident.
As policy moved from the high policy planning stage into operation and investments 
were made and allocated in a specific spatial context, the primacy of the governors 
and local politicians as the key political actors within the states appeared and 
influenced policy outcomes. The over-expansion of the projects and their lost of the 
original growth-approach focus clearly indicated the government intention to ensure 
that politicians and officials in each municipality and electoral constituency have 
access to resources with which to secure a political support. However, this over 
expansion, which was limited only by budget constraint, generated inefficiency to 
the extent that too few resources were provided for each farm.
The evidence suggests that the most influential proponents behind project 
implementation were: (i) elected local leaders - the governor, legislators and mayors 
- who increasingly viewed small farmers as an important constituency; (ii) like- 
minded executing agencies which provided the services, who were not traditionally 
oriented toward working with small farms; (iii) the World Bank, which had a great 
influence on planning and faced the task of channelling money through 
implementing agencies20; (iv) small and medium-sized capitalised farmers, who as a 
preferential clients, had a strong influence in diverting project away from the poorest 
target group; and, unfortunately, lastly (v) landless farmers or small owners with 
inadequate access to land, who were far less able than other mentioned actors to 
articulate their interests.
20 According to Payer (1982), the World Bank was in the business of lending money and "the 
handiest metric for assessing individual officers and offices was the volume of funds spent rather 
than any measure of their investments' development impact". He stated that "Its officers gain 
promotion on the basis of how well they are able to fill the quota (they call it the "pipeline”) for 
area or country under their charge, in order to meet MacNamara's massively expanding lending 
goals. As a result, they fund projects that are dubious by their own standards of cost- 
effectiveness, and lend large sums to projects that could have been funded at much less cost. 
The result is projects which are top-heavy with money spent on overpriced inputs, including an 
army of expensive foreign consultants’’^ 982:245). See also Clements (1993:1640).
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For local elites, survival depends on securing government largesse for their regions 
and the governors found project resources useful to the extent to which the services 
could be provided among competing areas or applicants on a discriminatory basis 
so that it could be used to bargain for political support. Most of the components - 
land, credit, marketing, building of health posts and schools, roads, water supply, 
and enterprise programmes - shared characteristics that made them politically 
appealing, especially to the governors wanting to show their constituency that they 
were concerned about poverty. These were: (i) results visibility; (ii) results rapidity, 
at least within the term of a state government; (iii) extensiveness, with the potential 
for reaching a large number of people, particularly poor ones.
The grown up of the bureaucracies to manage the project and to expand services 
offered has another political utility. Jobs on project administration - and jobs in many 
of federal, state and municipal bureaucracies involved in the project - represent 
political plums, given by those in charge of the programmes to their followers. 
However, in this expansion of services, performance was often weak, given to the 
tendency of to hire too large staff that is technically untrained. This fact also 
generates inefficiency, undercutting the economic viability of the project.
In sum, the analysis of the IRDP implementation-process and outputs seems to 
confirm the theoretical assumption of rational-choice theory, which has 
dismissed the characterisation of policy-makers "as selfless dedicate to 
disinterested pursuit of the public-good" as a "hopeless naive characterisation of 
political motivation". In its place, rational choice posits that “they behave as 
standard economic theory assumes Homo economics: they maximise their 
personal well-being.” (Williamson, 1994:13). Technocrats are not powerful in the 
decision making process and they are ineffective without the support of 
politicians. They became powerful because politicians choose to make them so 
and organise the political process in a way that enables them to exploit the 
technocrats’ informational advantage (Bates and Krueger, 1993:463). And 
politicians do not delegate to technocrats control over policy making and the 
power of implement policy reforms.
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A key determinant of the behaviour of politicians is the structure of political 
institutions. As we have seen, the rules that organise political competition 
generate political incentives shaping the behaviour of politicians. As a result of 
the characteristics of the institutions that determine political and policy rules, 
public policy becomes the subject of individual political choice. Because 
politicians want power, they are more frequently concerned with using public 
resources in a way that is politically useful than they are with using then in a way 
that is economically efficient. As a result of this typical behaviour a "social 
dilemma"21 arises, and two development problems were engendered for the 
project. First, costs grow excessively, making it difficult to generate earnings that 
which could cover the costs of the project or to generate a rate of return 
comparable to that could be obtained through alternative uses of government 
funds. Second, because the lack of effective control over the services provided, 
the considerable resources committed to the project were typically used 
inefficiently and, therefore the overall development effort was weakened.
As we have seen, politicians supported the project because it could serve as 
source of rewards for their followers and as an instrument for building a rural 
political constituency. In their effort to use the project resources to cultivate 
political popularity, political elites were providing services and production inputs 
that could nevertheless generate strong support for small farms with important 
consequences at the level of local structures and processes. As we will see in 
the following chapters, rural development policies promoted for political reasons, 
can also be important instruments to advance social and economic ends.
21 Bates (1995:29) refers to "social dilemmas" as those kinds of problems which arise when 
choices made by rational individuals yield outcomes that are socially irrational. According to him,
" A social dilemma arises when radical individualism becomes inconsistent with social welfare.”
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TABLE IV.2 - IRDP-AS-PE: PROJECT TARGETS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Component Unit Appraisal
Estimate
Accomplishments
Total
%
Credit
Credit Plans No. 6,800 13,788 203
Investment Credit Cz$ n.a. 24,423,827 n.a.
Seasonal Credit Cz$ - n.a. 7,129,767 n.a.
Cooperative Credit Cz$ n.a. 314,956 n.a.
Aaricultural Extension 
Extension Staff No. 140 127 91
Administrative Staff No. 44 52 118
Farmers Receiving Assistance No. 15,540 23,001 148
-Landless No. 4,662 9,435 202
-0-10 ha No. 8,236 9,890 120
-10-50 ha No. 2,642 3,686 140
Area Assisted: n.a. 301,520 n.a.
-Rainfed Ha. n.a. 67,565 n.a.
-Irrigated Ha. n.a. 2,347 n.a.
-Pasture Ha. n.a. 231,608 n.a.
Demonstration Units No. n.a. 136 n.a.
Assistance to Farmers Groups No. 800 5,887 736
Assistance to Cooperatives No. 8 20 250
Aaricultural Research
On-Farm Trials No. 34 35 103
Other Trials No. 105 79 75
Seed and Seedlina S u d d Iv
Beans Tons 3,152 1,405 45
Com Tons 879 556 63
Cotton Tons 929 709 76
Passion Fruit ’000 284 470 105
Coconuts '000 30 92 307
Citrus '000 90 220 244
Avocados '000 5 111 2,220
Bananas '000 n.a. 302 n.a.
Land Tenure
Land Purchased Ha. n.a. 9,595 n.a.
Land Titling No. n.a. 3,099 n.a.
Marketina
Marketing Studies No. 44 13 30
Construction:
- Assembly Warehouses No. 16 4 25
- Municipal Markets No. n.a. 12 n.a.
Purchase:
- radio equipment No. 10 8 80
- scale No. 16 16 100
- trucks No. 8 11 138
Staff Training No. 122 79 65
Feeder Roads
Construction Km 950 1,097 115
Maintenance Km n.a. 1,704 n.a.
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Non-Farm Enterorises
Enterprises Assisted No. 2,340 7,338 314
Training No. 3,508 6,325 180
Loans Granted No. 3,276 2,668 81
Education and Trainina
Schools Constructed and Expanded No. 76 115 151
Schools Improved No. n.a. 391 n.a.
Schools Equipped No. 75 146 195
Training Teachers No. .1,518 1,607 106
Training Supervisors No. 82 82 100
Vocational Training No. 7,200 5,897 82
Health and Sanitation
Health Centres and Posts:
- Constructed No. 4 13 325
- Improved No. 3 11 367
- Equipped No. 22 57 259
- Operational Support No. n.a. 105 n.a.
Sanitation
Construction of Pit Latrines No. 5,660 4,770 84
Distribution of Filters No. n.a. 10,330 n.a.
Training No. 2,992 3,269 109
Water S u d d Iv No. 36 100 278
System Studied No. 36 86 239
Systems Installed
Cooperative .
Cooperative Assisted No. 8 20 250
Cooperat. Education for Farmers No. 800 5,887 736
Associate's Training No. 80 1,785 2,231
Officials Training No. 240 319 133
Water Conservation
Constructed
- Communal Dams No. 2 2 100
- Small Dams No. n.a. 41 n.a.
- Tubewells No. n.a. 54 n.a.
- Small-Scale Irrigation Schemes
Irrigation Demonstration No. n.a. 51 n.a.
Units Constructed and Maintained No. n.a. 35 n.a.
Purchase of Tractors No. 8 8 100
Communitv Development
Community Activity Participating No. n.a. 721 n.a.
Families No. n.a. 19,340 n.a.
Source: PRORURAL, Relatorio de Finalizacao - PDRI do Aareste Setentrional. Recife, February 
1988.
n.a. Not available.
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TABLE IV.3 - PDRI-AS-PE: TOTAL PROJECT COSTS BY COMPONENT (US$ ’000)
Category Estimated Costs Total Costs Final Appraisal 
(%)
Relative
Importance
Credit:
.Seasonal 18,606 7,444 40 7.2
.Investment 26,318 24,442 93 23.7
Agricult. Extension 8,705 16,605 191 16.1
Agricult. Research 1,340 2,318 173 2.2
Seed Supply 417 750 180 0.7
Water Conservation 710 1,662 234 1.6
Cooperative 994 2,473 249 2.3
Marketing 1,757 1,958 111 1.9
Roads 15,081 17,890 119 17.4
Non-Farm Enterp. (*) 2,646 2,075 78 2.0
Water Supply 2,970 1,667 56 1.6
Education 4,536 4,490 99 4.4
Health 1,690 2,194 130 2.2
Management^*) 3,913 9,903 253 9.6
Unallocated:
Community 2,599 2.5
Development 
Land Tenure 
Training
- 3,827
808
- 3.7
0.8
Total 89,683 103,085 115 100.0
Source: THE WORLD BANK..Pernambuco Rural Development Project - Agreste Setentrional, 
In: Project Completion Report - Brazil. Agriculture Operations Division / Brazil Country 
Department, June 1988.
(*) Excludes BANDEPE credit
(**) Includes monitoring and evaluation
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CHAPTER V -  OUTCOMES: PROJECT IMPACT AT THE FARM 
LEVEL
1. Introduction
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the strategic political motivation of the 
military regime to deal with two of the biggest problems of the rural North-East 
through POLONORDESTE - poverty and lack of agricultural modernisation - was 
its search for legitimacy and political support. In the “democratising period” the 
regime sought to manage its legitimacy through the pursuit of redistributive and 
populist politics because it needed to mobilise political support through elections. 
However, besides the manipulation of the programme for organising a rural 
constituency, the regime’s need for legitimacy required that the programme 
should succeed in achieving its social and economic goals.
Indeed, it seems realistic to suggest that no State anywhere has the freedom to 
select and implement policies on the basis of economic considerations alone. 
Even States with highly legitimised institutions are confronted with the need to 
decide economic policies on the basis of a mixture of economic and political 
motives. Nevertheless, it might be argued that rural development policies which 
are promoted for political reasons could also be important instruments for 
improving social and economic indicators. In fact, several State interventions 
point to the fundamental role of politics for agrarian development.1
In fact, the most significant constraint on small farm strategy of rural 
development at local level may well be political. Policies to improve the small 
farm sector conflict directly with the interests of large-scale farmers who wish to 
increase their stock of land and capital. Such farmers constitute a powerful 
political force in virtually every country where agriculture has been an important 
economic sector. In Brazil, especially in the North-East region, these farmers are
1 See, for instance, Harriss (1995) analysis of the role of politics in the trends of change in the 
agrarian structure and agricultural development in India.
so well entrenched in the political system that governments are simply unable to 
pursue policies of which they disapprove.
However, the way in which political management has been achieved during the 
democratising period has introduced an inclination towards populist policies, 
amongst them rural development programmes which lead to a provision of 
services and production inputs to small farmers, with important consequences 
upon local level structures and processes. As we will see in the quantification of 
some effects of State intervention on the Northern Agreste farmers’ economic 
activities set out in this chapter, there is no reason to automatically assume a 
negative relationship between State involvement in agriculture and small-scale 
agricultural production.2 This evidence also argues against analysis of rural 
transformation which tended to regard the State and questions of politics as 
largely external to agrarian processes. The State matters, and the relationship 
between State and local society can exercise a powerful influence upon local 
power structures and processes of agrarian differentiation.
The purpose of this chapter is, thus, to illustrate some aspects of the nature and 
extent of the short-term transformations taking place the Northern Agreste 
farming activities under the impact of State intervention. Trends in the Northern 
Agreste agrarian structure can be partially inferred from changes in the pattern of 
landownership, composition of agricultural capital, levels of technology, land use, 
major rural activities, marketing patterns and the appropriation of labour of the 
same farm households through the period studied (1980-85). This analysis is 
based on information provided by a panel study of 340 sampled farmers of 
different size categories located in the area of influence of the small farmer 
oriented Integrated Rural Development Project3.
2 Although the area as a whole has benefited from the project, especially through the 
improvement of infrastructure, the group expected to receive direct project benefits was the 
agricultural population which has no land or cultivated land of up to fifty hectares. This group was 
labelled "small producers" (pequenos produtores) in the project.
3 The data for the panel study was provided by surveys carried out by the "IRDP-AS-PE
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2. Changes in the Sample of Farm Households: 1980-1985
From a Marxist standpoint, social relations of production are defined primarily by 
the mode of appropriation of surplus labour or the "relation of exploitation". 
However, in the process of material production, resources are combined with 
human labour and the help of different tools. Following Harriss (1982), the term 
"forces of production" is used here to include resources and technology (the 
means of production) and the organisation of labour.
According to Harriss (1982:110), corresponding to the form of appropriation of 
surplus labour there is a particular form of ownership of the forces of production. 
It may therefore be easier conceptually to begin by examining the forms of 
ownership and control of the forces of production, and to ask how different 
groups of people are related to the forces of production and to one another in the 
process of production. This signifies investigating the "agrarian structure".
Land distribution, in the absence of more direct information, shows roughly what 
the disparities in distribution of income in farming are likely to be. According to 
Thiesenhusen and Melmed-Sanjak (1990:394), contributions of farm people to 
agricultural growth and their "benefits" from agriculture vary according to their 
position in the agrarian structure. The position one occupies in the agrarian 
structure may also facilitate the choice of technology. Since the agrarian 
structure acts as a sort of prism through which public goods must filter, it could 
provide a basis for predicting the likely beneficiaries of government 
expenditures.
The comparison of the farms surveyed at two points in time give us information 
about land tenure in two ways: (1) the distribution of land by "units of 
production" and (2) the legal ownership of the land. We should make it clear that
Evaluation Unit", at the beginning and the end of the project period studied, in six selected 
municipalities of the Northern Agreste. See Appendix One (Methodology and Source of Data) for 
a description of the procedures followed in these surveys and for the selection of the panel
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the sample represents a privileged section of the Northern Agreste rural 
population: those who have access to land for independent production, and 
those who remained in the region as producers during the five year interval 
covered by the survey.
"Production unit" for the PIMES researchers means the sum of plots of land 
owned, rented or sharecropped (contiguous or not) which are connected in the 
process of production under a single command. All the information from the 
questionnaire is concerned with this production unit. This definition of production 
unit does not always imply legal ownership (proprietorship) of the land, and 
signifies the control of means of production for given uses.
"Rented land", in the questionnaire, is land ceded in exchange for a fixed 
payment. This payment can be in cash or goods. For it to be characterised as 
"tenancy" the payment needs to be a fixed amount, which does not involve risk 
for the landlord.
"Sharecropping" is the concession of land where payment is variable. It is, in 
general, given in kind and involves the sharing of risks between the landlord and 
the sharecropper. The concession of land in return for stubble fodder or clearing 
of lands for pasture is also considered to be sharecropping, although the latter 
does not involve risks for the landlord.
For the purpose of this study, I stratified production units according to their size 
into four categories distributed as follows: "micro" - less than 10.0 ha; "small" - 
10.1 to 50.0 ha; "medium" - 50.1 to 200 ha; and "large" - greater than 200 ha. 
This stratification follows the usual classification for farm size groups in Brazilian 
literature. The distribution of production units by farm size, according to this 1980 
stratification, will be used as a classification criterion to tabulate data and to 
analyse changes for each group of the same households interviewed in two 
panel waves.
sample studied in this thesis.
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2.1. The Distribution of Agricultural Capital
In the Brazilian North-East, as in other "traditional economies" land and water 
are the principal factors of production together with electricity, seeds and other 
inputs, principally chemical fertilisers, employed by labour using various 
instruments, including tools and livestock.
Examination of land distribution patterns through the size of establishments is 
also one way of identifying changes in the agrarian structure. Despite the 
relatively small interval between the surveys (5 years) several important changes 
can be perceived in the evolution of farm structures. Table V.1 shows the 
distribution of farms, from panel data, classified according to size categories of 
production units in each year. This table provides a useful representation of the 
dynamic process of change over time.
The comparison with data from the repeated measurement of household 
surveyed shows that there are differences in the number of holdings in different 
size classes of farm in each year. A trend which can be perceived in the sampled 
farms, between 1980 and 1985, is an increase in the proportion of micro 
establishments (from 25.9% to 28.8%) and a slight decline in the proportion of 
medium-scale and large production units. The numbers in bold are the observed 
"stayers", which correspond to the number of households that remain in the 
same size category of production unit (279 cases or 82 per cent of the sample). 
The other numbers are the "movers", which correspond to the number of 
householders which change to larger (20 cases, or 5.9 per cent of the sample) or 
to smaller categories of production unit (41 cases, or 12.1 per cent of the 
sample).
The declining trend in average farm size has been considered in studies of the 
"peasant question" as evidence of the disintegration of the family-farm sector 
under the pressures of capitalist development. It is pertinent to ask whether this 
taking place in the Northern Agreste. The pattern of changing farm size is 
apparently more complex than this simple model of differentiation suggests.
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Ta b le  v.1 - n o r t h e r n  a g r e s t e : d is tr ib u t io n  o f  p r o d u c t io n  u n its  by  size
CATEGORY OF FARMS(*), (TURNOVER) PANEL SAMPLE, 1980/85.
Year 1985
Year Farm Size Micro Small Medium Large Total
(%)
1980
Micro
no.
(%)
78
(88.6)
10
(11.4)
— — 88
(25.9)
Small
no.
(%)
19
(15.4)
94
(76.4)
10
(8.1)
— 123
(36.2)
Medium
no.
(%)
1
(0.9)
18
(15.7)
96
(83.5)
— 115
(33.8)
Large
no.
(%)
— — 3
(21.4)
11
(78.6)
14
(4.1)
Total
no.
(%)
98
(28.8)
122
(35.9)
109
(32.1)
11
(3.2)
340
(100.0)
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
(*) Micro farms = under 10.0 ha, small farms = 10.1 to 50.0 ha, medium-scale farms = 50.1 to 
200.0 ha, large farms = 200.0 ha and over.
Table V.2 shows the comparison of households surveyed in terms of the 
distribution of total area utilised and the average size of agricultural units in each 
year, according to their stratification of size categories of production unit from 
1980 data. These data showed that the total amount of area in use was less in 
1985, which caused a reduction in the average size per unit of production (from 
63.5 to 55.3 ha). However, this reduction occurs only in medium and large 
categories of farm, in which the average size of units dropped from 97.3 to 87.8 
ha and from 454.1 to 318.8 ha respectively. There is also a decrease in the 
proportion of land operated by large establishments from 1981 to 1985 (from 
29.3% to 23.7%).
Despite this apparent redistribution of land, the analysis of farmland by size 
categories of units of production still shows a strong landownership
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concentration. However, it is interesting to observe that the average area of 
cultivated land within small and medium size categories has been maintained, 
and the increase of micro and small units of production observed in the data 
does not suggest fragmentation among the "microfundium" holdings (the 
proportion of their farmland increased from 2.0 per cent to 2.9 per cent, and their 
average area increased from 4.8 to 6.2 hectares).
TABLE V.2 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: DISTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTION UNITS BY SIZE 
CATEGORY OF FARMS AND BY LAND OPERATED AMONG HOUSEHOLDS, PANEL 
SAMPLE, 1980/85.
Farm Size Number of 
Farms
1980 
% of Area Average Size 
(ha)
1985 
% of Area Average 
Size (ha)
Micro 88 2.0 4.8 2.9 6.2
Small 123 16.5 29.1 19.7 30.2
Medium 115 52.0 97.3 53.7 87.8
Large 14 29.3 454.1 23.7 318.8
Total 340 100.0 63.5 100.0 55.3
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
A second approach to land tenure, available from the data, uses the criterion of 
landownership (or proprietorship). This is different from the Production unit. It 
includes owned land, which constitutes the landlord's "production unit", and land 
that the landlord cedes to sharecroppers, tenant farmers, and moradores4.
Table V.3 shows the distribution of sample household farms using the concept of 
legal possession of land, and identifies landless producers. If we exclude 
landless farmers, the proportion of "micro", in the sampled holdings, increases
4 As explained above, "Moradores" are resident workers who receive a parcel of land on the 
property for independent production and, in exchange, work on the main crop of the 
establishment.
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from 25.8% in 1980, to 30.7% in 1985. This table, which presents the distribution 
of farms from panel data, classified according to size categories of property in 
each year, gives an indication of one of the ways in which these changes are 
occurring. This table also provides a useful representation of the dynamic 
process of changes over time. The observed changes show a heterogeneous 
transition pattern of landownership. The numbers in bold are the observed 
"stayers"; that is to say, they correspond to the number of householders which 
remain in the same size category of property (274 cases or 80.5% of the 
sample). The other numbers are the observed "movers" (66 cases or 19.4% of 
the sampled farms).
TABLE V.3 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTIES BY SIZE CATEGORY 
OF LANDOWNERS AND LANDLESS PRODUCERS (TURNOVER), PANEL SAMPLE, 1980/85.
Year 1985
Year Property
size
Landless Micro Small Medium Large Total
(%)
1980
Landless
no.
(%)
14
(63.6)
8
(36.4)
— — — 22
(6.5)
Micro
no.
(%)
— 62
(87.3)
9
(12.7)
—
— 71
(20.9)
Small
no.
(%)
— 17
(14.2)
92
(76.7)
11
(9.2)
— 120
(35.3)
Medium
no.
(%)
— 1
(0.9)
17
(15.0)
95
(84.1)
— 113
(33.2)
Large
no.
(%)
— — — 3
(21.4)
11
(78.6)
14
(4.1)
Total
no.
(%)
14
(4.1)
89
(25.9)
118
(34.7)
109
(32.1)
11
(3.2)
340
(100.0)
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
The disaggregation of changes in patterns of landownership shows a clear trend 
towards a reduction in the number of proprietors within categories of medium and 
large farms. There is an observed mobility in both directions of small landowners
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and 12.7 per cent of micro landowners moved to the category of small 
proprietors. On the other hand, 36.4 per cent of "landless" producers (in 1980) 
became landowners (in 1985). However, this table shows the same trend in the 
distribution of production units by size of area, that is, an apparent reduction in 
the average size of properties (the average size of properties falls from 70.0 ha 
in 1980 to 57.3 ha in 1985).
In sum, the available data does not provide evidence of any general increase in 
the concentration of land or of the loss of land by small landholders. On the 
contrary, there was a reduction in the incidence of landlessness and most 
smaller farmers were able to retain access to land. Moreover, as a result of 
partitioning of some holdholdings and the reduction of speculative investment in 
land, the decrease in the average size of properties ocurred mainly in the larger 
categories of farmers.
The results of our tabulation of the data from POLONORDESTE / PIMES - UFPE 
surveys are compatible with more recent information from the 1985 Brazilian 
Agricultural Census, in the sense that the land fragmentation, the so-called 
process of “minifundizagao”, is a perceptible trend in the structure of land tenure 
in the Northern Agreste region. Although our aim here is not to distinguish the 
cause underlying the apparent resurgence of small-scale family production in 
Brazil, it is important to point out the "common causal elements" highlighted by 
Goodman as an explanation for the reversal of apparently well-established 
trends in the agrarian transition in Brazil. These include:
"... declining rates of Brazilian economic growth and the recession of 1981-84 provoked 
by the debt crisis, and the consequent contraction of urban labour markets, particularly in 
the building industry and other sectors which absorb large contingents of unskilled labour, 
including rural migrants. In agriculture, cuts in the supply of rural credit, especially for 
investment purposes, the virtual elimination of credit subsidies, and fewer resources for 
agricultural fiscal incentive programmes have raised the real cost of capital. These 
changes allegedly have slowed down the pace of agricultural modernisation and reduced 
speculative investment in the land." (Goodman, 1989:6)
It is argued by Mueller (1987) and Rezende (1987) that landowners have reacted 
to these policy changes and the new condition in rural markets by adopting more
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traditional forms of labour and intensive land use in production. In the Agreste 
region, the “peasantisation” process could mean that capitalist farms are 
reducing the size of their holding and concentrating capital in them, removing 
internal peasants and allowing independent/external peasant producers to 
proliferate.
The declining trend in average farm size has been considered in studies of the 
"peasant question" as evidence of the disintegration of the family-farm sector 
under the pressures of capitalist development. It is pertinent to ask whether this 
was taking place in the Northern Agreste. The pattern of changing farm size is 
apparently more complex than this simple model of differentiation suggests. The 
fragmentation of holdings is also considered to be related to rural poverty, 
through the continuing expansion of sub-family farms. According to FAO 
estimates (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 1988), as many as two thirds of farm 
households across Latin America derive more than half of their income from off- 
farm sources, principally wages from employment in agriculture and a wide 
variety of other activities.
The striking process of land fragmentation and the proliferation of smallholdings 
is, according to Lehmann (1982), a refuge for labour displaced from wage or 
semi-wage employment, permanent and temporary, or for workers who in earlier 
periods might have expected to enter agricultural wage employment but have 
found such opportunities closed off. This process of "peasantisation", also 
observed by Lehmann in his analysis of the evolution of the agrarian structures 
of North-East Brazil between 1950 and 1970, is explained by the fact that "in the 
North-East there was still "room" for the peasant to find a refuge against poverty 
and employment in marginal lands, and there were few alternative job 
opportunities in agriculture or industry or services" (Lehmann, 1982:258). But for 
Lehmann this continues to be a marginal activity, excluded from the 
modernisation process.
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However, the differentiated conditions of production in the Northern Agreste led 
us to question the apparent economic homogeneity of these small farmers. A 
case study of micro proprietors (less than 10 ha), carried out in a village of this 
region (Soares, 1983), showed a great disparity in indicators such as income, 
capital stock and production costs, and tends to confirm the heterogeneity of the 
economic situation of these "minifundia" producers.
Agricultural capital is composed of the value of land and structures, the value of 
equipment and livestock. The importance of the analysis of agricultural capital is 
to account for the level of capitalisation of different farm units, in terms of the 
means of production at the disposal of labour, and their potential in the 
generation of an agricultural surplus (Ferreira, 1984). The identification of the 
availability of capital items within the economic units allows us to identify the 
composition of agricultural capital in the production units and gives us a rough 
indication of the development of productive forces and the degree of farmers' 
reinvestment in land, animals and equipment.
Land is, probably, the most important asset in the farms and its value is 
supposed to reflect its economic capacity. However, what usually happens, 
according to Ferreira (1984:134), is that the market value of land exceeds by far 
its economic value because of other factors, especially in areas where the 
application of resources in agricultural investment has been encoureged. 
According to him, the most important factors contributing to this process are: 
landlords' strong desire for more land; land is seen as an investment that allows 
protection against high inflationary trends; the connection between possession of 
land with social prestige; and agricultural credit requirements of land ownership 
for collateral.
Though land ownership is an important element in defining the level of well­
being of a farm household, it is not the only determinant of differentiation. The 
value of the land depends on localisation, soil fertility and the availability of
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water. The value of land is also increased by the value of structures and 
improvements incorporated. In the sampled farms, these structures consisted of 
residential masonry houses (an indicator of better conditions of livelihood) and 
other types of houses, such as mud wall (taipa); improvements, which include 
flour mills (casas de farinha), cheese mills (queijaria), etc; and other installations 
(such as storage buildings, livestock pens, etc) and wire fences (the most 
expensive) or other fences. Manioc flour-making depends upon the use of mills 
which not all farmers possess. Although the raw material can be processed in 
someone else's flour mill in return for a payment in cash or "conga" (normally 20 
percent of the flour), the owner of a flour-mill is considered well off by the 
householders, especially if he has an electric mill.
The percentage of farms that have structures incorporated onto the land and the 
changes, along the five year fieldwork interval, is reported in table V.4.
According to the indicators chosen, micro producers showed a clear trend 
towards improvement. The percentage of micro producers with masonry houses 
increased from 64.8 to 77.3%, improvements increased from 9.1% to 11.4%, 
installations increased from 33.0 to 55.7%, and wire fences increased from 37.5 
to 58.0%. In the other categories of farm, there were fewer changes and when 
these occurred, in most of cases, they were towards a reduction in the proportion 
of farms with structures incorporated onto the land.
Access to water, related to the existence of dams and wells, as well as irrigation 
systems and electric installations, are also items which would increase the value 
of land. Table V.5 shows the percentage of farmers with access to any kind of 
water storage on the farm, electricity, and irrigation systems. Because of semi- 
arid climatic conditions, the development of irrigation could be fundamental to 
eliminating constraints on the level of development of the productive forces in the 
Northern Agreste. Moreover, irrigation is one of the most important forms of 
investment on the land, leading to increased production both in terms of the
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TABLE V.4 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: PERCENTAGE OF PRODUCTION UNITS THAT HAVE 
STRUCTURES INCORPORATED INTO THE LAND BY SIZE CATEGORY OF FARMS, PANEL 
SAMPLE, 1980/85.
Farm Size Houses
(Masonry)
Improvements Installations Fences
(Wire)
1980
Micro 64.8 9.1 33.0 37.5
Small 99.3 35.0 75.6 72.4
Medium 92.2 35.7 90.4 85.2
Large 92.9 14.3 100.0 85.7
All 85.9 27.6 70.6 68.2
1985
Micro 77.3 11.4 55.7 58.0
Small 93.5 28.5 81.3 67.5
Medium 91.3 20.0 89.6 73.0
Large 85.7 14.3 100.0 85.7
Total 88.2 20.6 78.2 67.6
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
variety of crops that can be grown in a year and in terms of productivity per crop. 
However, only in large farms has it acquired some importance.
The greatest gains in access to water by micro farms can be related to the 
construction communal and small dams by the project. This was also the case 
with the slight increase in the number of micro and small farmers with access to 
irrigation schemes provided by the project. Electrification was not included as a 
segment of the project. Its access distribution follow the traditional pattern of 
State investment in the region: there was some improvement in all categories of 
farm, but access in 1985 was still biased against small farms. Because the 
installation of eletricity on farms is a private business (the state eletricity 
company provides electricity only on main routes), I saw several cases of small 
farmers who could not afford to install it, even with a connecting point located a 
few metres from their farm.
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TABLE V.5 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: PERCENTAGE OF PRODUCTION UNITS WITH  
ACCESS TO WATER, ELECTRICITY AND IRRIGATION SYSTEMS BY SIZE CATEGORY OF 
FARMS, PANEL SAMPLE, 1980/85.
Farm Size Water
Storage,
Dams
Wells,
Pumpsets
Irrigation
System
Electricity
1980
Micro 39.8 11.4 1.1 3.4
Small 79.7 29.3 0.8 9.8
Medium 93.0 36.5 5.2 15.7
Large 92.9 35.7 14.3 35.7
Total 74.4 27.4 2.9 11.2
1985
Micro 62.5 19.3 2.3 11.4
Small 79.7 26.8 4.1 20.3
Medium 87.8 30.4 2.6 29.6
Large 92.9 28.6 21.4 57.1
Total 78.5 26.8 3.8 22.6
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
2.2. Different Levels of Technology
The level of technology in Northern Agreste agriculture is very low, as confirmed 
by various studies undertaken so far. With the exception of sugar-cane and 
some crops produced in irrigated areas, the majority of crops are cultivated using 
traditional technology. The adoption of technology is also selective in relation to 
the categories of producers. A small farmer in the Northern Agreste uses 
cultivation methods based almost entirely on human labour and rudimentary 
means of production such as the hoe, the scythe, the spade, etc. Despite the 
generally poor availability of modern capital and machinery on the farms, it is 
possible to distinguish farmers in terms of levels of technological development.
Table V.6 shows the percentage of each category of farm employing tractors and 
other equipment. Equipment includes any nonfixed item directly or indirectly
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related to production or marketing, such as tractors, ploughs, hoes, oxcarts, 
dusting equipment, threshing machines, trucks, jeeps or other vehicles. Some 
tools are so few, simple and cheap that they can hardly be monopolised. Thus, 
they are insignificant for our analysis of differentiation.
TABLE V.6 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: PERCENTAGE OF PRODUCTION UNITS EMPLOYING 
TRACTORS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT BY SIZE CATEGORY OF FARMS, PANEL SAMPLE, 
1980/85.
Farm Size Tractor Oxcart Trucks Equip.
Treat.
Threshing
Machine
1980
Micro 3.4 10.2 2.3 17.0 2.3
Small 21.1 35.0 27.6 32.5 15.4
Medium 33.0 57.4 46.0 45.2 31.3
Large 64.3 64.3 71.4 50.0 78.6
Total 22.4 37.4 29.1 33.5 20.0
1985
Micro 12.5 17.0 8.0 15.9 5.7
Small 14.6 39.0 26.8 24.4 19.5
Medium 22.6 53.0 47.8 41.7 34.8
Large 57.1 85.7 64.3 42.9 71.4
Total 18.5 40.0 30.6 28.8 23.2
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
The possession of tractors is probably the most important factor differentiating 
the level of farm capitalisation. It is also a good indication of the level of farm 
mechanisation. Indices of tractor use are high only on large farms. However, 
comparison between 1980 and 1985 shows that there is a substantial increase in 
the number of micro farms employing tractors and there is a slight reduction in 
these indices in the other categories of farm. These changes could be linked to 
two factors: First, micro farmers could have access to tractor hire provided by the
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State through municipal governments, co-operatives or small farmers 
associations; Secondly, to cope with the increased real cost of capital and to 
face the uncertainty of the market for agricultural products, some larger farmers 
have found hiring out machine to poorest farms to be a profitable activity.
The difficulties encountered in trying to incorporate modern technology on small 
farms are well-known, particularly among agronomists who have some 
experience with agricultural extension. Clearly, one of the least appropriate ways 
to modernise peasant agriculture has been through mechanisation. The 
relatively low level of farm mechanisation in the Northern Agreste may be 
explained largely by two factors. In the first place, there is the considerable 
fragmentation of small units. Additional mechanised technologies can only be 
used on units that exceed a certain minimum size. In the second place, on 
medium and large farms, land is used mainly for stock raising, which does not 
have much need for mechanisation. Moreover, as Ortega pointed out (1986:248),
"The fact that the phenomenon of increasing mechanisation of agricultural tasks is 
carefully noted while the prevailing use of biological force is repeatedly omitted can lead 
to distortions, as is the case when it is forgotten, for example, that certain patterns of 
mechanisation are not suited to the great majority of productive units in Latin American 
agriculture, or when it is forgotten that appropriate technologies must be sought 
according to the availability of the various productive factors, particularly the work force."
The ownership of trucks or other vehicles is another factor of differentiation 
among farmers. The trend in the possession of vehicles follows that observed for 
tractors. Possession is biased against small and micro farms, but there is a slight 
increase in the proportion of micro farms with this item in the 1985 survey. As 
transportation is one of the items which absorbs much of the profit a farmer could 
get from his production, those who own vehicles are also considered members of 
the wealthier stratum. Truck owners use their vehicles mainly for activities 
related to the farm. Moreover, those without much land may buy a vehicle to 
transport people and commodities to and from the community. Even the 
possession of an oxcart, a more traditional item but very important for farm 
activities, is related to farm size.
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Livestock includes draft animals and cattle, which are considered agricultural 
capital on the assumption that they provide a flow of services to the owner and 
they represent capital equipment. Draft animals and cattle can increase the scale 
of rural production by providing traction power through which farmers seeking to 
increase their incomes can bring greater areas into production. Cattle also 
influence the intensity of production. Where cattle are available so is manure, 
and use of fertilisers can increase yields. But cattle is an important capital item, 
both for providing a flow of production (meat, dairy products, hides), and as a 
capital hedge against inflation (Ferreira, 1984:134).
Table V.7 shows that the number of farm herds has decreased slightly between 
1980 and 1985 (from 10,364 to 8,707 head), and does not suggest expansion of 
livestock as a general path for all categories of farm. However, the average size 
of herd by size of production units indicates that the changes in the herd size 
varies among distinct categories of producers. The average number of head per 
farm on micro holdings increased from 3.3 to 3.7 head. Small and medium farms 
have both seen a slightly decrease in numbers, but this decrease is more evident 
on large establishments (where the decrease is from 172.4 to 129.5 head).
Many studies suggest that large farms are the first to introduce technical change 
and adopt the most modern techniques available (chemical fertilisers, improved 
seeds, pesticides, etc.) in order to increase production and productivity.
However, there are factors that lead small farms to introduce certain innovations. 
Although we do not know enough about these factors, Ortega (1986:284) 
suggests that the prices of industrial inputs play a central role in limiting use of 
technology, but the extreme shortage of land and the need for increasing 
production may encourage small farms to use improved seed or fertilisers. 
According to him,
"to adopt technologies that involve the incorporation of inputs available in the market 
may be, from the peasant's point of view, a destabilising element, as they will require him 
to monetize his economy even more and increase his dependency on the market. For the 
peasant, it is really not sufficient to be presented with technologies that are only justified 
in terms of their potential for raising yields or providing for a positive cost-benefit-
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TABLE V.7 -NORTHERN AGRESTE: DRAFT ANIMALS AND CATTLE: INVENTORY OF HERD 
AND AVERAGE NUMBER OF HERDS BY SIZE CATEGORY OF FARMS, PANEL SAMPLE, 
1980/85
Farm
Size
1980 1985
No. % Average No. % Average
Micro 286 2.8 3.3 326 3.7 3.7
Small 1,963 18.9 16.0 1,760 20.2 14.3
Medium 5,701 55.0 49.6 4,808 55.2 41.8
Large 2,414 23.3 172.4 1,813 20.8 129.5
Total 10,364 100.0 30.5 8,707 100.0 25.6
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
ratlo.[...] it seems that they draw up a kind of balance-sheet as regards the relative 
availability of resources before introducing any new developments which might make 
them lose control over their own fate." (Ortega, 1986:283-284)
An indication of the level of technology adopted by various types of farms is 
presented in table V.8. The inputs considered are only those bought in the 
market and do not include inputs produced on the farm, such as seeds or natural 
manure. The pattern of technology varies according to the size of holding and 
this situation does not change throughout the five years of project 
implementation. This table shows a situation in which there is, as a rule, a 
reduction in the proportion of farmers using inputs bought in the market.
Fertilisers, whether natural (manure) or chemical are an expensive item in the 
production of crops. However, only those who can afford to provide their land 
with the required amount to overcome low soil fertility are likely to enjoy high 
yields. Chemical fertilisers have not been widely used in Northern Agreste 
agriculture, probably as a result of the availability of natural manure. A larger 
proportion of farmers used modern inputs such as pesticides, fungicides and 
insecticides and their adoption was not too different among the farm categories. 
This can be explained by the fact that, in the case of crop disease or pest-
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combating, State action included a combination of provision of subsidised credit 
that allowed small farmers to buy the inputs needed to eradicate disease with a 
high level of control over its use by the bank and the extension service. The 
disease and pest campaigns were of especial concern to small farmers, to the 
extent that they produced the same crop of medium and large farms. If small 
farmers were not included in the public assistance efforts, infestation in their 
crops would ultimately spread to larger farmers. This subsidised credit, 
therefore, forced changes in cultivation practices and in inputs use that were 
maintained even when these controls were dropped (see Tendler, 1993).
In 1980, only 4.5 per cent of micro farms used selected seeds, compared with 
almost 30 per cent for larger farms. The situation of small and medium farms is 
very similar for those farms under 10 hectares. In 1985, there was a slight 
increase in the proportion of smaller farms using selected seeds, which could be 
related to the programme of seed distribution by government agencies. This 
programme helped to change patterns of crop production, with the introduction of 
new crops, especially fruits.
The proportion of farmers using purchased inputs for livestock, such as vaccines 
or veterinary medicine and supplementary feed rations, are higher than those 
using agricultural inputs. The introduction of subsidised institutional and other 
governments incentives have brought about technological changes in the 
traditional pattern of cattle-raising through improved cattle breeding, fenced-in 
grazing and purchased animal feed. The early adopters of the new methods of 
production were typically larger farmers. The large flow of finance capital that 
was provided for them has helped accelerate the change from their traditional 
cattle ranch to the modern capitalist enterprise. However, with the extension of 
credit availability for small farmers the adoption of technology became much 
more widespread. Probably as a result of the reduction in credit during the 
project period there is a reduction in these indices in 1985 for all categories of 
farm. Except in the case of crop disease control, micro and small farmers
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appear to be more linked to the market for the purchase of livestock inputs than 
for the purchase of agricultural inputs.
TABLE V.8 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: PERCENTAGE OF PRODUCTION UNITS EMPLOYING 
MODERN INPUTS BY SIZE CATEGORY OF FARMS, PANEL SAMPLE, 1980/85.
Farm Size Chemical
fertiliser
Selected
seeds
pesticides / 
fungicides
Vaccines,
semen
feed ration
1980
Micro 2.8 4.5 56.8 40.9 47.7
Small 10.6 4.0 65.0 65.0 65.8
Medium 2.6 5.2 66.6 87.0 78.2
Large 14.3 28.6 78.6 85.7 71.4
Total 5.9 5.6 64.1 67.1 65.6
1985
Micro 3.4 8.0 42.0 27.2 20.5
Small 7.3 4.9 46.3 46.3 45.5
Medium 4.3 7.8 46.1 55.7 57.4
Large 7.1 21.4 35.7 71.4 78.6
Total 5.3 7.4 44.7 45.6 44.1
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
2.3. Land Use and Agricultural Production
By the 1960s, Agreste farmers planted a large number of products for self­
provision as well as for the regional market. Cash crops such as cotton and 
sugar-cane were planted together with staples like beans, maize, manioc and 
fruit on a semi-subsistence or even semi-commercial scale. In this system of 
shifting agriculture, cattle were reared in fallow areas, and during the dry season 
grazed on the stubble of cotton, beans and maize. Only modest areas of planted 
pastures and fodder were set aside for supplementing dry season pasture.
During this time, the Agreste was considered to be the bread basket of the 
North-East, supplying a variety of staples to the sugar plantations and cities of 
the coast as well as to the cattle-raising Sertao.
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During the 70s, cattle ranching became the predominant activity in the Agreste. 
Large and medium farms have become specialised in cattle raising and artificial 
pastures cover what had previously been fallow crop lands. The cropped area 
has ceased to expand in most places and has been drastically reduced where 
ranching has advanced most. With the rising profitability of livestock production 
and the greater availability of subsidised institutional credit, the basis of tenancy 
relations has, increasingly, become the formation of permanent pasture, which 
the tenant must establish before leaving the land. This conversion of former 
tenancy land has been accompanied by the parallel substitution of pasture for 
the landowner's commercial crops, such as cotton and coffee. If cattle-raising 
has been the most common form of production in the region since colonial times, 
with a strong influence on the economic, political and social organisation of 
North-Eastern rural society, recently it has became one of the main forms of 
capitalist penetration (Goodman and Redclift, 1981; Ferreira, 1984; Bicalho and 
Hoefle, 1990).
The variation of land use within units of production clearly shows the 
transformation under way in Northern Agreste farming (see table V.9). In both 
years analysed, pasture (native and planted) represents most of the farm area 
(45.0 per cent in 1980 and 48.8 per cent in 1985, against only 17.0 and 19.7 per 
cent of crop area, respectively), indicating that livestock is spread throughout all 
categories of farms surveyed. In spite of the predominance of grazing land in the 
form of native pasture, it could be seen that between 1980 and 1985 there was a 
substantial expansion in the area of planted pasture.
With extensive cattle-raising the increase in size of herds depends upon 
expansion of the area with native pasture. The new system of cattle raising uses 
technical innovation such as planted pasture and purchased animal feed. Thus, 
the "pecuarizagao" process can be associated with the expansion of cultivated 
pasture within land under productive use. However, the area effectively worked 
is only a small proportion of the total area administered, as native pasture 
occupies almost a third of the area incorporated into the productive process in
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TABLE V.9 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: EVOLUTION IN LAND USE BY SIZE CATEGORY OF 
FARMS (ROW  PER CENT), PANEL SAMPLE, 1980/85.
Farm Size Fallow/ idle 
land
Crops Native
pasture
Planted
pasture
Total Land (*)
1980
Micro
(ha) 70.0 241.0 58.0 38.5 421.0
(%) 16.6 57.2 13.8 9.1 100.0
Small
(ha) 774.6 984.0 984.7 513.2 3,547.5
(%) 21.0 27.7 27.8 13.8 100.0
Medium
(ha) 2,916.5 1,696.2 3,964.1 1,649.8 11,192.2
(%) 26.1 15.2 35.4 14.7 100.0
Large
(ha) 2,284.5 747.5 1,818.7 654.6 6,357.0
(%) 35.9 11.8 28.6 10.3 100.0
Total
(ha) 6,045.6 3,668.8 6,825.4 2,856.1 21,517.7
(%) 28.1 17.0 31.7 13.3 100.0
1985
Micro
(ha) 100.3 280.1 78.4 76.0 541.8
(%)
Small
18.5 51.8. 14.5 14.0 100.0
(ha) 634.6 1,129.0 997.9 674..6 3,708.4
(%)
Medium
17.1 30.4 26.4 18.2 100.0
(ha) 2,074.3 1,814.0 3,312.8 1,648.2 10,100.6
(%) 20.5 18.0 32.8 16.3 100.0
Large
(ha) 768.0 482.0 1,565.0 836.0 4,463.0
(%) 17.2 10.8 35.0 18.7 100.0
Total
(ha) 3,577.2 3,705.1 5,934.8 3,234.8 18,813.1
(%) 19.0 19.7 31.6 17.2 100.0
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
(*) The total is less than 100% because the total includes land given in moradia, tenancy and 
sharecropping and land with not specified use
both years. The importance of the area occupied by native pasture may be due 
to the low quality of land which does not permit a more intensive use of the soil 
with agricultural production.
An analysis of land use by size of holding shows that the form and intensity of 
land use varies predominantly according to the size of the units of production.
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Different trends can be observed among them in the two years surveyed. 
Generally speaking, the larger the unit of production, the higher the proportion of 
land with pasture and the lower the proportion of crop land. However, this is 
spread throughout all size categories of production units, and the expansion of 
the area with planted pasture (from 13.3 per cent to 17.2 per cent) is an 
important trend.
According to 1980 data, in micro units there was more intensive land use: 57% of 
the land was devoted to crops and they had the smallest proportion of grazing 
land. In 1985, they increased the proportion of unused land (from 16.6% to 
18.5%), probably as a result of the incorporation of worse quality land, with a 
slight reduction in the proportion of crop area and a slight increase in the area 
given over to planted pasture. The expansion of native pasture results from the 
incorporation of fallow land or other unused areas into the productive process. 
The important extension of grazing land in micro (especially in 1985) and small 
establishments could be, as Ferreira (1984:108) suggests, parcels of land of 
large farms under the administration of landlords given to be farmed by small 
tenants and sharecroppers, in the continuing symbiotic articulation between 
small and large farms.
However, in general terms, there was a more intensive occupation of land within 
faqm units, with an expansion of cultivated area (crops and planted pasture). The 
decrease of forest, fallow and idle land (from 28.1% to 19% of the total land), 
especially in medium and large enterprises, suggests that a more intensive use 
of land in the production process was taking place. Most of the expansion of the 
area under cultivation has been linked to planted pasture and crops. 
Nevertheless, livestock appears to be the predominant activity. According to 
Bicallho and Hoefle's field research5 (1990:55), farmers have their own reasons 
why they prefer cattle raising to cropping: (i) livestock is consistently more
5 Their field research was carried out in the Agreste and Sertao between 1977 and 1981, where 
two areas of advanced penetration of capitalised cattle ranching in the Agreste Baixo of Paraiba 
State and the enclave of capitalised irrigation along the lower-middle S3o Francisco River were
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profitable than many crops and; although larger farmers could plant high pay-off 
commercial crops, it does not resolve the "labour problem"; commercial cropping 
is also more difficult to supervise, thus, livestock fits neatly into the interests of 
absentee, urban-oriented land-owners.
Low profitability is indeed a problem for a number of crops planted in the 
Agreste. After 1960, the price of cotton and staples remained relatively stagnant 
for nearly two decades, so that by the late 1970s "only small farms which use 
mainly 'unpaid family labour1 could plant these crops".6 The table on changes in 
producer prices for the main farm products of the Agreste (table V.10) shows one 
of the reasons for the preference for cattle-raising.
TABLE V.10 - CHANGE IN PRODUCER PRICES FOR FARM PRODUCTS OF THE AGRESTE 
(1948/1950=100)
Product 1959/1961 1967/1969 1977 1986
Cash CroDS
Cotton 100.1 68.2 105.7 75.3
Sugar Cane 91.7 110.6 142.9 87.7
Food StaDles
Beans 134.8 108.1 167.6 137.4
Maize 115.1 91.3 101.1 110.1
Manioc 129.3 106.6 413.2 132.2
Livestock
Beef 157.9 179.7 253.1 318.9
SOURCE: Bicalho and Hoefle (1990)
However, if there are many new cash crops or traditional ones which can offer a 
large farmer substantially higher profits, other reasons can be added. Cattle 
raising, because of lower operating costs and less pronounced seasonal price 
fluctuations, is subject to less market risk than cropping. Environmental risk, in
studied in detail.
6 According to Bicalho and Hoefle (1990:55) if a large farmer, who uses exclusively hired labour, 
planted cotton and staples in 1977 he would lose from US $ 2 to US $ 160 per hectare depending 
on the crop, compared with profit of US $ 61 - US $ 79 per hectare for cattle raising. In the same 
year, operating costs of stock raising were only US $ 21 - US $ 25 per hectare in 1977 as 
compared with US $ 189 - US $ 321 per hectare per crop cycle for staples and cotton.
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the form of disease and drought, is also more of a problem for cropping than 
cattle. However, according to Bicalho and Hoefle (1990:57), perhaps the most 
important stimulus for the expansion of stock-raising is the fact that it is a rural 
activity which demands a low labour input7 and needs little supervision. 
Nevertheless, labour costs for crop production are not the principal concern for 
farmers because wages are extremely low in the North-East.
Conflicts related to the Peasant Leagues and progressive labour farm legislation 
(Estatuto do Trabalhador Rural and Estatuto da Terra) of the early 1960s 
alarmed landowners, leading to a reduced demand for permanently employed 
labour. On most farms this work can be done by one or two hired cowhands who 
are easier to control and who, as waged workers, do not acquire a claim to land 
rights over time, under the so-called "usucapiao" law.
However, other explanations can be offered for the expansion of land for cattle- 
raising in small establishment. Soares (1983) suggests that small producers may 
have their own reasons to justify their preference for cattle-raising. For these 
small producers, livestock represents a form of defence against inflationary 
pressures. Livestock, because of their resistance to climatic risk, their liquidity 
and constant value, operates as an instrument of "savings" for situations of 
crisis. If farmers have a good harvest, they will often acquire a calf or a cow for 
this purpose. To small farmers the livestock trade has, perhaps, a more 
important economic role than cattle breeding for meat, cheese and milk 
production. Among small producers, a cow is sold many times before it goes to 
the slaughterhouse.
Cattle are also particularly important to those seeking to shift from subsistence to 
commercial production. In addition, feed crops and foraging can improve the 
texture of soils; both feed crop growing and grazing can therefore increase the
7 The stock-raising system introduced in the Agreste, according to Bicalho and Hoefle (1990:56) 
needs less than 10 man-days work a year per hectare, while fruit and cereals, depending on the 
crop, require from 55 to 153 man-days of work.
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productivity of existing areas. Besides being a form of capital equipment, cattle 
also represents a finished product, for they can be sold as meat to urban 
consumers and so can themselves constitute a major source of income for rural 
producers. Nevertheless, Ferreira (1984:113) states that food production is basic 
for capitalist accumulation in the livestock sector through the supply of cheap 
labour and the creation of a fund inside the farm unit. This is because food 
production makes available grazing land and increased fenced-in areas for 
cattle-raising, and provides other basic conditions for capitalist accumulation in 
the sector.
Those trends which have been occurring in the product mix, to some extent, can 
be deduced from data on the evolution of the share of each category of farm 
cultivating the main crops (Table V.11). This table also shows the importance of 
each category of farm in the production of the main crops. Although these data 
are too few for a complete analysis of the complex changes under way, some 
conclusions can be drawn.
All categories of farms produce food crops either for their own consumption or for 
the market. The most important food crops are beans (including castor beans 
and two other varieties of beans, "de arranca" e Mde corda"8), manioc and corn. 
These crops make up a large proportion of the diet in the North-East. Beans are 
also a typical commercial crop and, although important on medium-sized farms, 
are also produced on micro, small and large farms. Manioc represents a large 
proportion of food production and is one of the most important crops of the poor 
population because it provides flour, a sub-product found in the diet of virtually 
every low-income group. It is also produced on all categories of farms, except on 
large farms.
8 "De corda" beans are more resistant to short rainfall intervals and suitable for different types of 
soil, and are cultivated throughout the North-East region. Cultivation of "arranca" beans is more 
suited to fertile soils and valleys.
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TABLE V .11 - .NORTHERN AGRESTE: SHARE OF EACH CATEGORY OF FARMS IN THE 
PRODUCTION OF THE MAIN CROPS AND DAIRY PRODUCTS (row per cent), PANEL DATA, 
1980/85.
Crops Micro Small Medium Large
Total 
1,000 Kgs 
(100.0%)
1980
Cash Crop
Sugar-cane 0.7 73.9 25.4 - 3,742.0
Cotton 17.5 24.0 49.7 8.8 30.8
Coffee 2.6 59.0 38.0 - 27.1
Food StaDles
Beans 13.4 36.2 41.1 9.3 129.5
Manioc/Cassava 13.1 43.5 43.5 - 2,055.2
Com/Maize 16.5 38.8 31.1 13.7 187.5
Veaetables/fruits
Tomatoes 0.5 80.0 11.8 7.7 142.9
Bananas (*) 5.2 71.4 23.4 - 658.9
Livestock
Milk (**) 1.1 11.5 29.0 58.5 1,693.6
Cheese 1.2 15.3 57.4 26.1 73.3
1985
Cash Crops
Sugar-cane 3.8 67.6 28.2 0.4 4,882.4
Cotton 5.0 5.0 63.6 26.4 30.2
Coffee 21.7 47.8 30.4 2.3
Food StaDles
Beans 26.4 19.2 35.1 19.3 479.5
Manioc/Cassava 9.6 32.0 58.4 - 1,247.7
Com/Maize 7.6 43.2 37.1 12.1 1,355.3
Veaetables/fruits
Tomatoes 29.5 17.4 46.0 7.1 254.6
Bananas (*) 0.4 73.6 26.0 - 681.0
Livestock
Milk (**) 0.8 13.1 58.7 27.5 808.8
Cheese 1.6 15.8 71.1 11.6 31.1
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
(*) 1,000 fruits 
(**) 1,000 litre
9 The sampled farmers were asked to estimate their postharvest production for each crop. They 
used several units of measurement that (when it was possible) were transformed into kilos, litre 
or unit. Although farmer estimates are considered to be fairly accurate (see Poate and Casley, 
1985), these results could underestimate the real level of production. To calculate the shared 
production of main crops I taken the total amount of each crop produced, divided by the amount 
of the crop produced by each category farm.
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Sugar-cane and coffee were produced mainly on small farms, while cotton was 
produced mainly on medium-sized farms. The increased importance of larger 
farms in the production of cotton shows that there is no longer any justification 
for calling cotton a typical "democratic" crop10, as Andrade (1980) has 
suggested. In 1985, medium and large farms controlled 90 per cent of 
production. However, cotton has lost its great economic importance in this 
region. The arrival of the boll weevil (bicudo) in the North-East region in 1983 
devastated most of the cotton crop in the project area.
The output of the major cash crop (sugar-cane), tomatoes and of two major food 
staples (beans and corn) has clearly increased between 1980 and 1985. While 
there was a reduction in the production of manioc and coffee. The intensive use 
of land, especially among smaller farms, was causing a disease in manioc, 
resulting in a strong fall in production. In the case of coffee, the main reason for 
its reduction was over-production in the South-East.
The reduction in the size of herd lead, as a consequence, to a decrease in the 
production of milk and cheese, the main livestock products. However, this 
reduction was more intense on larger farms which, in comparison with other 
groups of farms, clearly lost its relative importance in this economic sector. In 
1985, medium-sized farms were responsible for the bulk of dairy production.
Most of the production of basic food staples also takes place on medium-sized 
farms. According to the 1985 survey, they control 35.1 per cent of the production 
of beans, 58.4 per cent of manioc and 37.1 per cent of maize.. A general 
conclusion is that medium-sized farms appear to play a more significant role in 
Northern Agreste agricultural production in 1985 compared with 1980.
Nevertheless, micro and small farms also play an important role in the production 
of basic food staples, as well as in cash crops. Considering the proportion of 
land operated by micro and small farms it is surprising that they accounted for
10 Andrade (1980) considers cotton a "democratic crop" because it was cultivated equally by rich 
and poor farmers. Cotton is not difficult to grow and can be cultivated in association with beans 
and com. It is easily harvested by man, women and children.
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such a large percentage of production. In the 1985 survey, they were 
responsible for 71.4 per cent of sugar-cane, 69.5 per cent of coffee, 45.9 per 
cent of beans, 46.9 per cent of tomatoes, and 74 per cent of banana production. 
High-value crops are grown on some of these micro and small farms, and this 
accounts for the fact that their marketable surplus was on average so 
unexpectedly high, as we will see in the next section.
2.4. Market Orientation
It is well-known that peasants use part of their production for auto-consumption 
and that they mainly produce foods for their own subsistence. This fact has 
generated the idea that small farmer producers have no market links. However, 
according to Ortega (1986:265), this notion does not take into account the true 
contribution of peasant farmers to the supply of agricultural products and does 
not rule out the possibility of their making an important contribution to the market. 
Ortega, in his article about peasant agriculture in Latin America, stressed that:
"If one takes into account the fact that levels of own-account consumption amount to 
about 60 per cent of production, even though there are considerable variations between 
regions, depending on the characteristics of the basic infrastructure and proximity to the 
main urban centres, the participation of peasant producers in the market, either as 
buyers or suppliers, is definitely confirmed, despite the small scale of their operations 
when considered individually." (Ortega, 1986:265)
Let us look at some facts. Table V.12, which shows the proportion of production 
sold of the most important crops cultivated in the sampled farms, illustrates how 
the various categories of farm are integrated into the market. For our purpose, it 
will be sufficient if we confine ourselves to food crops. While only a small 
proportion of cash crops is retained on-farm for seeds and animal feeding 
purposes, the agricultural production of basic foodstuffs serves either for 
subsistence or for sale in regional markets.
As can be seen from these data, all types of production unit are integrated into 
the market to some degree, and even the smallest farms were market-oriented in
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TABLE V.1211 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: PERCENTAGE OF PRODUCTION SOLD OF FOOD 
CROPS BY SIZE CATEGORY OF FARMS, PANEL SAMPLE, 1980/85.
Farm Size Beans Manioc / 
Cassava
Com / Maize
1980
Micro 36.8 3.9 32.4
Small 45.0 16.7 26.6
Medium 75.2 16.6 19.7
Large 65.8 - 42.2
Total 49.7 15.0 27.6
1985
Micro 55.0 20.9 40.7
Small 46.8 25.1 18.6
Medium 51.8 1.0 31.7
Large 21.5 - 30.7
Total 45.8 9.4 28.9
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
the survey years. The low level of trade in manioc production is due to the fact 
that, on the whole, it is kept for processing on the farm and a large proportion of 
the sub-products is for self-consumption. Generally speaking, there are high 
retention ratios for manioc in all size strata. The high retention of food staples 
such as beans and maize in larger farms is due to the fact that most of this 
production is destined for sharecroppers and moradores, in the existent 
articulation between large farmers and minifundia.
The case of micro farms is an eloquent example of increased integration into the 
market. In 1985, for instance, only 45 per cent of the production of beans in 
micro farms was retained for on-farm consumption falling from 60 per cent in 
1980. Apart from the example of beans, 4 per cent of manioc and about 30 per
11 The percentage of production sold was calculated with the basis in the answers of the farmers, 
who estimate the amount of marketed crop from their postharvest production.
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cent of maize were sold in 1980, increasing to 20 per cent of manioc and 40 per 
cent of maize marketed in 1985.
It is widely known that minifundia mainly supply food for mass consumption, and 
this limits the possibilities of these farmers obtaining high prices for their 
products. There is some evidence of consistent urban bias in economic policy, in 
the sense that State policies are deliberately aimed at lowering prices of food 
crops in order to avoid social pressures or pressures on wages, or to favour 
accumulation processes in the urban area (see Bates, 1981). It is often expected 
that low prices of staples tend to cause a short-term contraction in supply or, if 
prices remain systematically low, it is suggested that production should be 
halted. However, special attention should be paid to the manner in which small 
farmers react to low prices.
According to Ortega (1986:267), in general the alternatives available to peasants 
are limited to the usual components of own- account consumption and the 
prospects offered by certain products such as vegetables, fruits or some cash 
crops (sugar-cane, cotton, coffee, etc.). The essential peasant rationale, the aim 
of guaranteeing themselves a certain standard of living, continues to operate in 
such circumstances. If the satisfaction of their needs requires additional work, 
they may be prepared to perform it. They will be also willing to increase their 
production or sell more products if a certain level of money income is required to 
purchase products which they consider essential. Hence, when faced with low 
prices, peasants are obliged to increase market supply.
The capacity of farmers to use the market to safeguard their interests is well 
documented by Bates (1981:82-87). The expected behaviour is that “when the 
price of a particular crop increases, then we should expect farmers to shift 
resources out of the production of other crops and into the production of the 
higher-priced commodity”. Conversely, “when the price of a particular crop 
declines, we should expect farmers to shift resources into the production of other 
commodities whose prices appear more attractive”. With what is called the “own-
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price” response, peasants exploit the alternatives open to them in the market 
and, thus, they are able to defend their incomes against adverse shifts in the 
prices of particular commodities.
Tables V.13 and V.14 present the ranking of crops by value of gross sales for 
each category of farms in 1980 and 1985. It should be noted that these data 
include only the value of marketed agricultural output. Traditional crops 
(foodstuffs, coffee, and some vegetables and fruits) are consumed on-farm as 
well as being marketed, while cash crops generally are not, so that the ranking of 
crops in terms of total production may well differ from the ranking in terms of total 
sales.
The appropriate question now is: Which of the farm groups is responsible for the 
bulk of marked output of agricultural production? The largest gross crop income 
from a single category in both years was generated by small farms (the 10-50 
hectare group), which produced about 50 per cent of marketed output. In 1985, 
these small farms generated 60 per cent of gross receipts in cash crops, almost 
a third in food staples and, 60 per cent in vegetables and fruits. Medium-sized 
farms ranked second, with more than 40 per cent of cropping receipts in 1980, 
which saw a slight decrease to 32 per cent in 1985. Their importance was 
greater in the supply of food crops in 1980 (55 per cent) and, despite the 
reduction of this proportion in 1985 (to 40 per cent), they remained the most 
important supplier of food staples. For the smallest sized category of farm the 
percentage of gross output increased from 3 per cent to 10 per cent, mainly food 
production. Larger farms, with a more specialised production pattern, rank last in 
the total value of marketed output.
Comparison of the value of gross sales among crop sub-groups in each year 
shows some of the changes under way. In 1980, cash crops ranked first, 
accounting for 37 per cent of total value. In 1985 this fell to 23.3 per cent and 
this group of crops ranked last among marketed crops. Sugar-cane clearly
168
TABLE V.1312 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: CROPPING: VALUE OF MARKETED OUTPUT BY
SIZE CATEGORY OF FARMS (IN US $) PANEL DATA, 1980.
Crops Micro Small Medium Large Total
Cash CroD 
Cotton 2,607 22,086 6,353 1,293 32,339
Sugar-cane 226 42,922 11,047 - 54,195
Coffee 614 18,742 11,118 - 30,474
Other cash crops 62 10,879 13,350 - 24,291
Sub-total 3,509 94,629 41,868 1,293 141,299
(%) 2.5 67.0 29.6 0.5 100.0
Food StaDles 
Beans 2,961 11,798 14,428 3,666 32,853
Manioc/Cassava 653 8,549 25,196 - 34,398
Com/Maize 1,826 3,595 2,268 1,935 9,625
Other food crops - 798 2,436 - 3,233
Sub-total 5,440 24,740 44,328 5,601 80,109
(%) 6.8 30.9 55.3 7.0 100.0
Veaetables/fruits
Tomatoes 73 10,163 767 875 11,878
Other vegetables 1,009 3,436 1,458 - 5,903
Bananas 271 5,206 2,010 - 7,487
Other fruits 478 4,133 2,218 - 6,829
Sub-total 1,831 22,938 6,453 875 32,097
(%) 5.7 71.5 20.1 2.7 100.0
Processed food 
Manioc Flour 1,652 47,979 75,419 - 125,050
Total 12,432 190,286 168,068 7,769 378,555
(%) 3.3 50.3 44.4 2.1 100.0
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
12 The value of the marketed output was calculated based in the answers of the farmers, who 
informed the amount sold, the price that was paid, and the month in which the crop was sold (see 
table 6 of the questionnaire). This value was converted in dollars, according to the official value 
for exchange in the respective month.
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TABLE V.14 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: CROPPING: VALUE OF MARKETED OUTPUT BY 
SIZE CATEGORY OF FARMS (IN US $) PANEL DATA, 1985.
Crops Micro Small Medium Large Total
Cash CroD 
Cotton 251 493 6,310 1,860 8,915
Sugar-cane 2,136 43,173 21,324 - 66,633
Coffee 1,219 909 941 - 3,069
Other cash crops 971 12,420 2,632 - 16,023
Sub-total 4,577 56,995 31,207 1,1860 94,639
(%) 4.8 60.2 33.0 2.0 100.0
Food StaDles 
Beans 17,455 16,079 30,330 8,146 72,010
Manioc/Cassava 4,647 9,173 1,472 - 15,293
Com/Maize 4,970 12,499 24,931 4,609 47,009
Other food crops 689 6,604 117 - 7,410
Sub-total 27,761 44,355 56,850 12,755 141,721
(%) 19.6 31.3 40.1 9.0 100.0
Veaetables/fruits
Tomatoes 3,920 4,330 1,124 1,325 10,699
Other vegetables 2,590 24,777 24,908 17,297 69,572
Bananas - 8,783 3,416 - 12,199
Other fruits 679 44,833 - 45,512
Sub-total 7,189 82,723 29,448 18,622 137,982
(%) 5.2 60.0 21.3 13.5 100.0
Processed food 
Manioc Flour 3,161 20,395 14,763 - 38,319
Total 42,688 204,468 132,268 33,237 412,661
(%) 10.3 49.5 32.1 8.1 100.0
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Survey
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predominates among cash crops and its importance increased in 1985. Small 
farms play a major role in supply. Cotton production, a traditional and most 
important cash crop of the Agreste region, has seen a significant reduction in the 
relative value of gross output. This reduction also occurred for coffee.
Most manioc is sold in the form of meal. Manioc flour, as a processed product, 
ranked first in terms of the value of gross sales in 1980. Because of the strong 
fall in manioc production in 1985, there was a strong decrease in its gross output 
value, as well as in the value of marketed manioc flour. Nevertheless, food 
staples together ranked third in 1980 (22.2 per cent), and, in 1985, there was a 
predominance of these crops in the value of gross farm income (33.6 per cent). 
The value of sales of beans and corn, among food staples, shows a clear 
increase in the commoditization of foodstuffs.
Overall, the trends in ranking of crops by value of gross sales show an increased 
diversification of agricultural production. In 1980, vegetables and fruits ranked 
fourth, corresponding to only to 8.5 per cent of the value of agricultural sales; 
tomatoes and bananas were crops that clearly predominated. In 1985, this group 
of crops was as important in sales as food staples and was responsible for 33.4 
per cent of gross agricultural income on the farms surveyed. This increased 
value stems mainly from the sale of several fruits and vegetables, some of them 
cultivated in irrigated areas. At a regional level, fruits and fresh vegetables are 
crops that are very representative of small farm commoditization. In 1980, their 
share in the marketed output of small farmers corresponded to 12 per cent of the 
gross output, increasing to 40 per cent in 1985.
How are we to interpret these trends in marketed production? There is some 
general evidence that small-scale farming and production of staple food was 
growing in Brazil in the 1981-85 period of economic difficulty. However, small- 
farm agriculture is a social and economic phenomenon which is often viewed as 
stagnant, deteriorating, impervious to technology, and undergoing a process of 
decomposition. As we can see, this was not the case for small farms in the
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Agreste. This was also observed by Thiesenhusen and Melmed-Sanjak 
(1990:400) for Brazil as a whole, where "these small farms, cannot be dismissed 
as simply subsistence producers, farmers who consume their output and do not 
make a useful contribution beyond farm gate to the country's economic 
development".
On the whole, the participation of small farms in stock raising is considerably 
lower than in crop farming. Nevertheless, although agriculture is limited where 
cattle raising is concerned because of lack of space, small farms do make a 
significant contribution to other types of stock raising as we can see in table 
V.15. Small animals such as pigs, sheep, goats and poultry form a large 
proportion of the animal population on small farms, whereas cattle are usually 
raised on lager farms. Many households raise fowl for eggs and meat, principally 
for domestic consumption and some local trade. The production of pigs, sheep 
and goats also provide a commodity for sale in regional markets as well as food 
for family consumption. In addition, it is well known that peasants consider it 
important to own animals as a form of savings to protect themselves in 
emergency situations, in place of conventional savings.
This table also shows trends in the ranking of livestock and their products by 
value of gross sales of the sampled farms. Medium-sized farms appear to be 
playing a larger role in livestock production for markets, accounting for around 
50 per cent of the value of sales in both years. For them, the cattle trade and 
dairy production are both important. Larger farms produce more than a third of 
gross receipts in livestock production. The value of the different marketed 
livestock products originating in micro and small farms accounted to 19 per cent 
of overall livestock production in both years analysed. Despite the relative 
importance of small animals on smaller units, cattle play an important economic 
role for them. Besides being a form of production capital, they act as a reserve 
of value with liquidity and a guaranteed price. Dairy production is also important 
for home consumption and some local trade. Cheese, sold to urban consumers, 
is also an important source of income.
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TABLE V.15 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: LIVESTOCK: VALUE OF MARKETED OUTPUT BY
SIZE CATEGORY OF FARMS (IN US $) PANEL DATA, 1980/1985.
Micro Small Medium Large Total
1980
Livestock
Cattle
Pigs
Goats/Sheep
Poutry
21,038
2,338
818
806
106,810
4,702
1,689
825
288,984
6,982
4,851
9,230
118,291
2,698
1,336
179
535,123
16,720
8,694
11,040
Sub-total
(%)
25,000
4.4
114,026
19.9
310,047
54.2
122,504
21.4
571,577
100.0
Livestock Droduct
Milk
Cheese
Eggs
3,546
1,820
405
47,368
25,290
471
114,759
99,864
33,601
236,388
19,071
153
402,061
146,045
34,630
Sub-total
(%)
5,771
1.0
73,129
12.5
248,224
42.6
255,612
43.9
582,736
100.0
Total
(%)
30,771
2.7
187,155
16.2
558,271
48.4
378,116
32.8
1,154,31310
0.0
1985
Livestock
Cattle
Pigs
Goats/Sheep
Poutry
16,914
3,261
2,124
234
59,603
11,557
438
250
167,022
12,800
1,671
9,514
155,243
1,216
530
398,781
28,834
4,763
9,998
Sub-total
(%)
22,533
5.1
71,848
16.2
191,007
43.2
156,989
35.5
442,377
100.0
Livestock Droduct
Milk
Cheese
Eggs
769
739
286
13,242
21,704
2,772
52,983
88,821
11,003
69,282
4,758
73
136,276
116,022
14,134
Sub-total
(%)
1,794
0.7
37,718
14.2
152,807
57.4
74,113
27.8
266,432
100.0
Total
(%)
24,327
3.4
109,566
15.5
343,814
48.5
231,102
32.6
708,809
100.0
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UF PE Surveys
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However, the large tracts of land utilised for cattle-grazing was reducing the area 
of land available for food production. At the same time that land appears to be 
moving out of food production, the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation of the 
North-East was making urgent demands upon the rural sector for an increased 
food surplus at lower costs. The disparity between decreasing land areas 
available for food production and increasing non-food-production for rural and 
urban populations that need to be feed, is still one of the principal problems 
facing agricultural planners in North-East Brazil. State policies for encouraging 
the small farm sector can be a promising means through which States can 
achieve substantial and rapid increase in farm cash incomes. Programmes to 
support small farm production thus promise to increase the level of output, at the 
same time that they allow States to satisfy their urban-based interests.
2.5. Household Class Status
The process of differentiation of the peasantry is related to the process of class 
formation. Social scientists studying peasant societies have long been 
preoccupied with questions about the nature and future of the peasantry, given 
the rapid and global expansion of capitalism, and these concerns have also 
spurred a growing interest in arriving at empirical measures of class status in the 
rural sector. If much of the theoretical debate has been conducted at a very high 
level of abstraction, at various stages attempts have been made to ground the 
theories by relating them to empirical material on the differentiation of the 
peasantry. Although the most used indicator is land-size, they have adopted a 
variety of alternative indicators to quantify the differences between classes: the 
value of agricultural output, capital expenditures, area under cultivation, number 
of livestock, total value of means of production, use of wage labour in production 
or some combination of the above (See Cox, 1986).
Lenin (1984) in "The Development of Capitalism in Russia", uses the concept of 
social differentiation to refer not just to inequality in landholdings (which he
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termed “simple” differentiation) but to the process of formation of the essential 
classes of capitalism: the bourgeoisie and proletariat. He developed an indicator 
of differentiation based not just on inequality in landholdings but in terms of 
concentration of the means of production. He does this by demonstrating that 
there is a strong correlation between access to any one of the essential means 
of production and access to the others: it is those households with access to 
more land which also have more land sown to crops, more draught animals, 
more implements, and use the most advanced farming techniques.
Once Lenin had established that rural areas are characterised by concentration 
of the means of production, he examined how commodity production is related to 
the formation of capitalist relations. This he does by demonstrating that the well- 
to do peasantry relates to land as a commodity (they are the ones who rent out 
land and purchase additional land) and that the bulk of their production consists 
of commodities for the market (less than half of their production is required for 
subsistence consumption). The poor peasantry, in contrast, has to rent land from 
others and sells minimal amounts of agricultural commodities.
However, the essential contrast between the poor and well-to-do peasantry is in 
terms of their relation to wage labour. Commercial cultivation among the well-to- 
do peasantry becomes capitalist farming when it is based on the hiring of wage 
labour. And it is the poor peasantry that has to sell labour power. Capitalist 
relations are the end of this process: differential access to the means of 
production is what allows the well-to-do peasantry to join the agrarian 
bourgeoisie, while insufficient access to the means of production among poor 
peasants compels their transformation into a rural proletariat. Considering 
Lenin's proposition, in which "unequal access to land and means of production is 
the basis for the formation of capitalist class relations in rural areas", I believe 
that is worthwhile attempting to classify the sampled population into social 
classes, in a step beyond the simple size of farm categorisation.
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This classification is carried out with the aim of identifying the class-status of a 
household on the basis of a criterion for the empirical classification of peasantry 
originally suggested by Utsa Patanaik (1988). The key criterion for classifying 
the different farms and the data to be used as indicators of them, are related to 
the tendency within a given production unit to use family labour or hired in/out 
labour13. This methodology is based on Patanaik's labour-exploitation index, 
which seeks "to 'capture' the class-status of a household, essentially by looking 
at the extent of use of outside labour or conversely the extent of the family 
working for others, relative to the extent of self-employment (Patanaik,
1988:304). It is defined for a given production unit as the ratio between the use 
of outside labour and hired out to the total of family labour, as follows:
E = (Hi - Ho)
FI
where:
FI = Labour days worked by household workers (family labour) on the 
'production unit' per annun;
Hi = Labour-days hired on the 'production unit' per annum;
Ho = Family labour days hired out to others per annum.
The classification of farms according to the labour-exploitation ratio (E) allows us 
to identify the farmers' class-status. Only 322 farms were included in this 
classification as 18 farms presented data problems for the estimation of the 
labour exploitation ratio. This "class-status" classification of units of production 
was operationalised using the following measures:
Landlord Class - Primarily employing others. No labour in self-employment and 
large-scale employment of other people's labour. It includes not only large 
landlords of the traditional type living off rents, but also smaller owners for whom
13 As put by Bernstein: "a clear distinction has to be established concerning differentiation in the 
sociological sense - indicators of inequality stemming from a concept of 'social class' that see the 
latter in terms of various ranked scales of privilege and deprivation, and differentiation in a 
materialist sense which poses class in terms of the social relations of production." (1979:430)
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other sources of income are more important; for instance, absentee city people 
with urban occupations. The net labour exchange (Hi - Ho) is positive and family 
labour is equal to zero.
Farmers - Primarily employing others. Hired labour is positive and greater than 
family labour. They are capitalist entrepreneurs in agriculture, who as a rule 
employ several hired labourers and are connected with the peasantry by the 
manual labour they themselves perform on their farm or by more direct farm 
management. Net labour exchange (Hi - Ho) is positive and greater than FI.
Upper Peasant - Primarily self-employed. Less employment of hired labour than 
family labour. Although there is hiring of labour in and therefore exploitation of 
other people’s labour, the employment of family labour predominates in the 
labour process. Net labour exchange (Hi - Ho) is positive and smaller than FI.
Lower Peasant - Zero employment of others and in some cases working for 
others ('off-farm' employment). The labour process is strictly commanded by the 
family members and there is no employing of other people's labour. They have 
adequate resources to allow full employment of family members or they need to 
work for others (to a smaller or greater extent than self-employment) as wage- 
labourers in order to obtain a subsistence income. Net labour exchange (Hi - Ho) 
is zero or negative and family labour is greater than zero.
Table V.16 reports the distribution of farms by size category, in 1980 and 1985, 
and their household class-status in the last panel wave. Ferreira (1984) and 
Patanaik (1988) pointed out that the classification by area is not itself a good 
indicator of class differences because factors such as soil quality, cropping 
pattern, and intensity of cultivation vary independently of farm size. However, the 
two criteria for grouping are associated as we would have expected. The data 
distribution within farms sampled (a two-way table grouping farms by both criteria 
with the application of the chi-square test of association) shows a high 
association between the two alternative criteria (in both years). Although the 
micro, small and medium farms contain the entire range of class status, the
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proportion of labour-hiring farms (farmers and landlord) tends to rise with 
increasing farm size.
Moreover, these results could mean that the so-called "small farms" are not a 
homogenous group, in which hired labour is not used to a significant extent', in 
contrast to the conclusions of Dias (1978:181), in his analysis of agriculture in 
the Brazilian North-East between 1920 and 1970. For him, "the ownership of 
land by a large number of dwellers did not result in the privileged stratum among 
the peasants who could appropriate surplus" and that "the limitations on 
production imposed by the family's own productive capabilities and the 
conditions under which this has occurred [...] have further restricted the 
emergence of any dominant group among peasants". The results of our analysis 
are closer to those observed by Silva (1984) in his analysis of small and medium 
producers in Vertentes14, in which he stressed the high incidence of agrarian 
capitalist relations of production among the landowning population.
In our analysis of producers whose area was less than 50 ha in the Northern 
Agreste, we find two basic results: first, although most micro farms are 
essentially family production units (60 per cent of them), production relations 
within the small units of production in the Agreste of North-East Brazil are not 
uniform or homogeneous as several studies have claimed; and, secondly, the 
incidence of capitalist production relations in small farms (up to fifty hectares) is 
relatively high (agrarian capitalists make up more than a third of the sampled 
small farmers). In addition, another third of these farmers also relies on outside 
hired labour, and thus may constitute what Marx (1971:779)15 called a "nursery 
school" of "prosperous peasants" or near capitalists.
14 Vertentes is one of the municipios sampled in the surveys which provide the panel data 
analysed in this research.
15 Cited by Silva (1984). For Silva, Marx wrote about the development of "prosperous peasants" 
(whose exploitation of agricultural wage-labourers allowed them to accumulate a certain amount 
of wealth and become transformed into future capitalist) in a not altogether different context of 
his analysis. In the context of Marx’s analysis, the rise of a "nursery school of capitalist" was 
"conditioned by the general development of capitalist production beyond the countryside".
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TABLE V.16 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS BY SIZE AND
HOUSEHOLD CLASS-STATUS CATEGORIES (row percent), PANEL DATA, 1980/85.
Farm Size Lower Peasant Upper Peasant Farmer Landlord Total
(100%)
1980
Micro 60.5 27.2 7.4 4.9 81
Small 35.7 33.9 20.9 9.6 115
Medium 12.5 33.9 40.2 13.4 112
Large _ 7.1 50.0 42.9 14
Total 32.3 31.1 25.5 11.2 322
1985
Micro 60.0 26.7 5.6 7.8 90
Small 31.3 34.8 27.0 7.0 115
Medium 13.2 34.0 38.7 14.2 106
Large _ . 45.5 54.5 11
Total 32.3 31.1 25.5 11.2 322
Source: POLONORDESTE /  PIMES-UFPE Surveys
The data analysis in the previous section showed that access to land is highly 
correlated with access to other means of production. However, there is no 
evidence here for the existence of a process of differentiation involving 
increased concentration of landownership and the ownership of agricultural 
capital more generally and losses of land by smaller landholders. This 
longitudinal study does not provide evidence supporting the conclusion that the 
concentration of landholding and capital, as a result of development of capitalist 
agriculture, is taking place. Although the data is sufficiently strong to support 
Lenin's proposition that unequal access to the means of production is the basis 
for the formation of capitalist class relations in rural areas, relations of production 
themselves do not explain agrarian change and rural differentiation.
What Deere and De Janvri (1981:341, 349) have termed the Leninist life cycle of 
social differentiation is quite different from that envisaged by Chayanov. 
According to Chayanov (1966), inequalities of farm income and farm size among
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Russian peasantry were not socially determined but could be explained in terms 
of demographic differentiation, which occurs through the life cycle determined by 
family size and the consumer / worker ratio change. Over the family life cycle, 
the consumption requirements of the household first increase; only later when 
children start to work and the number of family workers increases, can the 
household begin to acquire more land and capital to increase output. Thus, for 
him, the main cause of differences in farm size is the demographic process of 
family growth as its age, and hence, size increase, not social factors causing 
households to became capitalist or proletarian. Farm size expands and contracts 
as the household accumulates and loses children, and the resulting inequality in 
the distribution of income and farm size is reproduced in a static fashion from 
generation to generation. The Leninist approach allows for life cycle of social 
differentiation where transitions occur among social classes positions in the life 
history of a peasant household.
Within the Leninist approach, there are peasant processes of expansion and 
contraction in economic activity not only in response to endogenous factors, but 
primarily as a product of the interaction of peasant units of production within the 
wider economy. Bad or good harvests, unfavourable or favourable conditions of 
trade, the differential adoption of improved cultivation practices are some of the 
reasons that may allow individual farmers to lose or acquire more land. Peasants 
unable to compete in the market with more advanced farmers may be forced to 
abandon their holdings while those farmers who are successful may increase the 
hiring of wage labour. The intervention of the State in markets16 or in the form of 
rural development programmes, could also give support to capitalist or peasant
16 According to Bates (1981:3), farmers’ real incomes depend upon their performance in three 
major markets: the first is "the market for agricultural commodities" in which farmers derive their 
revenues from sales; the second is "the market for factors of production" in which farmers incur 
costs; the third is "the market for consumer goods" in which farmers buy commodities from the 
urban-industrial sector. The real value of their incomes is, thus, determined by their revenues 
from the sales, by their costs of production and by the prices they must pay for goods 
manufactured in the city. For Bates, "agricultural policy consists of governmental actions that 
affect the incomes of rural producers by influencing the prices these producers confront in the 
major markets which determines their incomes".
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farmers altering the "natural" conditions of the agricultural production in favour of 
one or another organisational form.
The analysis of the considered “opposing” models of Lenin and Chayanov 
provides many insights which are relatively independent of their general models 
and not incompatible with other, but rather highlight different process which may 
simultaneously at work in agrarian societies. The analysis of peasant family 
demographic cycles, for example, helps us to identify mechanisms of cyclical 
(nonpermanent) mobility which are responsible for the observed distribution of 
owned land or farm size at given times; the Leninist focus on the mechanisms of 
“accumulation of advantages and disadvantages” aims to identify and 
understand the more permanent, nocyclical component of these inequalities and 
their changes over time17.
Pointing to the rigidity that characterizes many theoretical formulations of the 
“agrarian question” and rural differentiation, White (1989) stresses the need for 
flexibility in the analysis of concrete situations. There is no universal form or 
definition of rural differentiation whose dynamics or “laws of motion” can be 
grasped throught abstract formulation. In the analysis of concrete situations, he 
suggests that a distinction be drawn between the process of differentiation itself 
and various aspects of that process - namely the causes, mechanisms, and 
indicators. The process of differentiation itself concerns shifts in patterns of 
control over the means of production and the accompanying social division of 
labour. External forces and historical political contexts, as well as local historical 
experience of agrarian struggles, he argues, can exert a great influence on these 
mechanisms or forms of differentiation. The situation described in Northern 
Agreste case study presents us with a situation in which it is certainly possible 
and useful to speak of local processes of socio-economic differentiation. The 
analysis of concrete situations of agrarian change leads to the recognition that 
economic and social changes occur in actual societies with their own
17 Few analyses have been attempted to disentangle the coexisting processes of cyclical and 
permanent mobility, which is indeed a technically complex task. See for instance Deere and De 
Janvry (1979) and Cox (1986).
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configurations of political forces at local and higher levels, with all kinds of 
complex and sometimes conflicting processes at work both within and beyond 
the rural sector.
4. Conclusions
The aim of this chapter has been to present an overview of characteristics and 
trends in the farming activities of the Northern Agreste over the period of IRDP 
implementation. This analysis of the project’s impact at the farm level permits a 
clarification of the role of the State and its project-based policies on rural 
development as a stimulus to modernisation, as well as for the reproduction and 
preservation of the small farm sector. Although some of the changes may be 
quantitatively measurable, these changes involve processes that are essentially 
qualitative rather than quantitative. The increasing role of State agencies in the 
countryside has given farmers access to factors and inputs and created 
opportunities for small farmers to respond positively to measures designed to 
raise market output. The results of this analysis seems to suggest that rural 
development projects could result in strong public support for the small farm 
sector. Let us now look the main trends observed.
A first trend perceived in the evolution of farm structures is a decrease in the size 
of the production units. However, the tendency towards declining average farm 
size and the increase in the proportion of micro establishments does not reflect 
fragmentation of “microfundia” farms. On the contrary, there was a reduction in 
the incidence of landlessness and most smaller farmers were able to retain 
access to land. Furthermore, as a result of partioning of some holdholdings and 
the reduction of speculactive investment in land, the decrease in the average 
size of production units ocurred mainly in the larger categories of farmers.
The availability of capital items by categories of farm gave us a rough indication 
of the development of productive forces and of farmers' investment patterns in
182
structures, equipment and animals. Despite a pattern of ownership biased 
against smaller farmers, according to the indicators chosen, micro producers 
have prospered, relatively speaking, compared with larger farmers. There was 
an increase in the number of "micro" production units with masonry houses, wire 
fences, installations and improvements, while in the other categories there was a 
trend towards a reduction in the proportion of farms with structures incorporated 
onto their land. There was also an increase in the number of micro and small 
farmers with access to electricity, water storage and irrigation on their farms. 
Although ownership of agricultural capital remained biased against smaller 
farmers, there is no evidence of a process of differentiation involving increased 
concentration of capital.
The level of technology on Northern Agreste farms in general terms is very low. 
The relatively low level of mechanisation is related to the considerable 
fragmentation of small units and the stock raising predominance on larger farms. 
The adoption of mechanisation and use of modern inputs is selective in relation 
to categories of farm and this situation did not change substantially throughout 
the five years of the project. Except on micro farms, where there was a relatively 
important increase in the use of tractors, chemical fertilisers and improved seeds 
there was, as a rule, a reduction in the proportion of farms using tractors and 
inputs bought on the market. This reduction can be explained by the fact that the 
high prices of industrial inputs play a central role in limiting farm modernisation, 
especially when the relatively price of agricultural products does not make such 
investment worthwhile.
In spite of the general reduction in the number of farm herds, the analysis of 
farmland use showed that livestock, in the form of pasture, was spreading 
throughout all categories of farm. Although there was an expansion in the area of 
planted pasture on large farms, it was in this category of production unit where 
the decrease in the number of cattle was more evident. Micro farmers expanded 
their area with both native and planted pasture as well as increasing their herd 
size.
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In general, expansion of the area devoted to crops and planted pasture is a clear 
trend, suggesting that a more intensive use of land was taking place on all 
categories of farm. The analysis in frequency of planting shows a trend in that, 
as the unit decreases in size, the proportion of crop land increases. Thus, 
empirical data confirm the general theoretical postulates that the smaller the 
area, the more intensive the cultivation. Trends in the product mix, were deduced 
from data on the evolution of the share of each category of farm in the production 
of main crops. As was expected, medium and large farms were responsible for 
the bulk of dairy production. However, considering the proportion of land 
operated by micro and small farmers, the relatively large share of crop 
production under their domain was surprising. They are important not only in the 
production of basic food staples, but also in the production high-value crops.
All categories of farm produce food crops either for their own consumption or for 
the market. Data from the panel study make it possible to assess the overall 
growth of small farmer gross output over the period of project implementation. 
This data also allows us to see a clear trend in the transition from subsistence to 
market production of smaller farms. There was an increased diversification of 
agricultural production, and the increased sale value of several fruits and 
vegetables are very representative of small farm commodisation. As this chapter 
demonstrates, a large proportion of total agricultural output marketed among the 
sampled farmers originates on farms under fifty hectares. Although the 
participation of small farms in stock raising is considerably lower than in crop 
farming, livestock production, cattle and small animals play an important 
economic role. Besides its importance as food for domestic consumption, it also 
provides a commodity for sale in regional markets. To own animals is a form of 
"savings" for situations of crisis. On the basis of the analysed data, the tendency 
of some to regard small-scale producers as subsistence growers, who support 
themselves but have little excess to sell, is largely incorrect. Many small 
producers have become quite integrated, supplying markets with food crops as 
well as with high-value crops.
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In sum, State intervention in the Northern Agreste through POLONORDESTE 
seems to have favoured small farmers at the expense of the traditional landed 
elite. State intervention provided to the small farm sector access to technology, 
capital, market facilities and infrastructure, resources which historically have 
been appropriated by the large farm sector. In this way, the causes of their 
relative success in engaging in commercial farming might be linked to their 
access to rural credit, the use of effective extension services operating in some 
of the project areas or the adoption of more productive techniques. Another 
reason was their ability to use alternatives open to them in the market. Their 
replication of the strategy used by large farms, that is, the production of more 
lucrative crops, has shown that, with their "own-price" response, they were able 
to defend their incomes against the overall adverse market conditions for food 
crops. Thus, the intervention of the State has brought opportunities and 
resources for some small farms leading to the emergence of a privileged group 
in which hired labour is used to a significant extent. If it is true that the outcomes 
of State intervention are influenced by choices of local actors (as will be 
discussed in the next chapter), we cannot ignore the fact that agrarian 
processes must be understood in the context of larger political and economic 
forces. The outcomes of State intervention would be different in the context of 
different kind of regime with another mode of political management.
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CHAPTER VI -  PUBLIC POLICIES AND PRIVATE CHOICES: 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERACTIONS AT LOCAL LEVEL
1. Introduction
The central aim of the POLONORDESTE strategy was to undertake institutional 
changes, which would improve small producers’ access to credit and modern 
inputs as part of an overall drive to accelerate their modernisation and 
integration into the market. Although the POLONORDESTE programme 
susceptibility to the politics of patronage and costliness and inefficiency of 
development agencies at the state and regional level (discussed in chapter IV) 
we have enough evidence to argue that the project represented a supportive 
step for improve small farming activities in the Northern Agreste region (as 
described in chapter V).
The main objective of this chapter is to make explicit the role of the State and its 
institutional framework as a catalyst for the reproduction and preservation of the 
peasantry and to examine some of intended and unintended political and 
economic consequences of Sate intervention at local level. It identifies the 
limitations of the central State for implementing programmes, and the capacity 
for autonomous choice on the part of local actors, both public and private. In so 
doing, this study argues that, to understand patterns of rural development, 
scholars should give greater weight to the importance of these choices in 
shaping the impact of State intervention upon the structure of local societies. 
However, if is true that the State intervention is influenced by local processes, it 
is not simply a reflection of them.
This chapter therefore represents an attempt to look at the process of 
development as the interaction of public and private choice. It attempts to 
demonstrate how the process of public choice can expand or diminish private 
choice. It suggests, furthermore, that in all circumstances the political process 
will structure private choices through its influence on key economic and political 
institutions.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section will look at the 
impact of State patronage on local power networks. That is to say the interaction 
between State apparatus, local powers and farmers in the Northern Agreste.
The second section will look at the role of the State institutional framework in 
creating opportunities for small farmers to engage their own agenda for 
integration into the market economy and to enhance income options. The final 
section will examine household livelihood strategies in the face of increased 
commercialisation and State intervention.
2. Public Policy: State Patronage and the Pluralization of Power
POLONORDESTE was designed specifically to overcome the historical lack of 
access of the small-farm sector in the Brazilian North-East to credit to finance 
investments and the purchase of agricultural inputs, and to complementary 
infrastructure such as water and roads. However, State intervention has also 
important nonagricultural impact on the local area. It has pluralized power at the 
municipal level, breaking the former fusion of wealth and power in the hands of 
the local landed elite.
For the first time in the history of electoral politics in the North-East there was a 
large rural constituency that politicians needed to start courting directly -  rather 
than indirectly through programmes and subsidies benefiting powerful 
landowners who, in turn, could deliver the votes of their large captive peasants. 
For a variety of reasons1, candidates were no longer able to count on votes 
being delivered to them by the large landowners on whom peasants were 
dependent for work, credit, land and welfare assistance. One important reason 
was the displacement of rural landowner as political boss by more urban 
leadership figures such as the town merchant, doctor, lawyer, factory owner, etc. 
After these candidates were elected, they concerned themselves with
1 See for instance Lavareda and S£ (1986).
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distributional issues regarding the rural population. As a councilman from 
Caruaru stated:
“I work in a region of small farmers. I help them through my influence in government 
agencies such as EMATER, CISAGRO or even the Secretariat of Agriculture of the state.
I am given this support to them because I was elected with their votes. I need to show that 
I am work for them. When election time-comes, I can go there and show what I have 
done. By helping those farmers I hope to convincing them they choose the right 
candidate.”
This changed political atmosphere represented a fertile ground for a programme 
like POLONORDESTE. And, indeed, the small-farmer emphasis encountered 
more sympathy among government bureaucrats, local politicians and state 
governors, in comparison to previous programmes like PIN and PROTERRA. I 
want now to describe some of the ways in which power has been pluralized at 
local level.
2.1. Employment
The first way was through State employment. To meet the project's objectives, 
the concerned agencies expanded the number of local offices, employees and 
degree of bureaucratisation. Several hundred people were employed by these 
various agencies in the micro-region. The significant increase in non-farm 
sources of income was an important component for the increase in incomes for 
small farmers and landless labourers. Thus, State intervention in rural areas 
was increasing and creating new job opportunities, helping to retain the rural 
population2. For instance, in both health and education components, local 
people were trained to provide services to their communities.
While direct statistics are not available, observation suggests that most of the 
primary teachers were women as were many of the heath post attendants. In 
spite of the fact that neither of these jobs provides an attractive income, 
women’s role in providing these vital services gave to them recognition and
2As pointed out by Cavalcanti (1982:269), "if this situation does not solve the problems of the 
agrarian structures, it re-inforces the existing peasant household strategies of combining 
agricultural and non-agricultural sources of income".
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status within the community. For instance, to be a teacher is one of the main 
aspirations for the female population in rural areas. Being a teacher provides a 
higher status, when compared with other types of occupations, and it is 
considered a good job for women, since they can teach near home. Despite the 
low wage, their income can be a source of help for agriculture or the family 
budget, especially in harder times.
Moreover, the recruitment of most officials from the village itself gave to some of 
them a sympathy for small farmers' problems and the typical local bureaucrat 
was no longer an instrument of the local landlord. There were also local 
officeholders who in economic terms were members of the small farmer strata 
and who have identified interests in common with them. Thus, patronage is 
"democratised" at the local level as public goods are diverted to favour some 
rural poor.
On the other hand the expansion of State employment has increased the extent 
of State patronage and political manipulation. The large number of bureaucratic 
positions in the community has been filled through political links. For instance, 
to get a job as a teacher it was necessary to have good political relationship with 
the political boss, or at least, not to be considered a political enemy, nor to be 
known as having voted against him in the last election. Francisca, daughter of a 
peasant owner of a ten hectare plot, is a rural teacher and headmaster of a 
village primary school in Gloria do Goita. She commented:
"I stay away from politics. I am so frightened because there were cases of teachers 
being dismissed because the elected mayor was from another party. When the mayor 
changes, if the teacher protest, she can get her job back. I was never pressured by 
mayors because they know that I do not like politics and I give my support to all elected 
mayors. I do not care for their party. In this way, politicians go by and I stay in my office.
I win through silence."
According to Cavalcanti (1982:158), this is one of the reasons why the majority 
of peasants do not like to be involved in politics. They feel that they have little to 
gain but a lot to lose if they declare themselves for or against a candidate. The 
frequent political coalitions make them prefer to be cautious about politics
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because those who are on one side at the present time could be on the other 
side in future.
2.2. State Visibility
In addition to employment there is the increased sheer visibility of the State. As 
we have seen in chapter IV, in the implementation of its rural development 
policy, the State has allocated resources in a way that has been visible 
politically. As we can see from the photos included in this chapter (see plates 1 
to 5), the massive intervention of the Brazilian State was visible in the area 
during project implementation and the extent of bureaucratisation was 
considerable in the Northern Agreste. Linked to national, regional and state 
level institutions responsible for the planning, execution and supervision of the 
project, there were many organisations each of which was responsible for one of 
the project components. The amount of these transfers to rural areas have 
created at least an impression of concerned government. Thus, rural 
development intervention lent legitimacy to the authoritarian State and 
contributed to the building up and maintenance of political support for the 
regime and to defusing antagonism in the countryside. As a result, Northern 
Agreste peasants do not have a pathological mistrust of the State. Often the 
peasant considers the State a source of help and many regard the government 
as a friend. For the landless and peasants who own only a small plot, the State 
is the only source from which they were receiving help. To achieve economic 
mobility the "enterprising peasants" find in the State the financial support they 
are looking for. Therefore, it seems that the real effective economic and political 
links of the group of more progressive peasants or even of the mass of poorest 
peasants and landless workers are with the State rather than with the traditional 
patron.
Data on information and access to POLONORDESTE services shows that the 
project soon became well known by farmers (see tableVI.1). In the first project 
year, almost 60 per cent of the farmers had heard about the existence of the
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TABLE VI.1 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: ACCESS TO POLONORDESTE'S SERVICES BY SIZE
CATEGORY OF FARMS (Row percent), PANEL SAMPLE, 1980/85.
Farm size Unknown Heard about Service
users
Total
(%)
1980
Micro 63.6 36.4 - 88
Small 37.4 58.5 4.1
(100)
124
Medium 25.2 26.6 12.2
(100)
115
Large 7.1 71.4 21.4
(100)
14
(100)
Total 38.8 54.7 6.5 340
(100)
1985
Micro 18.2 76.1 5.7 88
Small 9.8 69.1 21.1
(100)
124
Medium 10.6 65.1 23.9
(100)
115
Large - 78.6 21.4
(100)
14
(100)
Total 11.8 70.1 18.0 340
(100)
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
project. In the 1985 panel wave, this number increased to almost 90 per cent of 
farmers. However, according to the farmers themselves, effective access to 
project goods or services remained restricted to a minority. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to give precise numbers on small producers benefited by the project. 
Because of its multisectoral approach it is necessary to identify the 
characteristics of the specific intervention and relate them to benefit distribution 
among particular groups.
Most of the services provided by the project were already offered in some of the 
project areas and the project action consisted of extending the service to areas 
previously unaffected, improving the service offered and redirecting these 
actions to small farmers. Nevertheless, the amount of support given to small 
farmers through State intervention in agriculture was probably much less than
their needs demanded. From the farmers’ perspective, the main form of support 
for agricultural activities they received from the State was credit and rural 
extension. But the proportion of farmers’ answers on the support they received 
by the project shows that the State intervention was not so widespread as was 
expected.
The growing role of the State in rural development policies and the presence of 
its apparatus in the project area meant also the appearance, on the local scene 
of a new power holder. "The project leader, the man who directs the execution of 
the project, is an intruder who is going to compete for power with the established 
elite" (Galjart, 1967:337). With the rise of systematic State intervention in the 
rural sector the former landed elite has lost its role as an agent of the State and 
other external organisations. The roles are now performed by people integrated 
into the State apparatus in a direct way, professional bureaucrats. Thus, 
traditional patrons have been replaced by specific patrons operating from within 
positions of authority in official bureaucracies and organisations. For example, 
dedication by extension agents to the small farmers cause contributes to the 
dislike of some of the extension service by local elites, which is transmitted by 
their complaints to capital-city politicians and public sector management. This 
arises from the fact that “apolitical” agents replace local politicians in the 
distribution of politically valuable benefits.
2.3. Collective Action and The Trend Towards Privatism
A further aspect of the increase in State patronage was its impact on collective 
action. The authoritarian and technocratic nature of the Brazilian regime after 
1964 was evident in POLONORDESTE's lack of concern for beneficiary 
participation. Project benefits reached the local level in the guise of State 
patronage or government largesse, not as goods and services claimed by the 
targeted population. As was shown in chapter IV, the POLONORDESTE 
resulted from discussions and studies carried out in Brazilian and in state-level 
capitals. Planners at the state level, with assistance from the World Bank,
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followed guidelines established in Brasilia and gave little thought to the 
concerns of the local community. Although lack of experience with encouraging 
participation, as well as a long tradition of top-down planning and 
implementation, were generally pointed out in explaining these failures, it was 
clear that the Brazilian political regime had a vital interest in limiting the extent of 
peasant participation and in controlling them. As Grindle (1986:170) stressed,
"When they argued for participation, they meant organising peasants to benefit 
effectively from the goods and services offered and to monitor the delivery and use of 
resources. They did not intend for the scope of participation to go beyond the local level 
and demonstrate to the State and society more generally that peasants should be taken 
into consideration as important actors in national development".
Effective rural organisation and participation implied a redistribution of political 
and economic power and the Brazilian political context, during the military 
government, strongly suggests that such an alteration was not likely to come 
about as a result of officially sponsored activities in programmes like 
POLONORDESTE. For instance, the State attaches importance to co-operative 
development because it facilitates the centralisation of State control of 
resources and production in these communities. However, to organise co­
operatives was difficult because factional disputes and interests always 
threaten to undermining them. Furthermore, the development of co-operation 
through associations among rural inhabitants has not received much support 
from the peasants themselves3.
In fact, only three of the six municipios selected in this study had rural co­
operatives (Capoeiras, Caruaru and Cumaru). As shown in table VI.2, only 
around 30 per cent of farmers are associated with a rural co-operative.
Moreover, their links to co-operatives are related to farm size. The larger the 
farmer, the higher the proportion of farmers associated with co-operatives.
While 64.4 per cent of large farmers were associated with co-operatives in both 
panel waves, only 12.5 per cent of micro farmer were associated in 1980 and
3 As pointed out by Cavalcanti (1982:169), "the existence of different rationales among 
peasants, as a result of their internal differentiation, makes them aware both of the advantages 
and disadvantages they can get from co-operation imposed on them from above".
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TABLE VI.2 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: PERCENTAGE OF FARMERS AS MEMBERS OF CO­
OPERATIVES, PANEL SAMPLE, 1980/85.
Farms Members of Co-operative
1980 1985
Micro 12.5 8.0
Small 25.2 22.8
Medium 47.0 45.1
Large 64.3 64.3
Total 30.9 28.1
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
this number was reduced to 8 per cent in 1985. A rural technician confirmed this 
fact:
“There is a co-operative in this town. But it is not a co-operative of small potato 
producers. It is a co-operative of better-off farmers and it attends a larger region. For 
example, it sells pesticides and fungicides that even are used here.” (Jos6 Luiz, 
agricultural technician, Caruaru).
Data on farmer membership of labour unions also suggest that rural unionisation 
has been weakened in the area. There was a reduction from 38.5 per cent to 32 
per cent in membership of labour unions (table VI.3) among the sampled 
farmers. According to an agricultural technician, the local Labour Union does 
not have an important political role. As he commented:
“In my opinion the Labour Union is inactive. The only service that it provided was to bring 
to the village a dentist and an optician. For this, the members of the union received a 
discount for their own and their family consultation” (Jos6 Onildo, agricultural technician 
- Cumaru).
This illustrates the weakness of local political organisations. Small farmers’ 
common interest was not sufficient to induce participation in collective action. 
According to the rational peasant school, it is presumed that peasants prefer to 
pursuit their private interests when the results of their participation in collective 
organisation only result common advantage. The president of the “Sindicato 
dos Trabalhadores Rurais de Pogao”, explains why this situation occurs:
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“The ‘Union’ is weak because people are not interested. They do not have an appreciation 
of its importance for the worker. If they had such appreciation we could organise to force 
the government to provide what we need to improve the countryside. However, if the 
‘Union’ does not have something to offer to them individually, peasants are not 
interested”. (Francisco Caetano, owner of 22 hectares. His farm is worked by him and his 
7 married children, who live on the farm with their respective families.),
This statement illustrates the “free rider” problem, in the sense that when they 
expect that the only results of contributing to the common goals are common 
advantages, peasants may leave the contributions to others and expend 
resources in other ways.
TABLE VI.3 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: PERCENTAGE OF FARMERS AS MEMBERS OF 
LABOUR UNIONS, PANEL SAMPLE, 1980/85.
Farms Members of Labour Unions
1980 1985
Micro 52.3 47.7
Small 36.6 33.3
Medium 31.3 20.4
Large 28.6 14.3
Total 38.5 32.0
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
This lack of interest in collective organisation was occurring at the same time as 
the empirical data suggested that "patronage" and "factionalism" had not been 
dying in the region during the project years. My own observations from the 
project area and the publication of a number of studies of local politics from the 
seventies (Gross, 1973; Martinez-Allier and Boito, 1977; Hoefle, 1985) along 
with other evidence relating to elections in the 1970s and 1980s, and the 
discriminatory use of State funds and prerogatives in order to increase electoral 
support (see chapter IV), has revealed the continuing vigour of some of the 
practices associated with clientelism in the past.
The growing role of the State apparatus in implementing its rural development 
policy made it vulnerable to manipulation by the dominant local factions in
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villages and small towns. This fact must be linked to both the paternalistic 
character of the intervention, in which intended beneficiaries exercised no 
influence over activities ostensibly developed on their behalf, and to the brutal 
competition among politicians for access to all external resources entering the 
region4. The disbursement of funds for roads, dams, and school construction 
was clearly manipulated to benefit allies of the government in power. In contrast 
to agricultural services, the results of infrastructure are easy to see. Politicians 
support infrastructure projects more than they do agricultural ones because they 
see a beginning and an end. A technician from the Technical Unit explain how 
this occurred:
“Sometimes the governor sent messages with ‘give priorities’ to solicitation of location of 
infrastructure stemming from the majors... In the case of (the component) ‘roads' the 
mismanagement stem from states secretaries and deputies who had farms in the 
countryside.”
However, as a public good, rural infrastructure could benefit everybody 
indiscriminately and its consumption could not be limited to a particular group. 
Several factors may help explain roads popularity among rural dwellers. Roads 
are seen as providing benefits to all members of the community. Transport 
costs and time for getting the town are greatly reduced, and increased mobility 
for the individual also contributed to better working of the labour market. Often a 
road generates a daily or weekly transport service, then the farmers’ isolation is 
strongly reduced.
Peasant lack of involvement in national politics and their cautious activity in 
local-level politics (which is a non-party and personalised activity) are seen to 
be perfectly rational within the objective circumstances in which they live and 
work. This political behaviour is also related to the apparently contradictory 
authoritarian and paternalistic nature of the Brazilian State during the military 
regime. Although this context accounts for the absence of organised peasant 
action in the face of their problems, there are other reasons for the apparent
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inability of peasants to act together for their common good or for any end 
transcending the immediate material interest of their family5. The individual's 
attachment to the family must be the starting place for an account of the 
Northern Agreste peasants’ political behaviour. The hardships of their lives have 
forced them to devote almost all energy to their own survival.
The pervasive clientelism that surrounds many of the rural poor has reinforced 
this tendency to focus on interests of restricted scope, not on collective national 
or even regional goals. Small farmers often consider petitioning with local 
politicians or bureaucratic officials for small scale benefits as the only realistic 
way to obtain gains. I can personally recall one morning spent in the office of a 
town mayor during which a stream of applicants looking for benefits passes 
through. Among the benefits sought were: baby’s clothes, money for rent, a job, 
money for medicine, funeral expenses and much more. In this way, they 
compete (rather than co-operate) with other people requesting similar favours 
for themselves. As one extension agent commented:
“Here political corruption (“politicagem”) is very great. The use of public resources to 
benefit specific individuals is common. If the farmers have specific demands, “good" 
politicians try to give the support. However, there are some politicians who only do things 
in exchange for votes. For example, if they have agricultural inputs at their disposal, they 
only go to their supporters (Jeov£ Lopes, rural extension agent -  Capoeiras)
In contrast, efforts to exert powerful pressure through collective organisation 
would threaten local or regional politicians or their agents and therefore risk 
repression. Clientelism has thus helped to maintain rural poor divided and made 
mass mobilisation difficult. Moreover, through the conferring of divisible and 
particular benefits, the State has allowed peasants to seek public policies as a 
matter of personal self-interest. As a result, and because these small farmers
4 It being often alleged that “anti-poverty” activities in the North-East have the characteristic of 
an “industry” seeking to receive funds on the basis of the needs of the poor, but distributing 
resources in response to quite different concerns.
5 According to Bates (1995:36), families constitute a clear example of institutions that offer 
“generalised reciprocity”, which means “institutions in the developing world in which people 
invest resources, not in expectation of specific recompense, but rather in an effort to create a 
general fund of goodwill that can subsequently be tapped should a specific need arise”.
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lack formal organisation to act as a group, they were able only to find private 
alternatives to the collective problems that they face.
3. Public Policy: The Economic Impact of State Patronage
If the political legacy of the project at local level can be seen to have been 
somewhat ambiguous so too can the economic impact. There are undoubtedly 
from the outset fundamental weaknesses in the ability of a strategy of small farm 
modernisation to achieve its dual goal of increased staple food production and 
reduced rural poverty. In relation to this two observations can be made at the 
outset regarding POLONORDESTE. The first is that, in terms of supporting 
smallholders, it was much more successful than is suggested by the literature 
regarding such programmes. The second observation is that, while it was 
successful, it was not in the ways which state officials intended or anticipated 
and in this sense illustrates a central finding of New Institutionalism.
At the root of this ambiguity is the fact that there exist at least two major groups 
among small farmer in the region: those that have secure possession of enough 
land to allow, with suitable agricultural support, an on-farm income sufficient to 
give reasonable livelihood to the household; and those whose holdings are so 
small and insecure as to prevent, under current and envisaged technologies and 
relative agricultural prices, the generation of an adequate level of on-farm 
income. The first group may be seen as evolving, with suitable support, to form 
a stable “farmer” group; the second group may be not seen in this light. 
According to one rural extension agent, there is a clear limitation for the project 
give support to a landless peasant:
“It is too difficult to help people without land. What is the incentive for a peasant to 
improve his situation if one year he is working on the land of Mr. Joaquim and in the next 
he is working on the land of Mr. Joao? Landlords do not like to give land in tenancy in 
consecutive years because they are afraid of the law. Today the law is very clear and rural 
workers know how to bring the landowner to Court when there is a breach of the law." 
(Jose Luis, rural extensionist -  Caruaru).
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However, the essential characteristics of the first group, those of “prosperous 
peasants”, are not to be found in the size of the land, herd, agricultural output or 
capital expenditures. The capitalist small farm is primarily an agricultural 
business in which the operator is a risk-taking manager. Although they also use 
hired labour to a greater or less extent, farmers with their families do most of the 
farm work or perform most of the managerial activities. As an extensionist agent 
stated:
“There is a clear difference among producers of potatoes, bananas or coconuts and 
those of producers of subsistence. They are interested in technology. They are also small 
producers, but they have better economic conditions and their standard of living is far 
superior to that of subsistence producers. Their income are not restricted to production of 
only one crop. They know different ways of making money".
Thus, the differences in conditions and potential between these two groups 
absolutely require different approaches to providing assistance. In the following 
pages I will discuss farmers access and how they react to the agricultural 
components -  research and extension, credit and marketing -  the mainstay of 
POLONORDESTE economic justification as an project increase in agricultural 
production and productivity.
3.1. Technical Advice: Transformation of Technician into Broker
The level of productivity of the poor natural resources available to farming 
activities in most areas of the North-East is affected by the level of provision of 
relevant technical services to improve agriculture. The growth of agricultural 
output is attributable not only to the cultivation of more land and the expansion 
of irrigation, but also to new or improved technology. However, the generation of 
new technology is not a sufficient condition for increased farm productivity. The 
diffusion of the new knowledge among its potential users and its subsequent 
adoption by a significant proportion of them is a crucial element in the process 
linking the generation of new technology to increased farm productivity. An 
important public sector channel for disseminating agricultural knowledge is the 
extension service. Agricultural research and information services are 
undersuplied in the private market since information has public-good properties.
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The provision of technical advice was a central aspect of POLONORDESTE. 
One of the interesting aspects of this was the transformation of the role of the 
technician in the implementation process.
Under the IRDP-AS-PE the extension system was expanded, and extension 
services were reoriented towards small farmers, where group extension was 
emphasised. As we can see in table VI.4, when first interviewed in 1980, 72.6 
per cent of farmers had no exposure to extension agents. In 1985 this number 
was reduced to 57.8 per cent. There was a tendency for extension workers to 
concentrate on medium and large farms and this tendency was maintained in 
1985. Although the fear that local elites and better-off farmers could divert 
programmes is well-founded, with the reorientation of the extension services 
toward the small farmers defined in the project and the expansion of the number 
of farmers receiving advice, there was clearly an increase in the percentage of
TABLE VI.4 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: ACCESS TO TECHNICAL ADVICE BY SIZE 
CATEGORY OF FARMS (Row per cent), PANEL SAMPLE, 1980/85.
Farm Size No Received Receiving Total
advice advice (%)
1980
Micro 89.9 2.3 8.0 88
Small 69.9 12.2 17.9
(100)
124
Medium 64.3 13.0 22.6
(100)
115
Large 57.1 14.3 28.6
(100)
14
(100)
Total 72.6 10.0 17.4 340
(100)
1985
Micro 70.5 19.3 10.2 88
Small 48.0 24.4 27.6
(100)
124
Medium 43.3 28.7 27.8
(100)
115
Large 35.7 21.4 42.9
(100)
14
(100)
Total 57.8 24.5 23.8 340
(100)
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
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micro and small farms with access to extension advice. However, the main point 
here is the possibility of change in agricultural production as a result of 
EMATER's assistance.
The panel data do not allow us to establish where productivity increases took 
place, and how yields increased in comparison to yields before the project or in 
non-project areas. Moreover, there are no reliable quantitative estimates of the 
impact on output and productivity. Experience has varied between different 
project areas and crops, and only case studies provide a satisfactory way of 
investigating this question. Nevertheless, discussing eight World Bank IRDPs, 
Tendler (1988) asserts that “the North-East projects, on average, did not lead to 
impressive increases in agricultural production or productivity, and the extension 
service had no tested technical package that could deliver large increases in 
yields.”
Thus, the quantitative data available do not allow us to make clear connections 
between access to extension services and productivity-increasing practices. 
Nevertheless farmers, when asked about the importance of agricultural 
extension, always talk about its positive influence in the adoption of agricultural 
practices. As one farmer commented:
"I started to receive support from EMATER in 1983. Since then I made great 
improvements and I always asked for technical assistance. If the agronomist tells you 
how to plant a crop or to control a plant disease and you do not follow his advice, then 
you will have a bad production or you will not have a production at all.” (Isaias Galdino, 
landowner 21 ha, from Pogao).
The same sentiments were expressed by another producer, who works on 25 ha 
of his father's land inheritance (the land belongs to his mother and to ten 
brothers; eight of his brothers emigrated to Sao Paulo):
"The extension agents from EMATER gave much support to this community. Here a lot 
of cattle used to die. After an EMATER vaccination campaign no more animals died 
from this disease. The farmers also discovered the advantage of using selected seeds. 
[...] Nowadays it is easier to be a rural producer. W e have more information and no one 
lost the harvest because of a crop disease. When I see EMATER written, I see a light..." 
(Severino Jurandir, from Caruaru).
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Thus, based on farmers’ statements, we can reasonably assume that there are 
several cases in which extension services are useful for improving farming 
practices and that these practices may have a positive effect on production and 
productivity. Tendler (1993), in her article about "Tales of Dissemination in 
Small-farm agriculture" in North-East Brazil, reports "a dozen" successful 
dissemination stories and cases of good micro performance in agriculture 
research and extension6. However, we cannot presume that the expansion of 
extension services had a positive impact upon small farm agricultural output in 
general.
The intended diversification from traditional subsistence crops into vegetable 
and fruit crops (shown in Chapter V) was achieved mainly because of irrigation 
in some project areas. However, due to the susceptibility of the region to drought 
it would have required a major effort to expand irrigated areas. Moreover, there 
were some limitations on EMATER proposals about what to do about the "low 
productivity" of small farms. EMATER technicians were only given a mixture of 
technical issues to be delivered out to small producers. They were technological 
package points, which should have resulted, in accordance with the knowledge 
of the technicians, in an increase in farm productivity. But apparently, this could 
not have produced a significant improvement in the regional economy because 
the project was not promoting a substantial transformation of traditional 
agriculture in general. In most of the cases, as an informant stressed, “it was 
merely transforming subsistence agriculture into an improved agriculture of 
subsistence".
6 Tendler (1993:1570) shows that, in the cases of disease or pest-combating campaigns, this 
"successful dissemination" involved an unusual combination of high subsidy and high discipline: 
(i) farmers received credit at low or negative real interest rates to buy certified seeds, fertiliser 
and pesticide applicators, and eradicated disease plants and put in new ones; (ii) the bank, the 
extension service, and the research agency carefully monitored the uses to which the credit 
could be put; (iii) in several cases the State held a monopoly control over inputs; (iv) the subsidy 
was terminated when the disease problem was overcome. As she stressed, "subsidised credit for 
a particular crop forced changes in cultivation practices and input use that would be 
automatically self-sustaining, once the subsidy and strong control were dropped in a later 
period".
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At the end of four or five years of research, for example, the institution in charge 
[IPA-PE] reached the conclusion that you could not make a small area, of up to 5 ha 
economically viable by producing crops of low commercial value. According to an 
account by a former co-ordinator of the Evaluation Unit:
"... What was being done by the EMATER at that time was to take a small producer of 
maize and beans, in a seem-arid area, and to make that producer take an area of 1, 2 or 3 
hectares and increase its production by 10,15 or 20%. Then that only meant that he was 
going to produce slightly more maize and beans, so as that it could result in a small 
productive surplus... or in other words you would merely have more conditions to maintain 
the subsistence of that family. It was given the EMATER a quantity of resources to employ 
people, and to train people simply to take those packages to the farmers and the expectation 
of the project was that everything would be right, that it would work... but it did not work... 
there was no package, no crops, no productive system that would transform those small 
farms of subsistence into economically viable units."
Although observers of POLONORDESTE have rarely attributed to agricultural 
extension a significant improvement in production and productivity advances of 
small farms, these same observers asserted that, as a result of 
POLONORDESTE experience, extension agents are "less resistant today to 
working with small farmers" and that they are now "more sensitive to small 
farmer issues than they had been in the past" (Tendler, 1988:25). Moreover, 
anyone doing fieldwork in the programme area could see how important was the 
broker role played by extension agents between peasants and banks, landlords, 
traders, suppliers, and providers of government services. Although the 
agricultural advice provided by EMATER may not add up to a strong and 
sustained impact in regional agricultural development, there are enough of 
them to say that rural development projects present significant opportunities to 
increase diffusion of technology knowledge among peasants, helping them to 
maximise decisions about the allocation of resources in their farm activities.
3.2. Formal Credit and Risk Reduction
Institutional finance capital, principally subsidised credit, was the main vehicle of 
Brazilian agricultural modernisation after 1965, when official rural credit was 
established in Brazil. There is agreement that the massive volume of credit 
provided for agricultural modernisation allowed for changes in the technical
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basis of production and productivity of various crops and regions. It has 
provided incentives to large farmers to expand land holdings, to invest in cattle 
and machinery, and to develop private irrigation activities. Agricultural credit 
policy was also the main vehicle for the expansion of livestock activities in the 
Agreste during the 70s. Subsidised financial credit has been given for the 
improvement of cattle herds, the expansion of pasture, and the acquisition of 
new breeding varieties, with negative effects on employment and the growth of 
food staples production (Ferreira, 1984, 143-145). Having said this there is 
reason to believe that State provided credit is not necessarily bad for 
smallholders. Indeed the POLONORDESTE experience shows that the 
transition from informal to formal credit mechanisms did benefit smallholders, 
although not in ways anticipated by the State.
A standard justification for State intervention in rural credit markets has been to 
improve the distribution of income. However, because unequal distribution of 
endowments translates into unequal access to credit, in general, State 
intervention in rural credit markets has failed to have a significant impact on 
rural income distribution and poverty. According to Eswaran and Kotwal 
(1989:182), “unequal access to capital provides a rationale for hierarchies in 
agrarian production organisations and, more generally, explains the emergence 
of agrarian class structure; it explains why the rich behave in a less risk-averse 
fashion than do the poor and, as a corollary, why they adopt new technologies 
more rapidly”. However, to understand agrarian structure, it is essential not to 
abstract from the manner in which capital markets actually operate. The 
explanation of why credit is so inegalitarian must incorporate, as one essential 
ingredient, the limited liability of borrowers. Because rich farmers can offer 
assets of greater value as collateral than can the poor farmers, they will have 
access not only to larger amounts of loans but also at lower interests rates, 
since these loans would be viewed as being less risky.
Under the project, rural credit favoured medium and large farmers and 
discriminated against smaller producers. As shown in table VI.5, in 1980, 78.6
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per cent of the largest farmers got credit from official banks while only 15.9 per 
cent of micro farmers had access to official loans. Despite the reduction in the 
number of farmers with access to official credit in 1985 (the number of farmers 
with this credit fell from 38.8 per cent to 31.8 per cent), there was an increase in 
the proportion of micro farmers with official loans (from 15.9 per cent to 19.3 per 
cent). However, it does not change the situation in that the percentage of the 
micro and small farmers remained inferior to the relative number of medium and 
large farmers included as beneficiaries of the credit programme.
TABLE VI.5 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: ACCESS TO CREDIT BY SOURCE OF FINANCIAL 
CAPITAL AND SIZE CATEGORY OF FARMS (row percent), PANEL SAMPLE, 1980/85.
Farm Size No credit Official Others Total
loans loans (%)
1980
Micro 75.0 15.9 9.1 88
Small 55.3 42.3 3.3
(100)
123
Medium 46.1 47.8 11.3
(100)
115
Large 21.4 78.6 -
(100)
14
(100)
Total 55.9 38.8 7.4 340
(100)
1985
Micro 78.4 19.3 2.3 88
Small 65.0 30.9 6.5
(100)
123
Medium 57.4 38.3 5.2
(100)
115
Large 35.7 57.1 7.1
(100)
14
(100)
Total 64.7 31.8 5.0 340
(100)
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
The share of the value of official loans among categories of farms is also useful 
to reinforce this assertion. There was a substantial reduction in the total value of 
loans between the two years of the panel study (from almost US $ 600,000 to a 
little more than US $ 160,000), which reflects the reduction in availability of 
subsidised institutional credit between 1980-85 (see table VI.6). However,
205
medium-sized farmers had a major share of the credit, both institutional and 
non-official credit and, although there was a slight decrease in the share of 
medium farmers in 1985, this situation did not change much over the years. In 
1985 they still received 47.6 per cent of official credit and 65.3 per cent of other 
loans. Despite an increase from 1.5 per cent, in 1980, to 5.5 per cent of official 
credit in 1985, the share of micro farmers in this budget was insignificant in both 
years. There was also an increase from 19.5 per cent to 31 per cent in the total 
value of official loans received by small farmers. Larger farmers lost a 
proportionally greater share of rural credit than any other category.
TABLE VI.6 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: SHARE OF THE VALUE OF LOANS BY SOURCE AND 
BY SIZE CATEGORY OF FARMS (column percent), PANEL SAMPLE, 1980/85.
Farm Size Official loans Other loans Total
1980
Micro 1.5 5.1 1.6
Small 19.5 8.9 19.0
Medium 52.9 86.0 54.4
Large 26.1 - 24.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
(US$) (599,970) (72,120) (672,090)
1985
Micro 5.5 3.0 5.3
Small 31.0 27.2 30.7
Medium 47.6 65.3 49.0
Large 15.9 4.6 14.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
(US$) (161,140) (14,178) (175,320)
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
The small farmers’ main alternative to government-funded agricultural credit was 
informal credit suppliers of inputs, friends, relatives, landlords and 
intermediaries in the commercialisation process. The reason small farmers 
borrow from other farmers, merchants and local moneylenders is that the costs
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of making the transaction can be minimised for small loans. In the village, a 
farmer is known personally, so the information costs are low; little checking or 
paperwork is required to make a loan. Also, in these circumstances loans were 
typically granted without collateral. The agreement is made in a minutes and the 
money immediately provided. This contrasts with the time and travel costs 
incurred to complete complex institutional loan applications at a distant office 
and the uncertain wait for verification and approval.
The main informal credit mechanisms open to small farmers in the region were 
linked to tenancy arrangements (mainly sharecropping) and to marketing and 
commercialisation of the product. The principal mechanism for the latter was the 
purchase” of a crop prior to harvest (known as ‘compra antecipada’ or ‘compra 
na folha’). Under this system, an intermediary, generally a warehouse owner, 
independent trucker or other agent, purchases the crop for less than its 
estimated future price, providing the farmer with ready cash or a promise to pay 
at harvest time. This system also shifts some of the risk with respect to price 
fluctuations at harvest time to the intermediary and gives the farmer a market for 
the crop. These intermediaries provide transport, grading, processing and other 
services that would otherwise involve additional time and money expenditures 
for the farmer.
However, most significant is the expansion of formal-sector credit supplied 
through the project in relation to usurious money lending (which among the 
sampled farms appeared to be less extensive than has been supposed to be). 
Official credit accounts for 90 per cent in 1980 and 92 per cent in 1985. Credit 
supplied through the project was mostly long term and for investment in land 
purchase, building flour mills or other farm structures. Some of the credit was for 
short-term consumption and cultivation costs, but both types of loans were 
sometimes used for other purposes, including house construction or to buy 
cattle and to cover emergency needs or small consumption expenditures. This 
does not necessarily mean that it was badly spent, especially since the 
extension service was directly involved in the preparation of credit proposals.
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Even the apparent shift from permanent farm investments towards the purchase 
of cattle may have been in the right direction, since in the absence of 
irrigation,cattle, even on a small scale, are the most profitable enterprise. As 
stated by a former co-ordinator of the Evaluation Unit:
"Because problems of waiting for the agricultural cycle, uncertainty in relation to rain, 
then there was reasonable number of farmers who received funds from the programme 
for certain activities and used them for livestock. In reality it was not intense livestock. 
They were families who used part of the funds for the planting of crops and another part 
for buying one or two cows, or a bull. That was a way of maintaining the value of the 
money that they received throughout the period of the productive cycle. [...] If the 
drought had came along they would lose the crops and would not be able to pay the 
bank and provide for themselves".
The expansion in the supply of formal-sector credit by the project has certainly 
contributed to the weakening of usury within the small farmer sector. But credit 
extended through the project was also significant in another way. The so-called 
needs-based lending has further intensified the direct relationship between a 
broad spectrum of small farmers and the State apparatus.
Small producers could get loans at a very low rate of interest since credit was 
highly subsidised by the POLONORDESTE programme. However, there was a 
limit on the amount of credit conceded. This was done according to the MVR 
(major reference value) as defined by the Central Bank of Brazil. Producers 
were divided into four categories: the mini producer could get a loan up to 100 
MVR; the small from 100 to 600 MVR; the medium from 600 to 3,000 MVR; and 
the large from 3,000. Since the size of the MVR was not continuously indexed - 
and the rate of inflation was very high - the amount of credit provided for the 
mini-producers sometimes reached, a level below that which a producer might 
need to cultivate his fields, according to the techniques, fertilisers and type of 
seeds recommended by the project technical advisers.7
7 According to Cavalcanti (1982:23), this limit on the amount to be lent to the smaller categories 
of producer had, in some cases, caused trouble because a producer who obtained a good 
income which exceeded the amount established by the bank, could not continue to get the loans 
subsidised by the project.
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To achieve its aims the State has to build alliances which, in a situation of 
concentration of both land and capital, are likely to be with the rich or more 
capitalised farmer. It can be assumed that it was on the capitalist small farmer 
that the State relied mostly for the success of its policy to stimulate growth. 
Conversely, to achieve economic mobility the upper peasants find in the State 
the financial support they are looking for8.
To these households, who make up the higher strata of the peasantry in this 
region, the prospects of upward mobility make the risk worth the possibility of 
profitable results. If losses occur, they may not basically affect the subsistence 
requirement of the family. However, their upward mobility depends on having 
capital and on transforming their neighbours into suppliers of labour and raw 
materials as, for instance, the owners of modern flour-mills. This is 
demonstrated by the account of Severino Cordeiro, owner of 7 hectares in 
Caruaru:
"I got a loan from POLONORDESTE to built an electric flour-mill and bought a pair of 
oxen. Lots of people here use this flour-mill. They pay 1 kg of manioc flour for each 10 
kg of flower processed. Nowadays I plant manioc to make flour and I trade it as a 
wholesaler. When I do not have enough manioc I buy it from neighbours producers. The 
POLONORDESTE could be better if it had not finished."
Sometimes, previous experience with a bank may act as an incentive or a 
barrier for the next time. For those who had previously obtained loans directly 
from banks and were accustomed to its bureaucratic delays, POLONORDESTE 
made it easier to get loans. Jose Felix, owner of 6 hectares in Gloria do Goita, 
commented:
"I got the loan from POLONORDESTE to built a flour-mill and to buy a cow. With the 
"cria" (calf) of the cow I paid the loan. Who gave me orientation was a man from 
EMATER. At that time it was easier to get a loan and to repay it."
Both extensionists and farmers who benefited from the credit component 
remember it wistfully (World Bank, 1989:11). In that sphere of the IRDP-PE and
8 According to Cavalcanti (1982:265), those small farmers who respond quickly to agricultural 
incentives, provided by State rural development programmes, are those who already have some 
capital and the possibility of accumulating more.
other IRDPs the farmers spoke with nostalgia: "Agriculture can only improve 
when the POLONORDESTE returns". According to a technician involved, a 
negative situation arose from this, which was the following:
"They were small and medium sized producers who progressed during that period and 
who got used to easy and cheap money. As the credit was subsidised, because it had a 
nominal rate of interest which was below the rate of inflation, that carried a certain loss 
of efficiency, because the farmers knew they had that money to repair some inefficiency 
which might be occurring in their activities. When the POLONORDESTE disappeared 
they all complained... It was not transmitted to them, especially to the small ones, that 
the business was ending. Because of that they cannot even think of the chance of taking 
up money at the market price, of paying the price that the financial market is charging 
for the money. It's true there are other problems... that prices do not compensate, by not 
allowing a return that compensates the price generated by the loan at high interests 
rates."
The more a peasant becomes dependent on capital, however, the more he 
becomes affected by the risks which such a process brings with it. Because of 
the risks, there were some small farmers who did not want to work according to 
the project's expectations, although they were told of the benefits they would 
gain, such as credit at low interest rates, technical assistance and, at the end, 
increased production and productivity. Thus, there were also some small 
producers who did not pay much attention to the benefits of subsidised credit 
because of the fear of being unable to pay back the credit received. Jose 
Matias, owner of 40 hectares em Capoeiras, explained why he did not want to 
ask for a loan:
"In 1980 I received a loan from the Banco do Brasil. I used it for agriculture and to buy a 
cow and a pair of oxen. I lost the harvest. At this time there was agricultural insurance 
but, when I went to the bank the date to complain had expired. The loan was directed 
from the bank because there was no EMATER office in Capoeiras. I needed to sell 
some of my goods to pay the loan. From that time I have not asked for credit. I saw a lot 
of people lose their land to pay the bank."
Peasants, as rational actors, "evaluate the possible outcomes associated with 
their choices in accordance with their preferences and values. ...They make the 
choice which they believe will maximise their expected utility" (Popkin, 1979:31). 
Thus, they calculate the costs and risks involved in the process of getting loans 
from banks, and in the adoption of new crops or technology. Moreover, market 
conditions discourage production of basic foodstuffs involving the increased use 
of purchased inputs.
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Finally, we must note that credit is not an agricultural input, rather it increases a 
borrower’s command over inputs for production or consumption. As a financial 
instrument it has the characteristic that, once the loan is received, the additional 
household resources can be allocated to any purpose. Thus, although the State 
purpose of a loan may be the purchase of seeds and fertiliser, the farmer might 
have been planning to allocate to highest return available, whether in 
agricultural or nonagricultural activities, for investment or for consumption. The 
loan has simply increased the amount of resources over which the household 
has command. A rational peasant will use the additional resources in ways that 
should provide the highest return or that involve less risk.
3.3. Markets and Middlement
Because of State interest in lowering prices of farm products and the overall 
constraints on market conditions, marketing was a major area of difficulty in 
giving support to small farmers. However, deliberate price control policies are 
not the only factors that are detrimental to small farmers' income. The nature 
and conditions of participation in the market make them particularly vulnerable 
and defenceless. As Ortega (1986:263) points out,
"Since peasants do not have socio-economic or purchasing organisations to protect their 
income, intermediaries or buyers take advantage of the availability of a large variety of 
small lots of perishable commodities and purchase them at extremely low prices.
Peasants are required to adopt a form of behaviour which in itself tends to deteriorate 
prices because they need to sell quickly, sometimes before harvesting, and they lack 
storage facilities for their products."
One of the objectives of POLONORDESTE was to improve the marketing 
infrastructure for agricultural products. One of the consequences of this would 
be to eliminate the importance of middlemen. The reality is however that 
marketing modernisation can sometimes have the opposite consequences; 
increasing the influence of middlemen. An improved output and marketing 
infrastructure can increase uncertainty of product prices at harvest time. When 
production in the area is ready the surplus from other states comes to be
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marketed in regional market places. The abundant supply brings, as a 
consequence, lower prices. In good harvest years it is not unusual for some 
producers to throw away their crops because their low prices do not compensate 
for the cost of marketing them. Hence, the producer is never sure of the amount 
of cash he will get at the end of an agricultural year. As is well known increased 
productivity in the face of not very elastic demand results primarily in benefits to 
the consumer through lower prices (consumer surplus), rather than higher 
incomes for producers 9. The relative success of small farmers integration into 
the markets has rested on a buoyant demand from the larger cities which have 
bee able to absorb increased supplies of fruits and vegetables without a price 
collapse.
In the absence of formal marketing arrangements a larger number of competing 
middlemen have emerged who provide a wide range of marketing services. By 
abstaining from the provision of direct marketing services, the project provided 
the environment for a rapid expansion by the small scale commercial sector. 
Most isolated small farmers tended to sell their surpluses to middlemen at 
depressed prices. The reasons for this are various. Many small farmers were 
engaged in multiple relations with local merchants and/ or landowners, in which 
commercialisation is part of a larger exchange of services. These includes on- 
farm purchase (at fixed prices or relative to the price of regional market); 
transport of goods to markets (at a fixed price per box of product); provision of 
working capital, inputs, and new seeds. While these relations tend to limit 
possible competition in the sphere of commercialisation, it is also important to 
realise that small farmers supply, in general, tend to be so small and erratic that 
the development of commercial services at the local level is frequently inhibited 
by a low volume of trade and high transaction costs - while distance and
9 According to Cavalcanti (1982:247), "the interchange between producer and market, 
represented by the amount of goods brought to the market by the producers, and the amount of 
income received, is the measure of the effectiveness of Project strategies". Unfortunately, the 
data from the panel study do not allow us to measure farmers' net income.
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transport costs are a disincentive to independent delivery to government 
purchasing depots, which, moreover, are not organised to receive small lots of 
ungraded produce (Howe and Goodman, 1992:110).
Very few producers themselves take their products to local markets,10 or to 
markets provided by the State, such as the CEASA11. According to Cavalcanti 
(1982:249-255), though intended to protect small producers, the State also 
provided opportunities for traders. State intervention in the provision of 
marketing infrastructure, particularly roads and modernisation of market 
structure channels, shows a certain ambiguity: both merchant and farmers 
participate actively in the market and the State gives support to both groups. On 
many project roads, middlemen were making regular trips to buy agricultural 
production. Thus the road component may have contributed directly to better 
working of the vegetable and fruits markets. However, the market constitutes 
one of the main problems within the project area: the State creates a market 
which strengthens traders, who were meant to be displaced. Thus, to become 
traders as a complementary activity was an other alternative used by some 
households to overcome constraints in agricultural production and the overall 
adverse market conditions for food crops. On the other hand, the emergence of 
middleman and fostered competition among them was an advantage for some 
small farmers who appeared to be well informed about market prices and to 
have expanded the range of selling open to them.
10 The traditional local marketplace, called "feira", is a periodic market of intinerant sellers 
housed in nonpermanent structures (barracas) and convening in a designated place at a set 
time. Today, distribution within the feiras is carried on by a variety of traders (feirantes), peasant 
retailers and local shopkeepers. A feira distributes primary goods, as well as finished and 
semifinished consumer products, and services among rural people who participate in it both as 
buyers and sellers (See Forman, 1975:94-96). The "feira de Caruaru" is the largest market town 
of the Pernambuco interior.
11 CEASA is an organisation associated to COBAL (The Brazilian Corporation for Food) an to 
the Secretariat of Agriculture of Pernambuco State. CEASA, which was established by the 
government as part of an initiative to rationalise the networks of urban food supply, is located in 
Recife and it is the main centre for food supply Pernambuco. During the project years, there was 
also a smaller centre for urban food supply called "Rural Producer Market", located in Bezerros 
(a city located in the Agreste region). Now it is closed and in its place there is an army 
headquarters.
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Technological progress may take the form of not only of increases in outputs 
delivered from given inputs, but also of increases in quality and uniformity of 
products, lowering storage costs and susceptibility to damage, or in other ways, 
such as a reduction in transaction costs. Increases in the storability of outputs 
have been a key to the expansion of agricultural markets. For example, because 
most small farmers do not have access to proper storage, they must sell their 
production at harvest time and they cannot wait until the supply in the market 
goes down. As a result, they will receive much less than they would get if they 
could wait for one or more months.
This problem is by no means insoluble. The Association of Potato Producers 
(APROBACA), located in a rural area of Caruaru, is a good example of how 
storage facilities can improve production and high incomes for small producers. 
The building of a warehouse with a fridge store-room ("camara frigorifica") with 
POLONORDESTE resources was essential to improvements in potato 
production and to the improved living conditions of potato producers. With the 
storage facilities provided by project, potato producers could reduce loss in their 
products and wait for a better price in the market.
4. Private Choices: Household Survival Strategies
4.1. Strategies for Gaining and Maintaining Access to Land
As was shown in chapter V, the tendency towards declining average farm size 
along the project years did not involve fragmentation of “minifundium” farms 
themselves and the available data does not provide evidence of any general 
increase in the concentration of land. On the contrary, there was a reduction in 
the incidence of landlessness and most smaller farmers were able to retain 
access to land. Moreover, as a result of partitioning of some holdholdings and 
the reduction of speculative investment in land, the decrease in the average size 
of properties occurred mainly in the larger categories of farmers. This outcome,
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as we will see in the following pages, was due more to the strategies of small 
farmers rather than as a direct consequence of POLONORDESTE which failed 
in what would have been its most important contribution to small farming; land 
reform.
4.1.1. Balancing of inheritance and purchase
It is commonplace in the literature that laws on inheritance constitute a major 
way of transferring land in rural societies. Peasant farmers usually own small 
plots and the dissolution of the peasantry would occur very quickly if only laws 
of inheritance were operative. Brazilian rules on inheritance allow sons and 
daughters equal rights to their parents' property. Consequently, after a few 
generations, we might expect land to split to the point where it would not be 
worth cultivating. However, where inheritance is important, there are 
mechanisms which serve to preserve the original landholding. According to 
Cavalcanti (1982:218), it is the capacity of peasant farmers for diversifying the 
means by which land can be obtained or cultivated that assures continuity. The 
dynamic of landholdings is a key element in determining peasant survival 
strategies.
The data on sources of property holding shows how sampled farmers obtained 
land. As shown in table VI.7, in 1980, 57.4 per cent of the farmers obtained their 
land through purchase. The remaining cases inherited all their land (17.4 per 
cent) or part of their land (16.2 per cent). In very few cases was land obtained 
from other sources (2.7 per cent), such as by land invasion, by "usucapiao"12 or 
by donations. In 1985 there was a slight increase in the number of farmers who 
obtained some land or all their land from inheritance. This was the case with 
some landless producers who became proprietors.
12 From the Latin "usucapione. "The "usucapiao" is a way of acquiring a property by its pacific 
occupation and uninterrupted use. The "usucapiao” law gives the right of land ownership to a 
rural producer who has worked effectively on a piece of land previously empty, at least for five 
uninterrupted years.
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The table makes it clear that there are no significant differences amongst the 
four strata of farmers. The smallest farmers were more dependent on 
inheritance: in 1980, 25 per cent of families had acquired all their land though 
inheritance and this situation remained constant in 1985. For the largest farmers 
land came mainly through purchase and inheritance as combined strategies 
(42.9 per cent of the families in 1980 and 50 per cent in 1985). However, it is 
interesting to observe that laws on inheritance were less important than 
purchase as a way of acquiring land amongst the sampled farmers. More than 
half of the farmers acquired land though purchase and there is a remarkable 
similarity for all categories. This trade in land is usually made among relatives or 
neighbours. Sometimes successive small plots are purchased to form the 
production unit.
TABLE VI.7 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: ACCESS TO LAND BY SIZE CATEGORY OF FARMS 
(row per cent), PANEL SAMPLE, 1980/85.
Farms Purchase Inheritance Purchase + 
Inherit.
Other Landless Total
(%)
1980
Micro 43.2 25.0 6.8 0.3 22.7 88
Small 67.5 14.6 14.6 1.6 1.6
(100)
124
Medium 58.3 15.6 21.7 4.5
(100)
115
Large 50.0 7.1 42.9 - -
(100)
14
(100)
All 57.35 17.4 16.2 2.7 6.5 340
(100)
1985
Micro 43.2 25.0 14.8 2.3 14.8 88
Small 59.4 13.8 23.6 2.4 0.8
(100)
124
Medium 52.2 19.3 28.7
(100)
115
Large 35.7 14.3 50.0 - -
(100)
14
(100)
All 51.8 18.5 24.1 1.4 4.2 340
(100)
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
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Cavalcanti (1982:241) provided evidence that the larger the farm, the larger the 
number of people it may retain and the stronger is the possibility that the farm 
will be divided and subsequently become smaller There are cases of farmers 
left with little land as a result of the splitting-up of a large holding. There are 
fluctuations in the well-being of households through generations and, despite 
their differences, peasants have been able to use diversified strategies which 
contribute towards their continuity. As is well known, peasantries have a 
remarkable survival capacity.
The increasing demographic pressure on existing land causes households to 
increasingly diversify their economic activities. As Deere (1982) puts it, "the key 
survival of the minifundio is the allocation of family time among the labour 
market, subsistence agricultural production, and alternative income-generating 
and maintenance activities". When the father's farm is small, the division of land 
will not be sufficient for meeting family needs. In this case, alternative means of 
subsistence have to be sought such as renting a plot, alternative jobs or 
activities outside agriculture, such as crafts and trades, while awaiting the 
opportunity to buy land. Vehicle owners supplement their income by transporting 
people and commodities to and from the community. To complement the family 
budget, husbands and sons might permanently engage in seasonal migration to 
plantations or urban centres. Migration is the main strategy used by small 
producers to achieve a balance between family membership and size of land. 
Land is rarely sold by migrants. When permanent emigration of family members 
occurs, land would be retained in the family's hands though the renting or the 
purchase of plots of land from brothers or sisters who emigrate.
In some cases, savings may not be enough to purchase a piece of land. Credit 
from a bank is a possible alternative for those who have collateral. Investing 
savings in cattle might be a strategy while waiting for the opportunity to buy a 
piece of land, because evidence of some sort of capital is a requirement for 
credit. Nevertheless, it should be observed that the inefficiency of the land 
reform component makes it difficult to overcome a serious obstacle to long-term
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rural prosperity in the Northern Agreste region: the shortage of land in the small- 
farm sector.
4.1.2. Land titling
But land reform is not the only measure that could affect the small farmers; land 
legalisation and entitlement also play an important role in the development of 
small-scale production. Significant improvements in the farm will require 
capitalisation, and capitalisation will require clear title to land - to obtain credit 
and to allow fixed investment. Despite the underemphasis on land purchase, the 
State Land Authority (COTEPE) seems to have contributed to improving land 
titling services, assuring the legal rights on land of smaller farmers. In 1980 
more than 40 per cent of micro farm' owners had no title their land. In 1985 this 
number had declined to 16 per cent (see table VI.8).
TABLE VI.8 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: OWNERS WHO HAD TITLE OF LAND BY SIZE 
CATEGORIES OF FARMS (row per cent), PANEL SAMPLE, 1980/85.
Farms Yes No Landless Total
(100%)
1980
Micro 54.5 43.8 21.6 88
Small 86.2 12.2 1.6 124
Medium 89.6 9.6 0.9 115
Large 92.9 7.1 - 14
All 79.4 14.1 6.5 340
1985
Micro 69.3 15.9 14.8 88
Small 91.1 8.1 0.8 124
Medium 92.2 7.8 - 115
Large 92.9 7.1 - 14
Total 85.9 10.0 4.1 340
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
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The existence of a very large number of small producers operating on their 
“own” land without proper title, or with legitimate claims to land ownership by 
virtue of extended occupation may not have been a decisive factor depressing 
traditional agriculture. However, insecurity of title does present a major obstacle 
to agricultural modernisation in the small farming sector. Without secure title, 
access to medium and long-term official credit is problematic and the incentive 
for investments in land and fixed assets is low. Therefore, land regularisation is 
important not only to enforce those aspects of land law granting rights to long­
term occupants, but also for creating the conditions for increased income on 
existing holdings with less problematic claims to peasant owership. Although 
this measure did not help to overcome landlessness and concentration of 
ownership, it helped those who are blocked in the exploitation of the potential of 
their existing assets.
Feder and Feeny (1993), focusing on the relationship between property rights in 
land and resource allocation in agriculture explore, in a theoretical model, the 
consequences of insecurity of land rights. The contribution of the Feder and 
Feeny model is to identify three distinct sources of the efficiency cost of security 
of land rights. One obvious source is the distortion in farmers’ incentives to 
invest in land. A second cost arises if land is used as collateral for debt. In this 
case, part of the risks of land loss is borne by the lender, and thus insecurity of 
land rights will reduce farmers’ access to capital. The third efficiency cost arises 
because uncertainty in rural land rights depresses the price of capital much less 
(if at all) than the price of rural land, under the plausible assumption that rural 
land but not capital is in inelastic supply. The increase in the relative capital- 
land price-ratio will, through the usual substitution effect, reduce the capital 
intensity of farming.
The implication of this theoretical model is that, to the extent that State 
measures, such as titling, increase the security of property rights in land, they 
will increase the efficiency of resource allocation in the rural sector. Implicit in 
this view the universal neo-classical notion that efficiency can only be achieved
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by ensuring that impediments are removed to the rational decision-making of 
self-seeking individuals. The new institutionalism also supports reforms that 
redistribute land to individual owners, based on sligthtly different reasoning. 
According to Newbery (1989:288), the notion of efficient property rights in 
agriculture comes from the need to reduce transaction costs and to avoid 
principal-agent problems that can arise in other forms of agricultural relations 
such as hiring labour.
4.1.3. Sharecropping and Tenancy
For some economists sharecropping is seen as an inefficient institution whose 
consequences they could analyse, but whose persistence and perverseness 
remained essentially unexplained. For some neo-Marxists sharecropping is 
exploitative and prohibition sought in the interests of both efficiency and equity. 
However, a vigorous debate about sharecropping in the 1970s suggested that it 
was not necessarily inefficient and also, it had features favourable to the 
sharecropper, compared with simple rental contract. According to Stiglitz (1989: 
21), sharecropping performs a clearly role in sharing risks between landlords 
and tenants; in the absence of insurance markets (or other markets for risks), 
this is clearly an important economic function. Thus, he argues against the 
standard view that criticised sharecropping as inefficient because it dampened 
incentives, sharecropping was desirable because it increased incentives. For 
him, sharecropping represents a compromise between risks and incentive 
effects; while rental contracts provided perfect incentives, the tenant had to 
absorb all the risk; wage contracts, in which the landlord absorbed the risk, 
provided no incentive to work, unless workers were closely monitored. In sum, 
risk-spreading characteristic of sharecropping is beneficial in the high-risk 
environment of peasant agriculture for an operator who, because of poverty is 
highly risk-averse.
The traditional form of labour supply in the Agreste region was related to the 
existence of the called "precapitalist latifundium / minifundium structure" (Sa,
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1975), in which large farmers utilised the labour of moradores, tenant farmers 
and sharecroppers. Even small owners of minifundia holdings, of insufficient 
size to meet family livelihood needs, used to rent additional land on large farms 
or worked as day-labourers at seasonal demand peaks. During the 1980s, 
sharecropping or renting a plot was not easy in the area. According to the data 
(table VI.9) the amount of land under tenancy and sharecropping remained 
relatively small throughout the years of the panel study (only about 10 per cent 
of the total land in production units). However, due to the reduction in the total 
land available to the farms in the second wave of the panel study, there was a 
slight reduction in the amount of land rented. There was also a slight decrease 
in the number of production units operated by sharecroppers and tenants 
because of their change from "landless" producers to landowners during the 
project years. The use of sharecropped and rented land is, naturally, typical of 
landless producers, micro and small owners, and also in a few cases of medium 
sized holders. For small proprietors, sharecropping and tenancy are not systems 
in danger of extinction, since the availability of land would be maintained. As is 
well known, in "minifundium" farms, this is a way of complementing family 
income and avoiding semi-proletarianisation.
In a sense, sharecropping and some tenant farming are also a form of credit - 
the landowner advances the land for the farmer’s use and at the end of the 
agricultural year receives the land back, plus interests (in the form of product or 
money rent). In addition to this form of “credit” (which is a rental system) it is 
common for landlords to advance seed and other inputs, as well as basic 
foodstuffs that allow a sharecropper family to survive until the harvest. These 
advances were repaid in cash with interest, out of the sharecropper’s share of 
the marketed harvest, or, more commonly, repaid in kind because of high taxes 
of inflation. According to Howe and Goodman (1992:109) in either case, “this 
kind of credit has the potential for evolving into a system of debt servitude”. 
When the output is poor and the loan cannot be repaid from one year to the 
next, the debt is rolled over and the sharecropper finds it difficult to disengage 
from the debt, ensuring to the landlord the continued co-operation of the
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TABLE VI.9 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: COMPOSITION OF PRODUCTION UNITS: OWNED
LAND AND RENTED LAND BY SIZE CATEGORIES OF FARMS, PANEL SAMPLE, 1980/85.
1980 1985
Farm Area Area rented Total Area Area rented Total
Size owned (ha) area owned (ha) area
(ha) ha) (ha) (ha)
Micro 341.2 79.9 421.1 474.4 66.7 541.1
Small 3,485.3 62.2 3,547.5 3,613.1 95.3 3,708.4
Medium 11,116.3 75.8 11,192.1 10,090.6 10.0 10,100.6
Large 6,357.0 - 6,357.0 4,463.0 - 4,463.0
Total 21,299.8 217.9 21,517.7 18,641.1 172.0 18,831.1
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
sharecropper or tenant farmer. Despite, some pernicious effects of these 
informal credit mechanisms, it is important to keep in mind that they are linked to 
access to other resources and services - land and markets in particular- and that 
is part of the reason they are used by small farmers.
In the analysis of the information from the perspective of the proprietors who 
concede land in tenancy, sharecropping and moradia (Table VI. 10) shows the 
same trend, in which 10 per cent of owned land is leased out in both years. 
Because of the reduction in the total land available to the farms in the second 
wave of the panel study, there was a slight reduction in the amount of land 
leased out. Also the number of sharecroppers, tenants and moradores on farms 
fell from 891 in 1980 to 796 in 1985.
Let us now look at this information from the perspective of size categories of the 
proprietors who ceded land in tenancy, sharecropping and moradia systems in 
the panel sample. The pattern which can be perceived is that it is not only the 
largest landlords who give land to internal and external peasants. Medium and 
small holders also had a relatively high proportion of their land shared with sub­
family holders and internal peasants. However, there is a great variation in the
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TABLE VI 10 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: AMOUNT OF LAND LEASED OUT AND NUMBER OF
TENANTS, SHARECROPPERS, AND MORADORES BY SIZE CATEGORIES OF FARMS,
PANEL SAMPLE, 1980/85
1980 1985
Farm Size Area leased out 
(ha)
Tenants, 
sharecroppers 
and Moradores
Area leased out 
(ha)
Tenants, 
sharecroppers 
and Moradores
No Average No Average
Micro 13.5 48 0.5 6.5 9 0.1
Small 291.1 154 1.3 261.5 111 0.9
Medium 965.5 433 3.8 941.9 449 3.9
Large 851.7 256 18.3 770.0 227 16.2
Total 2,121.8 891 2.6 1,979.1 796 2.3
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
number of tenants, sharecroppers and “moradores” families, which is 
proportional to the size of available land.
According to the data on the main obligations of the sharecropper towards the 
landlord (table VI. 11), the concession of land in return for fodder (for cattle) is 
still the major reason for persistence of this system. The next most important 
factor is the supply of grass (also for cattle). Although important in 1980, 
tenancy relations based on “share in crop production” or as a way of supplying 
cheap labour through the obligation of sharecroppers to give “priority of work for 
the landlord” and the obligation to “give a free day’s work on the landlord’s 
land”, had lost its importance in the subsequent panel wave. The data on 
tenancy and sharecropping arrangements confirms the increased erosion of the 
“precapitalist latifundium / minifundium” structure and the traditional form of 
labour supply for larger farms. For smaller farmers, this erosion means a 
reduction in land available for tenancy as a way of complementing family 
income.
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TABLE VI.11 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: MAIN OBLIGATIONS OF SHARECROPPER
TOWARDS THE LANDLORD, PANEL SAMPLE, 1980/85.
Obligations 1980
No %
1985
No %
Return straw fodder 113 53.8 74 75.5
Planted pasture 26 12.4 6 6.1
Priority of work for the landlord
22 10.5 3 3.1
Share in the crop production
23 11.0 7 7.1
To give free working days or 
lower payment for worked days 13 6.2 7 7.1
Other 13 6.2 1 1.0
Total (*) 221 100.0 98 100.0
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
(*) The total corresponds to the number of mentioned obligations. In some cases more than one 
obligation was mentioned. The reduction in these numbers is related to the increase of tenancy 
by payment only in cash.
4.2. The Wage Labour Market: An Income Defensive Strategy
The consequences of POLONORDESTE for the labour market have predictably 
enough been mixed. While the proletarianization of rural workers has not 
occurred on a grand scale neither can it be said that the family farm utilizing 
exclusively family labour has been strengthened. In fact what occurred was a 
combination of apparently mutually exclusive processes; an increase in wage 
labour combined with a strengthening of small farming. How did this happen?
The decrease in importance in traditional forms of labour use led us to take into 
account other labour supply options and the categories of employment in the 
region. Since forms of occupation are complex and activities varied in rural 
areas, the analysis of employment requires an adequate understanding of what 
is meant by productive employment. The data on the agricultural labour force 
contain information on the number of persons, number of days worked in and
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outside the holding. The PIMES researchers' classification of the labour force 
divided workers into two groups:
a) Unpaid family-labour (the members of the household who work without 
determination of the form and period of payment). This includes the head of 
household, the wife, the adult sons and daughters and relatives, and the 
children (less than 15 years old);
b) Employees are those who sell their labour for payment in cash. They are 
classified as permanent workers (those who have steady employment or work 
for a long time, with a formal link) and temporary workers (those hired for 
temporary work or activities of short duration, with daily payment or by 
contracted job). A "morador" is a resident permanent worker who receives, as 
part of his compensation, a dwelling on the farm and a plot for cultivation of 
subsistence crops. A "non-morador" permanent worker is contracted annually 
but receives no housing or land.
The data on the agricultural labour force have some general shortcomings. In 
relation to employment, the questionnaire collected information on the number of 
workers (individuals) and the number of labour-days worked per year, which 
placed a considerable burden on the individual by requiring him to remember 
the number of days effectively worked over such a long period. Also, as the 
questionnaire was applied to the person responsible for the administration of the 
farm (owner-operator, administrator or manager) it was difficult for him to know 
the exact number of days worked by members of the family, "non-morador" 
workers hired permanently or resident workers. The above-mentioned 
restrictions are common to any empirical study and should be keept in mind, but 
it is not thought that they undermine the conclusions drawn from the data.
Analysis of data on the composition of the labour force13 shows that there is a 
great variation in the number of workers by category of employment and the
13 The questionnaire used in 1985 had a somewhat different format for collecting information on 
categories of employment, compared with the questionnaire used in 1980, thus making
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number of days effectively worked per annum on the farms. For this reason, our 
analysis will use as a measure of the importance of categories of farm 
employment an “equivalent-worker", which means "an agricultural worker fully 
employed 300 days per annum". If we take the number of labour-days worked by 
unpaid family-labour on the sampled farms as an “equivalent-worker" (table 
VI. 12) this is a more significant employment category. Despite the importance of 
family-labour in the composition of employment, the data show that important 
changes have taken place in the composition of categories of employment in 
this region14. The number of waged labour-days constitute 41.1 per cent of the 
labour force, with a sharp predominance of temporary workers (31.7 per cent of 
the labour is provided by temporary workers, against 9.4 per cent of permanent 
workers' labour).
Analysis of the composition of agricultural employment by size of units of 
production shows clearly that the use of different categories of employment is, in 
general terms, related to farm size. The structure of the labour force reflects the 
specific form of social organisation of production in the different categories of 
farms. On smaller units, the labour process is based mainly on family labour, 
while larger units rely mostly on proletarian labour. Unpaid family-labour makes 
up 85.9 per cent of the total labour used on micro holdings, in contrast to 80.9 
per cent in waged labour on large farms. The importance of unpaid family labour 
also exceeds the importance of salaried workers on small farms (70.6 per cent) 
while employed labour ranks first in the composition of employment in medium 
farms (55 per cent).
comparison over the years more difficult. Because of this restriction, our analysis will be limited 
to information collected in the last panel wave (1985), which provides enough information to give 
a general picture of the labour force used in the economic activities of the farms.
14According to Kageyama and Graziano da Silva (1988) the increase of temporary workers in 
agricultural employment between 1970 and 1980 was responsible for more than 50% of the total 
employment created in Brazilian agriculture. In the Brazilian North-East, of the 1,838,000 jobs 
additional created in the decade, 1,046,000 (57%) were of temporary workers.
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TABLE VI.12 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: COMPOSITION OF AGRICULTURAL LABOUR
FORCE, BY TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT AND SIZE CATEGORY OF FARMS (IN EQUIVALENT-
WORKERS PER YEAR) (*), PANEL DATA, 1980/85.
Categories of 
Employment Micro Small Medium Large Total
Family labour
Head 65.2 81.3 85.4 6.4 238.3
Wife 27.4 36.1 23.6 1.0 88.1
Sons > 1 5  years. 40.4 116.7 86.1 8.9 252.1
Daughter>15 years 43.1 54.2 30.4 1.0 128.7
Children (under 15 43.1 62.3 25.4 7.0 135.8
years)
Sub-total 219.2 350.6 250.9 24.3 845.0
(%) (85.9) (70.6) (45.0) (19.0) (58.9)
Permanent Labour
Administrator - 2.0 6.0 3.0 11.0
Herdsmen - 3.5 14.9 10.5 28.9
Men (Morador) 1.9 16.3 31.7 10.7 60.6
Men (Non-morador) 2.9 6.6 7.3 10.0 26.8
Women - 1.0 6.3 - 7.3
Sub-total 4.8 29.4 66.2 34.2 134.6
(%) (1.9) (5.9) (11.9) (26.8) (9.4)
Temporary Labour
Hired Men 29.1 108.6 226.4 63.9 428.0
Hired Women 2.1 8.0 13.4 5.0 28.5
Sub-total 31.2 116.6 239.8 68.9 456.5
(%) (12.2) (23.4) (43.1) (54.1) (31.7)
Total 255.2 496.6 556.9 127.4 1,436.1
(%) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Average per Farm 2.9 4.0 4.8 9.1 4.2
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
(*) The "equivalent-worker" meant an agricultural worker fully employed 300 days per annum. 
These numbers represent the amount of work/days "hired in" in the sampled farms in 
"equivalent-worker". I did not take into consideration sex, age or position in the occupation.
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Thus, these results are compatible with the presumed association between farm 
size and the level of capitalist penetration in the sphere of production. Peasant 
farms (which use predominantly family labour) are concentrated in smaller 
holdings, and capitalised farms (which use mainly salaried employees - 
temporary or permanent) are essentially the larger farms. However, medium 
farms have a relatively high proportion of family-labour (45.0 per cent of the total 
labour) while small farms also rely on capitalist relations of production (29.3 per 
cent of labour is provided by salaried workers).
Analysis of the labour force provided by salaried employment shows that 
temporary labour greatly exceeds that of permanent labour in all categories of 
farms. As a rule, labour demand in rural areas is conditioned by the particular 
form of production and the seasonality of agricultural activities. So while the 
utilisation of permanent labourers is linked to the permanent activities of the 
holdings - such as management or livestock activities - that of seasonal 
labourers is closely related to the needs of the crop cycle or the seasonal nature 
of agricultural activities. Although the seasonal character and the discontinuity 
of the production process explains to some extent the intensity in the utilisation 
of temporary labour, Ferreira (1984) suggests that other factors, such as 
changes in the production mix or the modernisation of some agricultural and 
livestock activities, could be largely responsible for modifications in traditional 
forms of labour use.
The great importance of temporary labour in the constitution of the salaried 
labour force reflects the principal manifestation of capitalist relations in 
agriculture. Temporary labour consists mainly of landless agricultural workers 
but also of smallholding producers (owner-operators or sharecroppers) who, 
with limited access to land, have to depend on outside employment for their 
reproduction. In Brazil, the replacement of permanent workers came early in the 
1960s, before the rapid technological transformation, and it also occurred in
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poor areas which had not introduced technological change to any large extent. 
According to Castro de Rezende (1985), the preference given to temporary 
workers came on the part of the landlords as a means of bypassing labour laws 
or institutional constraints. The implementation of the Rural Labour Statute in 
1963, which extended to agricultural workers the minimum wage and social 
benefits already applied to the urban labour market, did not include non-resident 
temporary workers, which then became a much cheaper source of labour.
However, as pointed out by Kageyama and Graziano da Silva (1988) if, from the 
perspective of demand, temporary workers constitute a capitalist form of 
employment (in contrast to those of family labour), we cannot ignore the fact 
that these workers are not necessarily a rural proletariat in the classical sense. 
Some of them are small producers or family members, who, because of 
inadequate access to resources, particularly to sufficient land and 
complementary means of production, must seek off-farm employment as a 
temporary or permanent recourse to ensure reproduction15. In this sense, 
according to Goodman (1989), these households are semi-proletarians. Thus, 
from the perspective of supply, this might represent an increase in the 
importance of the family production unit as a source of labour for the capitalist 
enterprise system.
The amount of labour reserved for capitalist production is related to resource 
availability in non-capitalist activities. In this way, according to Ferreira (1984) 
the greater or lesser availability of labour (small landowners, sharecroppers, 
tenant farmers and squatters) for seasonal or short-term activities in capitalist 
production depends on the intensity of work in family production units, which is 
in turn related to their possession of resources and means of production. When 
access to land and other resources is limited, one strategy used by the group of 
small producers as a whole is to sell their labour in the local labour market. Not
15 The absorption of labour is also related to farm size, so that on large farms the average is 9 
workers with full employment per farm per annum. It is followed, in the importance of absorption 
of labour, by medium and small farms, where the average is 5 and 4 workers per farm 
respectively. On micro farms the average is 3 workers with full employment per annum.
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all surplus labour need emigrate, if sons of small farmers and their relatives can 
sell their labour seasonally. This participation in the labour market play an 
important role in dampening fluctuation in income - fluctuation which frequently 
undermine the livelihood of small farmers in the long run.
4.3. Migration: Defusing Demographic Pressure
To the extent that one of the objectives of POLONORDESTE was to restrict the 
flood of rural migration to the cities it failed. One the other hand, ironically, it was 
this failure which helped to achieve another aim, the stabilization of small 
farming. In this section I want to look at how migration served as a small farmer 
strategy to maintain existing holdings.
For an overall understanding of household livelihood strategies in the rural area 
of the project, I will rely on the sample of 246 farming households16. Information 
was collected on 2,185 people (including married and migrant children), or an 
average of 8.9 people per family unit. The people interviewed were, whenever 
possible, the couple or the head of the family. For this reason, families whose 
residence was outside the area of the project were not included in this analysis.
In most of the cases (67 per cent), families were living in houses located in the 
middle of their plots, so the farm area is not separate from the home area17. The 
majority of the houses accommodate a nuclear family and may occasionally 
provide a room, in case of need, for other relatives or for other families. 
Sometimes a son emigrates intending to take his family with him soon. There 
are also cases in which married sons build their house near their parents' 
houses. In cases like this, they usually work together on the same land. The 
mean size of households is 6.2 people, with almost four children per household. 
Parents and children correspond to 88.3 per cent of family members. The
16 This sample corresponds to the number of households interviewed in part two of the 
questionnaire (Characterisation of family units) in 1985, which corresponds to 72.4 per cent of 
the farmers' residential units.
17 The remaining families lived outside the farms, with 19 per cent of farmers coming daily to the 
farm, 11.9% weekly and 2.1% monthly or less.
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number of relatives living with the nuclear family is low (11.7 per cent) and their 
relationship the head of household is varied.
The age structure of families helps us to understand one of the main socio­
economic processes: outmigration. According to data in table VI. 13, the majority 
of household couples are concentrated in the older age-groups. Only 23.4 per 
cent of heads of family are under 45, while 41.1 per cent are over 60. Wives are 
slightly younger than husbands. Children living within households are younger 
than children who have left (see also table VI. 14). This gives a picture of an 
area in which the household work-force is made up mainly of younger people 
(42.8 per cent of residents are between 7 and 21 years old) and older people 
(32.1 per cent of residents are over 35). There is a sharp concentration of 
migrants in the age group from 22 to 35 (62.9 per cent). Each household had 
lost, on average, 2,6 children to migration.
TABLE V I.13 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: RESIDENT POPULATION ACCORDING TO THEIR 
RELATIONSHIP TO HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD AND AGE GROUP (column percent), PANEL 
SAMPLE, 1985.
Age-Group Headf) Wife Children Other
Relatives
Total
0 - 6 - - 13.3 23.3 10.4
7 - 1 4 - - 31.3 35.6 22.1
1 5 -2 1 - 0.4 32.8 15.6 20.8
2 2 - 2 8 2.0 4.4 13.5 7.2 9.6
2 9 - 3 5 3.7 6.2 5.1 4.4 5.0
3 6 - 4 5 17.7 23.8 2.8 5.5 8.1
4 6 - 6 0 38.4 44.9 1.1 1.1 13.6
61 and over 41.2 20.1 - 7.8 10.5
Nl - 0.9 0.1 1.1 0.4
Total 245 229 880 180 1.535
(%) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Source: POLONORDESTE /  PIMES-UFPE Surveys
(*) There are 12 cases in which the family is headed by women.
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TABLE VI.14 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: MIGRANTS ACCORDING TO THEIR RELATIONSHIP
TO HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD AND AGE GROUP (column percent), PANEL DATA, 1985.
Age-Group Children Other
Relatives
Total
Up to 14 2.7 - 2.6
15 - 21 10.9 14.3 10.9
2 2 - 2 8 33.2 - 32.5
2 9 - 3 5 29.7 7.1 29.2
3 6 - 4 5 19.7 28.6 19.9
46 and over 2.5 50.0 3.5
Nl 1.4 - 1.4
Total
(%)
636
(100.0)
14
(100.0)
650
(100.0)
Source: POLONORDESTE / PIMES-UFPE Surveys
The high population density and the increasing demographic pressure on 
existing land has resulted in migration of part of the Northern Agreste 
economically active population. Other factors responsible for migration in the 
area are long periods of drought and the uncertainty of the climate. Sowing time 
is marked not by dates, but by the onset of rain. If the rain is late in coming it will 
disturb the whole life of the peasant18. However, as Ferreira (1984) observed in 
the Sertao region, the drought phenomenon and population surplus should not 
be emphasised as the most important element in this process. They are only 
some of the conditioning elements. Migratory trends should be considered also 
in relation to production conditions. The ownership structure, the substitution of 
livestock for agriculture, changes in crop production and the modernisation of 
production can also contribute to the rural emigration. As pointed out by Roberts 
(1979:91) "areas of capitalist farming 'expel' more people than areas of peasant
18 The periodic droughts transformed the afflicted areas into disaster zones in which the despair 
caused by hunger promotes unrest. Without the means to subsist, whole families invade the 
nearby cities and cause riots in order to get food. Having no way to feed their families, groups of 
peasants went to nearby towns and threatened to invade "market places" if the prefeitos did not 
provide food or work for them. For instance, in a "Veja" magazine (1991) article called 
"Emergency way out" (Saida de Emergencia) it is affirmed that, in the SertSo region "to organise 
a plunder is so natural as to call the neighbours to go to a football game".
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farming". Nevertheless, as he also stressed, areas of peasant production may 
present a more complex set of urban-rural relationships in which family 
enterprises span rural and urban locations, with town migrants retaining rights to 
land and aiming to return eventually.
The main strategy used by rural populations in the face of socio-economic 
constraints is migration. Land cannot easily be acquired by the landless or small 
producers in the Northern Agreste and this restriction in the market for land is 
one of the reasons for outmigration19. For some, migration represents a strategy 
for obtaining the means to come back with sufficient money to buy a piece of 
land for themselves or to increase the area of the family farm or to help other 
family members by supplying the means of survival of the household units. For 
others, migration is a means of finding a living, then, even seasonal migration is 
transformed, with time, into a permanent strategy.
According to Cavalcanti (1982:84-89) when there is a shortage of land to 
cultivate and when the grown-up children realise that their father's farm can 
neither provide them with a plot nor supply their wants, migration becomes a 
normal event in a particular phase of the domestic group. When the male 
children reach adulthood it is time for them to get their own plot or to form part of 
the land of their parents for themselves. When the parent's farm is insufficient to 
provide land to enable the son to get married the household splits.
The majority of migrants are children of the household head (97.9 per cent).
Most of the children (60 per cent) left their parents' home to get married. A third 
of them emigrated to get a job20. Even when they migrate to get married, this is
19 A specific analysis of rural migration in Latin American (Shaw, 1974) suggests that the land 
tenure system is an important factor in explaining rural migration rates since it conditions 
employment opportunities in agriculture. A more concentrated land-tenure system acts as a push 
factor, while a large small-farm sector allows a retention of population and a reduction in 
migration rates. However, in area of small farms, where the land is not sufficient to feed large 
families, migration by children is the main way to keep a balance between workers and land 
(See Maia, 1991).
20 This category of answer "to get a job" includes also other assertions such as "lack of land or 
job locally", "expectations of better income", or "information about better work conditions".
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related to their need to establish themselves as an independent household. If 
they have no hope of gaining control of a piece of land through the inheritance 
mechanism or via some means of staying working for others in the same area, 
they will became wage-workers somewhere else.
The empirical evidence shows that the reasons for migrating are related to 
socio-economic factors. The average number of emigrants per household 
among the larger and smaller landholders is higher than in other categories (3.8 
and 3.2 migrants per household, respectively). However, as shown in table 
VI. 15, they emigrate for quite different reasons. The larger farmer had the lowest 
percentage of emigrants who left home to get work (2.9 per cent) and the largest 
percentage of emigrants whose reason for migrating was to study (55.9 per 
cent). Thus, the wealthier farmers may either provide for their children to stay at 
home until they get married, or provide funds for them to study outside. The 
opposite occurs in the case of micro households. They had the largest 
percentage of members who migrated to get a job (35.8 per cent) and only 4.2 
per cent of their migrants went away to study. The small and the medium 
categories of farmers have the lowest average number of migrants per family 
(2.3 and 2.5 migrants per household, respectively). However, their reasons for 
migrating follow closely the tendency observed in micro and large farmers. The 
high correlation between size of landholdings and reasons for migration 
confirms what Cavalcanti (1982:86) stressed: "migration is a social and not only 
a demographic response"21.
The data on the direction of the rural outmigration (Table VI. 16) show that 
migration is not simply the product of desperate rural poverty, but appears to be 
based in part, on the attraction of the city22 and of its economic and educational
21 See also Maia (1991).
22 According to Maia's fieldwork on subsistence strategies of small producers in rural Bahia, one 
of the reasons for migration is that "young people want a flow of cash to buy small luxuries which 
are readily available in cities". In the "roga", they say "we do not see even the colour of money" 
(Maia, 1991:209).
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TABLE VI.15 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: REASON FOR MIGRATION BY SIZE CATEGORY OF
FARMS (COLUMN PER CENT), PANEL DATA, 1985.
Reason for 
migration Micro Small Medium Large Total
To get married 58.1 66.0 58.5 38.2 59.7
To get a job 35.8 30.1 19.0 2.9 27.2
To study 4.2 2.9 21.0 55.9 11.5
Others reasons 1.9 1.0 1.5 1.9 1.5
Total 215 206 195 34 650
(%) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Source: POLONORDESTE /  PIMES-UFPE Surveys
TABLE V I.16 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: DIRECTION OF MIGRATION BY REASON FOR 
MIGRATION (column percent), PANEL SAMPLE, 1985.
Direction of 
Migration
To get 
married
To study To get a job Others Total
NE-Cities 39.4 98.7 26.6 80.0 43.4
NE-Rural 35.6 1.3 8.5 - 28.6
South-East 18.6 - 63.3 20.0 23.7
Others 6.4 _ 1.7 _ 4.3
Total 388 75 177 10 650
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
opportunities for both the poor and the better-off members of rural society. Even 
when children migrate to study they usually stay in the large cities after 
graduation. The data show that 72 per cent of household members emigrate to 
urban centres. If the reason for emigration is to study, they always go to North- 
Eastern cities (98.8 per cent of the cases that left home to study). If they want go 
further than the fourth year and to finish primary school (which takes 8 years) 
they must go to large villages or to the nearest towns. Secondary school exists 
only in towns (sede de municipios), and Universities or Faculties are available
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only in the largest cities or capitals, like Caruaru and Recife. Thus, only better- 
off farmers can afford to send their children to them.
Whether the reason is to get a job or to have a better salary they usually go to 
the large cities in the South-East region, mainly Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro 
(63.3 per cent). Migrants, whatever their origins, arrive in the largest urban 
centres as a result of some prior contact or information. Many migrants have 
jobs or lodgings assured them before their arrival in the city. Cavalcanti's 
fieldwork (1982:95) indicates that people choose the city where they have more 
relatives or friends. To travel to Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Brasilia is easy 
with agents of one or two big bus companies operating in the area. For such 
people to move to the large cities and, by and large, to stay in them, appears to 
suggest that the urban economy has some capacity to absorb the increasing 
numbers of the economically active population and that employment 
opportunities continue to expand. However, this was not in fact the case23. 
These migrants are a cause for concern for the authorities of those cities, 
especially with the recession in the construction sector since the 1980s. 
Nevertheless, migrating to other North-Eastern rural areas is the least popular 
choice among migrants, who want to improve living conditions through a better 
job or salary (8.5 per cent).
Migration, in the context of limited employment opportunities in the commercial 
and industrial sector, only transfers the difficulties of the small-farm sector to 
other regions. In fact, Northern Agreste small producers migrate in order to 
defuse demographic pressure on existing land and due to lack of local 
employment opportunities. However, wages in the cities are so low that only a 
few migrants are capable of remitting enough money to the families left behind.
r
They send money and goods only sporadically and consequently are not
23 According to Maia's fieldwork (1991:207), numerous girls and boys over 16 years of age have 
gone to the large cities to work: girls in domestic activities and the boys until 1980 mostly in the 
construction sector. Five years later the situation changed; most families with migrant children 
informed that the boys work as street sellers, mechanics, washing cars, etc., that is, in the 
informal sector.
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significant for the household income (only 6.5 per cent of households stated that 
they had received some money from emigrant members).
On the other hand, migration has resulted in labour scarcity in the region, 
causing problems for large enterprises such as sugar-mills24 and “fazendas”, as 
well as for small farms. The defection of one member to seek work permanently 
outside is likely to have serious consequences for the viability of the household 
unit. Sometimes the migration of family members and fragmentation of the 
economic enterprise undermines its basis as a unit of production. It is, therefore, 
not surprising to find small farms cultivated by wage labours or sharecroppers 
while the proprietors are still living in the area, since their children have left to 
seek a better life. Thus, migrants are seen to cause problems both in the places 
to which they go and in those they leave.
In this way, to stabilise rural areas and to solve urban problems are important 
reasons for the State's interest in giving support to small farms. The 
POLONORDESTE attempts to improve the level of per capita income and rural 
employment opportunities have aimed to prevent out migration, alleviating 
problems caused by the conditions of the over-crowded large cities. However, 
peasants have their own interests and they are aware of the local socio­
economic constraints and of the economic and educational opportunities which 
exist in urban centres. As is shown in table VI. 17, there was no change in the 
trend towards to increasing migrating patterns in the project area. The 
longitudinal data shows that the number of household members who emigrated 
in the 1980-1985 period, except in the category of micro farmers, is higher than
24 The specific characteristics of the cycles of production activities in Northern Agreste allows 
the availability of migrant seasonal labour for sugar cane production in the Mata zone, where 
they work as cane cutters. This is possible because the cane cutting season partly coincides with 
the dead season in the Agreste, or at least with activities that can be left to the women and 
children. Expedients such as temporary migration to sugar-cane region were an integral part of 
the survival of the Agreste household economy. Although husband's or son's wage labour was 
not enough to provide an attractive basis for the permanent migration of the whole family, it was 
generally sufficient to complement small-scale farming. However, with the deteriorating working 
conditions and low wages of the plantations it no longer appears attractive, even for temporary 
migration.
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in previous periods, demonstrating that the State failed in its attempts to prevent 
migration from the area.
TABLE V I.17 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: MIGRANTS BY PERIOD OF EMIGRATION AND SIZE 
CATEGORY OF FARMS (row percent), PANEL DATA, 1985.
1940/69 1970/74 1975/79 1980/85 Nl Total
(%)
Micro 13.0 21.8 28.8 26.5 9.8 215
Small 12.6 13.1 16.5 33.5 24.3
(100)
206
Medium 11.3 16.9 21.0 34.9 15.9
(100)
195
Large 50.0 5.9 5.9 5.9 32.4
(100)
34
(100)
Total 14.3 16.7 21.4 30.2 17.4 650
(100)
Source: POLONORDESTE /  PIMES-UFPE Surveys
4.4. Education, Social Mobility and Urbanisation
Education formed one of the important aspects of POLONORDESTE policy. 
Education and agricultural modernization are seen to go hand-in-hand and as 
such it is an indespensible basis for rural development. Education however has 
also a potentially negative aspect in that, for the well educated, rural life comes 
to seen negatively against the attractions of the city. Education policy therefore 
can result in consequences which were entirely unintended by the State.
According to Cavalcanti (1982:229), education is one of the survival strategies 
used by households which has ambiguous implications for their "peasant" 
status. The consideration of education also shows the extent to which the 
State's presence in the area is shaping peasant survival strategies. As the main 
supplier of non-agricultural jobs in small towns and rural areas of the North-East, 
the State employs the majority of non-agricultural workers with certain level of 
education and parents educate children to get these jobs.
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Most parents have little formal education and employ all their efforts to have 
children educated, because education is considered a mechanism through 
which living standards can be raised. When farming households can afford to 
have wage-labour, they send children to school. As a result, children have 
received more education than their parents, as shown in table VI. 18. While 44.2 
per cent of parents are illiterate and 33.3 per cent have not completed primary 
education, 29.2 per cent of their children have completed primary school, 4.8 
per cent of them have carried on studying through secondary school, leading in 
1.2 per cent of cases, to a university degree. Migrant children are slightly better 
educated than resident children. Their indices of illiteracy are lower and they are 
provided with more years of education.
TABLE V I.18 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: PARENTS’ AND CHILDRENS’ EDUCATIONAL LEVEL 
(column percent). PANEL DATA, 1985.
Educational Parents Resident Migrant
Level Children Children
Illiterate 44.2 19.1 16.4
Incomplete Prim. 33.3 43.5 34.9
School
Complete Prim. 12.0 15.5 27.5
School
2nd Phase of 1st 5.0 13.8 9.6
Degree
Secondary School 1.1 4.8 4.9
University 0.2 1.2 2.8
Nl 4.2 1.8 3.9
Total 475 880 636
(%) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
Education is a strategy which is used by smaller and larger households 
simultaneously (Cavalcanti, 1982:234). When they do not have land or own just 
a small plot, education is an instrument to be mastered to get better job 
opportunities in nearby towns or when children migrate. The daughter may be a
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teacher in the local school or a civil servant. Families with the largest 
landholdings provide their children with more years of education. Because there 
is no certainty about the future, their children were prepared to have a non- 
agricultural occupation, and thus, it is worth providing them with education.
The benefits which the peasant families can get from education are perceived as 
extremely important. If their children remain to get a living from agriculture, an 
education will prepare them to better understand the functioning of bureaucratic, 
commercial and financial organisations. Their continual contact with these 
organisations has shown them that better educated people have access to the 
opportunities provided by those bodies. Education is also perceived as an 
important means of getting better jobs if they move out of the area. They know, 
through contacts with migrants, of the need to be skilled workers or to have a 
profession before migrating in order to get a better position in the big cities.
They know that migration is a sort of ritual to be performed sooner or later by 
some of their children.
In an earlier study, I analysed the value placed on the school by parents living in 
rural areas. The main question was: why, for them, was children's schooling 
important? I arranged their answers into four main groups: Firstly, schooling 
makes their children literate and numerate and this makes life easier. For them, 
"it is disgraceful to be illiterate". This was also related to the possibility of 
children voting. Until recently in Brazil, participation in the electoral process was 
restricted to literate people. Secondly, the school provides the knowledge 
necessary that everyone needs to face life. For them, a better educated person 
is more able to solve any kind of problem. Thirdly, schooling is important 
because it skills children for better jobs and, consequently, for earning a living. 
This view implies a negation of the rural way of life and high status of urban 
jobs; and, lastly, education is seen as good in itself. When speaking about the 
value of formal education, parents say that "education is the best legacy that the 
parents can give to the children", or that "education is a kind of inheritance that
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parents can give to their children and this legacy will never come to an end" 
(Fonte, 1982:51-54).
Parents' aspirations about the education of their children reveal that they 
perceive education as a means through which social mobility may occur. 
Education is an important device for mobility, and it has been used by local 
populations to get jobs which the State creates. Increasing numbers of schools 
require, as a consequence, more jobs in the education sector as well as in other 
sectors. The fact that, in most of the small municipios, the State is the main 
employer makes the population more dependent on the State, as well as on the 
political mechanisms operating locally.
Although since 1969 the Brazilian Constitution guarantees that every child will 
receive schooling from the age of seven to fourteen, this is rarely achieved, 
especially in rural areas. Table VI. 19 presents data on the schooling situation of 
school age children in 1980 and 1985. The data show that there were some 
improvements in schooling: the percentage of illiterate children was reduced 
from 15.9 to 7.1 per cent and the number of children attending school increased 
from 73.2 to 82.9 per cent25. Aiming to improve the level of education of the rural 
population, the POLONORDESTE included education among its main lines of 
action. The Project increased the number of classes by building schools, 
providing specialised courses for teachers and providing complements to 
teachers salaries. Targets for school construction, repair, equipment and 
teacher training were exceeded. This was attributed to the performance of the 
State Secretariat of Education, in spite of the problems of late release of 
budgeted counterpart funds. As with health, the staffing of project schools 
depended on teachers trained in the community. Because the low salary level, 
only very poorly trained local people are likely to be available as teachers. 
Teachers have often only finished second grade themselves.
25 According to data from the Demographic Census of 1980 and Secretariat of Education 
estimates, the rate of schooling among children (between 7 and 14 years old), for the Northern 
Agreste as a whole, was 70.8 per cent (PIMES, 1980).
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TABLE VI.19 - NORTHERN AGRESTE: SCHOOL SITUATION OF CHILDREN BETWEEN 7
AND 14 YEARS OLD (column percent). PANEL DATA, 1980/1985.
School Situation 1980 1985
Illiterate 15.9 7.1
Attending 73.2 82.9
Leave 10.9 7.1
Total 459 339
(%) (100.0) (100.0)
Source: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Survey
If physical targets were met through the construction of schools and though 
service delivered may have flourished for a few years, just as for health posts, 
Tendler (1988:22) states that, "the usual problems of flagging political interest 
and severely reduced operating funds for salaries and supplies ultimately 
undermined these activities". In fact, in education, low teacher salaries, the low 
educational levels of teachers, apart from the use of political criteria for hiring 
and firing teachers, created insuperable obstacles to improving schooling. 
Nevertheless, many people felt that the project had made a good start in 
improving educational opportunities open to rural people. However, the 
emphasis was in the formal education of children and not in professional or 
adult vocational education "to improve labour productivity".
Municipal governments are obliged to provide first degree schools but they are 
very often unable to maintain teaching at the appropriate quantitative and 
qualitative levels. State governments are responsible for providing secondary 
education. They also provide some primary schools, but rarely in the small 
municipios and rural areas. Teachers in the Municipal Schools do not normally 
complete the first phase of primary education, whereas the State school 
teachers have completed the secondary school and some of them have a 
degree or are doing a University course. A teacher's salary is generally very
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poor, but the municipal teacher receives worse remuneration than that of the 
state teacher.
To a certain extent, the perception of the positive contributions of project health 
and education components suggests, as Tendler points out (1988:23), "that 
something was better than nothing." Though the judgements in favour of health 
and education may not reflect upon the quality of implementation of these 
components, they nevertheless are consistent with the findings that education 
and health, when they are supplied, are "more beneficial and accessible to 
[rural] poor than credit and other agricultural services" as stated in a Bank 
assessment of the North-East projects (World Bank, 1983:58).
State educational policy has received the strongest support from the local 
population since it fits in well with survival strategies already used by peasants. 
The first time that children go to school (normally between seven and ten years 
old) coincides with their entry into agricultural work. Therefore, they are part- 
time peasants and part-time students. However, schools in rural areas often do 
not go further than the fourth year (the first phase of the first stage - “Primeiro 
Grau”-which corresponds to the former "primary school"). To finish the second 
phase of the first stage (which takes four more years) they must go to large 
villages or to the nearest towns. Secondary school only exists in towns (sede de 
municipios), and only better-off farmers can afford to send their children to them.
5. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss socio-economic and political effects 
of State action at local level. How did public policy choices affect private 
choices? Or, more specifically, how did small farms respond to the alternatives 
created by State intervention in Northern Agreste region? Some of the main 
conclusions about the cumulative social impact at local level, which will be
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discussed in the following section, are to be regarded as tentative answers to 
these questions.
The IRDP-AS-PE, like other Integrated Rural Development Projects, benefited 
some rural dwellers but, as pointed out by Grindle (1986:188-189), it has done 
so at the expense of more penetration of the State in rural areas and an 
increase in the State's capacity to co-opt and diffuse demands made by the rural 
poor. At the local level, bureaucracy constitutes one of the main structures 
linking State and village. In this way, this State's presence maintains the 
peasantry and controls it. Furthermore, trough the conferring of divisible and 
particular benefits, the State allowed peasants to seek public policies as a 
matter of personal self-interest. The Sate bureaucracy created grateful clients -  
people who own their special fortunes to public officials who choose them, from 
among competing claimants, for privileged access to resources and 
improvements. This is clear in the case of POLONORDESTE where, as we have 
seen, state employment and patronage strengthened clientelist relations. As 
Bates puts it, “State intervention, excess demand and the conferral of privileges 
are part of the political process by which public programmes create vested 
interests in rural development policies” (Bates, 1981: 99).
The choice of policy type determines the conditions of individual choice in the 
face of public authority. “Distributive policies” (including credit, irrigation 
facilities, dams, transportation infrastructure, education and health services, 
etc.) frequently provide benefits to group of recipients at little cost to 
themselves. These policies are the mainstay of patronage politics because they 
make benefits available generally to the population. Although the benefits of 
distributive policies are freely available to the target population, the resources 
are scarce to society and thus became exceptionally valuable to beneficiaries. In 
this way it is not surprising that individuals attempt to appropriate these benefits 
to themselves. Usually this is done by controlling the intermediary institutions 
that distribute the benefits. As we saw in the case of the Northern Agreste 
region, the weakening of peasant organisations, which was a consequence of
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patronage, inevitably lead to an individual rather than collective response to the 
opportunity structures created by the State. Thus, peasants were more 
interested in securing individual livelihood than acting collectively to defend their 
common interests.
While there is no doubt about the political utility of the programme in helping the 
government in power to organise political support in the countryside, the socio­
economic consequences of State policy, as we have seen, were ambiguous. On 
the one hand, state intervention through POLONORDESTE favoured small 
farmers at the expense of the traditional landed elite. State intervention provided 
to the small farm sector access to technology, capital, market facilities and 
infrastructure, resources which historically have been appropriated by the large 
farm sector. On the other hand, the implementation of the agricultural 
components of the project selected as a main beneficiary that group of small 
farmers with a sufficiently high resource endowment, especially land, to respond 
to incentives to increase their marketed surplus. It seems that the project 
became primarily a production strategy in which the principal objective was to 
reinforce the productive role of the small-farm sector within the overall economy, 
rather than to improve the income position of the small-farm household as a 
whole.
Although the case of the Northern Agreste project suggests that it was possible 
to improve the economic conditions of small farmers or even of households 
whose only access to land was through sharecropping or rental arrangements, 
this was more problematic than focusing on households with "adequate" and 
“titled” landholdings. The project's failure to solve the problem of shortage of 
land in the small farm sector allowed the maintenance of a basic obstacle to the 
intergenerational reconstitution of small-farm households as full-time family 
farms. As we have seen, the intergenerational reconstitution of small-farm 
households as full-time family farmers could only be accomplished through land 
reform or a strong employment-generating national development strategy that 
draws large numbers of people out of the rural sector. In the context of the
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overall scarcity of employment opportunities outside the peasant sector and of 
land in that sector, and given the limited income gains that can be obtained per 
hectare, low-cost credit, market expansion and technological innovation seems 
to be insufficient to enable several small farm households to remain as full-time 
family farmers or to reduce their poverty26. Nevertheless, peasants have been 
able to cope with this constraint and, as we have seen, they used diversified 
strategies which contributed towards their continuity.
There is empirical evidence of the erosion in the traditional forms of labour use, 
such as moradores or sharecroppers and that agrarian capitalist relations of 
production are highly extended among the landowing population. This 
capitalisation of the relations of production is marked by the fact that the labour 
force provided by temporary workers greatly exceeds that of permanent labour. 
However, when access to land and other resources is limited to sell their labour 
in the local labour market is one strategy used by the group of small producers 
as a whole. To these salaried workers, some of them household farms with 
insufficient land or other means of production for family needs, project impacts 
were related only to a probable increase in employment opportunities and 
access to collective goods such as education and health provided to some 
villages. The State had stimulated the creation of new jobs, permitting some 
farm households to diversify their survival strategies, for instance, by taking 
advantage of new opportunities for off-farm income. This participation in the 
labour market plays an important role in dampening fluctuation in income - 
fluctuation which frequently undermine the livelihood of small farmers in the long 
run.
The main strategy used by small farmers to strike a balance between family 
membership and size of land holding and also to complement household 
income, is migration. This survival strategy is contrary to the State's interest in 
preventing out-migration. Another main survival strategy, which is used by
26 These results are similar to those observed by Reinhardt (1987,1988), in the case study of 
modernisation strategies in a Colombian peasant community.
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smaller and larger farmers, is the education of their children. If they remain 
agriculturalists, education will prepare them to better understand the functioning 
of bureaucratic, commercial and financial organisations. If they emigrate, 
education is an important instrument to get better job opportunities. State 
intervention in rural area was expanding new employment opportunities within 
its various local agencies and in the educational sector. And parents educated 
their children to get the jobs which the State creates. Thus, the State's 
educational policy fits in well with survival strategies already used by peasants.
Overall therefore we can conclude that the case study of a POLONORDESTE’s 
project implementation and outcomes seems to confirm some of the main 
arguments of new institutionalism. In the light of this view development studies 
must deconstruct the notion of intervention as one involving active and rational 
States and passive, and maybe recalcitrant recipients and grant that intervention 
is itself a drawn-out and complex social process involving many agents. These 
agents must be seen as having their own understanding of their situation, their 
own expectation of change, and their own strategies for securing such 
objectives. The central concern of such an approach to development studies is 
with the exchange between structures and agents: in particular the ways in 
which agents make up their social worlds in routine process of social life. This 
implies a greater recognition of cultural-institutional diversity and recognises 
not only the rationale for the conservative or predatory behaviour which inhibits 
reform, but also the possibility of positive change resulting from a range of 
individual actions.
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Plate 1. A POLONORDESTE Health Post in a Northern Agreste 
v illa g e
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Plate 2. Supply of Water in a Northern Agreste village with 
POLONORDESTE resources
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Plate 3. A small Dam constructed with POLONORDESTE 
resources in the Northern Agreste
Plate 4. A feeder road constructed with POLONORDESTE 
resources linking a Northern Agreste village to the town 
cen tre
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Plate 5. An artisan cooperative supported by POLONORDESTE 
resources
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CHAPTER VII - CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS FROM THE 
NORTHERN AGRESTE PROJECT
1. Introduction
This thesis began by noting the limited attention paid by studies of rural 
development programmes to the way national and local political and institutional 
environment shape State intervention and its role in agrarian development. The 
basic aim of the thesis is to highlight a critical issue underpinning the policy­
making process that is; the State as a social phenomenon, its role and limits in 
the management of reforms and the role of intervening agents in shaping the 
outcomes of State intervention. This conclusion summarises the main findings of 
the study and returns to the theoretical issues to which I referred in Chapter II.
The analytical model adopted in this thesis is the new institutionalism approach 
in development theory1. This approach retains the rational choice neo-classical 
axioms of methodological individualism and rational utility maximisation. Under 
the rational choice approach the State is analysed as an arena in which 
outcomes result from the pursuit of rational interest by individual politicians, 
bureaucrats and others actors. Nevertheless, new institutionalism emphasises 
the institutional context within which individuals’ preferences are determined. 
Here individual and social rationality need not correspond, creating situations 
where power can be systematically used for private gain, and dominant social 
groups will support autocratic or predatory institutional arrangements. The core 
argument of new institutionalism is that institutions provide the mechanisms 
whereby rational individuals can transcend the tensions between individual and 
social rationality. Since the State is a central part of the institutional complex, 
given its capacity to stabilise or transform institutions, it has a pivotal role in 
determining the path of development. However, it is argued that the capacity of
1 1mportant contributions to an assessment of the new institutionalism are offered by Harriss, 
Hunter and Lewis (1995) and Ostrom, Feeny and Picht (1988).
the State to promote equitable development depends upon the nature of the 
States own institutions.
Applying this theoretical perspective to agrarian problems and to the question 
of State policy leads to a fuller appreciation of the complexities of the 
intervention processes. It emphasises the theoretical importance of considering 
differential responses and outcomes to intervention, and exposes the 
limitations of highly generalised models. It points to the need to examine how 
policy is transformed during the process of implementation and stresses the 
value of undertaking case studies of the social impact of particular forms of 
State intervention at the national and local levels. New Institutionalism, rather 
than insisting on one identical projection for the economic role of the State in all 
developing countries, seeks to incorporate in its analysis the historical context 
in which the State and its policies are situated. It also highlight the primacy of 
politics as a central determinant in the development path that is followed2.
This argument is illustrated through the analysis of a case study of policymaking, 
implementation and outcomes of the Integrated Rural Development Project in the 
Northern Agreste region of Pernambuco state. Although this study is restricted to 
a relatively small geographical area involving a project within the larger 
Programme for the Development of the Integrated Areas of North-East, it 
provides us with a number of findings which can be further analysed in terms of 
their theoretical and practical implications.
In this conclusion, I put together the main findings of the thesis in relation to the 
following points: first, how pre-existing political and institutional environments
2 The new institutionalists recognise that the creation of economic institutions takes place not on 
the market level but rather within the political arena, in which some are endowed with greater 
power than other. The image here, as put outs Bates (1995: 42), “is that of economic actors, 
frustrated in their efforts to transact in markets, structuring non-markets institutions that will 
enable them to transcend their dilemma and thereby attain welfare-enhancing outcomes." The 
fact is that non-market institutions are often created in the legislature or by economic actors who 
anticipate the appeal of others in such political arenas. The Sate has a particular importance in 
setting and enforcing property rights, contract law and regulating production and exchange of 
commodities and other economic institutions.
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shape the strategic political motivations of policy-makers and the policy process; 
second, the importance of the local institutional environment and actors -  both 
public and private -  in shaping the economic and political outcomes of a rural 
development policy. Finally, I will discuss the long term limitations of the 
programme approach for solving problems of small scale agriculture and rural 
poverty and draw out some policy implications for State intervention in rural 
development.
2. Policymaking and Implementation: The Institutional Environment and the 
“Rules of the Game”
Though the axioms of methodological individualism and rational utility 
maximisation appear to be useful in illuminating certain kinds of political 
behaviour, new institutionalism emphasises the importance of the institutional 
context by reason of its key role in determining the way in which individuals’ 
preferences aggregate into social outcome. With this renewed emphasis on 
social structure, the institutions of political life are no longer seen merely as a 
set of constraints within which individual politicians and bureaucratics rationally 
maximise their utility. It is the institutional environment that defines “the rules of 
the g a m e which determine the values of outcomes which can be sought by 
alternative courses of action” (Bates, 1993: 140). Thus, to explain the direction 
of the major rural development programme implemented by the Brazilian State 
under the military government I had to begin with a description of the political 
and institutional environments in which the policy process takes place.
I shown in chapter III how centralised and relatively autonomous State framed 
the policy process under the first phase of the Brazilian military regime. Because
3 According to North (1995: 23), institutions determines the rules of the game of a society, or 
more precisely, they “... are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction". 
Nicholson (1988: 4) states that "institutions affect human choice by influencing the availability of 
information and resources, by shaping incentives, and by establishing the basic rules of social 
transactions.”
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the military came to power in 1964 with the declared intention of rooting out 
"corrupt" old-style politicians who had relied on patronage to build and maintain 
political support, and instituting "rational government and policy-making", to the 
exclusion of particularistic considerations, predictions were common in the early 
years of military government that the last remnants of clientelism would soon be 
swept away (Cammack, 1982:54). However, during the ‘democratising’ period 
(1974-1985), the influence of the technocrats declined and the military began to 
cultivate its regional and social bases more systematically. Although the 
bureaucracy continued to retain a central role in the policymaking process it also 
became an instrument of co-optation and a source of patronage.
As was shown in chapter III, the POLONORDESTE was launched in 1974, within 
the policy guidelines of the II PND, as one of the efforts made by the military 
government to deal with two of the biggest problems of North-East rural areas: 
poverty and lack of agricultural modernisation. The strategic political motivations 
of policy-makers at national level were clear. If successful, the programme could 
be used to argue that the military regime's economic model was accessible to all 
classes and was an apt vehicle for social as well as economic development. 
Thus, a successful rural development programme for the North-East would be 
especially effective in the military’s search for legitimacy, as it could be used 
both as a response to national and international criticism and as an affirmation of 
the regime’s superiority over previous governments.
Frequently, however, the resources that political elites needed to achieve their 
ideological and economic goals are also the resources they needed for building 
and maintaining political support. The electoral support from North-East political 
elites was of great significance for maintaining the appearance of government 
majority at state and federal level, in the electoral cycles of 1978 and 19824. This 
period coincided with the elaboration and implementation of POLONORDESTE
4 In fact, as Hoefle (1985: 27) argues, the small-town politics of the country were of great 
significance for maintaining the military regime in power. In 1978 and 1982 elections, the interior 
votes outweighed the votes of the capitals, and the North-East with its numerous small states 
helped maintain the appearance of a government majority at the state and federal level.
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and this fact is important to explain its outcomes. The changed political 
atmosphere during the ‘democratising’ period led politicians to start courting 
directly the large rural constituency in the North-East -  in place of indirectly 
through programmes and subsidies benefiting powerful landowners who, in turn, 
could deliver the votes to their large captive peasants. But, because of the lack 
of political mobilisation of the target population for effective demand making, 
their capacity to benefit from government policy rested on the congruence 
between their needs with the predominant economic and political government 
goals.
As was shown in chapter IV, most of the components included in the project 
shared characteristics that made them politically appealing, especially to the 
political rulers wanting to show their constituency that they were concerned 
about poverty. Elected local and state level leaders - the governor, legislators 
and mayors - who increasingly viewed small farmers as an important 
constituency, were the most influential proponents of project implementation. As 
policy moved from the high policy planning stage into operation, and investments 
were made and allocated in a specific spatial context, the primacy of the 
governors and local politicians as the key political actors within the states 
appeared and influenced policy outcomes.
In short, the evidence provided by the analysis of project implementation 
(chapter IV) suggests that, even in more centralised regimes, the policy process 
typically takes place in a number of different arenas and channels. Public policy 
ideologically shaped by elite orientation is altered in the process of 
implementation as it encounters a reality that is hard to control - for example, 
resource constraints and limited capacities of the local bureaucracy or 
resistance of the target population. The empirical evidence seems to show that 
ideology and technocracy are most evident at the level of goal-setting and in the 
planning process, while interests politics and patronage are most evident in the 
capture of "projects" and in the shaping of day-to-day administration and 
implementation. This seems to indicate that central States often have more
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autonomy to plan policies than to implement programmes. Nevertheless, it was 
during implementation and in the actual distribution of State resources at micro­
social level that the disparity between declarations of intent by State leaders at 
national level with what was done at local level has been most evident. This 
leads us to suggest that, once the political decision to reform is taken, issues 
surrounding implementation constitutes a major determinant in the fate of 
reforms.
Our analysis of project implementation (in chapter IV) seems to indicate that it 
was the political interests of elites at all government levels and their lack of a 
real commitment to the target population or the aims of the programme which led 
to a major source of bureaucratic ills: the failure of political leadership to provide 
proper direction to the bureaucracy. In fact, as we have seen, politicians do not 
delegate to technocrats control over policy making and the power of implement 
reforms. The technocratic approach -  in which the bureaucracy and policy­
making apparatus are the focus for explaining policy outcomes -  therefore fails 
to accord with the political reality captured in this case study. Moreover, the 
policy process did not fit into the kind of planning or command and control 
process implicit in State centred theories. Interests group theory -  which 
provides a far more decentralised conception of politics - offers a commonly 
employed alternative. However, one clear finding in our case study is the 
degree to which the intervention of interests groups fails to account either for the 
initiation of the policy or for its implementation.
It also become clear how political power and political institutions shape 
development policies. The choices made in the policy process reflect neither the 
free play of markets forces nor popular political choice, but rather the sometimes 
conflicting purpose of political elites. State elites have ideological and economic 
goals which are shaped by a set of factors which form the environmental context 
and circumstances within decisions are made. But they also have personal goals 
and want to remain in power, and they manipulate State resources to secure
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their political goals5. The policies they choose may therefore represent optimal 
solutions to political problems. As Bates (1988: 244) points out,
“A major reason why politically rational choices are not economically optimal is that 
expenditures that represent economic costs might well be regarded by politicians as 
political benefits”.
This leads closer to the core problem which is the political origins of economic 
development There is a tradition in political science that posits that political 
entrepreneurs are driven by the desire for power in the same way that economic 
entrepreneurs are driven by the desire for wealth (Lasswell, 1960: ch. 13)6. 
Because politicians want power, they are more concerned with using public 
resources in a way that is politically useful than they are with using them in a 
way that is economically efficient. However, a key determinant in the behaviour 
of politicians is the structure of political institutions and the rules governing 
elections. In electoral systems, numbers count; political incentives induces 
efforts by politicians to secure majorities; and politicians will defend policies that 
favour the numerous small at the expense of the ‘national interests’7. Therefore, 
the approach that is required to explain the outcomes of the POLONORDESTE 
is one that looks at this rural development policy as part of the whole 
mechanisms employed by government in its efforts to secure political control 
over the rural population and thus remain in power. This is not to say that the 
effects of public policy are inevitably negative, but that, to the extent that those 
policies are determined by nonmarket forces, they have the potential for 
becoming increasingly distorting in the absence of careful monitoring and control 
of policy measures.
5 As Bates (1983:146) stressed, "politicians ... selected economic policies not out of a regard for 
their economic merits but out of a regard for their political utility; economic inefficiency ... can be 
politically useful".
6 Cited by Nicholson (1988: 29).
7 This is a crucial argument developed by Bates (1995) to show “the necessity of embedding the 
new institutionalism within the study of politics”.
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3. The Outcome: Private Solutions to Collective Problems
The data concerning Northern Agreste farmers analysed in this thesis has 
shown that, although the weak political organisation of the peasantry made the 
programme vulnerable to manipulation by political interests at all government 
levels, there is no reason to automatically assume a negative relationship 
between State involvement and small-scale agricultural production8 Rural 
development policies promoted for political reasons could also be important 
instruments for improving the social and economic life of rural societies. 
Therefore, if is true that the outcomes of State intervention are also influenced 
by choices of local level actors, we cannot ignore the crucial role of the State in 
the agrarian processes through its influence on key economic institutions in the 
rural sector9. It appears likely that a multilevel approach, in which public choices 
interact with individual choices, has a considerable potential to explain outcomes 
of State policies.
3.1. Economic Outcomes: Some consequences of Risk Aversion
To understand how peasants respond to State intervention it is important to 
understand peasant rationality. As we have seen throughout chapter V  and VI, 
there is evidence that Northern Agreste peasants are not as adverse to change 
as sometimes appears, but they do estimate their possibilities of success and 
they try to avoid risks as much as they can. They calculate the costs and risks 
involved in the process of getting loans from banks, in the adoption of new crops 
or technology, and they play an active role in selectively using it according to
8 That is why Fenichel and Smith (1992:1323) suggest that, "when judging economic rates of 
return, sunk costs for political overheads should be excluded from the analysis". The separation 
of productive costs from political costs is difficult but such a division makes possible an 
assessment of the economic or social efficiency of particular investments
9 Here I am using the concept of economic institutions given by Hoff, Braverman and Stiglitz 
(1993:1), which mean “a public system of rules that define the kinds of exchanges that can 
occur among individuals and that structure their incentives in exchange”. These includes markets 
and property rights, system of land tenure and other systems of exchanges that are determined 
by implicit contracts or social norms.
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their interests. Thus, there were some peasants who did not want to work 
according to the project's expectations. However, they recognise that 
modernisation is an important achievement and they have tried many different 
alternatives to improve living conditions.
“While peasants may be rational, responding to market forces, they are not fully 
informed about the consequences either of their actions, or the institutions 
through which they operate.” This in itself, according to Stiglitz (1989: 23), could 
provide part of the explanation “why institutional rearrangements that increase 
productivity are not adopted.” Although individual peasant families may be highly 
efficient -  even individually maximising -  when allocating their resources among 
various production activities, they pay far more attention to risk and uncertainty 
than free-markets economists presume10 Popkin (1988: 247) suggests that “the 
concern with risk means that improved insurance or welfare schemes may do as 
much to increase production as education or technology will.” The economic 
benefits of institutional solutions to these problems were ignored by most free- 
market economists.
The influx of capital provided by massive State intervention created opportunities 
for higher incomes, and some small farmers appear to have sought to exploit 
these opportunities. Therefore, as it was shown throughout chapters V and VI, 
there is some evidence that the causes of the relative success of small farmers 
in engaging in commercial farming might be linked to their access to rural credit, 
market expansion, the use of an effective extension service operating in some of 
the project areas or the adoption of more productive techniques. State 
intervention provided the small farm sector with access to technology, capital,
10 For market-oriented economists, development is a produce of efficiency and grow, and they 
are resistant to be interested in rural institutions other than the markets. Since economic forces 
naturally lead to development, lack of development can only be attributable to lack of resources 
or harmful government intervention. An example of the assumptions that market economists 
used in examining peasant agriculture is Shultz’s Transforming Traditional Agriculture, in which 
he emphasises the responsiveness of peasants to markets forces. For Shultz (1978: 5), the basic 
problem of farming in the developing countries is improper incentives for farmers. By adopting 
policies that confound the operation of markets, Third World governments undercut the 
productive potential of their farm population.
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market facilities and infrastructure, which historically have been appropriated by 
the large farm sector11. The State's credit and inputs have advanced the State's 
control over production decisions, while providing peasants with relatively cheap 
access to credit and inputs needed to stimulate intensification of production and 
to break the control of usurers over the village. Large farmers were excluded 
from most of the programme benefits because a project design that was of 
practical use mainly to small farmers. As a result the project did not follow the 
course of many untargeted agricultural policies, in which subsidised services 
and inputs has ended up largely in the hand of the landed elites.
As was shown in chapter V, the overall economic outcome of State agricultural 
intervention in the Northern Agreste region was mixed. Although the State 
largely failed to change the very low level of technology in the region, the 
adoption of technology became much more widespread among small farmers, 
probably, as a result of the extension of credit and technical advise available to 
them. There also was an increase in the gross agricultural output of small farms 
over the period of project implementation and the tendency was towards 
transformation from subsistence to commercial farming. As this chapter 
demonstrated, a large proportion of total agricultural production among the 
sampled farmers originated on farms under fifty hectares and this proportion 
increased along the project years. On the basis of the data analysed, we can 
assert that many small producers became quite integrated, supplying markets 
with food crops as well as with high-value crops. Their replication of the strategy 
used by large farmers, that is, the production of more lucrative crops, has show 
that, with their “own price” response, they were able to defend their incomes 
against the overall market conditions for food crops. Furthermore, they 
expanded the area devoted to crops and planted pasture, suggesting that a
11 A study of the adoption of agricultural practices by small farmers in the Brazilian state of 
Minas Gerais found that road access and the distance of the farm from the town were two of the 
most important factors in determining adoption by small farmers of high-value crops and 
productivity-increasing practices. Two other important determinants of adoption were the degree 
to which farmers marketed their food crops or produced cash crops, and tenancy arrangements. 
The role of information and learning in bringing about adoption was also significant; the 
cumulative number of visits to farmers by extension agents had a positive impact on adoption.
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more intensive use of land was taking place. This record is certainly not 
compatible with any generalised claim that the State is an obstacle to agrarian 
development.
Moreover, the data analysed in chapter V seems to indicate that State 
intervention has favoured small farmers at the expense of the traditional landed 
elite. As was shown, the tendency towards declining average farm size and the 
increase in the proportion of micro production units did not involve fragmentation 
of "minifunfundium" farms themselves. On the contrary, they increased their 
average area and there was a clear trend in the direction of reduction of 
farmland operated by medium and large farms. The availability of capital items 
by categories of farm gave us a rough indication of the development of 
productive forces and of farmers' investment patterns in structures, equipment 
and animals. Despite a pattern of ownership biased against smaller farmers, 
according to the indicators chosen, small producers have prospered, relatively 
speaking, compared with larger farmers.
Nevertheless, not all aspects of the changes among small farmers were 
equitable. There are at least two major groups among small farmers in the 
region: those who have secure possession of enough land to allow, with 
provision of agricultural inputs, an on-farm income sufficient to give reasonable 
livelihood to the household; and those household whose holdings are so small 
and insecure that the project's provision of low-cost credit, market expansion 
and technological innovation and so on, seems to have been insufficient to 
enable them to avoid rural proletarianization or to reduce their poverty. Those 
small farmers, who make up the higher peasant strata in the region, are those 
who already have some capital and the possibility of accumulating more. It can 
be assumed that it was this group of "enterprising" small farmers who benefited 
from the State's policy to stimulate growth in marketed agricultural output, who 
has at the same time become dependent on State-sponsored programmes.
The Minas Gerais findings give only a secondary role to farm size as a determinant of adoption
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As shown in chapter VI, that the main problem of the State's modernisation 
strategy was the large segment of landless rural population or some farmers 
without "adequate" landholdings or secure properties right in land that had been 
excluded by the project's agricultural components. To these wage labourers12 
and some household farms with insufficient or insecure land, or other means of 
production, project impacts were related only to a probable increase in 
employment opportunities and access to collective goods provided to some 
villages13. The non-interference in the structure of land-distribution, has as a 
consequence that fact that agricultural incentives were of little use to some 
peasants in the lower strata.
The atrophy of the land component in the project obstructed the most important 
factor shaping the extent and depth rural poverty in the region: the unequal 
distribution of stable access to land and the shortage of land in the family-farm 
sector. However, the project seems to have contributed to improving land titling 
services, assuring the legal rights on land of considerable number of smaller 
farmers. This political institution -  land rights -  is considered to be an important 
element in the development process because secure properties rights make it in 
the interests of private agents to act in ways that are socially beneficial. 
Accordingly, land without property rights will not be used efficiently. Farmers 
without secure lands rights may fail, for example to switch to permanent crops or
(Cited by Tendler, 1988: 20).
12 According to Harriss (1988: 292), the extent to which labourers are ignored in considerations of 
"rural development strategies" (and also in "studies of rural development") is "remarkable". 
Although international development agencies identify rural labours and marginal farmers as one 
of the targets groups requiring special programmes, their interests tend to be neglected or 
attempts are generally vague proposals concerned to rural works programmes.
13 There is some empirical evidence that, as Tendler (1988) suggests, social interventions tend 
to be more favourable to the poor because of the more public-good nature of education and 
health, while agricultural intervention tends to provide private-goods like credit and extension 
which can be captured disproportionately by specific groups of farms. Although political influence 
is important for defining locations, investments in infrastructure like roads, water supply and 
sanitation are likely to benefit everybody indiscriminately and its consumption could not limited to 
a particular group.
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to adopt new technologies (such as irrigation). They may underinvest in land, 
fearing that the returns to their investment may be appropriated by others14.
Shortage of land results both from fragmentation due to the inheritance process 
and also from the process so-called "pecuarizagao" (cattle) and the substitution 
of arable cultivation on large farms by permanent pasture. Increasing 
demographic pressure on existing lands causes households to diversify their 
economic activities. There are small markets in the urban peripheries, especially 
in the skilled production of ceramics, embroidered lace, ready-made articles of 
clothing (called "sulanca") in which some peasants themselves or members of 
their family are engaged. To complement the family budget, husbands and sons 
are also engaged in seasonal migration to plantations or larger urban centres. 
They supplement their income by becoming traders or, when they are vehicle 
owners, transporting people and commodities to and from the community. Thus, 
some peasants have been able to use diversified strategies which have 
contributed towards their continuity.
Despite the State's interest in preventing out-migration, the evidence provided 
throughout chapter VI shows that the main strategy used by small farmers to 
strike a balance between family membership and size of land holding and also to 
face their socio-economic constraints is migration to urban centres. Another 
main survival strategy, which is used by smaller and larger farmers, is the 
education of their children. For them, education is an instrument to be mastered 
to get better job opportunities in nearby towns or when children migrate. Thus, 
the State's educational policy fits in well with survival strategies already used by 
peasants.
14 Fenny’s (1988) study help us to understand why there is a demand for State intervention.
When people are certain that they will reap the rewards from the costs they incur, then they are 
willing to manage society’s resources in the economically most productive way.
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3.2. Political Outcomes: Impact on Clientelism and Collective Action
As was shown in chapter VI, an important nonagricultural impact of the project 
was the extension of the State’s physical presence in rural areas. To meet the 
project's objectives, State organisations have expanded the number of local 
offices, employees and degree of bureaucratisation and there was considerable 
investment offered to small holders. In increasing and creating new job 
opportunities, State intervention gave opportunities for off-farm income, 
reinforcing the existing peasant strategy of combining agricultural and non­
agricultural sources of income. As we have seen, the wider dispersal of services 
and growing access of the rural population to education and public health has 
made rural life more viable, and the gaps between towns and villages have 
narrowed. The State's presence has also pluralised power at the municipal level, 
breaking the former fusion of wealth and power in the hands of the local landed 
elite. Traditional patrons have been replaced by specific patrons operating from 
within positions of authority in official bureaucracies and organisations. At the 
local level, bureaucracy constitutes one of the main structures linking State and 
village.
Notwithstanding, by making the attainment of particular benefits - whether 
educational and health services for a community, or jobs or access to credit and 
extension services - the State has increased its control over the rural population. 
Furthermore, through the conferring of divisible and private benefits, the State 
allowed peasants to seek their individual interests and limited objectives15. State 
Patronage has helped to maintain rural poor divided and made mass 
mobilisation difficult. Distributive policies are the heart of patronage politics
15 This finding is consistent with Hirschman’s (1984: 98) observations about the character of 
authoritarian regimes during the sixties and seventies in Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Argentina. 
According to him, this major authoritarian wave “definitely attempted to defuse mass mobilisation 
and to turn the citizens into very private persons. In principle, the formation of co-operatives and 
other forms of collective action at the grassroots should be incompatible with the very structural 
requirements of those authoritarian regimes.” In authoritarian regimes the mass are demobilised 
to the greatest possible extent. As Hirschman (1984 :97) pointed out, “Demobilisation means 
privatisation: everyone is to be concerned exclusively with his own welfare and that of his 
immediate family".
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because they make benefits available generally to the population. However, 
because the resources are scarce to society they became remarkably valuable 
to individuals. Typically individuals try to appropriate these public goods to 
themselves by controlling the institutions and agencies that distribute the 
benefits. As a result, public policies remain for peasants a matter of personal 
self-interest. Therefore, rather than focusing their political energies on the 
collective interest or appealing for collective changes, peasants were, instead, 
focusing on the securing of private improvements or benefits.
Although this context accounts for the absence of organised peasant action in 
the face of their problems, I want to look at another explanation for the apparent 
inability of peasants to act together for their common good or for any end 
transcending the immediate material interest of their family. The individual's 
attachment to the family must be the starting place for an account of the 
Northern Agreste peasants political behaviour16. The hardships of their lives 
have forced them to devote almost all energy to their own survival. What this 
means is that they often opt for individual interests over common interests, and 
that they do not necessarily act to further their group or common interests. 
Therefore, it seems be correct to adopt Popkin's assumption (1979:31) that 
peasants are "primarily concerned with the welfare and security of self and 
family" and they will usually act in a "self-interested manner" when they take into 
account the likelihood of receiving the preferred outcomes "on the basis of 
individual actions".
Popkin (1979, 1988b) point out the difficulties of peasants to generate village 
insurance or welfare arrangements or to organise to supply public goods 
themselves. Certainly, all members of peasant societies would be better off 
where there irrigation, dams, roads, education, health services, etc. But, as
16 According to Bates (1995: 36), “families” constitutes the most strinking example of institutions 
that offer “generalised reciprocity”, that is “institutions in developing world in which people invest 
resources ... in a effort to create a general fund of goodwill that can subsequently be tapped 
should a specific need arise”. They became important in the absence of effective States, capable 
of providing public goods. See also Banfield (1965).
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Popkin (1988b) argues, rational actors find it in their interests not to contribute to 
the formation of such facilities. There is thus a central disjunction between the 
social good and individual rationality. To secure contributions to the formation of 
public goods people have to be organised. Thus, because Northern Agreste 
peasants lack formal organisation to act as a group, they were able only to find 
private alternatives to their common problems. However, it is within the context 
of State patronage and authoritarianism, allied to local factionalism, that the 
cautious participation of peasant in politics and in collective action must be 
understood17.
We accept that Northern Agreste peasants were making economically and 
political by rational choices given the situation in which they find themselves18. 
While peasants may, in many respects, be rational, responding positively to 
measures to raise market output to market forces, they are not fully informed 
about the consequences either of their actions, or of the institutions through 
which they operate. As Stiglitz (1989: 26) points out,
“individuals known more about the institutions and conventions with which they have 
lived than they know of others in which they might live. The consequence of change 
are thus uncertain, and risk aversion itself provides some impetus to the preservation 
of current institutions."
Thus, at the political level it seems more rational for peasants to request small 
scale benefits for themselves with politicians or bureaucratic officials, than to 
make efforts to exert powerful pressure through collective action which would 
threaten local or regional politicians or their agents. In all situations collective 
action involves risk and repression. Therefore, it is logically incorrect to equate 
intensity of need with the likelihood of collective response without considering 
the ability of individuals to gamble on an improvement in the status quo.
17 It should be noted here that this situation appears to confirm an important conclusion reached 
by North (1981: 31-32) in propounding his theory of the State. The main reason that individuals 
do not rebel against repressive regimes is that the perceived cost are extremely high, and while 
the potential benefits may also be very high, the chances of success are assumed to be very 
low.
18 The new institutionalism stresses the limited information available to different groups and 
diverse mental modelling of available information within distinct ideologies and cultures, which in 
turn generates their own institutional arrangements -  including also social organisations and 
social practices (Toye, 1995:62).
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4. Lessons from from the Northern Agreste Project: Political and Policy
Implications
In spite of the effectiveness of the Northern Agreste Integrated Rural 
Development Project in delivering some public goods and services to needy 
rural dwellers, the general economic results of the State’s attempts to modernise 
agriculture using POLONORDESTE as an instrument of intervention in rural 
areas fell far short of what was planned. These results leads us to point out a 
key problems facing the State intervention in rural development: efficiency and 
sustainability. Another related question is the importance of the participation of 
local actors in State initiatives to promote rural development.
4.1. The Residual Problems: Efficiency and Sustainability
Considering the amount of capital employed, the profits the State obtained from 
bringing these peasants to modernise was nearly nil. The surplus appropriated 
by the State in this process was easily consumed by the cost of administering 
the new services. Thus, in economic terms - in the form of services, credit and 
investment - the State was probably putting more into the small agriculture 
sector than it was extracting. As one former co-ordinator of the Evaluation Unit 
stated:
"Considering the volume of financial resources spent in the region, to say that nothing 
happened is absurd. Schools and health centres were built, roads were repaired, credit 
was given, technical assistance was granted. It is clear that the sum of these things has 
repercussions. However, if these repercussions are compared with the financial and 
intellectual effort that was made by the programme, it is ridiculous... “
Inefficiency occurs when the return on resources investment is low in 
comparison with a rate of return that could be possible obtained trough 
alternative investments or when the high expenses makes difficult to generate 
gains which could cover the costs of the project. As we have seen in chapter IV, 
large cumbersome bureaucracies had grown up to implement the programme. 
Because the key incentive in such bureaucracies was ostensible the expansion 
of services, performance was often weak and quality control, cost-effectiveness,
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and opportunity costs received little attention. Its was not uncommon that public 
agencies became over-capitalised, ignoring comparative advantage, and 
operating without concern for either production or costs market. This fact 
generates inefficiency, undermining the economic viability of the project.
Sustainability is the other major concern. In fact, we cannot say that the project 
brought long term improvement to small farmers in the region. When the money 
finished, the benefits ended. When POLONORDESTE disappeared, both 
technicians and farmers complained. As one technician of the Evaluation Unit 
said:
As an integrated rural development programme you look for the POLONORDESTE, and 
you do not find it... If you do research today on the producers of the area, perhaps, 
some will simply remember the logo. Others will remember POLONORDESTE as the 
health centre, or the school, or perhaps the road. In terms of the volume of resources 
that was spent much more should remain apart from half a dozen loose pieces."
Sustainability refers to the inability of the State to maintain the investments that 
have been made. For instance, rural road and water systems, and other 
infrastructure deteriorate because of lack of maintenance. However, the 
sustainability problem cannot be blamed on a preoccupation with artifacts rather 
than to human capital and institution-building. The community based 
investments particularly health care and primary education were probably 
sustainable. Tendler (1988: 22) posits that many villagers felt that, because of 
the POLORDESTE, there is
“... a kind of dormant potential in the village person who had been trained and worked as a 
health worker during that period, or the heath clinic sitting shut with its broken refrigerator, 
or the closed school building. Some talked nostalgically of the 'excitement' of that period -  
vaccinating all children, revising the school materials so that they reflected local condition, 
seeing the teachers respond well to in-service training."
The communities and technicians felt that they were now readier for mobilisation 
of this potential than before, as soon as an interested government come along 
and breathe life into the old buildings and trainees. However, extension as was 
delivered by the project was too expensive to be sustainable in the long-run. At 
the POLONORDESTE time extension salaries were attractive, staff were being
268
added, new vehicles and recurrent resources were freely available, and 
extension could clearly help farms by giving them access to cheap credit. 
Clearly, the credit programme, viewed as primarily a grant programme, was not 
sustainable. Subsidised credit could have a mixed of sustainability depending 
on the purpose for which the credit/grant was used. However, a valued 
“institutional achievement” was the change in the thinking of extension agents 
“that it was riot unprofessional to work with small farm agriculture” (Tendler, 
1988: 25)
Ironically, the governors were still complaining about the lack of long term 
improvements as a result of POLONORDESTE. At one level, they felt politically 
compelled to maintain the level of public sector employment and the 
bureaucracy strength that the World Bank funded programme allowed in the 
agricultural services and other State services. At another level, They felt that the 
State, as the leading provider of services, did not gain benefits in the long-run. 
As a Deputy Secretary of the Secretariat of Agriculture of Pernambuco State 
stated, “the State benefited in the same manner that the small farmer benefited. 
When the money finished, the benefits ended”.
4.2. A Missing Element: Beneficiary Participation
Much of the early sociology and anthropological literature focused on how the 
emergence of modern markets and more intrusive States tended to destroy the 
efficacy of the local community. As those institutions grew in strength, they 
undermined the values of reciprocity and ascriptive status on which these 
communities were organised. Thus, the local communities to lose even their 
ability to manage their own local affairs. This perception gave rise to two 
different schools of thought in the development literature. One placed emphasis 
on restoring the local community’s degree of control over its own fate. This has 
been variously described as “community development”, “decentralisation”, or 
“local participation”19. The second approach was to advance the new nation-
19 See Stdhrand Taylor(1981) and Chambers (1983).
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State as the appropriate vehicle for restoring social control over the economy 
and direction of change20. Neither of these solutions has been entirely 
successful. Both the national and local institutions are characterised by 
inefficiency and exploitation.
In short, the existing institutional context has neither the broad-based 
participation of the population in the process of choice, nor an institutional 
environment in which resources are allocated in socially efficient ways that 
facilitate development. Both the market and centralised political order permit 
“predatory elites” to create private opportunities that are beyond the control of 
local communities and existing institutions. Nor are “traditional” institutions 
immune from corruption. In fact, as Wynne (1988: ch 7) suggests, many of these 
local institutions were merely older versions of similarly predatory strategies. In 
fact, the character and contribution of local institutions depends to a great extent 
on the character of the broader regime within which they exist.
Nevertheless, there is a broad literature that argues that development projects 
frequently fail without provision of local participation. As a way of assuring that 
maintenance and operation of various kinds of rural development projects many 
government have recently turned to “beneficiary participation” or “users groups”. 
What is called “project sustainability is argued to be closely dependent upon, in 
the worlds of a World Bank reports (1984),
“fostering the development of grass roots organisations with salient qualities that are 
embedded in their growth and their relationship to project activities. Desirables qualities 
center on increasing assumption by beneficiaries responsibility for project activities during 
implementation, and especially following completion. Such responsibility is fostered by an 
increasing degree of autonomy and self reliance of the gross roots organisations, plus 
some form of decision-making input into project activities leading to a measure of control 
over the management of the project.”
20 See for instance the illiberism latent in a Leftwid (1995) paper. What is required to promote 
development in the Third World and elsewhere, Leftwid concludes, is not less State, but a better 
and strong development State that can pursue “market-friendly" policies in such way that even 
poor households are empowered to participate in development.
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What this means is that the World Bank believes that development programmes 
are more successful when services users or the affected community has been 
involved in consultation during project planning, direct participation on 
maintenance and monitoring. However, what type of rural organisation could be 
harnessed for promoting economic development more directly or how could this 
kind of organisation be induced in Northern Agreste or elsewhere in Brazil?
As it was shown in the previous chapters, In general, small farmers themselves 
were conspicuously absent as demanders in the project implementation. 
Although local level actors and institutions played important in shaping project 
results, it was unexpected because they were not included in the project design. 
It is true that State intervention changed what local actors would have done by 
themselves. Standing behind each local actor was a more centralised 
government agency -  offering financial incentives, providing technical 
assistance, infrastructure and social services. Nevertheless, a malfunctioning 
system of State control, based on distant authority which does not take into 
consideration local conditions, may be worse in terms of resource management 
and project sustainability than a strategy which aims to improve local systems of 
rules and collective organisation21. Thus, on the basis of the Northern Agreste 
experience it seems to be clear that long-term success of public policies 
directed at distribution of wealth and power is more difficult to achieve if people 
are not integrated into the decision-making and implementation process. As 
Tendler (1993: 1576) suggests, “the co-participation of local actors in more 
centralised initiatives can make the outcomes better than they would have been 
if the State had been working on its own”, because they had “a certain kind of 
experience, understanding of local markets and production systems”, besides an
21 The PAPP programme (Programa de Apoio ao Pequeno Produtor Rural), which replaced 
POLONORDESTE, included a new component - the community-participation fund (APCR). 
APCR is a grant fund, accounting for about 15%-20% of PAPP funding, whereby communities 
gain control over small investments projects - principally, “income-generating” projects like 
manioc flour mills, collective vegetable plots, input-supply stores, seed banks, and community 
laundries, but also including small works projects like roads and bridge repairs, etc. This 
decentralisation of decision-making with empowerment of beneficiary organisations gave new 
power to rural unions, co-operatives, church groups, and the local organisations (Tendler, 1988: 
2)
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intense desire for their community to prosper, that the State and central 
government agencies did not have.
Therefore, my understanding of what works better involves more than focusing 
on unidirectional movement from central initiatives to local, as occurs in much of 
decentralisation policy literature and advice. It requires, instead, a particular 
combination of central and local participation that changes the role of the State 
(regardless of if it reduces that role) to elicit a new form of local organisations 
and action. The State can help by providing the legal framework which make 
possible for local collective organisation to obtain enforceable recognition of 
their identity and rights within the society22. In addition, institutional 
arrangements which encourage mismanagement and waste must be replaced by 
other which force their managers to serve the public interest rather than their 
own.
Thus, if goals of rural development programmes are the creation of progressive 
structures and organisations, and not merely the diffusion of technology or the 
increase of production or productivity in agriculture and reinforcement of 
individual interests, they can serve as instruments of institutional change. The 
creation of progressive structures should produce a circle in which people 
recognise their social obligations because they can reliable expect others to do 
the same. The political process must be centred on the creation and 
enforcement of institutions to bridge the gap. Equity-enhancing success hinges 
on a long-term effort at institutional transformation, supported by a solid, wide- 
ranging socio-political organisation. This suggests that researchers, political 
activists and policy-makers also need to takes more seriously the role of social 
movements23 in general, and grassroots organisations24 in particular, in shaping 
public policies and their outcomes.
22 Development specialists “seeking a middle ground between the champions of the markets and 
the defenders of the State, finds in the new institutionalism a justification for basing development 
efforts on community and civil engagement” (Bates, 1995: 27).
23 See Alvarez and Escobar (1992). For a discussion on the main debates and issues in 
contemporary social movement theory see Foweraker (1995).
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In order for concerted action - and therefore sustainable economic and political 
development - to take place, it would not of course, be necessary that 
individualism be replaced by altruism. However, “rational self-interested” must 
transcend the short-term calculations of market theory, and recognise the 
collective obligations and self-sacrifice required to create the social movements 
which will campaign for institutions based on freedom and competition (Brett, 
1995). Rural development programmes that foment collective action can be also 
effective mechanisms in the creation of social articulation and mass-based 
democratic regimes. Only in this way can long-term effects of programmes on 
the distribution of wealth and power in society be considered.
I do not claim to have found the one true way. Rather, this concluding chapter 
should stimulate continuing efforts by development specialists to rethink the 
problems of choices confronting people in different parts of the contemporary 
world. I presume that individuals continually attempt, within the latitudes of 
choices available to them, to improve their conditions or to avoid more adverse 
conditions. The relevant normative criterion, however, is to take advantage of 
opportunities to improve welfare without doing so at the cost of others. How 
power relationship are arranged varies depending how political orders are 
constituted. The reintroduction of structures and institutions to the debate by 
new institutionalism is an invitation to inject into development studies a much 
richer understanding of politics.
24 See Hirschman (1984).
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APPENDIX ONE - METHODOLOGY AND SOURCE OF DATA
1. Introduction
A multi-faceted research approach is used in this study. Quantitative and 
qualitative studies have been seen as complementary to each other and an 
integrated approach to social science research methodology has been accepted 
as having the potential to provide more accurate findings. The research carried 
out in this thesis follows this methodology.
The collection of information on the implementation and achievements of the 
project was carried out through unstructured and semistructured interviews, 
participant observation and informal contacts at project management level and 
local level. At the same time, the archival sources of the project - initial 
diagnosis, evaluation and completion reports - and oral histories of participants 
served as instruments for the recovery of the social history of the project.
The method used to analyse the project's impacts at local level included a panel 
study with 340 household farmers located in six selected municipalities of the 
Northern Agreste. This panel study tried to establish the socio-economic 
situation of sampled households and the factors of production to which they had 
recourse at the beginning and at the end of the project period studied (1980-85).
The data for the panel study was provided by surveys carried out by the "PDRI- 
AS-PE Evaluation Unit". In the "Evaluation Unit" research design for "Impact 
Evaluation" of the Integrated Rural Development Project (PDRI-AS-PE) the data 
were collected at three points in time in a "rotating panel design". This is 
characterised by Van de Pol (1988:43) as "a hybrid of panel sample and 
repeated cross-sectional surveys" where, in the data collection of the repeated 
surveys, part of the sample remained the same and part was replaced. This 
methodology for data collection, thus, allowed myself to use a "Panel" research
design as a method for analysing change1. A panel design refers to a study 
where observations are collected for the same unit of analysis at two or more 
points in time. In this way, I selected a sub-sample of 340 farmers from these 
surveys, using as criteria the existence of the same farm household in both 
surveys.
The first and second surveys were carried out during the time that I was one of 
the members of a team working on the research project concerned with the 
evaluation of "effects and impacts" of the Northern Agreste Integrated Rural 
Development Project. The research team included mainly agricultural 
economists and myself as a sociologist (responsible mainly for the evaluation of 
the Education segment). All of us contributed to the design of the social and 
economic surveys, in which sampled householder farmers from the six 
municipalities were studied throughout the agricultural years of 1979/80, 81/82 
and 84/85. Some of the results of the two first surveys have been described in 
"Evaluation Reports" which have been referred to in this study. The final survey 
(84/85) and the data collected remained without being analysed and evaluated 
(inexplicably, no contract was entered into to cover the processing and analysis 
of the final survey).
In January and February 1992, before I began to write the final version of this 
study, I was fortunate enough to be able to return to the six municipalities of the 
sample and re-interviewed a small number of farmers sampled in the panel 
study. In these semi-structured interviews I collected some information that had 
previously been gathered in the surveys; I did this to test the validity of my data. 
However, the main purpose was to collect new information on rural-urban 
migrants, their residential, and employment histories. I solicited their political 
history and their history of involvement with project components - the 
cooperatives, rural credit, marketing and rural extension, etc - and their 
response to experiences as clients of the government. In addition to these 
interviews, I also carried out interviews with some politicians or local leaders and
1 The advantage of this method for analysing change is discussed by Kessler and Greenberg
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middlemen, focusing on the founding of local institutions and local disputes. 
Issues covered were local politics, the cooperative societies or other 
association, and the relationship between market services and the farmers.
Although short, the visit to the municipalities enabled me to collect these oral 
histories which gave me important new insights into the nature of the economic 
activities of the farmers and their relationship with the local powers and the state 
apparatus. All of these provided data which was extremely valuable in 
understanding the behaviour of rural people.
2. The Panel Sample Data2
The sample data used in the "panel" study came from the 
POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE surveys undertaken at two points in time: 1980 
and 1985. These surveys collected information about the previous agricultural 
year (1979 and 1984, respectively) in selected Municipios and Farms in two 
microregions of Pernambuco State - Agreste Setentrional and Vale do Ipojuca - 
situated in the Agreste Region3. Here the procedures followed in these surveys 
are described briefly.
The sample design was based on a cluster sampling approach according to 
which groups of farms were sampled within subregions which are differentiated 
in accordance with ecological and production patterns. The sampling required 
the categorization of municipios located in the project area (the primary sampling 
unit) by physiographic zones (ecological regions) and production patterns.
(1981).
2 The content of this section follows closely the description of methodology and sampling 
procedures given by 'Projeto de A valia^o do PDRI do Agreste Setentrional de Pernambuco', 
Diretrizes para as Pesquisas de Campo, vol. 4, anexo, 1980.
3 From 1989, a Resolution of the Brazilian Federal Government changed the division of Brazil 
into "mesoregions" and "microregions" and GI6ria do Goit£ is no longer considered to be
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2.1. The Selection of Municipios
The Agreste is a transitional zone between the Zona da Mata and Sertao and is 
characterized by diversity of landscape over short distances. It is almost the 
North-East in miniature, with very dry and very humid areas. Due to the diversity 
of ecological conditions there is differentiation in the composition of agricultural 
production, which is presumed to result also in great diversification in the social 
and economic organization of production. The municipalities selected as a 
sample in this study are supposed to represent the variations in ecological 
conditions and agricultural orientation among different agrarian sub-regions of 
Northern Agreste. Each of these sub-regions is made up of municipios which are 
the smallest administrative units in Brazil on which statistical information is 
available.
When the sample was defined the PDRI-AS-PE included 31 municipios4 
situated in the Agreste Region. The municipio was the administrative unit which 
served to define the sub-areas. The municipios of the project area were grouped 
in strata according to (1) their ecological characteristics, and (2) their production 
orientation. This classification resulted in the identification of five sub-regions.
A) 'Subsistence/Commercial Crop' system defines an economic transition zone 
between Mata and Agreste. Thus, sugar-cane is the important element in the 
economy of this sub-region. In this productive system manioc prevails, followed 
by a commercial crop (sugar cane and tobacco plants) and multicrops without 
individual economic importance whether at municipal level or regional level. This 
sub-region includes the municipios of Cha Grande, Feira Nova, Gloria do Goita 
and Pombos.
B) The complex 'Livestock/Cotton/Subsistence Crops', typical of the 
Northeastern Sertao, characterize this second sub-region. Although it has
pertaining to the Agreste Region. Now this municipality is considered to be part of the 
"Mesorregiao da Mata Pernambuco".
4 From the third year of project implementation was included more 5 municipalities. The 
municipalities included are Bom Jardim, Joao Alfredo, Machados, Orob6 and Sao Vicente 
Ferrer.
277
declined, the cotton, in general hybrid (herbaceous) but with some 
concentrations of perennial (arboreo), is still an important crop. The subsistence 
crops, especially maize, beans and broad beans (fava), are a peculiar feature of 
the cotton production system, as well as the extensive raising of livestock. 
According to the classification adopted, this zone includes the largest number of 
municipalities of the region of the project: Cachoeirinha, Cumaru, Frei 
Miguelinho, Jatauba, Limoeiro, Passira, Riacho das Almas, Santa Cruz do 
Capibaribe, Santa Maria do Cambuca, Salgadinho and Surubim. These 
municipalities, with the exception of Cachoeirinha correspond to a longitudinal 
strip in the north of the state of Pernambuco.
C) In the other half of the Agreste, in the central highway axle, the municipalities 
of Gravata, Bezerros, Caruaru, Sao Caetano, Toritama, Tacaimbo, Sao Bento do 
Una, Sanharo and Capoeiras are situated. They represented the 
'SubsistenceAJvestock' system, where manioc, maize, and beans are the 
predominant crops. Livestock is also an important component in this sub­
regional economy.
D) In the 'Industrial Multicrops' sub-region, vegetable production in general, and 
the tomatoes in particular, are important. Subsistence crops and livestock 
complement this productive system. This zone is composed by the municipalities 
of Alagoinha, Pesqueira and Pogao, situated in the extreme west.
E) The 'Food Multicrops' system represents the maximum degree of productive 
diversification of the Agreste. Besides cotton, manioc, corn, beans and 
vegetables it has important fruit-growing and some areas with coffee-growing. 
This zone comprises the municipalities of Belo Jardim, Brejo da Madre de Deus, 
Taquaritinga do Norte and Vertentes.
Each municipio was attributed a weight, as a measure of its economic size. One 
municipio from each of the five conglomerates was randomly selected. The 
criteria chosen as size measures were the following:
- The importance of small producers (<10 ha) in the municipio;
- The density of rural population in the municipio;
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- The area with agricultural crops by the total area of the municipio;
- The number of herds (livestock) as a measure of cattle raising process 
(pecuarizagao).
The indicators used for the construction of the sub-regions indicated that 
livestock is spread throughout the region, although with qualitative and 
quantitative differences among the municipios. For this reason, it was 
considered important for the representation of the region to define a sixth 
conglomerate, which represents mainly "livestock". For this sub-region, the 
municipios were classified according to their relative importance to cattle raising 
production in two respects: dairy cattle and cattle for slaughter. For the calculus 
of the probabilities, it was defined as a measure of the importance of municipal 
cattle raising in the Agreste region production.
F) The sixth sub-region, which represents mainly "livestock", includes the 
municipalities of Belo Jardim, Brejo da Madre de Deus, Cachoeirinha,
Capoeiras, Caruaru, Jatauba, Limoeiro, Pesqueira, Sanharo, Sao Bento do Una 
and Surubim.
The municipalities selected for sampling are represent, therefore, differentiated 
production systems, with specific patterns of use of material and human 
resources. Each municipio selected corresponds to one of the six sub-regions of 
Agreste (see Map 4) as shown in table 1.
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Table 1. MUNICIPIOS SELECTED BY PRODUCTION SYSTEM AND SUB-REGIONS
Sub-Regions Productions System Municipios selected
A Subsistence/Commercial Crop GI6ria do Goitd
B Livestock/Cotton/Subsistence Cumaru
C Subsistence/Livestock Capoeiras
D Industrial Multicrops Pog§o
E Food Multicrops Vertentes
F Livestock Caruaru
2.2. The Selection of Farms
Once the sample size was determined and allocated to ecological zones, the 
problem was to select the farms to be sampled. For the selection of the farms, 
four strata were defined with the aim of representing the large, medium, small 
and micro rural producers. The percentile participation of the number of 
producers in the strata over the total number of producers in the municipio was 
defined as a proportional standard of measurement.
Agricultural production occurs through the participation of two economic agents: 
producers and workers. For the purpose of the study the "Evaluation Unit" 
researchers defined producers as decision making economic agents, whether 
they partake directly in the productive process or not. Workers are those who, by 
means of payment or not, incorporate labour in the process of production.
In terms of access to the land, the producers were classified into two categories: 
proprietor producers and landless producers. Proprietor producers are those that 
have a guarantee by law of access to land, with an assured right in the decision 
about its utilization. In this group we can distinguish the micro, small, medium
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and large landowner. Landless producers are those who have access to the land 
by means of permission from a landowner. This access can be through:
a) payment in cash or goods, according to a pre-fixed amount (tenancy, rent);
b) division "ex-ante" of production with the landlord (many forms of 
sharecropping). The sharecropper pays rent in the form of an agreed share of 
the various crops (one-half, one-third, one-quarter, etc);
c) payment for the land by working the landowner's land (yoke, "cambao" or 
"trabalho de sujeigao")\
e) those that have access to the land for independent production through the 
institution of moradia (resident workers).
The sample, within the municipios selected, was chosen from among the 6,232 
proprietor producers registered by INCRAfor the year 1978. The households 
were taken from the farm units selected as a sample. In this sample, not only the 
proprietors, but other households living on farms were selected. This is the 
reason why landless households appear in the data; some families, despite 
living within a farm, may not have their own land to cultivate but have 
independent production as a sharecroppers, tenants or moradores.
For the purpose of this study a sub-sample of farms was selected for the "panel 
study" using as a criterion the existence of repeated measurement in the 1985 
survey. The number of households interviewed by municipio in the first and 
second surveys, as well as the number of cases with repeated measure, are 
presented in table 25. Farms are classified according to municipios which make 
up the "systems of production" described in this section.
For the purpose of this study, I stratified production units according to their size 
into four categories distributed as follows: "micro" - less than 10.0 ha; "small" -
5 The number of farms surveyed in 1980 correspond to 10.2 per cent of the total of producers 
registered by INCRA in 1978.
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10.1 to 50.0 ha; "medium" - 50.1 to 200 ha; and "large" - greater than 200 ha. 
This stratification follows the usual classification for farm size groups in Brazilian 
literature. The distribution of production units by farm size, according to this 
1980 stratification, was used as a classification criterion to tabulate data and to 
analyse changes for each group of the same households interviewed in two 
panel waves. The number of households surveyed in the first and second 
survey, classified by size categories of farmers, as well as, the number of cases 
re-interviewed in the second wave are shown in table 3.
The under or over-representation of some "systems of production" and of size 
categories of farmers in the panel sample occurs because the non-repeated 
cases were dropped. Thus, the data no longer maintained the proportion defined 
in the sample procedures for the first survey. However, the problem with the use 
of repeated cross-sectional survey in the observation of change, in which the 
quality of the sample can be kept, is that some observed differences in the 
comparison of their results could be more related to differences between the 
sampled individuals in the surveys, than as a result of true changes. In this way, 
panel data would be more powerful in the observation of true change, in spite of 
problems like "drop-out" of informants, and a possible under-representation of 
distinct categories of respondent.
TABLE 2 - NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDERS SAMPLED BY MUNICIPIO
Municipios Wave 1 
1980
Wave 2 
1985
Cases selected Drop-out
(%)
Capoeiras 100 144 60 40.0
Caruaru 177 135 86 51.4
Cumaru 122 137 64 47.5
GI6ria do Goitd 60 62 38 36.6
Pog3o 72 98 33 54.2
Vertentes 102 110 59 42.2
Total 633 686 340 46.3
SOURCE: POLONORDESTE/PIMES-UFPE Surveys
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TABLE 3 - NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDERS SAMPLED BY SIZE CATEGORY OF FARMERS
Farm Size Wave 1 
1979/80
Wave 2 
1984/85
Cases Selected Drop-out
(%)
Micro 206 256 88 57.3
Small 208 246 123 40.9
Medium 187 154 115 38.5
Large 32 30 14 56.3
Total 633 686 340 46.3
SOURCE: POLONORDESTE /  PIMES - UFPE Surveys
2.3. The Household Interviews
Formal interviews were conducted with the head of household and/or the spouse 
in resident householders or with farm managers in the case of absentee 
landowners. The interviews included detailed questions on the activities of each 
member of the household (inclusively the family members who had emigrated), 
on land transactions (purchases, sales, rental) and all aspects of farm 
production. The interviews varied in length from approximately one to two hours, 
depending on the size of the family and the complexity of the agricultural 
operations. The interviews were conducted by research assistants under the 
supervision of members of the "Evaluation Unit" team.
The variables surveyed were grouped in a questionnaire (see Appendix two, 
which contains the version of the questionnaires applied in 1985 survey) divided 
in two parts distributed as follows:
Part 1 provided information about the main economic activities at the farm level.
All the information from this part of the questionnaire is concerned with what the 
"Evaluation Unit" researchers called of "production unit". It means the sum of 
plots of land, owned, rented or sharecropped (contiguous or not) which are 
connected in the process of production and that are under a single command.
The rented land, in the questionnaire, is the land that was given in exchange for
■ss»
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a fixed payment. This payment can be in cash or goods. For it to be 
characterized as tenancy the payment needed to be a fixed ammount, which did 
not involve risk to the landlord. Sharecropping is the concession of land where 
the payment is variable. It is, in general, made in kind and involves the sharing 
of risks between the landowner and the sharecropper. The concession of land in 
return for stubble fodder or clearing lands for pasture is also considered to be 
sharecropping, although the latter does not involve risks for the landlord. This 
definition of a production unit involves the concept of economic ownership. This 
economic ownership does not always imply legal ownership of the land, and 
signifies the control of means of production for given uses.
This part of the questionnaire consisted of twelve tables describing farm 
production and exchange relations, condensed under the following headings:
(1) general information;
(2) land tenure and land use;
(3) fixed capital, machinery and equipment;
(4) production of livestock, swine and poultry on the farm (inventory, variation 
and composition of herd);
(5) agricultural calendar;
(6) crop production;
(7) processing and distribution;
(8) marketing and storage activities6;
(9) labour used by kind of activity;
(10) remuneration of labour7;
(11) production inputs used per crop;
6 In the version of the questionnaire applied in 1985, the information asked in table 8 was 
included in tables 6 and 7.
7 This table was excluded in the questionnaire used in 1985. In its place was included the table 
23, concerning to the use of hired in and hired out labour. It asked information about number of 
people and number of work days by category of worker.
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(12) financial Capital;
Part 2 included questions on each member of the household familiar units that 
could be grouped under five headings:
(1) characterization of family units (table A, residents members; table B, family 
members who emigrated);
(2) health of family members
(3) health services
(4) education
(5) composition of family income
3. The Oral Histories
The oral histories were collected when I came back to Recife aiming to 
undertake further primary investigation from September 1991 to February 1992. 
My intention was to check parts of my data set, to complement them, and to 
collect additional material on the agrarian history of the Northern Agreste as well 
as the history, implementation process and achievements of the project. Some of 
the sources were historical documentation, project archival records, evaluation 
and institutional reports and interviews of people involved in the definition, 
negotiation, implementation and evaluation of the project (technicians from State 
apparatus, farmers' organisations, politicians, and researchers).
After the first stage, in the collection of archival and secondary sources on the 
project implementation history and governmental information, I started the 
interviews. The choice of person to be interviewed was intentional. Those 
chosen at project management level included technicians and researchers who 
worked in some way on the project and are characterised by their 
comprehensive knowledge of the project under study, and were still working on 
"rural development" subjects. These interviews confirmed much of the
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information included in written documents, and were very close to my own 
observations at the time when I was also involved in the project "Evaluation 
Unit".
At the municipal level, my initial contacts were with agricultural and social 
extensionists from the State Rural Extension Company - Pernambuco (EMATER- 
PE). In a series of roughly hour-long unstructured interviews with EMATER 
technicians from each municipality sampled, I gathered information concerning 
their work, their relationships with the farmers and local powers, their experience 
with the project and their perceptions of the processes of local political, social 
and agricultural changes which were (or were not) occurring in the recent past. 
From these conversations I identified the farmers (on which to collect life 
histories) and other relevant people (to local specific questions) to be 
interviewed about specific questions in the next round. The number of 
interviews, categories of people and places where they are located are shown in 
table 4.
TABLE 4 - NUMBER OF UNSTRUCTURED/SEMISTRUCTURED INTERVIEWS BY 
CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED AND PLACE (**), 1991/92.
Municipios Technicians Politicians/ 
Local Leaders
Farmers Total
Recife 4 2 - 6
Capoeiras 2 2 4
Caruaru 2 1 4 7
Cumaru 2 1 2 5
GI6ria do Goit£ 2 1 3 6
Pogao 1 C) 3 4
Vertentes 1 2 2 5
Total 14 7 16 37
(*) Amongst the rural producers interviewed in the municipality of Pog§o is include a former 
municipal Vice-prefect and the president of the Syndicate of Rural Workers of PogSo.
(**) The nominal list and some information about each case come in annex.
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ANNEX
List of Names and Some Characteristics of People Interviewed (From December 
91 to February 92)
Recife
1- Helita Novais - Technician of the former Technical Unit' for Coordination of 
POLONORDESTE - Projects in Pernambuco, and currently one of the managers 
of the Technical Unit (PRORURAL) for Coordination of Programme of Support to 
Small Producers (PAPP).
2- Herminio de Souza Ramos- Former member of the PDRI-AS-PE "Unit of 
Evaluation" team, and currently Deputy Secretary of the State Secretariat of 
Agriculture - Pernambuco.
3- Alfredo Soares - Former coordinator of the PDRI-AS-PE "Unit of Evaluation" 
team, and currently Director of the State Secretariat of Agriculture - Pernambuco
4- Augusto Cesar de Oliveira - Former coordinator of the PDRI-AS-PE "Unit of 
Evaluation" team, currently teaching Economy in the Integrated Masters 
Programme of Economy and Sociology (PIMES) / Federal University of 
Pernambuco (UFPE).
5- Severino Ramos - Rural Producer and President of the Association of Small 
Producers of the State of Pernambuco (UNIPROPE).
6- Israel Libaneo - Agricultural Technician and Directory Advisor of UNIPROPE.
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Capoeiras
7- Jeova Lopes de Queiroz - Agricultural Extensionist of State Rural Extension 
Company - Pernambuco (EMATER-PE).
8- Jose Matias Gomes, St. Junco - Rural Producer, 40 ha, 14 children, 11 of 
them are living with their own family on the farm and are independent producers 
on the father's land (previously interviewed).
9- Manoel Rodrigues de Lima - Rural Producer, 64 ha, 6 children, family 
production (previously interviewed).
10- Edson Cameiro - Agricultural Technician and middleman - intermediate 
commercialization of "curd cheese" (queijo coalho) produced in rural familiar 
units.
Caruaru
11- Joao Luiz Magalhaes - Agricultural Extensionist of State Rural Extension 
Company - Pernambuco (EMATER-PE).
12- Carmelita de Lima Ramos - Social Worker of State Rural Extension 
Company - Pernambuco (EMATER-PE).
13- Severino Jurandir, St. Pogo Dantas - Rural Producer, works 25 ha of 
mother's inheritance (8 of his 10 brothers emmigrate to Sao Paulo and they 
never came back).
14- Constantino, St. Lajedo - Rural Producer, 8 ha, 6 children, temporary 
migration for S.Paulo (where he lived for 7 years, while his wife managed the 
farm).
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15- Jose Joaquim do Nascimento, St. Maribondo, - Rural Producer and 
middleman - intermediate commercialization of potatoes. Active member of the 
Association of Potatoe Producers of Caruaru (APROBACA).
16- Severino Alves Cordeiro, St. Lagoa de Pedra - Rural Producer, 7 ha, 9 
children, 3 of them are living with their own family "cultivating together the same 
land portion".
17- Rui Rosalva, Councilman (vereador) of the municipality of Caruaru.
Cumaru
18- Rivaldo Jose dos Santos - Agricultural Extensionist of State Rural Extension 
Company - Pernambuco (EMATER-PE).
19- Waldemir Bernardo de Paiva - Agricultural Extensionist of State Rural 
Extension Company - Pernambuco (EMATER-PE).
20- Jose Gabriel Gomes Neto, St. Caju - Rural Producer, 11 ha, 7 children, civil 
servant of Municipal Prefecture and retailer of "cachaga" - a sugar-cane spirit 
(previously interviewed).
21- Jose Pedro da Silva, Caja - producer Rural, 6 ha, 5 children, temporary 
emigrant to Zona da Mata (seasonal labour in sugarcane plantation) and 
S.Paulo (previously interviewed).
22- Jose Medeiros, Prefect of the Municipalitie of Cumaru.
Gloria do Goita
23- Waldemar Otavio de Lima - Agricultural Extensionist of State Rural 
Extension Company - Pernambuco (EMATER-PE).
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24- Maria Jose Ferreira dos Reis - Social Agricultural Extensionist of State Rural 
Extension Company - Pernambuco (EMATER-PE).
25- Jose Vicente da Silva, St. Gameleira - Rural producer, 40 ha, 17 children, 10 
of them are living in the farm (previously interviewed).
26- Jose Felix de Oliveira, St. Araga, son of Sebastiao Felix de Oliveira 
(previously interviewed) - Rural Producer, works 6 ha of father's inheritance with 
7 brothers.
27- Daughter and inheritor of Severino Jose de Santana (previously interviewed) 
- Spouse of rural producer, 10 ha, teacher and directing the local Municipal 
Primary School, St. Araga.
28- Ceciliano Jose Ribeiro de Vasconcelos - Secretary of Finances of the 
Municipal Prefecture of Gloria do Goita and father of the Prefect.
Pocao
29- Jose Onildo Pereira Barbosa - Agricultural Extensionist of State Rural 
Extension Company - Pernambuco (EMATER-PE).
30- Isaias Galdino de Franga, St. Mangueira - Rural Producer, 21 ha, 2 children. 
The only son emigrated to Rio de Janeiro (previously interviewed).
31- Francisco Caetano de Lima (Chicao), St. Balao - Rural Producer, 22 ha, and 
7 married children who are living on the farm with their own families. He is the 
president of the Syndicate of Rural Producers of Pogao (previously interviewed).
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32- Manoel Barbosa da Silva - Ex-Rural Producer, (St. Olho D'Aguinha, 10 ha) 
former municipal Vice-prefect. All children emmigrate to S. Paulo (previously 
interviewed).
Vertentes
33- Luiz Jose Barreto - Agricultural Extensionist of State Rural Extension 
Company - Pernambuco (EMATER-PE).
34- Jose Joaquim de Santana (Ze Miguel), St. Bomba D'Agua - Rural producer, 
200 ha, 8 children, proprietor of a town drugstore (managed by his wife). Family 
live in the town centre.
35- Irineu Jose da Silva, St. Bomba D'Agua, Rural producer, 6 ha, 9 chidren, of 
who 6 children and 3 grandchildren are livening the same house (mother of the 3 
children emigrated to Rio de Janeiro where she is working as a servant).
36- Marlinda Bezerra Chagas da Silva - President of a local beneficent fundation 
(Fundagao Beneficente Renato Guedes) and wife of councilman.
37- Raimundo Bezerra da Silva - President of the City Council (Camara de 
Vereadores de Vertentes).
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U N I D A D E  DE A V A L I A Q A O  DO P D R I - A S - P E
CONVENIO POLONORDESTE /  UFPE (CME -  PIMES -  DPTO. DE ECONOMIA)
P arte  I - Caracterizagao d as U nidades de Produgao Agricola (quadros 1 a  12)
Parte II - Caracterizagdo d as  U nidades Fam iliares (quadros 13 a  18 B)
M unicipio:.
Nome:
Sub-Area:
Nome d a  Propriedade
N .o  do Quest..
N .o  h a
C ondigao do Entrevistado:
D ata d a  Entrevista: Inicio: hs Termino:. h s
N om e do  Entrevistador:
O bservagoes do Entrevistador:
O bservagoes do Supervisor:
1 * RevisSo 2.* Revisfio Supervisor de Campo Escritorio Computador
Data Data Data Data D ata __
Ass. AS8. Ass. AS8. Ass. ,------------------ «-----
Q U A D R O  N.o 01 - Informacdes Gerais
1. Nbm ero cadastral (MCRA
8 9 10 11 12 13 14
2. D istancia da sede do m unic ip io  (km )
3. Como teve acesso a essa terra (1 . por compra; 2. por heranga;
3. por com pra e heran<;a; 4. outra forma, especifique)
4. T itu lo  da propriedade ( I .  escritura defin itiva; 2. promessa de com­
pra; 3. d ire ito  de posse; 4. outra forma, especifique).
5. O senhor v is ita  o estabelecimentu (1. diariamente; 2. dois dias por 
semana; 3. mensalmente; 4. outro  (especifique). 5. reside na propriedade.
6. De jan e iro  de 1982 ate a presente data o senhor com prou outras 
terras? (1 . s im ; 2. nao)
7. Especifique a area adqu irida  (h a .)
8. A te rra  fo i adqu irida  (1 . com benfeitorias; 2. com culturas; 3. com 
benfeito rias e com cu lturas; 4. nua).
9. V a lo r da te rra  comprada (CrJ 1.000,)
10. Qual a u tilizagao da terra  recem-adquirida ( I .  cu ltu ra ; 2. pecuaria; 
3-. cu ltu ra  e pecuaria; 4. outra , especifique).
11. Podendo a d q u ir ir  mais terras, em que as u tilizaria?  ( I .  cu ltu ra ; 2 
pecuaria; 3. c u ltu ra  e pecuaria; 4 outra, especifique).
12. D iticuldades para aquisigao de terras (1. fa lta  de terras disponiveis
no mercado; 2. fa lta  de credito ; 3. preqo m u ito  a lto ; 4 outra  
(especifique).
13. Quantos hectares o senhor vendeu em 1982/84 ?
14. M otivo  da venda (1 . pagamcnto de dividas; 2. o fe rta  vantajosa;
3. pretende m igra r; 4. necessidade de recursos para financ ia r outros
negocios; 5. a terra  nao era boa; 6. pretende m udar de ram o; 7. 
outros (especifique).
15. A te rra  fo i vendida ( I .  com benfeitorias; 2. com cu lturas; 3. com 
benfe ito rias e cu ltu ra ; 4. nua).
16- V a lo r da te rra  vendida (CrJ 1.000,)
17. Pastos tornados alugados em 1984 (hai)
18. Pastos dados em aluguel em 1984 (ha)
18.1 Num ero de cabegas p or mes
18.2. Periodo de aluguel (n.° de meses)
18.3. V a lo r to ta l do aluguel (CrJ 1.000,)
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1. Sobre os seguintes orgaos, o senhor; (0 —  nao sabe nada; 1 — 
ouviu fa la r; 2. u tilizou  servigos)
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1.1 Rcsultados da utiliza<,'ao: (1. excelente; 2. bom ; 3. regu lar; 4 .ru im ; 5. pdssimo)
Para o senhor,. us princ ipa ls  problemas da agricu ltu ra  sao (em  
ordcm ) (0. sccas; 1 pre?os ru ins; 2. fa lta  de armazens; 3. d if i-  
culdadc de assistencia tecnica; 4. d ificu ldade de cred ito ; 5. escassez 
de terras; 6 pragas; 7. fa lta  de estradas; 8. escassez de mao de 
obra; 9 outros (especifique)
E associado a alguma entidade? (0 . nao; 1. um ano; 2. 2 anos; 
3 3 anos; 4 4 anos; 5. 5 anos; 6 6 anos; 7. 7 anos; 8. 8 anos; 
9. mais de 9 a no s).
coopecaiiva □ sindicato |
4 Recebe assistencia da EMATER? (0. nao; 1. um ano; 2. 2 anos; 
3. 3 anos; 4. 4 anos; 5. 5 anos ou mais; 6. ja  recebeu assistencia 
mas nao achou resultados favoraveis; 7. o extensionista deixou dc 
aparecer; 8 teve preju izos com os conselhos da EM ATER; 9. ou tro ;
especifique).
5 Segue os ii;t.u ',6es tccnicas rigorosamcnte? (0 .  nao; 1. s im ).
6 Quais as principals ajudas que o senhor recebe do governo (em  
ordcm ) (0  nao recebe a juda; 1. cred ito ; 2. assistencia tdcnica; 
3 precu m inim o; 4 informa^oes de pre^os; 5. dgua (agude); 6. 
iscnvuu de im poslos; 7. insumos subsidiados; 8. armazenagem; 9.
outro : especifique).
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Q UAD RO  N.o 02 - Uso da Terra por tipo e Atividade /  Cadastro
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Codigos para o Quadro N.o 2
Obrigafdes dos parceiros -  Cob. 4 9 - 5 0 - 5 1
0 —  Sem obrigaQfios
1 — Capim 
1 —  Palha 
1 —  Moia
4 —  Tcrqa
5 — Prioridade do mao-dc-obra para o patrdo
6 —  Diarias mais baixas
7 — Dias de trabalhu gratuiio
8 —  O b r ig a g io  dc vcn d a  do  p ro d u tc  
• 9  — Outros espedflque
ObrigafOes da mio-de-obra rinculada • Cob. 49 • 50 - 51
0 — Sem obrigaqao
1 — Prioridade dc mao-de-obra p/o patrlo
2 — Dias de trabalho gratuito
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feti'odo de Parceria - Col. 47 '•
1 -  Menor ou igual a 1 ana
2 -  2 anos
3 - 3  anos
4 - 4  anos a 5 anos 
S -  Idefuiido
6 - 6  anos
7 - 7  anos e mais
8 -  At6 o capim tomar conta da ire  a
9 -  Deixa maniva p an  o proprietirio.
QUADRO N.o 03 Benfeitorias, Equipamentos e Implementos
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Codigos para o Quadro N.°
C6digo B -  Col. 20 (sd para o trator)
01 -  A?ude
02 — Preparo do solo
03  -  Transporte
04 -  Vdrios
05 -  Bamgem
06  -  A?ude e preparo do solo
Codieo C —  Col. 21 *
0 —  < 1  ano
01 —  1 ano
02 —  2 anos
03 — 3 anos
04 —  4 anos
05 —  5 anos
06 —  6  anos
07 —  7 anos
08 — 8  anos
09 — 9 anos c mais
Coctiso D — Col. 36 —  Dc quem alugou ou 
lomou emprcstado?
1 -C isagro  
1 -  Cooperativa
3 -  PatrSo
4  -  Vizinho
5 -  Plan am (Pesqueira)
6 -  Proterra
7 -  Particular ou outro proprietlrio/parente
8 -  Prefeitura
9 -  Emater
0  -  Outros (especifique)
Obs.: Nos casos em que haja mais de uma unidade, colocar a idade mldia
QUADRO N.o 04 - Inventaiio do Rebanho no Ultimo Ano
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Codigos para o Quadro N.
Codieo dos anim ais —  Cols. 1 e 2
01 — animais de trabalho
02 -  touros
03 -  vacas
04 -  bezerros nascidos no ano passado 
03 -  outros bezerros
06 — sui'nos nascidos no ano passado
07 -  suinos
08 -  caprinos nascidos no ano passado
09 -  caprinos
10 — ovinos nascidos no ano passado
11 -  ovinos
12 -  aves
13 -  coelho
14 -  cavalo de lazer
Codigo —  Cols. 19. 24, 37. 43
01 —  gordo
02 —  m agro (o u  velho)
Cddigo para a causa -  Col. 31 (perdidos ou mortos)
1 — Ataque de animais/acidente/mie matou
2 -  Aftosa
3 -  Raiva
4  -  Brucelose
5 -  Perdidos ou roubados
6 -  Outras doenfas
7 -  ComplicafOes do parto
8 -  Decorrincia da seca
9 -  Ignorado
0  -  Outros (especifique)
Q U A D R O  N.o 05 - Calendario A gricola
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Codigos para o Quadro N.° 05
Codigo das culturas —  Cols. 1 e 2
01 —  abacate
02 —  abacaxi
03 —  algodao moco
04 —  algodao herbaceo
05 —  algodao verdao
06 —  alfacc
07 —  alho
08 —  amendoim
09 —  aiToz
10 —  banana
I t  —  batata doce
12 —  batata inglcsa
13 —  beterraba
14 —  cafe
15 —  caju (castanha de caju)
16 —  caju
17 —  cana de agucar
18 —  cara (inhame)
19 —  cebola
20 —  cebolinha
21 —  cenoura
22 —  chuchu
23 —  coentro
24 —  couve
25 —  feijao (preto ou mulatinho)
26 —  fava, feijao verde ou de corda
27 —  fumo
28 —  je r im u m
29 —  la r a n ja
30  —  l im a
31 —  lim a o
32 —  m a n d io c a
33 —  m a c a x e ira
34 —  m a x ix e
35 —  m ilh o
36 —  m a m o n a
37 —  m a n g a
38 —  m e la o
39 —  m e la n c ia
40 —  m a m a o
41 —  m a r a c u j i
42 —  p e p in o
43 —  p in h a
44  —  p im e n ta o
45 —  re p o lh o
46  —  q u ia b o
47 —  s a p o ti
48 —  to m a te
49  —  ta n g e r in a
50 —  u v a
51 -m a d e ira
52 -  capim nattvo
53 -  capim ptantado
54 -  pilm a
112 -  outros espedfique
QUADRO N.o 06 Culturas Colheita e Perdas no Campo
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C6digo Am  Cultural -  Cob. 1 e 2
01 -  abacate
02 -  abacaxi
03 -  algodio m oai
04 -  algodio herbioeo
05 -  algodio vetdlo
06 — alface
07 -  alho
08 -  amendoim
09 -  arroz
10 -  banana
11 -  batata doce
12 — batata inglesa
13 -  betem ba
14 — caft
15 -  caju (castanha de caju)
16 -  caju
17 — cana de afucar
18 — card (inhame)
19 -  cebola
20 -  cebolinha
21 -  cenoura
22  -  chuchu
23 -  coentto
24 -  couve
25 -  fe ijio  (preto ou mulatinho)
26  -  fava, fe ijio  verde ou de corda
27 -  fumo
28 -  jerunum
29 -  laranja
30  -  lima
31 - l i m i o
32 -  mandioca
33 -  macaxeira
34 — maxixe
35 -  radho
36 -  mamona
37 -  manga
38 — m elio
39 — melancia
4 0  -  m amio
41 -  maracuji
42 -  pepino
43 -  pinha
44 -  pim entio
45 -  repolho 
4b — quiabo
47 -  sapoti
48  -  tomato
49  -  tangerina
50 — uva
51 -m a d e ira
52 -  capim nativo
53  — capim plantado
54 -  palma
55 -  rapadura
56  — aguardente
57 — fumo de corda
58 — farinha
59 -  goma
60 -  massa
61 -  k ite
62  — queijo
63 -  manteiga
64 — ovos
65 — came
66  -  peles
67 -  xerfm
68 -  pio-de-milho
carvio 
‘ "TO -  fub i
71 — erva-doce
72 -  cdco
73 -  palha de xerfm
74 — raspa de mandioca
75 — adubo orginico
76 — jaca
77 -  a fa frio
78 —jaboticiba
80  -  mel de abelha
81 -  cal de pedra
82 — cal queimado
84 -  tijolo
85 -  telha
87 -  seriguela
88 -  goiaba 
9 0  -  agave
92 -  cana forrageira 
98 -  c&co da Bahia 
112 -  outros (especiflque)
Tipo de Adm inistrafio -  Col. 3
01 -  Proprietirio
02  -  Prop/cedente de parceria
03 -  Prop/tomador de parceria
04 -  Parceiro (sem terra)
05 -  ArrendaUrio
06 — Arrend./cedente de parceria
07 -  AnendV tomador de Parceria
08 -  Prop./anendVcedente de parceria
09 — ProprieUrio tomador de arrendamento 
00  -  Outro - especifique
C u ltu ra s . C o lh c ila s  c 
Pergunta A -  Col. 23 -  Por que plants esta cultura?
01 -  Porque aqui todo mundo plants /  nao sabe
02 -  A  terra nao serve para outra coisa
03 -  Os prefos sio vantajosos
04 -  Ind ica fio  da EM ATER
05 -  Ind ica fio  do rid io /T V
06 -  Ind ica fio  do patrlo  ou intermediirio
07 -  N io  sabe lidar com outra cultura
08 -  Sao cultures prOprias do seu padrio alimentar
09 -  lncentivos
10 -  O utro: especiflque
Pergunta B -  Col 24
Por que planta apenas essa irea?
01 -  Sempre plantou essa irea /n io  sabe
02 -  N io  dispde de terras
03 -  NJo dispde de recursos
04 -  N io  compensa plantar mats
05 -  £  arriscado plantar mais
06 -O u tro : especiflque 
Unidade de Medida -  Cols. 25 e 26
01 -  Quito
02 -  Arroba
03 -T o n elad a
04 -  Litro
OS- 1 . 0 0 0  litros
06 -  Unidade
07 -  Cento
08 -  Milheiro 
0 9 - H a
10 -  Quadros
11 -  Pickup
12 -  Carga de Burro
13 -  Tarefa
14 -  Canada
15 -  Cam inhio
16 — Cano de boi 
1 7 - V id r o
18 -  Canafa
19 -  Contas
20 -  Caixa
21 -  M3
22 -  Sacos
23 -  Pis
24 -  Tubo
25 -  Feixes 
2 7 -  100 litros
30 -  Outros (especiflque)
s no C a m p o
Causa das Perdas -  Cols. 45 e 46
01 -  Pragas, doenfas
02 -  Falta de mio-de-obra para colher
03 -  Demora na colheta por falta de transporte
04 -  Demora na colheta por falta de estradas
05 -  N io  colheu por falta de prefo
06 -  Excesso de chuva na germ inafio
07 -  Excesso de chuva na flo ra fio
08 -  Excesso de chuva na m aturaflo
09  -  Falta de chuva na germ inafio
10 -  Falta de chuva na flo ra fio
11 -  Falta de chuva na m aturafio
12 -  Ataque de pissaros
13 -  Pisoteio de animais
14 -  U tiliza fio  inadequada de defensivos
15 -  Terra Ruim/Geada
16 -  Tena imprdpria
17 -  Roubo e apodrecimento
18 -  O cupafio na terra do patrio
19 -  Plantada fora de epoca
20 -  Preparo inadequado do solo
21 -  Bicho comeu/Falta de limpa no tempo adequado
22 -  Terra timida
23 -  Seca e praga
24 -  Falta de M Io  de obra p/colher
25 -  Por causa da fia fio
26 -  Abandono
27 -  Frio
28 -  Invemo rigoroso
29 -  Desenteresse
30 -  V aria fio  d im itica
3 1 -  Outros (especiflque)
Tipo de Comprador -  Cols. 64 e 65
01 -  Dono da terra
02 -  Outro proprietary
03 -  Intermediirio
04 -  Cooperative
05 -  Fibrica
06 -  Feirante
07 -  Consumidor
08 -  Govemo via prefo mi'nimo
09 -  Comerciante
10 -  Feirante
11 -  Diversos
12 -  U s in a (n °5 )
13 -  Feirante da Ceasa
14 -  Outros (especifique)
Forma de Pagamento -  Cols. 66 e 67
01 -  A  vista, em dinheiro
02 -  A  vista, em mercadoria
03 -  A vista, pane em dinheiro, pane em em mercadoria
04 -  A  prazo, em dinheiro
05 -  A  prazo, em mercadoria
06 -  A prazo, pane em dinheiro, pane em mercadoria
07 -  A  vuta-f a Prazo
08 -  Ap6s moagem ou fabricafio da farinha
09 -  De 8 em 8 dias
10 -  Outros (especiflque)
Razio  da Venda -  Cob. 68 e 69
01 -  Prefo nielhor
02 -  Compromisso com o proprietirio
03 -  Compromisso com o intermediirio
0 4  -  Compromisso com a fibrica
05 -  Venda na folha
06 -  Preferinoa pessoal
07 -  Onico comprador que apareceu
08 -  N io  tern casa de farinha
09 -  £  comerciante
10 -  Mais perto
11 -  Compra de uma s6  vez 
1 2 - (v id e  8 )
13 -  Vem  buscar em casa
14 -  N io  paga ftete
15 -  Mais comodo
16 -  £  comprador certo
17 -  Comprador forte da Regiio
18 -  Ocasiio
19 -  Pagamento imediato
20 -  Interesses politicos (votos)
21 -  Compra grande quantidade
22 -  Tem condifdes de armazenar
23 -  Compromisso com casa de farinha
24 -  N io  tem condifdes de venda em Recife
25 -  Garante toda a colheita
26 -  Compromisso com o consumidor
27 -  Facilidade
28 -  Vende por encomenda
29 -  Recebe comissio
30 -  Outros ^especiflque)
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Culturas,
C6digo das culturas —  Cols. 1 e 2
01 — abacate
02 —  abacaxi
03 —  algodao moco
04 —  algodao herbaceo
05 —  algodao verdao
06 —  alfacc
07 —  alho
08 —  amendoim
09 —  arroz
10 —  banana
11 —  batata doce
12 —  batata inglesa
13 —  beterraba
14 —  cafe
15 —  caju (casianha de caju )
16 —  caju
17 —  cana de agticar
18 —  card (inham e)
19 —  cebola
20 —  cebolinha
21 —  cenoura
22 —  chuchu
23 —  coentro
24 —  couve
25 —  feijao (preto  ou m ulatinho)
26 —  fava, feijao verde ou de corda
27 —  fumo
28 —  jerim um
29 —  laranja
30 —  lim a
31 —  limao
32 —  mandioca
33 —  macaxeira
34 —  maxixe
Pastos e Producao Beneficiada —  D is trib u i;d o  no ano passado
Unidade de medida —  Cols. 3 e 4
35 —  m ilho
36 —  mamona
37 —  manga
38 —  melao
39 —  melancia
40 —  mamao
41 —  maracuja
42 —  pepino
43 —  pinha
44 —  pimentao
45 —  repolho
46 —  quiabo
47 —  sapoti
48 —  tomate
49 —  tangcrina
50 —  uva
51 —  madeira
52 —  capim nativo
53 —  capim plantado
54 —  palma
55 —  rnpndurn
56 —  aguardente
57 —  fumo de corda
58 —  farinha
59 —  eoma
60 —  massa
61 —  leile
62 —  queijo
63 —  manteiga
64 —  ovos
65 —  cam e
66 -  peles 76
67 -  xer<m 77
68 *- pao-de-milho 78
69 -  carvao 80
7 0 -fubd  81
71 -  erva-doce 82
72 -  coco 84
73 -  palha-de-xerim 85
74 -  raspa db mandioca 87
75 -  adubo oiganico 88
90
92
98
112
01  —  quilo
0 2  —  arroba
03 —  tonelada
04 —  lit ro
05 — 1 000 litros
06 —  unidade
07 — cento 
03 — m ilhe iro
Codieo A —  Col. 20
no -  H ec ta re 13 -  G a rra fa
09 -  hectare 2 0  -caixa
10 -  quadro 21 -  M3
11 -  pickup 12 -  sacds
12 -  carga de burro 23 — pis
13 -  tarefa 24 -  tubo
14 -  Canada 25 -  feixes
15 -  caminhio 27 100 litros
16 -  cano de boi 30 -  outros (especiflque)
17 -  vidro
18 -  garrafa
19 -  contas
01 -  outro proprietirio
02  -  parceiro
3 -  feirante
4 -  armazim/varejista/comerciante
5 -  cooperativa
Causa das perdas — Cols. 53 e 54
6  -  intermediirio
7 -  vendedor
8 -  usina
9 -  outros (especiflque)
01 —  demora na chegada de com prador
02 —  transporte precdrio
03 —  estradas precarias
04 —  ausencia de em balagem  apropriada
05 —  ausencia de armazenagem
06 — armazenamento precdrio
07 —  espera de m elhor prego
03 —  bicho
09 — fatores am bientais (um idade, ca lo r)
10 -  Md qualidade
11 -  Acidez
12 -  Leite nio coalhou
13 -  Oulros(especiflque)
- jaca
- aga frio
- jaboticaba
- mel de abeilia
- cal de pedra
- cal queimado
- tijolo
- telha
- seriguela
- goiaba
- agave
- cana forrageira
- coco da Bahia
-  outros (especiflque)
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Codigos para o Quadro N.
C6digo das culturas — Cols. 1 e 2
01  —  abacale
0 2  —  abacaxi
03 —  algodao moc6
04 —  algodao herbaceo
05 —  algodao verdao
06 —  alface
07 —  alho
OS —  amendoim
09 —  arroz
10 —  banana
1 1 —  batata doce
12 —  batata inglesa
13 —  beterraba»„
14 —  cafe
15 —  caju (castanha de caju)
16 —  caju
17 —  cana de agucar
18 —  card (inhame)
19 —  cebola
2 0  —  cebolinha
21  —  cenoura
2 2  —  chuchu
23 —  coentro
24 —  couve
25 —  feijao (p reto  ou m ulatinho)
26 —  fava, fe ijao verde ou de corda
27 —  fumo
28 —  jerim um
29 —  laranja
30  —  lim a
31 —  limao
32 —  mandioca
33 —  macaxeira
34 —  maxixe
35  —  m ilho
36 — mamona
37  —  manga
38 — melao
39 —  melancia
40 —  mamao
41 —  maracuja
42 —  pepino
43 — pinha
44 —  pimentao
45 —  repolho
46 —  quiabo
47 — sapoti
48 —  tomate
49 — tangerina
50 — uva
51 — madeira
52 -  capim nativo
53  -  capim plantado
54 -  palma
71 -  erva-doce
72 -  c6 co
76 - jaca
77 -  a;afrio
78 -  jaboticaba
87 -  seriguela
88  -  goiaba 
90 -  agave
92 -  cana-foriageira 
98 -  cdco da Bahia 
112 -  outros (especiflque)
Cddigo A col. 19
01 -  manual "Ladeira Abaixo” / Ladeira abaixo e contra as iguas/Plano e
ladeira abaixo (Manual)
2 -  Manual “ contra as dgua”
3 -  Mecdnico “ Ladeira abaixo"/Plano e ladeira abaixo mecanizafdo
4 -  Mecdnico “ contra as iguas” /Plano e contra as Aguas
5 -  Animal “ Ladeira Abaixo’VAnimal Ladeira Abaixo+Manual Ladeira Abaixo
6  -  Animal “ contra as Aguas"
7 -  Manual Plano
8 -  Mecdnico Plano
9 -  Animal Plano
0 -  Outros (especiflque) *
Cddigo B -  Cols. 20. 31,42 e 53 
Diflculdades de encontrar mio-de-obra
01 -  nao houve dificuldade
0 2  -  houve alguma dificuldade
03 -  houve muita dificuldade
Q U A D R O  N.o 11 - Com pra e Uso de Insumos
Eapecltlcac&o
© m
oo B 
*  3
3  5o Un
ida
de
 
de
 
M
ed
ld
a Estoque em 
31/12/83
)
Preco 
Unitdrio 
CrS 1.000.
1 O
: *  
*  S
© ©
£ 2 
u &
■? E a. o
©•o
0
1rs
?•j
Utllizaq&o nag 
Culturas
Estoque em 
31/12/84
<
a
3
Id e n tilica c& o
Uua
Ger
U. P
ntidade 
ada na 
(1984
Quantid
Comprs
ade
Ida
ca-
E
S
a.
Cult.
1
Cult
2
Cult.
3
a
<
a
9
3.
a3
o■C
5 1•  zz
z  s3
o
o o
*  5• a
o o
:  s
*  o
1 2 3 | 4 5 61 V 8 9 i o i i i 12 13 14 la lb  17 18! IK 2 u|2 l 2:: 2:. ; 2512b 27 28 2!I|.')C 31! 32 33! 34 35|36 37138139140 41 42 43! 44'45148147 48149150 51| 52153154! 55* 56 57 72 73 74 75 7b 77i 78 79 80
.
I
1
I 1
! 1
1 1k
i 1 ! 1
1
i
i
i
1
!1 I 1
j 11 !
| 1
i |
I
1 1
Codigos para o Quadro N.° 11
Uniclade de Medida —  Cols 3 c 4
01 —  q u ilo
0 2  — arroba
03 —  lonelada
04  —  l i i r o
05  —  1 .0 0 0  litro s
0 6  —  u n id a d e
07  —  c e n to
08 -  milheiros
09 -  hectare
10 — quadro
11 -  pickup
12 -  carga de burro
13 -  tare fa
14 -  canada
15 -  caminhio 
16-canodeboi
17 -  vidro
18 -  ganafa
19 -  contas
20 -  caixa
21 - M 3
22 -  sacoa
23 — pda
24 -  tubo
25 -  feixea
27 - 1 0 0  Utroa
30 -  outros (especiflque
Codisns dos Insumos —  Cols. 1 e 2
01 —  A dubo s  orgdnieos
02 —  A ilu h u s  q u im ieo s
03 —  Sementes coniuns
04  —  S e m e m e s  selecionadas
05 —  M u d u s /E s ln c n s
06  —  D e lc iis iv o s
07  —  F o rra g e m
08  —  S a l c o m u m , m is tu ra  m in e ra l.
fa r in h a  de ossos
0 9  —  V a c in a s . m e d ic a m en to s , sem em
10 —  C o m b u s liv c l
11 —  E n e rg ia  e le lr ic u
12 —  Agua
13 —  M a te r ia l  p a ra  em b ala g en i
14 —  L e ite
15 —  M a n d io c a
16 —  C a n a
17 -  milho
18 -  coalho
19 -  pd de serra
20 -  ra fio
21 -  farelo
22 -  lenha
23 -  carvjo
24 -  outraa deapesaa
25 -  bano
26 -  arame
27 — pedra
28 — aluguel (pago em produto)
29 -  divenos
30 -  cal de pedra
31 — outros (especiflque)
De qticm compra —  Cols. 25 e 26
01 — Dono da Terra ( Patrao)
02 —  Do gincrno
03 —  Cooperaiiva
04 —  Armazem
05 — Vcndedur/Viajante/Representanie
06 —  Granjas
07 — Outro proprietario 
OS —  Feirn livrp
49 -  Outros especiflque
Condieoes de Pauamento —  Cols. 29 c 30
01 — A vista
02 —  A prazo
03 —  Depots da colheita c venda- do produto
04 — Outro: cspecifique
Pcreunta A Quem the indicou o uso deste insumo?
P o r q u e  c o m p ra  a i —  C o ls . 27 e 28
01 —  M e n o r  prcgo
02  —  M a is  p e r to
0 3  —  O r ie n ta g a o  tdcn ica
0 4  —  E  a  u n ic a  que  conhece
05 —  F a c ilid a d e  de p a g a m e n to
0 6  —  P o r o b rig a g a o
0 7  —  U n ie o  q u e  te m  esse p r o d u to
08 -  mais comodo
09 -  preferincia pessoal
10 -  sem preferincia '*
11 -  tinico que vai a propriedade
12 -  facilidade de pagamento
13 -  n io  paga frete
14 -  transagio comercial com o comprador de algodio 
1 5 - o  vendedor mesmo aplica
16 -  sd pode comprar at', n io  tem cota na cooperative
17 — mais garantido
18 -  porque i  mais completo
19 -  facilidade de entrega do produto
20  -  melhor produto
21 -  facilidade de transporte
22 -  outros especiflque
01 —  EM ATER
02 —  Vizinhos
03 — Propaganda no radio
04 —  Propaganda por cartazes
05 —  Outro: cspecifique
Q U A D R O  N.o 12 — Fontes e Uso do Credito
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Codigos para
Trimestre - Col. 2
01 -  Out. Now. Dez. 1984
02 -  Jul. Ago. Set. 1984
03 -  Abr. Mai. Jun 1984
04 -  Jan. Few. Mar. 1984
0 5 -O u t .N o w .D e z . 1983
0 6 - J u l .  Ago. Set. 1983 
07 -  Abr. Mai. Jun. 1983
05 -  Jan. Few. Mar. 1983
Fonte - Col. 3
01 • Banco do Brasil
02 -  Banco do Nordeite
03 • Banco do Estado
04 • Banco Nacional de Cooperativaa
05 • Banco Privado
06 - Patr&o
07 -  Parente/Vizinho/Amigo
08 — Polouordeste
09 • Outro: especlfique
Outras Obrigapoes * Col. 21
01 -  Entrega da produp&o
02 -  Venda da produpfto por am prepo menor
03 • ObrigapSo de dias de trabalho gratuito
04 • Obrigapfto de dias de trabalho a prepo mala baixo
05 -  \Vende Cado do “ Empregador”
0 6  -  Outros (especiflque)
Garantia - Col. 29
01 - Sim
02 - Nfio
Quadro N.o 12
Codiqo do Investimento - Col. 30
01 -  Formafdo de culturas perenes
02 -  Construfio e/ou re forma de armazens, galinheiros,
pocilgas.etc.
03 -  Construfdo ou melhorias em infra estruturas (Estradas/Eletricidade,
Afude ou Barreiro etc. (Construfio/Lim peza) Desmatamento
04 -  Construflo e/ou reparos em cercas
05 -  Fotm affo  de pastagens
06 -  Construflo e/ou reforma de residencies rurais
07 -  Compra de Bowinos e outros animais
08 -  Compra de terras
09 -  Compra de tratores, implementos e equipamentos
10 -  Outros especiflque
Pergunta A -  Cols. 56 e 57
1I& quantos anos utiliza o cr£dito banc&rio?
Pergunta B - Col. 58
Seu contato com o Banco 6 teito:
01 - Diretamente
02 • Atraves da EMATER
03 -  Diretamente e atravds da Emater
Outros especiflque
Tempordrio Permaiientes lamilu
i?
Mulheres
Homens
Trarorista
Mulheres
Xo33
38*
30
1
Homens moradores
Tratoristas
Vaqueiros e cocheiros
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1 menores de 15 anos
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Uso 
de 
M
ao-de-O
bra 
dentro 
e 
fora 
da 
Unidade 
de 
Produgao
UNIDADE DE AVALIA£AO DO fDRI-AS-PE 
CONVfiNIO POLONORDESTE/UFPE/CME-PIMES
"QUESTIONARIO PARA CARACTERIZAgAO DAS UN ID APES FAMILIARES"
MUNIClPIO _______________________________________________
UNIDADE AMOSTRAL ________________________________________
NOME DO PROPRIETARY) ____________________________________
NtJMERO DO QUESTIONARIO __________________________________
questionArio sOc i o-econohico
1 - CARACTERTSTICAS DA FAMlLIA
1.1 - Composigao famiiiar
OUADRO A - RESIDENTES
FDUCACAO
cCjdico
ESCO'A
• DADSTATUS 
FANILlAR 
( 2 )
O i f  '.Sl -R A) CCVV')
(A)
ID A
13)
QUADRO B - MIGRANTES DEFINITIVOS
SITUAQAO AO SAIR SITUAQAO ATUAL
ANO
DA
SAlDA
(9)
HOTIVO
DA
SAlDA
DESTINOESCOLARI
DADE
(6)
IDADE SEXONOME INSTRUQAO
(5) (11)(1) (3) w
cn
2 -  saOde
2.1 - Doen^as na familia apos dezembro de 1983 
MQRB1DADE
Se pessoas dessa casa estiveram doentes no ultimo ano preencher o seguinte quadro
N9 DE ORDEM DOENQA QUEM TRATOU? LOCAL ONDE FOI MEDICADO N9 DE VIAGENS CU3T0 TOTAL
1 ! If ■ i . - .I-,—
V
i
\
I
1
Obs.: N9 DE ORDEM - Obtido do quadro de composiqao familiar. Sera repetido tantas vezes quantos episodios de
doenqa tiver tido.
QUEM TRATOU?- Interessa saber a pessoa ou tipo de profissional que o fez e nao seu nome proprio.
Ex. parente, farmaceutico, estudante, medico, etc.
o
05
3 - ASSISTENCIA m£DIC0-0D0NT0L6GICA
3.1 - Qual a primeira pessoa ou servigo que a familia procura quando surge um
problema de saude?
a) balconista de farmacia; 
b; ervateiros;
c) benzedores e outros misticos;
d )  praticantes da medicina cientifica;
&
e) parteiras leigas;
f) outras pesscas ou servigos.
Caso a resposta anterior seja diferente da alternativa d, pergunte:
3.2 - Qual c motive de nao prccurar o netidc?
a) falta de tempo;
b) problemas de transporter
c) distancia,
d) desconhecimento da existencia de servigos;
e) restrigoes as condigoes de atendimento;
f) esta satisfeito com o atendimento leigo;
g) outro: especifique
3.3 - Ten alguma restrigao ao fato de ser atendido por um auxiliar de saude
e nao um medico ou dentista?
3.3.1 - Sin
3.3.2
06
3,4 - No caso de resposta afirmativa, responda qual o tipo de restrigao
a) experiencia pessoal ou noticia do tnau atendimento tecnico;
b) experiencia pessoal ou noticia de maus tratos pessoais;
c) falta de confianga na competencia tecnica;
d) temor de rompimento do sigilo;
f) outros (especifiqiie)
3.5 - Quais os servigos medicos aos quais a familia tem direito
a) previdencia;
b) sindicato;
c) clinica convencionada;
d) outros servigos (especifique)
3.6 - Na sua opiniao, quaj. o melhor servigo de saude da regiao?
3.7 - Por que?
a) qualidade tecnica do atendimento;
b) elevado padrao de atendimento em termos humanistas;
c) capacidade de resolver os mais variados problemas;
d) poucos entraves burocraticcs para a realizagao do atendimento;
f) outro: especifique
07
3.8 - Sugestoes para melhoria da existencia de saude da area 
4 - EDUCAQAO
Se pessoa da familia fez curso de capacitaqac profissional (na regiao) 
responder os seguintes itens:
4.1 - Tipo de curso:
4.2 - Quem informou:
4.3 - Periodo (n9 de semanas):
4.4 - Carga horaria semanal:
4.5 - Orgao promotor:
4.6 - Tipo de aula:
4.7 - Foi importante este curso? Por que?
08
4.8 - Alguem da familia gostaria de receber algum tipo de treinamento profissio-
nal? Especificar tipos de curso:
4.9 - Por que gostaria de receber esse treinamento?
SO PARA QUEM TEH FILHOS DE 7 A 14 ANOS QUE NAO FREQUENTAM A ESCOLA
4.10- Por que algumas crianqas nunca frequentaram a escola?
4.11- Por que algumas das crianqas abandonaram a escola?
SO PARA QUEM TEM FILHOS NA ESCOLA:
4.12- Escolas que crianqas frequentam:
NOME DA ESCOLA 
(1)
cOdigo
DA
ESCOLA
(2)
0 QUE A ESCOLA FORNECE
DISTANCIA DA CASA 
(6)
MERENDA 
, (3)
MATERIAL
ESCOLAR
(4)
FARDAMENTO
(5)
____ ____
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4.13 - Seus filhos costunam faltar a aula?
4.14 - Por que razao principal seus filhos costumam faltar as aulas?
4.15 - Com que idade seus filhos foram a escola pela primeira vez?
4.16 - Gasto medic mensal por filho que estuda (media) Cr$
4.17 - 0 senhor discute com os professcres os problemas de seus filhos na escola: 
quando e por que?
4.13 - 0 que a escola promove na localidade?
4.19 - Esta satisfeito com os servigos prestados pela Escola? Por que?
*
4 . 2 0 - 0  que o senhor acha que poderia ser feito para melhorar o atendimento 
escolar na comunidade?
10
ASPISAQOES E EXPECTATIVAS EDUCADIOHAIS E OCUPACIONAIS (SO PARA QUEM TEM 
FILHOS DE 5 A 18 ANOS
4.21 - E importante para o senhor que seu filho frequente a escola? Por que?
4.22 - Ate que serie c senhor gostaria que seu filho estudasse?
4.23 - Se seu filho arranjasse um emprego o senhor peraitiria que ele deixasse a 
escola para trabalhar? Por que?
4.24 - 0 senhor prefere rue seu filho pemanega trabalhando nesta localidade cu 
que ele saia para outre lugar? For que?
4.25 - 0 senhor acha que ele vai permnecer ou vai sair? Por cue?
4.26 - Que prcfissac c senhor gostaria que seu filho tivesse?
4.27 - 0 senhor acha que a escola oferece condigoes de prepara-lo para este tipc 
de trabalhe? Por que?
4.28 - Na sua opiniac c que o senhor acha que a escola da conunidade deve ensinar 
ao seu filho?
5 - OUTRAS RENDAS
----  —  — .. .... ............. .
i aluguEis
N0JIE j (EM Cr$)
i . . .
previdEncia
(EM Cr$)
PARENTE AUSENTE 
(EM Cr$)
VENDA DE A.TIVOS 
(EM Cr$)
1
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